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vision is always made for the possibility in well-drawn drafts. The following remarks of Baron Bayley in Barlow v. Rhodes (1 C. & M. at p. 448), lay down an excellent rule for the guidance in such cases of the draftsman. "It has been decided over and over again, that where an easement has become extinct by unity of ownership," which ownership, be it observed, must amount to a common seisin in fee simple, "and the owner wishes to grant the easement with the premises to which it was formerly appurtenant, he must use language to show that he intended to grant the easement de novo. If, in the case of an easement extinguished by unity of ownership, a man grants the land to which before the extinguishment the right of common was attached, and uses only the words 'appertaining' and 'belonging,' the right will not pass, these words not being sufficient to revive the right. There are, however, apt words for the purpose of passing such an easement; and if you will only insert the words or therewith used and enjoyed,' the right would pass."

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These things being so, and this being, we believe, the only part of the "general words" which cannot be omitted without danger, let us see how our authors have dealt with it. The forms given by them, as respectively applicable (1) to "land," (2) to "land having houses or other buildings thereon," and (3) to "a manor," are as follows:(1.) All easements, rights, and advantages whatsoever, appertaining or reputed to appertain to the land, or any part thereof, or at the time of conveyance enjoyed with, or reputed or known as part or parcel of or appurtenant to the land or any part thereof. (2.) All easements, rights, and advantages whatsoever, appertaining or reputed to appertain to the land, houses, or other buildings conveyed, or any of them, or any part thereof, or at the time of conveyance enjoyed with, or reputed or known as part or parcel of or appurtenant to, the land, houses, or other buildings conveyed, or any of them, or any part thereof. (3.) All. easements, profits, advantages, rights, emoluments, and hereditaments whatsoever, to the manor appertaining or reputed to appertain, or at the time of conveyance enjoyed with the same, or reputed or known as part, parcel, or member thereof.

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Would it not almost seem as if the words in italics had been expressly inserted to deprive these forms of all possibility of serving their most useful purpose? Nothing is more certain than that, at the time of conveyance, the easement, in the case above supposed by us, has been utterly extinguished by the unity of seisin; and it would be difficult to devise any form of words less "apt," than one which should describe an owner in fee simple as enjoying an easement over one part of his own land in respect of another part. And this blemish occurs in a part of the Act which might, with comparative ease, have been made perfect; and in which anything short of the perfection which gives the absolute certainty of safety is useless.

Lord

Lord Justice Lush has appointed the following dates for holding the autumn assizes on the North and South Wales Circuits-viz, for the combined counties of Chester, Montgomery, Merioneth, Carnarvon, Anglesea, Denbigh, and Flint, at Chester, Saturday, October 22; and for Glamorgan, Carmarthen, Pembroke, Haverfordwest, Cardigan, Brecknock, and Radnor, at Swansea, Monday, October 31. Chief Justice Coleridge has appointed the following days for holding the autumn assizes on the South-Eastern Circuit:viz., Norwich, Monday, October 24; Cambridge, Thursday, October 27; Maidstone, Monday, October 31; Chelmsford, Monday, November 7. Mr. Justice Cave has fixed the following dates for holding the autumn assizes on the NorthEastern Circuit-viz., Newcastle, Monday, October 24; Durham, Thursday, October 26; York, Wednesday, November 2.

CORRESPONDENCE.

SHERIFFS AND THEIR OFFICERS. [To the Editor of the Solicitors' Journal.] Sir, Having given notice of my intention to move at the next meeting of the Court of Common Council, "That it be referred to the Law and City Courts Committee to inquire and report to this court as soon as practicable as to the vexation, delay, and costly projudgment creditors, are subjected in obtaining from ceedings to which citizens and others, who may be sheriffs' officers and county court bailiffs moneys received by them in respect of executions levied at the suit insuring the speedy payment of all such moneys to the of such creditors, and the best means to be adopted for parties entitled thereto, with power to confer with the Right Hon. the Lord High Chancellor, Citizen and Mercer, thereon," I shall be glad to receive information (which, if so required, shall be regarded as private) respecting the difficulties which any of your readers may have experienced in obtaining payment of moneys received by sheriffs' officers from executions levied by them. W. J. FRASER.

