THE DISCUSSION at the Brighton meeting on Bills of Sale was particularly well-timed, and the course adopted of formulating in resolutions the opinion of the meeting cannot be too highly commended. We cannot help regretting, however, that the suggestion for the repeal of the 20th section of the Act of 1878 was not adopted. Mr. DANIEL, Q.C., in his answer to the Lord Chancellor's circular, put the matter, as it seems to us, in its true light. Under the old law, he said, "the interests of bona fide creditors were to some extent protected in bankruptcy through the operation of the order and disposition doctrine. Under the Act of 1878 that protection has been taken away, and the money-lender under his bill of sale is now absolutely secure, and enables the debtor to set his other creditors at defiance. Mr. MILLER, in his excellent remarks in the course of the discussion at Brighton, affirmed that of the 200 bills of sale which are given in each working day of the year not less than 150 are the result of this 20th section. What necessity was there to improve the security of a bill of sale, as was done by this section? We print this week a letter from a well-informed and experienced correspondent which seems to us to contain a suggestion well worthy of consideration-viz., that it should be rendered illegal for a trader to grant a bill of sale on stock-in-trade and articles in which he deals in the ordinary course of his trade.

THERE SEEMS to be an impression abroad that the case of Debenham v. Mellon (29 W. R. 141, L. R. 6 App. 31), has laid down a principle upon which all questions relating to the authority of the wife to pledge the husband's credit may be readily decided, and we have heard of some rather summary decisions in the county courts based upon that case. It may be worth while to point out that there was really nothing in that case which

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fairly entitled the plaintiff to suppose that the wife had authority to pledge the husband's credit except the mere status of marriage, which it is clear is not enough, though the retail tradesman's view always is that it should be. There are, no doubt, cases on the other side of the line which are abundantly clear. If the husband has done anything in the course of the cohabitation from which it is a fair inference that he knew of and assented to his wife pledging his credit, as, for instance, if he allowed her to manage the household and paid debts contracted by her in the course of such management, such as debts to butchers, bakers, and grocers, he would be liable for debts of a similar nature; if he paid bills contracted by the wife for clothing he would be liable for debts contracted for clothing; and, in accordance with the general principle of the law of agency, a retractation of the authority would not be effective unless communicated to the tradesmen. Again, assuming a retractation of authority to be material, a jury may, from the conduct of the husband, be oftentimes justified in disbelieving in the existence of such retractation, though alleged. But there are many conceivable cases between the classes which fall well within or well without the line. The sort of case we are imagining is one where there is more than the mere fact of cohabitation, and the wife does manage the establishment, but the husband makes her a sufficient allowance for the expenses of such establishment, and forbids her to pledge We should think, in his credit beyond such allowance. prudently-managed households, this case is very comBut in such a case every husband knows that things are not actually paid for on delivery. A certain credit is always given, even if but a week. The wife, in such a case, acts as the husband's agent in incurring and paying the debts out of the allowance made to her. The tradesman, no doubt, would in such a case debit the husband with the goods, and would receive payment from the wife as the agent of the husband. Suppose, after this course of dealing has gone on for some time, a debt is incurred which the wife does not defray out of the allowance given to her by the husband, having spent that on some other purpose. Would, in such a case, proof of the real circumstances as between the husband and wife be a defence to an action against the husband? We do not think the case quite clear, though, from much that is said, especially by Lord BLACKBURN, in Debenham v. Mellon, it would seen that the answer ought to be in the affirmative. But applying the ordinary principles of the law of principal and agent to the question, it does not seem free from doubt. Suppose a principal were to employ an agent to conduct a business in his name, giving him a certain sum for expenses, but forbidding him to pledge his principal's credit beyond that sum, could the principal thus shield himself from liability? It may be that the case of a business of which the principal takes the profit is different. It might be urged, however, that the husband having allowed the wife to do acts importing a general authority to manage the household, could not affect the tradesman who gave credit on the strength of such appearance of authority by a private arrangement with the wife in limitation of such authority unknown to the tradesman. On the whole, it seems to us that the case of Debenham v. Mellon may perhaps have still left open various nice questions on the law with respect to this subject.

OUR CORRESPONDENT, Mr. JOHN HUGHES, whose letter we printed last week, has returned to the charge. He

has written us another letter, in a very courteous and good-humoured tone, in which he takes some exception to our "somewhat summary method of disposing" of his suggestions. We regret that, in the crowded state of our columns this week, it is impossible for us to print his lengthy letter in full, but we shall give those parts which seem to be material.

