clause was already sufficiently provided for by order 60a, enacted by the Rules of April, 1880. We do not think that Part I. of the schedule has any legal effect. But we doubt whether it can be judicially divorced from the Act on the ground of what took place in Parliament. There is, we believe, but one single instance in which an argument from a Bill has been judicially used for construing an Act. We can recall no precedent of a schedule without its supporting section, but there is a very recent case of a section without its supplementary schedule. The Artizans and Labourers Dwellings Act, 1879 (42 & 43 Vict. c. 64), s. 22, sub-section 3, provided that loans for the purposes of the Act should be" secured by a mortgage in the form set forth in the third schedule hereto." There was no third schedule at all. But the next Parliament quickly came to the rescue by the recital in 43 Vict. c. 8, that "the words 'in the form set forth in the third schedule hereto ' were inserted by mistake," and by the enactment that section 22 "should be construed and read as if the said words had not been inserted therein." CURRENT TOPICS. THE BRANCH BANK OF ENGLAND at the Royal Courts of Justice was opened last Monday, and practitioners are now enabled to pay money into court in the Chancery Division, and suitors to cash their chancery cheques, without incurring the trouble of a journey into the City. WE UNDERSTAND that arrangements are in progress for transacting through the new Royal Courts branch of the Bank of England, and under the conduct of the Chancery Paymaster, all matters respecting payment into and out of court in the Queen's Bench Division of the High Court of Justice. A NOTION Which has long prevailed in Lincoln's-inn has been rudely dispelled in the course of the demolitions now in progress. In a secluded corner of the chambers which are being removed to enlarge the chapel, there was a tablet recording the merits of an ancient member of the inn, whose mortal remains, according to tradition, were built into the thick brickwork. So strong was the belief in this story, that, before the building was pulled down, a hole was driven into the wall in order to extricate whatever remained of the venerable conveyancer. All that was found was a sooty chimney flue. IN PERUSING the Conveyancing and Law of Property Act, 1881, the reader will probably be puzzled what to make of Part I. of the First Schedule, which first schedule is headed "Acts affected." The said Part I. contains a list of nine enactments relating to the entry of judgments. But where in the Act is the section upon which Part I. of the schedule depends? Nowhere. Clause 6 of the Bill, relating to requisitions of searches and certificates, contained the missing words upon which Part I. of the schedule would have depended, but clause 6 was struck out during the passage of the Bill through Parliament owing, we believe, to a suggestion of our own that the subject-matter of the 66 THE LAND BILL for England, which has been "drafted under the auspices of the Farmers' Alliance," is probably framed on the principle of asking for more than you expect to get. It certainly asks for a good deal. The Bill (which no one is to be able to contract himself out of) proposes, in the first place, to sweep away the landlord's right of distress. The landlord, however, is generously allowed a right (which it did not require any new provision to give him) to apply to a county court judge, who "may order" [not shall order] the tenant to pay the rent in arrear, the order being enforceable in the same way as an ordinary county court judgment. The judge, however, is also enabled, in addition to such order, to make an order that the tenancy be determined. Observe that this latter order is not necessarily restricted to cases where the landlord has applied for it; so far as appears the landlord may apply for an order for payment of rent, and the judge, while making that order, may also relieve the tenant from all further obligations under his lease. By clause 23 the right of the landlord to reenter for any breach of covenant is restricted, so as only to be exercised by the court, which is to consist of the county court judge, and two assessors appointed by the Board of Guardians. In the next place, every agricultural tenancy is to be converted into a very singular kind of tenancy from term to term. By clause 12, unless the landlord or tenant gives a notice in writing, two years [we presume this means at least two years] before the expiration of the term, that he declines to renew the contract of tenancy, the existing contract is to be renewed "for the same term, at the same rent, and on the same conditions, as in the existing contract of tenancy." Assuming that we are correct in supposing that the notice may be given at least two years before the expiration of the term, the only practical result of the passing into law of this provision would be to add to the costs of every agricultural lease or agreement the expense of preparing and serving, at the time of the execution of the lease or agreement, of a notice by the landlord that he declines to renew it. If it is intended that the notice shall be given precisely two years before the expiration of the term, and only then, a charming prospect of litigation as to whether the notice was served in time is opened up, and agents and trustee-landlords will find their responsibilities greatly increased. The