2, Soho-square, W., October 10.

THE CHANCERY PAY OFFICE.

[To the Editor of the Solicitors' Journal.]

Sir, The enclosed cutting is from to-day's City Press. I have heard that something of the kind was being done. Either the rule should be abolished requiring personal identification or the practice mentioned should be put a stop to. Y.

[The following is the cutting referred to:-"A gentle. man has a sum of money in Chancery to receive from the Paymaster's office, and something like the following takes place when he gets to the New Law Courts. He asks for the office, and a minor official, whom I will call A., inquires his business, and then says, 'Oh, you will have to be identified.' Gentleman says, 'Shall I? But I have all my papers. What further identification is needed ?' A.: 'Oh, you must be identified.' He then gets to a clerk, B., who tells the same tale, and the gentleman is informed that there is Mr. C. across the way, who will do the identification business. C. is sought out, and requires a fee of half-a-guinea, which the gentlemen objects to, and C. then says, "Well, six-andeightpence, then.' The above is a fact; and I ask is this sort of thing right and proper, or is it only for the benefit of A., B., and C. ?"]

THE CONVEYANCING ACT.

[To the Editor of the Solicitors' Journal.] Sir, There is a singular oversight in your article of the 8th inst.; you have overlooked the 13th section, which negatives the right to call for the title to the leasehold reversion on a contract to grant an underlease.

Permit me to take this opportunity to ask whether, expedient as it doubtless is that the measure should be searchingly tested, some of your criticisms are quite consistent with the loyal reception which should, I venture to think, be accorded to this well-meant endeavour to curtail what a learned divine of the last century called "the villainous tautology of the lawyers." I might instance your inquiry," When is a sale made-when the contract is entered into, or when it is completed?" in discussing the provisions as to conditions of "sales male after the commencement of the Act" (section 3, subsection 10). Can there be any real doubt? Four previous sub-sections use the term "sale" or "sold" in a connection which shows plainly that it is the contract of sale that constitutes a sale.

Or again, as to the exoneration of a solicitor from

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With reference to the discrepancy which you think exists between the common-form conditions provided by the Act and the rules in section 2 of the Vendor and Purchaser Act, 1874-the latter in your opinion applying only to contracts for the sale of " land," and not to an incorporeal hereditamen, to which the former are applicable-have you not overlooked 13 & 14 Vict. c. 21, 3. 4 (An Act for shortening the language used in Acts of Parliament), which provides that "the word 'land'

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20, Threadneedle-street, E. C., Oct. 11.

[As it happens, the oversight is on the part of our correspondent. At the beginning of our article on the Conveyancing Act this week he will find his first paragraph treated in a manner which we hope he will find satisfactory.

We do not understand to what extent our correspondent thinks that the Act is entitled to a "loyal reception." If he means to express the opinion that we are not doing our duty to the profession by pointing out its numerous defects, whether verbal or otherwise, we do not think our readers will agree with him. We are quite unable to follow our correspondent in his criticism upon our question, "When is a sale made-when the contract is entered into, or when it is completed?" We cannot find the "four previous sub-sections which, according to our correspondent, show plainly that the contract constitutes the sale. Indeed, we seriously doubt whether most people would, by "sales properly so called understand "contracts of sale"; and we thus find, both in the interpretation clause and in sub-section (8), an additional germ of doubt and ambiguity.

With respect to the consolidation of mortgages, we repeat our opinion that the language of section 66 (which our correspondent ought to have cited with fewer blanks if he wished to get at its true significance) has no bearing upon the matter, and though we do not say that a soli citor would incur legal liability by omitting to provide against the application of section 17, yet we are clear that there is nothing in section 66 to relieve him from any liability which may exist independently of that section.

As to the 13 & 14 Vict. c. 21, s. 4, if our correspondent had looked at the context of the words which he cites, we think that he would never had asked his last question. The words of the Act, are "land' shall include messuages, tenements, and hereditaments, houses, and build. ings, of any tenure," &c. Does our correspondent really seriously contend that this includes incorporeal hereditaments?