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The first relates to our interpretation of section 13 of the Act. Mr. HUGHES, relying, as we think unduly, upon the punctuation, proposes to place upon this section an interpretation which implies a sarcasm upon the Act much more severe than anything which we have written. He says: "Your reading of the 13th section ignores the commas which mark off the phrase 'with a leasehold reversion,' and set it in apposition to a term of years to be derived,' &c. The words' with a leasehold reversion' constitute an explanation of the manner in which the term of years is to be granted, and are not an extension or qualification of the idea 'leasehold interest.'" Mr. HUGHES gravely contend that this is the true connection of the words, and that the Act talks about deriving, out of a lease, a sub-lease with a leasehold reversion? as if, perchance, some sub-leases might have upon them a freehold reversion! We repeat that we, who have come under Mr. HUGHES' censure for our alleged severity, have never said anything about the Act half so cutting as this imputation made by a friendly critic. Nor can we quite follow Mr. HUGHES in his next words: "The very expression 'reversion' desiderates a term of years." He surely cannot mean to affirm that there can be a reversion only upon a term of years, and not upon any greater estate. Mr. HUGHES frankly states the objection against his curious interpretation of section 13, that it renders the word "leasehold" in the phrase "leasehold reversion redundant, but, by way of defence, he maintains that by parity of reasoning in section 3, sub-section (1), the words "leasehold reversion" are also redundant; and he suggests that the words were used in both sections "in contradistinction to the freehold reversion, as to which provision had already been made by the Vendor and Purchaser Act, 1874." We cannot admit that the cases are at all parallel. The words "leasehold reversion," referring to an existing reversion, are properly used in section 3 for the purpose mentioned by our correspondent. But the construction of section 13 contended for by him would make the Act forbid the purchaser to call for the title to a reversion which does not yet exist.

MR. HUGHES next returns to the "doubt and ambiguity" which we said surrounded the meaning of the expression "sale made." This doubt, he now contends, "may be dispelled by reference to section 5. By subsection 4, the section applies to 'sales made' after the commencement of the Act. By sub-section 2, the court is empowered to make an ‘order for conveyance, or vesting order, proper for giving effect to the sale.' Therefore," says Mr. HUGHES, "the contract, and not the completion of the sale, is a ʻsale made.'” Having gently reminded him that he has shifted his ground (for in his former letter he referred us, not to section 5, but to "four previous sub-sections" of section 3, which we declared ourselves unable to find, and which he now seems to be no more able to find than we were), we reply as follows. In the first place, we must decline, so far as regards the meaning of "sale," to interpret section 3 by means of section 5, because section 3 contains a special interpretation clause of its own (sub-section 8), specifically dealing with the meaning of the word "sale as used in that section. This (especially considering the terms in which it is Couched) seems to us to exclude all other sources of interpretation derived from the Act. And in the second place, even allowing section 5 to be called as a witness, we protest that we cannot see upon what grounds Mr. HUGHES deduces his inference from the words he cites.

The court may make an order "to give effect to the sale"; that is surely the same thing as "to complete the sale." How on earth does this tend to show that to make a sale is not to complete a sale? We cannot see that it throws any light upon the matter whatever.

Lastly, Mr. HUGHES thinks that, "remembering the distracted session which produced this important measure, it may well be that it has defects, and will even have its 'victims'"; but he seems to plead that it has nevertheless indisputable merits, and reminds us, in some words of Cardinal NEWMAN, that no mark will be hit if it is never shot at. But the political distractions of the session are so far from being any excuse for whatever defects the Act may show, that they are rather an aggravation. The time when the attention of the ordinary meddler is distracted by general politics is the most favourable for safely passing an Act like this with. out his disastrous interference. Besides, we have reason to know that the Act has been under consideration for nearly two years; and we cannot forget the tradition that Mr. BRODIE, in a more difficult case, reached perfection in six months. And we confess to a profound feeling of sympathy with its prospective" victims," who will be doubtfully consoled for their own loss by the gain, even if it be certain, of other people.

THE PRACTICAL EFFECT OF
THE CONVEYANCING ACT.
V.-GENERAL WORDS (continued).

