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to determine a tenancy from year to year ia proposed to be extended to two years at least.

Clause 13 proposes to make the county court judge and bis two assessors (probably tenant farmers) the arbitrators as to whether, upon a proposed renewal of a lease or tenancy, the rent should be increased; and it is provided that "the court shall not sanction an increase of rent unless it is proved that the value of the holding has increased from other causes than the improvements made by the tenant, and shall determine the amount, if any, of such increase." The practical effect of this, will, of course, be to prevent any landlord from even entering into any negotiations for renewing the lease to his former tenant whenever he thinks more rent can be got by going into the open market. Elaborate provisions are made for enabling a tenant to obtain compensation for improvements made by him upon his holding, the amount of such compensation being estimated "by the sum that a person having sufficient means to cultivate the holding is willing to give in consideration of being admitted as tenant of the holding at the rent payable by the outgoing tenant, or at such increased or decreased rent as may have been determined in the manner" by the Act provided —i.e., in case of disagreement, by the county court judge and his two tenant farmer assessors. The jurisdiction "of any court of law or equity" [has the framer of the Act forgotten the Judicature Act?] is to cease as to "every matter of difference or dispute between a landlord and tenant in respect of, or arising out of, any contract of tenancy, except any question as to the validity of such a contract," and landlords are to be handed over to the county court judge and his tenant farmer colleagues. There are many other provisions in favour of the tenant, but we think our readers will probably have learnt sufficient for the present as to this class of provisions. The provisions in favour of the landlord are, first, a power to apply to the county court judge and his tenant farmer colleagues to assess damages for deterioration of the holding by the tenant, but solely (see clause 21) "with reference to the extent to which the acts or defaults complained of have lessened the letting value of the holding." The triumvirate are also empowered, if "such deterioration" be persisted in, to order the tenant to give up possession of the holding to the landlord. The landlord may also obtain an injunction " to restrain the tenant from doing any acts which, in the opinion of " the county court judge and his tenant farmer colleagues, " would be injurious to the holding or the estate of the landlord."

The Statutb Law Revision and Civil Procedure Act, 1881, has revived the curious power of surveyors of taxes to make domiciliary visits, which was taken away from them by the Taxes Management Act, 1880 (44 Vict. c. 19). The revival is effected in this wise. The ancient Act, 43 Geo. 3, c. 161, s. 60, empowers "assessors, inspectors, and surveyors," taking with them, where necessary, " a constable, headborongh, tythingman, or other officer" to view and examine "such dwelling-house" [i.e., the dwelling-house subject to house-tax], "in order to ascertain the number of windows therein and the annual rent at which the same dwelling-house ought to be charged," and for so doing they are to have liberty " to pass through any bouse or houses, aud to go through any court, yard, or back side," &c. The Taxes Management Act, 1880, repealed a large number of enactments relating to this subject, and amongst them 43 Geo. 3, o. 161, s. 60. But the repeal of section 60 was either the result of a pure mistake, or else the Inland Revenue officials repented of the abolition of the power to make domiciliary visits. At all events the Statute Law Revision, &c, Act, 1881, contains, amongst the list of repealed enactments, the following:—"In the third schedule [of the Taxes Management Act, 1880, of which other sections are also repealed], containing enactments j

repealed, in the entry of 43 Geo. 3, o. 161, the word 'sixty,' which section sixty is hereby revived, a* from its repeal in that schedule to the extent to which it was in fores at the repeal." The qualifying words " to the extent," &c, have reference, we presume, to the repeal of the whole of section 60 by the Statute Law Revision Act, 1872, "exoept as to ascertaining the rent of a house." We cannot think this to be a desirable mode of passingwhat is in effect a new Revenue law. There are, we are aware, precedents for something of the kind. The Statute Law Revision Act, 1875 (38 & 39 Vict, c. 66), s. 33, enacts that "section twenty-five of the Act of the ninth year of King George the Fourth, chapter fiftyeight, repealed by the Statute Law Revision Act, 1873, is hereby revived, as from the repeal thereof, and all proceedings taken thereunder since such repeal shall be as valid and effectual as if the said section hod not been repealed;" and the second schedule of the Statute Law Revision Act, 1878 (41 & 42 Vict. c. 79), contains no less than five "revived" enactments. The work of Statute Law Revision has been executed on the whole with great accuracy. But when mistakes of this kind happen to be made, they should surely be corrected by separate and perfectly intelligible re-enactments.