period of notice required to determine a tenancy from year to year is proposed to be extended to two years at least. Clause 13 proposes to make the county court judge and his two assessors (probably tenant farmers) the arbitrators as to whether, upon a proposed renewal of a lease or tenancy, the rent should be increased; and it is provided that "the court shall not sanction an increase of rent unless it is proved that the value of the holding has increased from other causes than the improvements made by the tenant, and shall determine the amount, if any, of such increase." The practical effect of this, will, of course, be to prevent any landlord from even entering into any negotiations for renewing the lease to his former tenant whenever he thinks more rent can be got by going into the open market. Elaborate provisions are made for enabling a tenant to obtain compensation for improvements made by him upon his holding, the amount of such com. pensation being estimated "by the sum that a person having sufficient means to cultivate the holding is willing to give in consideration of being admitted as tenant of the holding at the rent payable by the outgoing tenant, or at such increased or decreased rent as may have been determined in the manner" by the Act provided -i.e., in case of disagreement, by the county court judge and his two tenant farmer assessors. The jurisdiction "of any court of law or equity" [has the framer of the Act forgotten the Judicature Act?] is to cease as to "every matter of difference or dispute between a landlord and tenant in respect of, or arising out of, any contract of tenancy, except any question as to the validity of such a contract," and landlords are to be handed over to the county court judge and his tenant farmer colleagues. There are many other provisions in favour of the tenant, but we think our readers will probably have learnt sufficient for the present as to this class of provisions. The provisions in favour of the landlord are, first, a power to apply to the county court judge and his tenant farmer colleagues to assess damages for deterioration of the holding by the tenant, but solely (see clause 21) "with reference to the extent to which the acts or defaults complained of have lessened the letting value of the holding." The triumvirate are also empowered, if "such deterioration" be persisted in, to order the tenant to give up possession of the holding to the landlord. The landlord may also obtain an injunction" to restrain the tenant from doing any acts which, in the opinion of the county court judge and his tenant farmer colleagues, "would be injurious to the holding or the estate of the landlord." 46 66 a THE STATUTE LAW REVISION and Civil Procedure Act, 1881, has revived the curious power of surveyors of taxes to make domiciliary visits, which was taken away from them by the Taxes Management Act, 1880 (44 Vict. c. 19). The revival is effected in this wise. The ancient Act, 43 Geo. 3, c. 161, s. 60, empowers assessors, inspectors, and surveyors," taking with them, where necessary, constable, headborough, tythingman, or other officer" to view and examine "such dwelling-house" [i.e., the dwelling-house subject to house-tax], "in order to ascertain the number of windows therein and the annual rent at which the same dwelling-house ought to be charged," and for so doing they are to have liberty “to pass through any house or houses, and to go through any court, yard, or back side," &c. The Taxes Management Act, 1880, repealed a large number of enactments relating to this subject, and amongst them 43 Geo. 3, c. 161, s. 60. But the repeal of section 60 was either the result of a pure mistake, or else the Inland Revenue officials repented of the abolition of the power to make domiciliary visits. At all events the Statute Law Revision, &c., Act, 1881, contains, amongst the list of repealed enactments, the following:-"In the third schedule [of the Taxes Management Act, 1880, of which other sections are also repealed], containing enactments repealed, in the entry of 43 Geo. 3, c. 161, the word 'sixty,' which section sixty is hereby revived, as from its repeal in that schedule to the extent to which it was in force at the repeal." The qualifying words “to the extent,” &c., have reference, we presume, to the repeal of the whole of section 60 by the Statute Law Revision Act, 1872, "except as to ascertaining the rent of a house." We cannot think this to be a desirable mode of passing what is in effect a new Revenue law. There are, we are aware, precedents for something of the kind. The Statute Law Revision Act, 1875 (38 & 39 Vict. c. 66), s. 33, enacts that "section twenty-five of the Act of the ninth year of King George the Fourth, chapter fiftyeight, repealed by the Statute Law Revision Act, 1873, is hereby revived, as from the repeal thereof, and all pro ceedings taken thereunder since such repeal shall be as valid and effectual as if the said section had not been repealed; and the second schedule of the Statute Law Revision Act, 1878 (41 & 42 Vict. c. 79), contains no less than five "revived" enactments. The work of Statute Law Revision has been executed on the whole with great accuracy. But when mistakes of this kind happen to be made, they should surely be corrected by separate and perfectly intelligible re-enactments. THE PRACTICE prevalent in the Western counties of requiring purchasers by private contract, or under