We feel compelled, for the reasons indicated in our last article, to express the opinion that purchasers cannot safely rely upon the forms of "general words" implied under the Act, unless in those cases in which, under the present practice, they would be willing to omit "general words" altogether. We are not able to satisfy ourselves that these forms contain any provision for re-granting extinguished easements. Some of our readers might perhaps be inclined to suggest that this may be effected by the phrase "reputed to appertain"; but we cannot concur in this opinion, for two reasons. In the £rst place, the words are not appropriate. This phrase properly refers, not to extinguished easements, but to easements which are enjoyed by a doubtful title, and we think that it was probably originally designed with reference to the danger to which, before the Prescription Act, the claimant of an easement was exposed, in case the other side could show an origin not lying in express grant and less remote than the first year of Richard I. This would formerly have defeated the claim; and the hardships inflicted by the rule in a manner forced the judges to invent the well-known fiction of a lost grant, which the Prescription Act practically confirmed and placed on a legal basis. We think that the phrase “reputed appurtenants" had its origin in a fear lest the bare word "appurtenants" might not suffice to carry rights to which only a defective title existed. For this reason, we do not think that extinguished easements are within the meaning of reputed appurtenants. And it must not be forgotten that when we use the word "reputed" in this connection, the only reputation to which we can properly refer is that between the owners and occupiers of the dominant and servient tenements respectively. The reputation of the vicinage is quite irrelevant to easements, and would not, properly speaking, be admissible as evidence to prove them. The rights to which the reputation of the vicinage is relevant, are not easements, but public rights. And what could be more grotesque than an owner reputing himself to be able to cross one of his own fields because he happened also to possess another? In the second place, the phrase used in the Act is "appertaining or reputed to appertain"; and we submit that the time here indicated by "reputed" must be identical with that indicated by "appertaining"; and

this can hardly be any other than the time which is directly afterwards indicated more emphatically as "the time of conveyance." It is very significant that in many old forms the reader will find the words, "at any time heretofore"; and similar expressions. We think that the impropriety (to use a studiously mild expression) of regarding an owner in fee simple as enjoying an easement over one part of his land in respect of another part, is so obvious, that it should not lightly be imputed to an Act of Parliament. And since the result of the imputation would be to deprive some very remarkable and emphatically repeated words of all their apparent meaning, we can feel no confidence that the courts will adopt that course.

Another awkward consequence seems to follow from the insertion of these words, at the time of conveyance. These may possibly have been inserted in view of the fact that a conveyance does operate from the time of its execution and affects only rights which the conveying parties at that time either possess or are otherwise capable of granting. The framers of the Act may have inserted these words from a desire to make their implication of law conterminous in time with the deed's operation in fact. But we seem here to find a confirmation of the remarks made by us in a former article upon the difficulties inseparable from all attempts to turn these simple matters into abstract and universal propositions. What a purchaser bargains for, and what he is entitled to get, dates, not from the time of conveyance, but from the time of the contract. It is true that the law knew nothing of the contract, and that the conveyance operates from the time of its execution; and the course rightly pursued by the purchaser is to see that the conveyance expressly includes all that he bargained for at the time of the contract. This is done under the common practice as a matter of course, without any particular notice being taken of the fact that it is done. But when the question is, not about adapting an actual conveyance in express terms to an actual contract, but about devising some universal and abstract propositions in an Act of Parliament which are to be equally applicable to all contracts and to save everybody by implication from the trouble of expressly adapting his conveyance to the state of the facts, difficulties at once begin to emerge. What are we to say about appurtenants or reputed appurtenants, which admit of being altered, released, extinguished, or interrupted, between the time of making the contract and the time of making the conveyance? does it not seem that these would pass, if at all, not as they existed at the former time, but as they existed at the latter time? It is pos sible that this question may become one of grave importance, if the ideal state of things at which the successive Vendor and Purchaser Acts and the part now under consideration of this Act were manifestly aiming, should ever be realized in practice; namely, that in all ordinary cases the only contract between the parties shall be a bare open contract to sell on the one haud and to purchase on the other.

For these reasons we find it very difficult to assert, even upon the most favourable construction of the forms given in section 6, that their use would be free from risk; and cautious persons may not improbably think that the gain of omitting "general words" from a conveyance is not great enough to compensate even for the slightest risk.

We regret that so favourable an opportunity of pruning away a mere excrescence should have been lost; but we think it possible that conveyancers may be induced to venture upon the safe improvement of omitting in future those parts of the "general words' which are universally admitted to be superfluous, and inserting only the part which, in our opinion, still retains an intelligible and useful function.