The Practice prevalent in the Western counties of requiring purchasers by private contract, or under conditions of sale by auction, to pay a contract fee to the vendor's solicitor and the auctioneer, seems to have given rise to an animated discussion at the annual meeting of the Bristol Law Society, and we are glad to see that a resolution was passed to the effect that, in the opinion of the meeting, the time hid arrived for a re-consideration of the matter, and that an adjournment should take place for the purpose of the council canvassing the local solicitors as to their agreeing to forego their fees in the matter, and reporting to a future meeting of the profession. It may be worth while to point out that the auctioneer cannot sue for such fees. In Cherry v. Anderson (Irish Reports, 10 C. L. 204) leasehold premises were sold by auction upon this among other conditions of sale, "that the purchaser shall pay two and a half per cent, auctioneer's fees." The declaration of sale was signed by the auctioneer, who was employed by the vendor, and the agreement for sale was signed by the respective agents of the vendor and purchaser, the conditions of sale being incorporated in both documents. It was held that the auctioneer could not recover his fees from the purchaser on a count for work and labour, nor on the special contract, inasmuch as he was not a party to it, and no consideration moved from him, the ouly contract to pay fe* between the vendor and purchaser.

The Sf.vextef.xtii Sec-tux of the Statute of Frauds is repealed. Start not, learned reader : the seventeenth section in question is not the famous section, commonly so numbered, relating to a sale of goods of the value of £10 or upwards, but the section commonly numbered as the sixteenth, directing that writs of execution shall only bind goods from the time of their delivery to the officer. The repeal is effected by the Statute Law Revision and Civil Procedure Act, 1881 (44 & 45 Vict, c. 59), to the schedule of which, containing a whole host of enactments repealed as "spent or having ceased to be in force otherwise than by express and specific repeal of Parliament," the Legislature has considerately prefixed the note that "this schedule is to be read at referring to the Revised Edition of the Statutes prepared under the direction of the Statute Law Committee, in all cases of statutes included in that edition." The section commonly numbered seventeen is numbered sixteen "in that edition," and no doubt correctly so nun


The importance of the subject must be our excuse for returning to the discussion of the recent cases of Smalley v. Eardinge (29 W. E. 555), and Ex parte Walton (which has now been reported in the current number uf the Law Reports). Iu the former case Mr. Justice Mathew had held that a lessor, after disclaimer by the trustee of the bankrupt lessee, ■was entitled to eject a sub-lessee of part of the property. The Court of Appeal (consisting of Lords Justices Bramwell, Baggallay, and Lush) considered that as the sub-lessee would not have been prejudiced by the •voluntary surrender of the principal lease, he was not affected by the disclaimer. Ex parte Walton, it will be remembered, also deals with the relations of the landlord and a sub-lessee. The entire property bad here been sub-let, and (in consideration of a premium) at a smaller rent than that reserved by the lease. An application by the lessee's trustee for liberty to disclaim was opposed by the landlord, on the ground that a disclaimer would leave him only the rights attaching to the reversion of the sub-lease. The Court of Appeal gave leave to disclaim, holding that the landlord's rights of distress and re-entry upon the property in respect of the lease disclaimed would subsist notwithstanding the disclaimer j and that the sub-lessee could prove against the bankrupt's estate for his damnification in respect of the difference of rent. As we pointed out at the time of the decision, the sub-lessee is not by the disclaimer relieved from his previous liability to distress and forfeiture on breach of the provisions in the superior lease. The trustee and the bankrupt have got rid of their liability, and the landlord has no one to sue upon the covenants in the lease ; but a sub-lessee, claiming possession for part of the term granted by the lease and an interest carved out of the lessee's interest, cannot enjoy such possession and interest, except subject to the reversionary rights attached to the term in its inception.