At all events Mr. Dart's opinion aceords with our own-see 1 V. & P. 206, note (Z.)-ED. S. J.]

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CASES OF THE WEEK.

PRACTICE-WINDING UP OF COMPANY-APPOINTMENT OF SPECIAL EXAMINER TO TAKE EVIDENCE-COMPANIES ACT. 1862, s. 115.-In the case of In re The Working Men's Mutual Society (Limited), before Cave, J., sitting in the Rolls Court as Vacation Judge, on the 12th inst., an order had been previously made for the compulsory winding up of the company, and an official liquidator appointed. It appeared that the late manager of the company, Ledru Rollin Reynolds, had misappropriated a considerable portion of the assets of the company, and an action had been commenced to recover the same. Reynolds had become bankrupt, and meetings of his creditors been held, but as yet no trustee appointed. An ex parte application was now made on behalf of the official liquidator under the Companies Act, 1862, s. 115, for the appointment of a special examiner in the winding up to at once take evidence as to the misappropriation, on the ground that such a course would be more advantageous than waiting for the appointment of a trustee in bankruptcy. CAVE, J., made the order asked for, but stated that no proceedings were to be taken in the action without leave of the court.-SOLICITORS, Beall & Co.

COMMITTAL-VACATION BUSINESS-In the case of In re a Solicitor, also before Cave, J., on the 12th inst., a motion was made for the committal of a solleitor for non-compliance with an order of the court ordering the repayment by him of sums for which he was responsible. An objection was taken that applications for committal or attachment were stated by the late Vice-Chancellor Stuart not to be properly vacation business. CAVE, J., said that to allow such an objection would be to make the vacation a period of impunity. The motion was ultimately arranged to stand over.

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The PRESIDENT (Mr. C. C. Druce) then delivered the opening address as follows:

After some introductory observations, the president said: -By the vacancies created in two of the three chiefships an opportunity was presented for exercising the powers, given by the Judicature Act of 1873, of abolishing the distinction of the offices of the Chief Justice of the Common Pleas and the Chief Baron of Exchequer from those of the puisne judges, and of reducing the number of divisions of the High Court of Justice. This consolidation of the three common law divisions has, I think, fully borne out the prediction to which the Lord Chancellor gave expression in first proposing it, that "there would be a better economy and more equal distribution of judicial power, and greater elasticity, as well as regularity, in all the arrangements for the transaction of business." The existence of three separate ard distinct divisions, each with its own lists and arrange ments, was necessarily an obstruction to the dispatch of business, whilst their raison d'être had ceased to exist when all distinction in the nature of their business and the titles

of their judges was done away. It became, indeed, little better than a farce when three judges, one perhaps from each of the three divisions, might be seen sitting together on one day to constitute a court in Banc of the Exchequer Division, and on another day to constitute a court in Banc of the Queen's Bench or Common Pleas Division, according to the name of the court in which they sat. It was merely in accordance with common sense that so anomalous a state

of things should have been put an end to and replaced by one divisional court, with one chief at its head, and ore list of its business. I may, perhaps, remind you in passing, that this step was taken with the express approval of our society, who presented to the House of Commons a petition in favour of the measure.

A further alteration in the constitution of the courts has been effected by an Act introduced into the House of Lords by the Lord Chancellor towards the end of last session. By ferred from the Chancery Division to the Court of Appeal, and bis place as a judge of first instance is to be filled by the appointment of another justice of the High Court. The President of the Probate Division by the same Act becomes an ex-officio member of the Court of Appeal. We shall thus have three divisional courts-videlicet, the Chancery Division, consisting of five prisne judges, with the Lord Chancellor as its president; the Queen's Bench Division, comprising fourteen ruisne judges, and presided over by the Lord Chief Justice of England; and the Probate Division, with two puisne judges, the senior of whom presides. The Court of Appeal, on the other hand, will be composed of the three presidents of the divisional courts as its ex-offico members, and of five Lords Justices of Appeal, presided over by the Master of the Rolls, as its permanent members. It is, perhaps, to be regretted that the judges of the Court of Appeal have not been relieved from the obligation to go circuit. The interruption to the business of the Court of Appeal which is occasioned by the absence on circuit of three of its members during some ten or twelve weeks of the legal