conditions of sale by auction, to pay a contract fee to the vendor's solicitor and the auctioneer, seems to have given rise to an animated discussion at the annual meeting of the Bristol Law Society, and we are glad to see that a resolution was passed to the effect that, in the opinion of the meeting, the time had arrived for a re-consideration of the matter, and that an adjournment should take place for the purpose of the council canvassing the local solicitors as to their agreeing to forego their fees in the matter, and reporting to a future meeting of the profession. It may be worth while to point out that the auctioneer cannot sue for such fees. In Cherry v. Anderson (Irish Reports, 10 C. L. 204) leasehold premises were sold by auction upon this among other conditions of sale, "that the purchaser shall pay two and a half per cent. auctioneer's fees." The declaration of sale was signed by the auctioneer, who was employed by the vendor, and the agreement for sale was signed by the respective agents of the vendor and purchaser, the conditions of sale being incorporated in both documents. It was held that the auctioneer could not recover his fees from the purchaser on a count for work and labour, nor on the special contract, inasmuch as he was not a party to it, and no consideration moved from him, the only contract to pay fees being between the vendor and purchaser. THE SEVENTEENTH SECTION of the Statute of Frauds is repealed. Start not, learned reader: the seventeenth section in question is not the famous section, commonly so numbered, relating to a sale of goods of the value of £10 or upwards, but the section commonly numbered as the sixteenth, directing that writs of execution shall only bind goods from the time of their delivery to the officer. The repeal is effected by the Statute Law Revision and Civil Procedure Act, 1881 (44 & 45 Vict. c. 59), to the schedule of which, containing a whole host of enactments repealed as "spent or having ceased to be in force otherwise than by express and specific repeal of Parliament," the Legislature has considerately prefixed the note that "this schedule is to be read as referring to the Revised Edition of the Statutes prepared under the direction of the Statute Law Committee, in all cases of statutes included in that edition." The section commonly numbered seventeen is numbered sixteen "in that edition," and no doubt correctly so numbered. DISCLAIMER OF LEASE IN THE importance of the subject must be our excuse for the obligations of his own lease." The Master of the Rolls says: "The generality of the words of the section must be so far limited as to have the effect merely of relieving the estate of the bankrupt and the trustee from liability on the one hand, and on the other entitling those whose rights as regards the enforcement of liabilities against the bankrupt or trustee are interfered with by the disclainer to prove against the bankrupt's estate for the amount of the injury they may have sustained." The practical result of the last decision with regard to sub-lessees is no doubt this, that, losing the benefit of the indemnity which their lessor had given them against the covenants in the superior lease, they lose the benefit of their sub-leases so far as the terms of holding under these are more advantageous than under the superior lease. For what they thus lose, they are put to prove against the bankrupt's estate. Sub-lessees of part of the property in the disclaimed lease are in a peculiarly disadvantageous position, for no doubt the principle of Ex parte Walton covers their case. There is another question, whether the landlord, after disclaimer, could take advantage of section 9 of the statute 8 & 9 Vict. c. 106, as giving him the rights of reversioner on the underlease, and at the same time maintain against the sub-lessee his rights under the original lease. Perhaps by setting up against the sublessee rights grounded on his succession to the immediate reversion upon the sub-lease he would adopt the sub-tenancy, and lose against the property comprised in it the advantages preserved to him by Ex parte Walton. THE PRACTICAL EFFECT OF THE CONVEYANCING ACT. WE III.-CONTRACTS FOR SALE. propose in this article to examine the subdivision, Contracts for Sale, which begins the second part of the Act headed "Sales and other Transactions," and consists of sections 3 and 4. Section 3 is intended to supplement the Vendor and Purchaser Act, 1874, in such a way that the two together may supply a statutory set of common form conditions of sale, sufficient to meet the requirements of all ordinary cases. The present enactment, like the former one, is distinguished by a brevity which is too dearly purchased by the omission of much that ought to have been inserted, and also by an undesirable trick of casual allusion which leaves the reader to gather the meaning not from the text or the context but from his knowledge of the usual course of affairs. It should be premised that by sub-section (10.) the provisions of this section are restricted to "sales made after the commencement of the Act." When is a "sale" made? when the contract is entered into or when it is completed? In sub-section (11.) a very different phrase is used. There we are told that the provisions of the section are to apply only "if and as far as a contrary intention is not expressed in the contract of sale," and are "to have effect subject to the terms of the