It does not appear that the ejectment in Smalley v. Eardinge was brought for breach of the covenants in the priucipal lease; had it been, the action ought, according to Ex parte Walton, to have succeeded. The plaintiff in Smalley v. Sardinge claimed to re-enter by reason of the extinction of the sub-tenant's interest with that of his landlord on the disclaimer, and failed in that contention. In theory the decisions may perfectly well stand together. Indeed the spirit in which the judges in Smalley v. Bardinge treat the language of the 23rd section is quite agreeable to the principle of Exports Walton. What the court had been asked, and refused to do, was to give a very wide effect to the words of the section; what it did was to decide that the disclaimer did not have a certain result beyond what would have arisen from a voluntary surrender—a result affecting the relations between other parties than those to the fictitious surrender. This harmonises very well with the tenour of Ex parte Walton. That case was before the Court of Appeal at Lincoln's-inn on two distinct days; and the language employed by the judges must be taken as carefully weighed. Lord Justice James says, 'By the law of England a lessor has a double right — a right in personam on the contract, a right in rent by distress on the property demised, and by the power of re-entry for non-payment of rent or breach of covenant. Where the lessee makes a sub-demise the sub-tenant is not liable on the contract, but he takes the property subject to all the lessor's rights in rem, and it would be very unjust and unreasonable if a lessee who takes the property subject to liabilities could by any arrangement whatever with a third party derogate from the lessor's rights. Of course the lessee may enter into any contract lie pleases with his sub-lessee by which he (the lessee) expressly or impliedly undertakes to discharge

the obligations of his own lease." The Master of the Rolls says:—" The generality of the words of the section must be so far limited as to have the effect merely of relieving the estate of the bankrupt and the trustee from liability on the one hand, and on the other entitling those whose rights as regards the enforcement of liabilities against the bankrupt or trustee are interfered with by the disclaimer to prove against the bankrupt's estate for the amount of the iujury they may have sustained."

The practical result of the last decision with regard to sub-lessees is no doubt this, that, losing the benefit of the indemnity which their lessor had given them against the covenants in the superior lease, they lose the benefit of their sub-leases so far as the terms of holding under these are more advantageous than under the superior lease. For what they thus lose, they are put to prove against the bankrupt's estate. Sub-lessees of part ot the property in the disclaimed lease are in a peculiarly disadvantageous position, for no doubt the principle of Ex parte Walton covers their case.

There is another question, whether the landlord, after disclaimer, could take advantage of section 9 of the statute 8 & 9 Vict. c. 106, as giving him the rights of reversioner on the underlease, and at the same time maiutain against the sub-lessee his rights under the original lease. Perhaps by setting up against the sublessee rights grounded on his succession to the immediate reversion upon the sub-lease he would adopt the sub-tenancy, and lose against the property comprised in it the advantages preserved to him by Ex parte Walton.


III.—Contracts For Sale.

We propose in this article to examino the subdivision, Contracts for Sale, which begins the second part of the Act headed "Sales and other Transactions," aud consists of sections 3 and 4.

Section 3 is intended to supplement the Vendor and Purchaser Act, 1874, in such a way that the two together may supply a statutory set of common form conditions of sale, sufficient to meet the requirements of all ordinary cases. The present enactment, like the former one, is distinguished by a brevity which is too dearly purchased by the omission of much that ought to have been inserted, and also by an undesirable trick of casual allusion which leaves the reader to gather the meauing not from the text or the context but from his knowledge of the usual course of affairs.