this Act the office of Master of the Rolls has been trans

year, is a matter of no slight consequence as tending to delay an increasing accumulation of arrears. Possibly a rearrangement of the circuits would enable the judges of the Court of Appeal to remain in town, without its being found necessary to augment the present number of judges of the High Court. But, even should this course not be practicable, I do not think it could be said that the cost of one or two more judges of first instance would be too much to pay for a speedy determination of appeals. However, a point of more immediate interest to us is that the Bill, as introduced in the Lords, provided that the district registrars to be appointed should be either harristers or solicitors. In co-operation with our friends in the North, we succeeded in inducing the Attorney-General to alter this provision (in the House of Commons), so as to leave these registrarships to the solicitors only.

I have caused copies of this Act, and of Lord Cairns' Acts for the amendment of the laws of conveyancing and of the remuneration of solicitors, to be circulated among the members. On the last of these I had thought of offering some remarks, but considerations of time and space, and of the exceptional duties which will probably devolve on me personally as a commissioner under that Act, and the expecta

tion of a separate, and therefore better, paper on the subject being contributed by some member, have led me to refrain from the attempt.

But a more important change than either that I have mentioned has been initiated since our last meeting, by the appointment of a committee to consider the reforms which are necessary to reduce the expense and delays of our legal procedure. That there is great scope for improvement in this respect no one who reads the reports of cases in the daily papers can doubt. When one reads of a case where it ots £150 to decide a dispute with reference to the dyeing of some wool, in which £13 or £14 is involved, or sees the many instances of hardship consequent on delay, amounting sometimes to almost a denial of justice, it becomes manifest that our procedure is defective. The report of the committee, which has been laid before the judges for their consideration, has not us yet been made public, and therefore we can only hope that it may be the means of salutary changes being introduced to remedy the isting evils. When that report is published, I shall gladly redeem the pledge given by my predecessor to print and circulate it, and call a special general meeting for its consideration.

ex.

I ought not to pass unnoticed that which I trust is a not unsatisfactory settlement of a matter which for some time past has been the subject of complaint on the part of some of the members of our profession. I refer to the call of solicitors to the bar. In pursuance of a resolution passed at the annual meeting of our society in London last year, a Bill, containing provisions for facilitating the cail of solici

tors, was forwarded by the council to the Lord Chancellor, who was at the same time informed of the reasons which had led to the framing of the Bill, and was asked to receive a deputation on the subject. The Lord Chancellor suggested in reply that, before taking the matter into consideration, it would be well to ascertain whether any steps had been taken by the benchers of the several Inns of Court in consequence of a communication addressed to them by Lord Cairns when Court were communicated with by our late president, and, in Chancellor. Accordingly, the treasurers of the four Inns of that a student who, previously to his admission at an Ina of the result, resolutions were passed by the Ions to the effect Court, had been a solicitor in practice for not less than five years, but had ceased to be a solicitor before admission as a student, might, after having kept four terms, be called to the bar, after passing the bar final examination. Thus, although the term of probation intervening between abandoning the one branch of the profession and entering upon the other bas not been (as it had been hoped it would have been) altogether done away with, it has been reduced from three years to one year, and in this way a material concession has been obtained. For a solicitor desirous of going to the bar to have to deprive himself of all professional earnings for a space of three years was, no doubt, in many instances, an actual prohibition to the gratification of his wish; the sacrifice of time and money was too great to be incurred. But I do not think that this can any longer be said. It is not any very great hardship for a man to have to devote the space of one year to the preparation required to fit him for the other branch of the profession. That some prepara. practice of pleading and of advocacy is of course not untion is requisite I do no not think can be denied. The familiar to the solicitor, still he has but few opportunities of exercising himself in either, and a year spent in this study will be by no means thrown away. During the year which, in the course of my articles, I passed in a special pleader's and a conveyancer's chambers, I learned not only a little law, but also, which I have since found more useful, where and how to look up law I did not know. It will no doubt be said, and truly said, that there is equal if not greater need for an interval of preparation in the case of a barrister who wishes to become a solicitor. But the mere fact that a period of probation has not been insisted on in the one case does not prove that it is unnecessary in the other; and I should imagine that, as a matter of fact, a member of the bar would scarcely venture to start in business as a solicitor on his own account without spending at least twelve months in acquiring a knowledge of the practical working of the profession in a solicitor's office. On the whole, then, I do not think that the compromise which has been effected with the Inns of Court in regard to the matter is one which is other than satisfactory. At all events, we do not by its acceptance preclude ourselves from endeavouring to obtain a further concession, should we find that our members are still unduly hindered in passing into the other branch of the profession.