contract, and to the provisions therein contained." We cannot believe that this awkward variation is due to design; and if we did, it would not raise our opinion of the designer. By sub-section (1) the purchaser of a derivative lease is, in the absence of express contract, deprived of "the right to call for the title to the leasehold reversion." This is, of course, intended to supply the omission in rule 1 of section 2 of the Vendor and Purchaser Act, 1874, which says that, "under a contract to grant or assign a term of years, whether derived or to be derived out of a freehold or leasehold estate, the intended lessee or assign shall not be entitled to call for the title to the freehold." The effect of the new legislation is that a purchaser cannot call for the leasehold title. It must be observed that while the earlier provision related to contracts both to grant and to assign a term of years, the new provision relates only to a contract to assign an existing derivative lease. Under a contract to grant an underlease, the intended underlessee can still call for the leasehold title. Sub-section (2) apparently adopts from the Vendor and Purchaser Act the use of the word "freehold," originally derived from the slang of auctioneers, to mean "fee simple." It enacts as follows: "Where land of copyhold or customary tenure has been converted into freehold by enfranchisement, then, under a contract to sell and convey the freehold, the purchaser shall not have the right to call for the title to make the enfranchisement." This can hardly mean to leave upon the vendor the burden of proving that the lands were actually so converted into freehold; because this would oblige him, not only to submit to have the title to make the enfranchisement "called for," but to show a good title in answer to the call. Does it then mean that, upon an open contract to sell land in fee simple, the vendor may avoid the obligation to make out any title whatever, by merely producing a deed, purporting to enfranchise the land, dated the day before the contract, and executed by somebody who purports to be the lord of some supposed manor in which the land is mentioned to be situate? And if it does not mean this, whereabouts between these two extremes are we to place its true meaning? these indicia, there is no more reason why the purchaser should dispense with this particular right than why he should dispense with anything else mentioned quite at random; and the Act might as reasonably have forbidden him to insist upon the due execution of any deed dated in the month of April, or to require proof of the death of anybody whose name began with an F. It may be observed that this sub-section does not protect against objections and requisitions to the enfranchisement ascertained aliunde, and that it does not provide that the purchaser shall take under and subject to the restrictions and conditions contained in the deed of enfranchisement. Neither of these things can be safely omitted in such a condition. It may be added that the sub-section we are consider. ing can hardly have much operation, for it was expressly decided by the late Master of the Rolls (Kerr v. Pawson, 9 W. R. 447, 25 Beav. 394) that under the Copyhold Enfranchisement Act, 1852, a good title to the lands enfranchised may be made without any proof of the lord's title. Sub-section (3) provides a common form condition as to commencement of title of & stringent character. But it provides that the purchaser is to "assume, unless the contrary appears, that the recitals contained in the abstracted instruments, of any ... document, forming part of that prior title, are correct, and give all the material contents of the document so recited." How is the contrary to " appear"? Does what becomes known to the purchaser "appear"? Or is it to "appear on the abstract"? and, if so, how can it? It is to be observed that this clause, and the clauses (6) relating to expenses, and, (7) relating to a single abstract for the purchaser of two or more lots held under the same title, are made applicable to sales "of any property," and " property" is defined in section 2 as including real and personal property, and any estate or interest in any property, real or personal, and any debt, and anything in action, and any other right or interest. It appears, therefore, that these rules will apply to the sale of an incorporeal hereditament, to which, it seems, the rules in section 2 of the Vendor and Parchaser Act, 1874 (which apply only to contracts for the sale of "land"), do not apply. This has apparently been overlooked by the framers of the new provisions. The reader must bear in mind that the part of the Act under consideration will be quite useless, unless the statutory conditions supplied by it are obviously appropriate to all ordinary circumstances, and quite clear and easy of application. Then he will be able to appreciate the felicity with which the task has been executed. It was a task of immense difficulty, yet a careless person might think it very easy. The kind of difficulties which we are suggesting do not often occur under the established practice; and it might therefore seem to be a very simple matter to provide an ideal scheme which should be equally free from their intrusion. Dolus latet in generalibus. The safety-bringing restrictions which exist, without being particularly noticed, when we are considering the bearing of specially constructed