It should be premised that by sub-section (10.) the provisions of this section are restricted to "sales made after the commencement of the Act." When is a " sale" made f when the coutract is entered into or when it is completed? In sub-section (11.) a very different phrase is used. There we are told that the provisions of the section are to apply only "if and as far as a contrary intention is not expressed in the contract of sale," and are " to have effect subject to the terms of the contract, and to tho provisions therein contained." We cannot believe that this awkward vaiiation is due to design; and if we did, it would not raise our opinion of the designer.

By sub-section (1) the purchaser of a derivative lease is, in the absence of express contract, deprived of "the right to call for the title to the leasehold reversion." This is, of course, intended to supply the omission in rule 1 of section 2 of the Vendor and Purchaser Act, 1874, which says that, "under a contract to grant or assign a term of years, whether derived or to be derived out of a freehold or leasehold estate, the intended lessee or assign shall not be entitled to call for the title to the freehold." The effect of the new legislation is that a purchaser cannot call for the leasehold title. It must be observed that while the earlier provision related to contracts both to grant and to assign a term of years, the new provision relates only to a contract to assign an existing derivative lease. Under a contract to grant an underlease, the intended underlessee can still call for the leasehold title.

Sub-section (2) apparently adopts from the Vendor and Purchaser Act the use of the word " freehold," originally derived from the slang of auctioneers, to mean "fee simple." It enacts as follows :—

"Where land of copyhold or customary tenure has been converted into freehold by enfranchisement, then, under a contract to sell and convey the freehold, the purchaser shall not have the right to call for the title to make the enfranchisement."

This can hardly mean to leave upon the vendor the burden of proving that the lands were actually so converted into freehold; because this would oblige him, not only to submit to have the title to make the enfranchisement " called for," bat to show a good title in answer to the call. Docs it then mean that, upon an open contract to sell land in fee simple, the vendor may avoid the obligation to make out any title whatever, by merely producing a deed, purporting to enfranchise the laud, dated the day before the contract, and executed by Bomebody who purports to be the lord of some supposed manor in which the land is mentioned to be situate? And if it does not mean this, whereabouts between these two extremes aro we to place its truo meaning P

The reader must bear in mind that the part of the Act under consideration will be quite useless, unless the statutory conditions supplied by it are obviously appropriate to all ordinary circumstances, and quite clear and easy of application. Then he will be able to appreciate the felicity with wbieh the task has been executed. It was a task of immense difficulty, yet a carelcsB person might think it very easy. The kind of difficulties which we are suggesting do not often occur under the established practice; and it might therefore seem to be a very simple matter to provide an ideal scheme which should be equally free from their intrusion. Dolus latet in generalibus. The safety-bringing restrictions which exist, without being particularly noticed, when wo are considering the bearing of specially constructed conditions upon an actually existing title, disappear when we seek to make those conditions of universal application, by the simple device of writing "whenever" in front of them. No better illustration could be found of our meaning than that supplied by sub-section (2) of the Act. In the actual practice, when copyholds have been previously enfranchised by mutual agreement, and the vendor desires to avoid showing the title of the lord, the excluding condition gives some particulars as to the enfranchisement, and thus offers to the purchaser a fair choice for his consideration. He will know for how long the land bus been held under and according to the freehold title purporting to have been created by the enfranchisement; he will know of what manor the property was formerly held; and he can easily discover by common report—if he cannot, it will be a warning to him to refuse assent to the proposed condition—whether any reputed manor of that name does exist in the specified locality, and on application to the steward he will be able to ascertain whether such an enfranchisement was made as is alleged. Given these data, he may very fairly be called upon to decide whether he will consent to dispense with further proof and information; and if he consents, be is fairly bound by his decision. But when this kind of transaction is' reduced to general terms in four lines of an Act of Parliament, all these practical safeguards disappear. The very essence of them was, that all the details of the transaction by which the land purported to have become freehold, or at any rate the means of obtaining them, had been communicated to the purchaser beforo he was asked to rely upon their plausibility. In the absence of

these indicia, there is no more reason why the purchaser should dispense with this particular right than why he should dispense with anything else mentioned quite at random; and the Act might as reasonably have forbidden him to insist upon the due execution of any deed dated in the month of April, or to require proof of the death of anybody whose name began with an F.