Let us now turn our attention from those changes which have taken place, or have been provided for, to those matters of remedial legislation which are still the subject of expectation. First amongst these is the subject of Bankruptcy Reform, the urgency of which imperatively demands attention. Louder and louder grows the cry of dissatisfaction from the trading community of the country in general at the scandals to which the existing administration of our bankruptcy procedure gives rise. Bankers, merchants, and manufacturers alike join in condemnation of a system which allows the dishonest trader to rid himself of his embarrassments at a minimum of personal inconvenience, and his assets to be diverted from his creditors into the pockets of those who are employed to distribute them. Experience has long since shown that, so long as the investigation and control of a debtor's affairs are left in the hands of his creditors, there is but little probability of any thorough or satisfactory inquiry as to the causes of his failure, or as to the disposal of his property. Creditors are, and are always likely to be, supine in regard to these matters. I mentioned this to the Attorney-General while he was, or was understood to be, in charge of the Bankruptcy Bill introduced last session, and he agreed that there lay the difficulty to be contended with. Creditors can hardly be expected to readily respond when called upon to sacrifice time, which

is of immediate value to them, in order to obtain perhaps a merely nominal dividend upon their debts. Still less can they be expected to be impelled, by the motive of serving the community at large in the detection and exposure of knavery, to a tediously strict examination of the debtor's business. It is not strange that they should prefer to accept whatever is offered to them, or even to write off their debt as a bad one, rather than throw good money after bad in the shape of long, expensive, and infructuous investigations. It is, I think, then evident that we must look elsewhere than to the creditors for a means of rendering more certain that exposure and publicity which alone can serve to check reckless or dishonest trading. It has been aptly observed that no Bankruptcy Act will ever be satisfactory which does not guarantee to the creditors twenty shillings in the pound. This observation, however, has been met with the remark that even then the creditors would not be content unless interest were added to the amount of their debts. And a glance at the bankruptcy legislation of the present century will show that these criticisms are not illfounded. No less than seven distinct Acts have been passed in a space of forty-four years, thus showing the average life of a Bankruptcy Act to be between six and seven years. And it is worth while to note the shifting character of this legislation; how, for instance, the changes have been rung between official supervision by the court and private control by the creditors; how the court's proceedings have been condemned as dilatory and expensive, and private arrangements been authorized in substitution; and how these have been condemned in their turn, and a resumption of authority by the court insisted upon. The fact is that it is well-nigh impossible to provide a system which will work satisfactorily in regard to all bankruptcies. To say that an equal degree of supervision is required for all is to state what is obviously inaccurate. Where a leading commercial firm fails, and its affairs are placed in the hands of solicitors and accountants of high standing, there cannot be the same occasion for guarding against fraud as in the case of small traders. A careful discretion should, therefore, be exercised as to when and how the court or other authority should interfere. For, as its influence will be salutary if directed to those cases in which it is really required, so will it do rather harm than good by hampering and increasing the cost of the proceedings, if applied to cases in which it is unnecessary. Clearly, then, much must depend upon the manner in which the enabling provisions of any Bankruptcy Bill that may be passed are worked by the courts. And with a view to their efficient working I think that the advisability of having at the head of the bankruptcy administration a judge who is fully conversant and experienced in the law and practice of bankruptcy, and who will devote his whole time to hear. ing bankruptcy cases, cannot be too strongly insisted on. It has been suggested, and the suggestion formed part of the Bill introduced last session by Mr. Chamberlain, that the Board of Trade should be intrusted with certain powers of supervision. But it may be doubted whether such powers would not be more properly intrusted to a judge, and, in certain circumstances, to his registrars acting under his direction. The Board of Trade must necessarily act upon the advice of its officers, and these may and probably would have no special knowledge of the principles or prac tice of bankruptcy. A judge, on the other hand, if intrusted with the full powers created by the Bill, would be enabled to bring the whole system into harmonious working, and thus the difficulties arising from divided authority would be overcome. You are most of you doubtless aware that our society last year drew up and forwarded to the Government certain suggestions as to the alterations and amendments which, in their judgment, ought to be made in the bankruptcy law. Prominent amongst those suggestions was one to the effect that, "as in the Probate Division, a judge ought to be appointed to give his whole time to bankruptcy, and the hearing of all important matters and appeals from the registrars and county court judges; and the Court of Bankruptcy ought to form a division of the High Court of Justice." Now the Bill as introduced by the Government into the House of Commons, although it to a great extent adopted the suggestions of our society, omitted to give effect to the one I have cited. It provided that matters of bankruptcy should be assigned to the Chancery Division of the High Court of Justice, and be disposed of by one of the judges attached to that division, and that the Lord Chancellor