conditions upon an actually existing title, disappear when we seek to make those conditions of universal application, by the simple device of writing "whenever" in front of them. No better illustration could be found of our meaning than that supplied by sub-section (2) of the Act. In the actual practice, when copy holds have been previously enfranchised by mutual agreement, and the vendor desires to avoid showing the title of the lord, the exclud. ing condition gives some particulars as to the enfranchisement, and thus offers to the purchaser a fair choice for his consideration. He will know for how long the land has been held under and according to the freehold title purporting to have been created by the enfranchisement; he will know of what manor the property was formerly held ; and he can easily discover by common report-if he cannot, it will be a warning to him to refuse assent to the proposed condition-whether any reputed manor of that name does exist in the specified locality, and on application to the steward he will be able to ascertain whether such an enfranchisement was made as is alleged. Given these data, he may very fairly be called upon to decide whether he will consent to dispense with further proof and information; and if he consents, he is fairly bound by his decision. But when this kind of trans-binding a purchaser to complete his purchase in any case action is reduced to general terms in four lines of an Act of Parliament, all these practical safeguards disappear. The very essence of them was, that all the details of the transaction by which the land purported to have become freehold, or at any rate the means of obtaining them, had been communicated to the purchaser before he was asked to rely upon their plausibility. In the absence of The remainder of this section may be dismissed without much further remark. Sub-section (5) enacts that, in the absence of express contract, on production of a receipt for the last payment due for rent under an underlease, the purchaser shall assume, unless the contrary appears, that all rents reserved by, and covenants contained in, not only the underlease, but also every superior lease, have been paid and performed. The common stipula tion that a receipt for rent given by a lessor shall operate as proof that the covenants of the lease have been duly performed, is of course open to this objection, that breaches may exist of which the lessor was not aware at the time of giving the receipt, which would, therefore, not operate as a waiver of them. But, in the case of an underlease, we have to contemplate not only concealed breaches: a lessor holding by a derivative lease not only might, but certainly would, accept payment of rent from his lessee, even while his own lessor was suing him in ejectment. This is, therefore, a very stringent condition. In the last sub-section we find something which may have been meant to meet the difficulties above suggested by us in reference to enfranchised copy holds : "(11.) Nothing in this section shall be construed as where, on a contract made independently of this section, and containing stipulations similar to the provisions of this section, or any of them, specific performance of the contract would not be enforced against him by the court." But how does this meet those difficulties? We objected against the condition contained in sub-section (2) that it binds the purchaser to take an enfranchise ment for granted, without having been previously made aware of those details which are necessary to enable him to form a rational judgment of the probability that the enfranchisement is valid. But if he chose to consent to the insertion of that condition in the contract, he would of course (in the absence of actual fraud) be bound by it; nor can we see anything in sub-section (11) to relieve him from it. Or is sub-section (11) to be taken to mean, that if the state of things subsequently disclosed by the title is such as the court thinks the purchaser would probably have accepted if it had previously been made known to him, then he is to be bound by the implied acceptance contained in sub-section (2), otherwise not? Even granting that this is to be found in the Act, and we cannot find it there,-how much litigation will be required to determine the measure of probability to be applied to such cases by the court? We now turn to section 4, which is as follows: "(1.) Where at the death of any persou there is subsist. ing a contract enforceable against his heir or devisee, for the sale of the fee simple or other freehold interest, descendible to his heirs general, in any land, his personal representatives shall, by virtue of this Act, have power to convey the land for all the estate and interest vested in him at his death, in any manner proper for giving effect to the contract. (2.) A conveyance made under this section shall not affect the beneficial rights of any person claiming under any testamentary disposition or as heir or next of kin of a testator or intestate. "(3.) This section applies only in cases of death after the commencement of this Act." Here we may remark in passing that "estate" means, prima facie, a legal estate. An equitable estate, socalled, was a mere right, though it was held to devolve in certain ways copied from the limitations of legal estates. Is it certain that an equitable fee, the legal estate being out-standing, would be within this section? Again, as