We hope our readers will not do us the injustice to think that we are indifferent to the improvement of conveyancing. This is, on the contrary, a cause which we have most seriously at heart. But we cannot help

noticing that of what has been done in the past to this end, little is due to Acts of Parliament. And the omens are certainly not obviously in favour of this Act; for a good many Acts have been passed during the last forty years, bearing a close resemblance in their fundamental ideas and methods to the present Act, all of which have been conspicuous failures. The only Act which has been a conspicuous success gives emphasis to this fact, by the utter diversity of its character. We allude to the Act for abolishing Fines and Recoveries. Fines and common recoveries were formerly among the most important of the "common assurances of the realm"; but a single Act of Parliament superseded these cumbrous and expensive proceedings by a deed which remains quite singular in its brevity and simplicity. Yet we now find the highest legal authorities once more coming forward, to try once more by wellworn methods which ave repeatedly been tried in vain, whether they cannot banish general words and covenants for title from conveyances, and give to mortgagees by statute all that they can reasonably demand, and so forth. We should have thought that a better hope would have been offered by another method. We believe, indeed, that another method is in some quarters supposed to have been found in the Solicitors' Remuneration Act. But, for our own part, we should rather have been disposed to advocate another style of drafting. For example, instead of making out lists of general words," it might have been considered carefully what useful functions "general words" do in fact fulfil; and the attempt might have been made to render needless the part of them which is now necessary, by assimilating the law in respect of them to the law applicable to the part which is universally admitted to be superfluous. It would be quite possible to enact that in future, whenever a once existing easement has become extinguished by the union in seisin of the dominant with the servient tenement, then, upon any conveyance, made within twenty years afterwards, of either tenement apart from the other, the easement should, in the absence of the expression of a different intention, revive and become appurtenant to the dominant tenement.

VI.-COVENANTS FOR TITLE.

We have now to turn our attention to section 7, which deals with implied covenants for title, and seems to be regarded by the public with a degree of interest out of all proportion to its importance, even granting that the forms of covenants here supplied, and the mode of supplying them, are such as a prudent man would choose to rely upon. Even if this much were granted in their favour (and we shall presently mention some doubts which we think worthy of serious consideration), it by no means follows that these implied forms will be commonly adopted in practice. The experiment has been tried before only to fail; and it seems to us that those who expect it now to succeed, lie under the necessity of showing that the present conditions of the trial are such as to warrant the expectation of a different result. We are quite aware, as we once before observed, that some people find in the Solicitors' Remuneration Act the true leverage which is to bring the Conveyancing Act iuto common use; but we are not sufficiently cynical to believe that the failure of former schemes has been due to a selfish cupidity on the part of the profession, or that nothing is needed in matters of this sort to attain success except the timely and judicious offer of a bribe. Other causes of a far more respectable kind can be assigned for the complete neglect with which the 8 & 9 Vict. c. 119 has in practice been treated. That Act was both well conceived and well executed, and failed, in our opinion, from causes which must always interpose very serious obstacles in the way even of perfect schemes of this kind. In the first place, the gain is much smaller than it is commonly supposed to be. This gain cannot by any possibility exceed whatever is to be gained by omitting a few folios (exactly four in simple cases) from

cross-examinations, it has been deemed expedient (1) to put some limit on the power of instituting proceedings for libel, and (2) to provide an easy mode of discovering whom to proceed against for a newspaper libel.

After an elaborate definition of " newspaper" as any paper containing public news, intelligence, or occurrences, or any remarks or observations therein, printed for sale, and published in England or Ireland periodically, or in parts or numbers at intervals not exceeding twenty-six days between the publication of any two such papers, parts, or numbers; also any paper printed in order to be dispersed and made public weekly or oftener, or at intervals not exceeding twenty-six days, containing only or principally advertisements," the first object of the Act is sought to be attained in four clauses (sections 2-6) to the following effect :

(a.) "Privilege" is given to fair reports of public meetings — thus extending the principle of Davis v. Duncan (L. R. 9 C. P. 396).

(b.) The interposition of the "Director of Public Prosecutions" is required before a criminal prosecution can be instituted-a provision entirely new.

(c.) A court of summary jurisdiction is to have power to hear evidence on a defence of "justification" before committing for trial-thus reversing the rule of Reg. v. Carden (L. R. 5 Q. B. D. 1).

(d.) A similar court, if of opinion that "though the person charged is shown to have been guilty, the libel was of a trivial character, and that the offence may be adequately punished," on summary conviction, may itself convict the offender, and adjudge him to pay a fine not exceeding £50.