It may be observed that this sub-section does not protect against objections and requisitions to the enfranchisement ascertained aliunde, and that it does not provide that the purchaser shall take under and subject to the restrictions and conditions contaiued in the deed of enfranchisement. Neither of these things can be safely omitted in such a condition.

It may be added that the sub-section we are considering can hardly have much operation, for it was expressly decided by the late Master of the Bells {Kerr v. Pawson, 9 W. R. 447, 25 Beav. 394) that under the Copyhold Enfranchisement Act, 1852, a good title to the lands enfranchised may be made without any proof of tha lord's title.

Sub-section (3) provides a common form condition as to commencement of titleof E stringent character. But it provides that the purchaser is to " assume, unlets the contrary appears, that the recitals contaiued in the abstracted instruments, of any .... document, forming part of that prior title, are correct, and give all the material contents of the .... document so recited." How is the contrary to "appear"? Does what becomes known to the purchaser " appear"? Or is it to "appear on the abstract"? and, if so, how can it?

It is to be observed that this clause, and the clauses (6) relating to expenses, and, (7) relating to a single abstract for the purchaser of two or more lots held under the same title, are made applicable to sales "of any property," and "property" is defined in section t as including real and personal property, and any estate or interest in auy property, real or personal, and aay debt, and anything in action, and any other right or interest. It appears, therefore, that these rules will apply to the sale of an incorporeal hereditament, to which, it seems, the rules in section 2 of the Vendor and Parchaser Act, 1874 (which apply only to contracts for the sale of " land "), do not apply. This has apparently been overlooked by the framers of the new provisions.

The remainder of this section may be dismissed without much further remark. Sub-section (5) enacts that, in the absence of express contract, on production of a receipt for the last payment due for rent under an underlease,the purchasersball assume, unlessthe contrary appears, thatall rents reserved by, audcovenanta contained in, not only the underlease, but also every superior lease, have been paid and performed. The common stipulation that a receipt for ront given by a lessor shsll operate as proof that the covenants of the lease have been duly performed, is of course open to this objection, that bleaches may exist of which the lessor was not aware at tho time of giving the receipt, which would, therefore, not operate as a waiver of them. But, in lb* case of an underlease, we have to contemplate not only concealed breaches: a lessor holdiug by a derivative lease not only might, but certainly would, accept payment of rent from his lessee, even while his own lessor was suing him in ejectment. This is, therefore, a very stringent condition.

In the last sub-section we find something which may have been meant to meet the difficulties above suggested by us in reference to enfranchised copyholds :—

"(11.) Nothing io this section shall be coostrard as binding a purchaser to complete his purchase in any esse where, on a coutract made independently of this section, sod containing stipulations similar to the provisions of this section, or any of them, specific performance of tho contract would not be euforced against him by the court."

But how does this meet those difficulties? We objected against the condition contained in sub-section (2) that it binds tho purchaser to take an enfranchisement for granted, without having been previously made aware of those details which are necessary to enable him to form a rational judgment of the probability that the enfranchisement is valid. But if he chose to consent to the insertion of that condition in the contract, he would of course (in the absence of actual fraud) be bound by it; nor can we see anything in sub-section (11) to relieve him from it. Or is sub-section (11) to be taken to mean, that if the state of things subsequently disclosed by the title is such as the court thinks the purchaser would probably have accepted if it had previously been made known to him, then he is to be bound by the implied acceptance contained in sub-section (2), otherwise not? Even granting that this is to be found in the Act,—and we cannot find it there,—how much litigation ■will be required to determine the measure of probability to be applied to such cases by the court?

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We now turn to section 4, which is as follows :—

"(1.) Where at the death of any person there is subsisting a contract enforceable against his heir or devisee, for the sale of the fee simple or other freehold interest, descendible to his heirs general, in any land, his personal representatives Bhall, by virtue of this Act, have power to convey the land for all the estate and interest vested in him at bis death, in any manner proper for giving effect to the oontraot.