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should from time to time assign a judge for that purpose, but so that no additional judge should be appointed until the number of such judges, other than the Lord Chancellor and the Master of the Rolls, should be reduced below four. This provision would simply perpetuate the present unsatisfactory state of things-for bankruptcy matters would only receive, as now, a portion of the attention of one of the chancery judges, and thus the bulk of cases, or indeed almost the whole of them, with the exception of county court appeals, would be left to the decision of the registrars. Now, far be it from me to suggest that the registrars do not exercise great care and diligence in their conduct of the business, or that they do not devote their best endeavours to satisfactorily dispose of it. But it should be remembered that they were originally appointed with a view to the discharge of administrative rather than judicial fanctions. I venture to think that in a great number of cases in which an appeal is now instituted, the parties would rest satisfied with the decision of a judge. But however this might be, the gain to the public in the more efficient and uniform administration of the bankruptcy law would more than compensate for the extra cost.

By far the most necessary reform, however, is the repeal of the 125th and 126th sections of the existing Act, which provide for liquidation by arrangement and compositions without imposing any proper check upon the application of them to guard against their being abused. The repeal of these two sections has been recommended, not only by this society, but by a committtee of the House of Commons, by the Bankers' Institute, and by the Chambers of Commerce. To this recommendation, the Bill which was introduced last session, and will probably be reintroduced next year, proposed to give effect. And an instructive insight into the mischievous character of these two sections is afforded by the comments of Mr. Chamberlain when introducing it. After showing that the number of liquidations and composi tions had been steadily increasing until they had reached a total in the year 1879 of very nearly 12,000 (or about 93 per cent. of the total number of proceedings under the Act), he proceeded to explain the reasons why these provisions had been so largely resorted to. He pointed out how, under section 125 of the Act, it was possible for a debtor, who found himself unable or unwilling to pay, to have a meeting of creditors summoned on his behalf at a time and place convenient to himself, and certainly in many cases inconvenient to the majority of the creditors. At this meeting the creditors present, either by themselves or by proxies (creditors in some cases in friendly collusion with the bankrupt, in other cases fictitious, in not a few cases fraudulent), might by the requisite majority in number, and three-fourths in value, elect a trustee, agree to a liquidation, dispense with the security which the Act required the trustee to give, get rid of all investigation of the previous conduct and affairs of the bankrupt, discharge the debtor, although guilty of fraud or scandalous negligence, and although the assets showed no dividend, and this arrangement might be imposed upon a dissenting minority of bond fide creditors. Under this arrangement there was no public inquiry whatever, no examination on oath, and no security or the protection of the public interests which were involved in every insolvency. Under this system the position of a trustee was an enviable one, provided he was not troubled with moral scruples. He was uncontrolled as to the disposition of the estate, and the management of it; he might appoint, and often did appoint, his own committee of inspection, from whom he was bound to take his instructions. The accounts of the trustee had been in more than one instance audited by persons who could not write their own names. The trustee could make any arrangement for the discharge of the debtor, he could dispose of the funds, he could vote his own remuneration, he could tax his solicitor's bill, he could audit the bills of the other professional persons he employed, he could audit his own accounts, granting himself a release, and retire to the bosom of his family, satisfied that he had complied with all the legal requirements of the statute. He might, if he liked, declare a dividend, or he might delay doing so. He might keep the creditors' money in his own hands, and use it for his own purposes; he might appropriate undivided balances and unclaimed dividends; he might assist in the creation of fictitious claims, certain that in such circumstances dividends could not be claimed; and in fifty different ways he might rob the creditors to his own advantage. Is it then matter for surprise that reckless or dishonest trading should abound