Against the first three of these provisions we have not a word to say. They seem to be perfectly fair and reasonable, and recent cases have shown how much they are required. But the working of the fourth provision, which arms courts of summary jurisdiction" with a kind of local censorship of the press, will have to be very carefully watched. If justices should be inclined to push their powers too far, it is hard to say where a remedy could be found.

The second object of the Act is carried out in fourteen clauses (sections 7-20) as follows:

(a.) A register of newspaper proprietors is to be kept by the Registrar of Joint Stock Companies, and to be open to public inspection, with power to any person to require copies and extracts.

(b.) The printer and publisher of every newspaper is bound, under pain of a fine of £25, to make an annual return for the purpose of making up the register.

(c.) "Every copy of an entry in or extract from the register purporting to be certified . . shall be received as conclusive evidence of the contents of the said register, .. and every such certified copy or extract shall, in all proceedings, civil or criminal, be accepted as sufficient prima facie evidence of all matters and things [why and things?] thereby appearing unless

and until the contrary thereof be shown."

This last provision is a vast improvement on the law

as it was before the passing of the Act, under which it was very difficult to "get at" defendants. The rule of Reg. v. Holbrook (L. R. 4 Q. B. D. 42), that a proprietor is not criminally liable as such, is, we may observe, left untouched.

We have not noticed any difficulty of construction in the Act. Criminal informations, though not named, appear to come within its scope. It might have been better, perhaps, expressly to name them. The marginal note to section 8 is, as was said by Bramwell, L.J., in Attorney-General v. Great Eastern Railway Company (L. R. 11 Ch. D., at p. 460), of some marginal notes, "grossly inaccurate."

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The late Lord Advocate has taken his seat on the Scottish bench as Lord McLaren.

THE NEW CONVEYANCING ACTS. INCLUDING THE CONVEYANCING AND LAW OF PROPERTY ACT, 1881, AND THE SOLICITORS' REMUNERATION ACT, 1881, WITH INTRODUCTION, NOTES, AND FORMS. By SYDNEY E. WILLIAMS, of Lincoln's-inn, Esq., Barrister-at-Law. Stevens & Haynes.

The considerable length at which this Conveyancing Act is now being reviewed in our columns renders it unnecessary for us to express any detailed opinion upon the notes and comments of Mr. Williams. But we may say briefly that the notes generally show acuteness and good sense; that the cases cited (necessarily not very numerous) are important to the matter in hand, and that the introduction contains a fair summary of the Act as a whole, though we might ourselves be inclined to view some parts of it with a less hopeful eye than the author apparently does. We lay some little stress upon the penultimate word of our last sentence; for we have not always found the tone of the introductory remarks quite easy to reconcile with the criticisms in the notes. Occasionally we have found something of which we were not quite able to follow the meaning. The author says (p. 40), in a note upon section 10 of the Conveyancing Act, "The condition of re-entry and all other conditions are to go with the reversion or any part thereof. This provision extends 22 & 23 Vict. c. 35, s. 3, which only applied to conditions of re-entry, and only where a rent had been legally apportioned." We might perhaps have thanked Mr. Williams if he had given us some further information about these "other conditions," which, it would seem, are not conditions of re-entry. But if he is not absolutely clear upon this point, he might plead that Acts of Parliament could be found (and are not far to seek) which are no clearer. Altogether we think that his work displays intelligence, and is likely to be useful.

CORRESPONDENCE.

SHERIFFS AND THEIR OFFICERS. [To the Editor of the Solicitors' Journal.] Sir, I am glad to see that attention has at length been drawn to the serious difficulties which are, in many ways, thrown in the way of obtaining from sheriffs' officers moneys which they have received from executions levied by them.

Quite recently very much trouble was experienced, and no little expense was incurred, in securing, after a great deal of delay, the fruits of an execution which had some time previously been levied by one of the sheriffs of a home county.

The sheriff's officers gave no attention whatever to the repeated applications, which were made by letter and

personally, and even the under-sheriff himself manifested a degree of indifference unworthy of his position. Indeed, there were so many applications pending against the sheriff of this particular county, that the judge before whom they came threatened to make an order for the personal attendance of the sheriff. Acting upon this hint, I wrote to the sheriff myself, but he did nothing beyond simply courteously acknowledging my letter. Of course the sheriff, as a rule, knows nothing of these matters, and if he is communicated with probably only passes on the letter to his under-sheriff.

In addition, I wrote to a member of Parliament, who had formerly been a Cabinet Minister, and who represented the constituency to which my client belonged. He seemed disinclined to take up the matter, and my client, having ultimately obtained his money, was so sick and tired of the matter that he declined to pursue it any