"(2.) A conveyance made under this section shall not affect the benefioial rights of any person claiming under any testamentary disposition or as heir or next of kin of a testator or intestate.

"(3.) This section applies only in oases of death after the commencement of this Act."

Here we may remark in passing that " estate" means, prirnd facie, a legal estate. An equitable estate, socalled, was a mere right, though it was held to devolve in certain ways copied from the limitations of legal estates. Is it certain that an equitable fee, the legal estate being out-standing, would be within this section? Again, as readers of an article which appeared in our last number will remember, an estate pur autre vie, although it passed to the heir general if named in the grant, was not, properly speaking, descendible to the heir general. Is it at all clear that this case is within the section? and if not, was it omitted by design? Leases for lives are estates pur autre vie, and are (or lately were) common in Ireland, to which this Act extends.

But as the section only offers a conveyance by the executor for what it is worth, very properly abstaining from giving him power to bind the heir or devisee, we may reasonably anticipate that purchasers will not be ■very ready to accept such a conveyance.


[To the Editor of the Solicitors' Journal."]

Sir,—Will you kindly allow me a little space for the •purpose of showing the delay and annoyance to which suitors in the High Court are subjected at the hands of masters and judges on applications for liberty to sign judgment under order 14, rule la?

About three weeks ago, by the direction of my principals, I issued a writ on a bill of exchange (drawer against acceptor), the consideration for which was goods sold and delivered in the way of trade.

The defendant having appeared, I immediately took out a summons for judgment, which was at once duly served upon defendant's solicitor, accompanied by copy affidavit in support in the usual way.

The summons was not made returnable till seven days after its issue, thus giving the defendant ample time to snake a counter-affidavit, had he thought proper to do so.

The defendant's solicitor attended on the return, but

without an affidavit, and on going before the master he offered no opposition to the application, but admitted the debt, only asking for a little time, whereupon the master inquired whether he would bring the money into court, to which he replied that he would, and that he should prefer an order to that effect. The master then, notwithstanding my strong protest, made an order giving the defendant liberty to defend, provided he brought into court, within a week, the amount indorsed on the writ " to abide the event."

On the following day I took out a summons to rescind the master's order, and for liberty to sign judgment forthwith, returnable the next morning at eleven o'clock.

On the hearing of that summons the judge said that the master was clearly wrong in the order he had made, and was about to indorse the summons accordingly, when the defendant's solicitor urged that, inasmuch as the copy summons had only just come to his hands, he ought to have time to communicate with his client, and to answer the plaintiff's affidavit; whereupon the judge (my protests notwithstanding) adjourned the summons for a week—viz., three days beyond the time limited by the master's order for payment iuto court. What course the defendant's solicitor intends to take under these circumstances remains to be seen.

Had the master made an order for immediate judgment, as he clearly ought to have done, the sheriff would by this time have been in possession of a writ of fl. fa., and the plaintiff's money would most likely have beeu secured, but as matters now stand, the chances are that it will be lost.

Why should the interests of clients suffer in this way f

To show the uncertain results of these applications for judgment, I may add that on an application iu another action on a bill of exchange, by the same plaintiffs against the same defendant, only a few weeks ago, an order for immediate judgment was made by another master without the slightest hesitation, the facts in both actions being identical.

London, October 5. A Common Law Clerk.