when such facilities as these are afforded for getting quit of the consequences of it? Or, is it not rather natural that both trustees and debtors should largely avail themselves of provisions which might well have been framed expressly to enable them to benefit themselves at the expense of the creditors? It is to be hoped that the abolition of liquidations by arrangement, the restriction of compositions to a minimum payment of five shillings in the pound, and this subject to the approval of the court, and the adoption of one uniform mode of proceeding-viz., by bankruptcy, in all cases of insolvency, may tend to ameliorate the present state of things. There is one matter, however, in regard to which the provisions of our bankruptcy laws ought to be most stringent, and that is, the granting of a discharge to the bankrupt. Whilst justice and public policy require that the man who, by mere misfortune or accident, becomes unable to meet bis engagements, should be given the opportunity of starting afresh in business, it none the less demands that the reckless or fraudulent trader shall not be able lightly to cast aside the claims of his creditors, and free himself from the control of the court. And I feel confident that no more effectual means can be found of checking the offences of overtrading and fraudulent bankruptcy than to enact that the proof of these or similar offences having been committed shall absolutely debar the bankrupt from obtaining his discharge, except in the event of his paying his creditors in full. If (as is proposed by the Bill) a discretion be given to the court to grant or withhold the discharge in such cases, it is not unlikely to be leniently exercised, and thus the deterrent effect of the provision would be greatly lessened, or altogether

lost.

It is satisfactory to note that it is proposed to place a restriction upon the present most mischievous and facile use of proxies. Hitherto, as you are aware, a proxy has constituted the person to whom it has been given the general agent and representative of the creditor signing it. The proxy proIvided for by the Act of 1869 gives the nominee of the ereditor authority to act for him "in all matters under the Act, of whatsoever kind, as fully as the creditor himself could act." The course adopted, only too frequently I fear, has been to canvass for, or even to purchase from creditors, a sufficient number of these documents to give the debtor, or bis solicitor, or his trustee, the power of controlling the votes at a meeting, and thus to enable them to retain for themselves the bulk of the estate, whilst the creditors have gratefully to accept the few. crumbs of dividend which are thrown to them. Under the proposed new system, however, smaller scope will be given for such scandals. The careless or the friendly creditor will not be allowed to wash his hands of the matter so readily. A proxy will "not be available except for the purpose of voting at a specified meeting, or an adjournment thereof." Moreover, the appointment as proxy of the solicitor for the bankrupt will be prohibited altogether; and whoever may hold a proxy will not be allowed to use it for the purpose of voting for the appointment of himself as trustee, unless specially authorized to do so by the terms of the proxy itself.