readers of an article which appeared in our last number will remember, an estate pur autre vie, although it passed to the heir general if named in the grant, was not, properly speaking, descendible to the heir general. Is it at all clear that this case is within the section? and if not, was it omitted by design? Leases for lives are estates pur autre vie, and are (or lately were) common in Ireland, to which this Act extends. But as the section only offers a conveyance by the executor for what it is worth, very properly abstaining from giving him power to bind the heir or devisec, we may reasonably anticipate that purchasers will not be very ready to accept such a conveyance. CORRESPONDENCE. APPLICATIONS FOR JUDGMENT. [To the Editor of the Solicitors' Journal.] Sir,-Will you kindly allow me a little space for the purpose of showing the delay and annoyance to which suitors in the High Court are subjected at the hands of masters and judges on applications for liberty to sign judgment under order 14, rule la? About three weeks ago, by the direction of my principals, I issued a writ on a bill of exchange (drawer against acceptor), the consideration for which was goods sold and delivered in the way of trade. The defendant having appeared, I immediately took out a summons for judgment, which was at once duly served upon defendant's solicitor, accompanied by copy affidavit in support in the usual way. The summons was not made returnable till seven days after its issue, thus giving the defendant ample time to make a counter-affidavit, had he thought proper to do so. The defendant's solicitor attended on the return, but without an affidavit, and on going before the master he offered no opposition to the application, but admitted the debt, only asking for a little time, whereupon the master inquired whether he would bring the money into court, to which he replied that he would, and that he should prefer an order to that effect. The master then, notwithstanding my strong protest, made an order giving the defendant liberty to defend, provided he brought into court, within a week, the amount indorsed on the writ "to abide the event." On the following day I took out a summons to rescind the master's order, and for liberty to sign judgment forthwith, returnable the next morning at eleven o'clock. On the hearing of that summons the judge said that the master was clearly wrong in the order he had made, and was about to indorse the summons accordingly, when the defendant's solicitor urged that, inasmuch as the copy summons had only just come to his hands, he ought to have time to communicate with his client, and to answer the plaintiff's affidavit; whereupon the judge (my protests notwithstanding) adjourned the summons for a week-viz., three days beyond the time limited by the master's order for payment into court. What course the defendant's solicitor intends to take under these circumstances remains to be seen. Had the master made an order for immediate judgment, as he clearly ought to have done, the sheriff would by this time have been in possession of a writ of fi. fa., and the plaintiff's money would most likely have been secured, but as matters now stand, the chances are that it will be lost. Why should the interests of clients suffer in this way? To show the uncertain results of these applications for judgment, I may add that on an application in another action on a bill of exchange, by the same plaintiffs against the same defendant, only a few weeks ago, an order for immediate judgment was made by another master without the slightest hesitation, the facts in both actions being identical. London, October 5. A COMMON LAW CLERK. CASES OF THE WEEK. EX PARTE APPLICATION INCORRECT AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT-DISMISSAL OF MOTION.-In the case of Crouch v. Jay, before Kay, J., sitting as Vacation Judge, on the 30th ult., a motion was made to restrain the defendant from distraining the goods and effects of the plaintiff. It appeared that Chitty, J., had already granted an interim injunction upon an ex parte application made before him by the plaintiff. The statement made in support of that application had omitted important facts, and had also contained a statement that no account of the sums claimed had been rendered by the defendant to the plaintiff, which statement was shown now to be incorrect. The defendant also denied the plaintiff's story. KAY, J., said that under such circumstances the court must be extremely loath to continue the injunction already granted. Where mis-statements and imperfect statements appeared in the evidence of one party, the court must be more inclined to believe the evidence of the other party. His lordship had always understood that the rule of the court was that where an ex parte application was made the party making it was bound to display uberrima fides. If there had been any doubt in his mind in the present case arising from the conflict of facts, he would have taken these considerations into account and dismissed the motion; as it was he dismissed the motion on its merits, with costs.-SOLICITORS, C. H. Robertson, for R. E. Large; Taylor, Hall, & Taylor. WINDING UP OF COMPANY-PROVISIONAL LIQUIDATOR -LEAVE TO BRING ACTION IN NAME OF COMPANY.-In the case of The Working Men's Mutual Society (Limited), also before Kay, J., on the 30th ult., an ex parte application was made for leave to use the name of the company for |