Ex Parte Application Incorrect Affidavit In SupportDismissal Of Motion.—In the o»ne of Crouch v. Jay, before Kay, J., Bitting as Vacation J udge, on the 30th ult., a motion was made to restrain the defendant from distraining the goods and effects of the plaintiff. It appeared that Chitty, J., had already granted an interim injunction upon an ex parte application made before him by the plaintiff. The statement made in support of that application had omitted important facts, and had also contained a statement that 110 account of the sums claimed had been rendered by the defendant to the plaintiff, which statement was shown now to be incorrect. The defendant also denied the plaintiffs story. Kay, J., said that under such circumstances the court must be extremely loath to continue the injunction already granted. Where mis-Btatements and imperfect statements appeared in the evidence of one party, the court must be more inclined to believe the evidence of the other party. His lordship had always understood that the role of the court was that where an ex parte application was made the party making it was bound to display uberrima fides. U there had been any doubt in his mind in the present case arising from the conflict of facts, he wonld have taken these considerations into account and dismissed the motion; as it was he dismissed the motion on its merits, with costs.—Solicitors, C. II. RoberUon, for 11. E. Large; Taylor, Mall, <0 Taylor.

Winding Up Of CompanyProvisional Liquidator Leave To Bring Action In Namb Of Company.—In the case of T/ie Working Men'i Mutual Society (Limited), also before Kay, J., on the 30th ult., an ex parte application was made for leave to use the name of the company for the purposes of an action to set aside a post-nuptial settlement made by the late secretary upon his wife, which settlement, it was believed, oomprised funds belonging to the company. It appeared that the company was ordered to be wound up on the 7th of September, when a provisional liquidator was appointed, and it was stated that an application was on the point of being made in chambers for the appointment of an official liquidator. Kay, J., declined to make the order asked for until after the appointment of the official liquidator.

Contempt or CourtLegal ActDismissal Of WitBBSS From Defendants' ServiceForm Of Undertaking. —In the case of Bowden v. The Universities Co-operative Association, also before Kay, J., on the 30th nit., a debentnre-holder of the association had brought an action to restrain the manager and other officials of the association from selling goods except to customers in the ordinary way of business, and had on the 14th of September moved the court for an interim order in that behalf, but the motion was then ordered to stand over until the trial of the action upon an undertaking being given on behalf of the association not to in the meanwhile act in the manner complained of. An affidavit was sworn by one of the employes of the association, named Fatman, in support of the plaintiffs motion. Shortly afterwards Patman received from the general manager of the association a letter as foliows :—"It having come to my knowledge that you have swom an affidavit against the association (your employers), I am compelled to at once suspend you from your duties pending the decision of the directors, and I beg you to leave the premises at once, and I will communicate with yon in a few days." The general manager also told Fatman, that, in consequence of his affidavit, a son of Fatman who was also an employe" in the establishment, would be dismissed. It was stated that other employe's of the association were afraid to give evidence for fear of dismissal, and the plaintiff under these circumstances moved the court for committal of the general manager to prison for contempt of court. It was argued ai;ainat the motion that the tleman whose conduct was being complained of only acted within his strict legal right of dismissing a servant, and could not be punished for doing that which he had a legal right to do, and it was also contended that the authorities showed no instance of a committal for contempt unless the act complained of was one in itself illegal. Kay, J., said that be was of opinion that the illegality of the act done or threatened was not an element in a case of contempt. All that had to be considered was, Did the act complained of interfere with the course of justice'r or, as well, Did it interfere with the freedom of a witness's evidence': On his part be could not conceive a graver offence against a court of justice than to endeavour to exercise a power, legal or illegal, in order to pnnish a witness for giving evidence, or to intimidate bim from giving evidence, or to induce him to pervert evidence. A grave and flagrant contempt bad been perpetrated, and he would not hesitate to commit the offender to prison for such an endeavour to obstruct the course of justice unless an undertaking were given by him to withdraw the suspension of Fatman, and not to discharge or suspend, or threaten to discharge or suspend, or otherwise injure any officer or servant oftbeassociation, either because he had given or because he intended to give evidence in the action; and also the offender must pay the costs of the motion. The undertaking was given.—Solicitors, G. Blagdcn; 8. O. Turner.