It would, doubtless, be bold to prophesy an entire cessation of the present evils as the outcome of the reforms to which I have referred. A panacea is an impossibility, and cannot be devised. We must rest satisfied with the hope that the many years of consideration which have been devoted to the subject may, ere our next meeting, have resulted in the introduction of, at all events, a far less defective system of bankruptcy procedure than at present exists.

perfect and incomplete statement of legal principles. There is doubtless some truth in these objections. It is necessarily impossible to frame a perfect code which shall in itself contain an exact principle of law to fit every state of circumstances which may arise. It is consequently out of the question that a code could be a complete substitute for the whole of the text-books and reported decisions which at present form our materials for collecting the general principle which is applicable to a particular case. Incompleteness must be the result even of the greatest possible care in its preparation. But it would surely be possible to codify at any rate some portions of our law with sufficient completeness to be of immense service. You are aware that steps have already been taken towards embodying the whole of the criminal law in one Act of Parliament in the shape of a Criminal Code. When the proposed Bill is passed, we shall have in a compact form a substitute for a

vast number of statutes and decisions contained in some hundreds of volumes, the examination and comparison of which now involves a great amount of time and trouble and consequent expense. And if the result of a criminal code be to dispense with or, at any rate, to minimize this labour, we may, I think, look to a still greater gain from a codification of other branches of the law. The object of the criminal law is to deter persons from the commission of crime, and not to confer rights upon them. A general and widely-spread knowledge, therecriminal law is not so useful and

fore, of the important an object as the rendering familiar to the public the principles, for instance, of mercantile law. For the purpose of our mercantile law is to inform the public of their rights, and an accessible, concise, and intelligible statement of the several subjects which it embraces would enable the mercantile community to understand and appreci ate their rights and liabilities towards one another, and to transact their business and frame their conduct towards one another in accordance with what is the law. They would thus feel a far greater amount of security through being competent to judge as to what transactions they could carry out, and, generally, as to their position. Take, for example, the case of a German merchant. In the majority of instances in which he is desirous of ascertaining his legal position in reference to a bill of exchange, he is able easily to do so by looking at the German Code relating to negotiable instruments. Moreover, by a study of this code he can, with slight difficulty, obtain at least a general knowledge of the branch of the law contained in it. In this country, however, so long as our law retains its present cumbrous and unwieldy form, it is almost impossible for any but lawyers to obtain more than a vague notion of its general principles. These have to be laboriously extracted from a vast number of statutes and decided cases, which are themselves not unfrequently difficult, if not impossible, to reconcile one with another. I do not say that this labour would te altogether saved by a code. That would be to assume the possibility of a statement of the law which should be not only accurate but exhaustive. Cases will always arise which require the application of some new principle, or, any rate, the modification of an old one; and in such cases the ana oy of former decisions might be of assistance. But I do think that were many, if not at all, of the branches of our law reduced to the form of a code containing a concise and accur ate statement of general principles covering the majority of probable cases, the advantages would be enormous. The administration of justice would become more certain, tre labours of judges and of lawyers generally would be facili tated, and by rendering law more intelligible and accessible, a code would be the means of creating a wider and more public interest in the study of it. Stripped to a great extent of its technicalities, and extracted from its present labyrinth of decisions, law would become an interesting and attractive study, within the reach of the general body of educated

men.

Let me, before I conclude, devote a few observations to a subject which yearly growe more urgent, but to which too little attention has, I think, been paid. I refer to the codification of our law. I am aware that many and diverse opinions are entertained both as to the advisability and as to the practicability of framing a code. It is objected by some that any attempt at a concise statement of the whole of the English law would tend to ambiguity rather than clearness; that it would add to, and not diminish, the doubts and difficulties of the law, by affording fresh matter for judicial interpretation without enabling us to dispense with the existing accumulation of decided cases and statutory enactments; that it would detract from the present malleability or elasticity of the law, by allowing less scope for its adjustment to changing circumstances; and that, at best, it could not be otherwise than an imp the code. Rules would have to be inserted to cover the

But there is a still greater benefit which might fairly be expected to accrue. In order to render their work to any extent accurate and complete, it would be necessary for the framers of the code to travel over the whole range of possible cses. In doing this they would have brought to their attention many cases as to which no rule or principle of law has been laid down. The conflict of authority and the inconsistencies in various decisions would also be made evident. Both these defects would be remedied in drawing

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