CompanyAllotment Of SharesNotice Of AllotMent Sent By Fost But Not Keceived.—In the case of ilaelay v. Carta Para Gold Mining Company (Limited), before Kay, J., on the 5th inn., sitting as Vacation Judge, a motion was made to restrain the company from calling for or enforcing payment of any sum by way of allotment, or other money alleged to be payable in respect of the shares alleged to be entered in the name of the plaintiff in the books of the company, and asking that tbe name of the plaintiff might be expunged from the list of shareholders. It appeared that the company was incorporated on the 18th of March last, and the plaintiff by his affidavit stated ti at a firm of promoters who brought

outthe company solicited him on the 31st of March last to allow his name to be used as an applicant for a few shares in the company, as tbe number of shares already subscribed for was not sufficient to enable the company to obtain a settlement on the London Stock Exchange, and that the promoters also assured him that the number they required bim to take would be very small, and handed him a printed application for sbares. This doenment was, according to the statement of the plaintiff, signed by him in blank and returned to the promoters, it being at the time distinctly understood "that the nnmber of shares to be allotted to theplaintiff were not to exceed fifty." The plaintiff also stated that he never roceived any notification of allotmeut, nor paid any money in respect of sny shares, nor received any intimation from the company until the 16th of August last, when he received a notice from the company reminding bim that he had subscribed for, and had had allotted him, 1,275 shares, and making a call upon him of five shillings in. respect of each share. The secretary of the company, however, stnted that an application purporting to be signed by the plaintiff was received for 1,500 shares, and a deposit of £75 paid through its bankers to the company and a proper notice of allotment, allotting 1,275 instead of the 1,500 shares, was sent by the company to the plaintiff by post in the ordinary way of business. Kay, J., said that he did not consider himself at liberty to remove the plaintiffs name from the register of tbe company. By the plaintiff's own affidavit it was stated that he had authorized the promoters of the company to fill in on a blank form of application, signed by him, such a number of shares ss should be neoesiary to make up the nnmber requisite for a settlement on the Stock Exchange. Tbe plaintiff alleged that it was distinctly understood that the number was to be a small one. His lordship bad heard learned judges say that the phrase "distinctly understood" meant that no agreement whatever had been made. There was also the authority of Dunlop v. Higgins (1 H. L. C. 3S1) for declining to admit the statement of the plaintiff that the letter posted to him was not received by bim; for it was held in that case that a contract entered into in the ordinary way of business by post was completed by the posting of the letter accepting the contract, and far this reason his lordship must hold that the balance of evidence was in the company's favour, and that the letter was posted. It must also be taken into consideration that the person who was now endeavouring to escape liability had incurred it for tbe sake of inducing persons to subscribe to tbe company. The motion must be dismissed with cost*. —Solicitors, 11. Holland; Harrisons.

At Bow-street, on Saturday last, Charles Burwocd, a clerk, was charged on a warrant with embezzling the sam of £165, received for and on account of his employers, Messrs. Warry & Co., solicitors. The money was paid on July St to the prisoner in Bank of England notes, by Mr. John Green Hine, of Bruce-grove, to complete a purchase. The prisoner had no authority to receive any money, a cashier being appointed for that purpose. The sum mentioned in the charge had not been accounted for, but a sum of £50, paid by the same gentleman to the prisoner on the same day, had been duly handed to the cashier. Mr. Lucas, a member of the firm of Messrs. Warry & Co., stated that a lew days after the money was paid the prisoner did not corns to tbe office, excusing himself on the ground of illness. He never attended again after Bank Holiday, August 2, and the embezzlement being subsequently discovered, a warrant was applied for and issued for his arrest. The warrant was executed by Detective-Sergeant Reader, of the E Division, and in reply to the charge the prisoner said, "I have been in great trouble lately, and have lost all my ideas. I did not embezzle the money." He asked at he would be admitted to bail, as, if so, he could get tbe money together, having lent £100 to a man in tbe Trafalgar-road which bad not been repaid. An I O C tor that amount was found in his possession. The person to whom the money was advanced was, however, called and proved that the loan had been repaid. Mr. Cbnrchlsy applied for bail, but upon its being stated that the prisoner had contracted a loan of £50 since he had been is custody, Mr. Flowers declined to entertain the application.

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