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It is customary with the opponents of this sort of action to say that it is much better that it should be broken if the man has really changed his mind; but that answer seems to us to regard too exclusively the cases in which the promise is actually made. It is all very well to say that it is better to break the promise than keep it in such cases. We say that it is better not to make the promise in such cases, and our suggestion iB that the existence of the action causes fewer promises to be made which it iB afterwards better to break. There are a great many men of a selfish and sentimental order of mind, but without much manly •ense of responsibility and fidelity. This sort of people exist among the lower grades of society, where to jilt a woman would not be to incur much social stigma. We are afraid it does not always involve much social stigma among the higher circles. We cannot help thinking that if all legal liability were removed, such persons would more frequently trifle with the affections and damage the prospects of women than they do at present. Besides, we are disposed to think that many very fairly successful marriages come to pass because the promise to marry is binding in law.The very highest ideal of marriage ought not, to our mind, to be regarded as indicating the basis of legislation. The law must regard men and women as they practically exist in the bulk. It is very easy to say that a man who marries a woman because he will have damages to pay if he does not, is a man whom Bhe is better without. To begin with, the damages are not the only element that the man will consider. The defendant in a breach of promise case is made to appear both in a ridiculous and odious light. And the feeling of shame which, according to some moralists, is the original root of virtue, and at any rate is a feeling other than merely sordid, is appealed to. Again, there is no doubt, to our mind, that the same consideration applies in this case as in the case of marriage, though no doubt in a minor degree: people to a great extent embrace willingly, and in the end are tolerably satisfied with, a thing which is of binding legal obligation when they would have perhaps changed their mind and rejected it had it been purely voluntary. Many married people go on very comfortably and really to their mutual advantage when they would have separated if the continuance of the union had been purely voluntary. We think it very probable that many sufficiently happy marriages have been brought about by the fact that the man could not be sure if he broke it off whether he might not be held up to public scorn in a court of justice. We do not say that this very consciously suggests itself to his mind, but the existence of the legal obligation is a latent factor preventing fickleness and assisting to steadfastness. In the higher circles these actions are no doubt uncommon. Though we do not say that bad conduct on the part of men in this respect is not common enough in those circles, we should bo disposed to think that social opinion in this respect was more potent and effective as a check upon such conduct than it would be in the lower middle class.

On tbc 15th inst, Mr. Justice Barry passed sentence of ten years' penal servitude upon Thomas Colclough, the stamp distributor, at Dublin, who was found guilty of iorging and uttering forged stamps.

After finishing the assizes at Croydon, says the Times, Mr. Baron Huddleston was requested to proceed to Bristol, to take the place of Lord Jostioe Lush, who was obliged to return to London from illness. It was noticed during the assizes, both at Croydon and Bristol, that the judge was suffering great pain. Immediately after his return to London on Wednesday morning, having finished the eause list at Bristol, a consultation with bis doctors was held and the operation of lithotrity was advised. It was performed by Sir Henry Thompson, in the presence of Dr. Horace Dobell, Mr. Buckstone Brown, and Mr. Clover, who administered the ether. The operation was eminently successful; a large calculus was removed, and Mr. Baron Huddleston is progressing favourably.


The recent cases of In re Hopkins, Williams v. Hopkins (29 W. R. 658), and In re Hopkins (29 W. R. 752), an of much importance, as showing the practice under the provisions of section 10 of the Judicature Act, 1875, importing the Bankruptcy Rules into the administration of insolvent estates. The plaintiffs were equitable mortgagees of part of the estate of an insolvent testator. They took a judgment in their action on behalf of themselves and all other the creditors. After the usual decree had been mode, the chief clerk called upon the mortgagees to put a value on their security, which they did, valuing it at £1,800, and the chief clerk then certified that they were unsecured creditors for the balance, beyond the amount of such valuation, of the mortgage debt. They then applied that the mortgaged property might be included in the sale of the testator's real estato ordered by the decree, and that, in the event of the proceeds being insufficient to pay their debt and costs, they might be allowed to prove for the balance against the testator's estate. The judge ordered all the testator's estate to be sold, without prejudice to any question; and upon the sale the mortgaged property realized £343 less than the valuation. The mortgagees then applied by summons that they might prove for the balance between the sum actually realized and the amount of their mortgage debt and costs. Mr. Justice Fry hdd that, as the plaintiffs had not excepted to the chief clerk's certificate or attempted to vary it, they must be taken to have exercised their right of election, under section 10 of the Judicature Act, 1875, to treat the mortgaged property as being of the value of £1,800, and could not be released from that election unless under circumstances showing that there had been mistake or miscarriage. As no such circumstances were shown to exist, and no question was raised as to the election being made under pressure or by mistake, Mr. Justice Fry dismissed the summons. Subsequently the mortgagees applied that the chief clerk's certificate might be varied or altered, alleging that" in putting a value on their security, when directed by the chief clerk so to do, they did not exercise any right of election, and had no option; that it was the invariable practice in chambers, in the administration of an insolvent estate of a person who had died since the commencement of the Judicature Act, 1875, to compel every secured creditor to put a value on his security, and the chief clerks had in all cases ignored rule 78 of the Bankruptcy Rules, 1870, and had regard only to rules 99, 100, and 101; and that the plaintiffs were forced to value before it was proved that the estate was insolvent."

Now, under the Bankruptcy Rules referred to in the summons the course of procedure is this:—Rule 78 enables the owner of the seourity to apply by motion for the realization of the property comprised in his security. Rule 80 provides that, in case the moneys which arias from the sale shall be insufficient to pay and satisfy what shall be found due to the owner of the security, then he shall be entitled to prove for such deficiency. Rule 99 provides that a secured creditor, unless he shall have realized bis security, shall, previously to being allowed to prove, state in his proof the particulars of his security and the value thereof. These rules, in the opinion of Mr. Justice Fry, contemplate two successive acts ; that is to say, the realization of the property is contemplated as taking place, if at all, at an earlier stage; and when the stage of proof has been reaohed, if the sale has not previously taken place, then the valuation istobeputupon the property. Applying the rules, as thus interpreted, to the administration of an insolvent estate, the learned j udge held that the plaintiffs might, if they bad thought tit, have applied by motion for the realization of their security at any time before the matter came before the chief clerk to ascertain the amount of their debt. That period, in the opinion of Mr. Justice Fry, corresponds to the period of proof in bankruptcy. After that period the 99th rule applies, and, if the plaintiff has not then realized his security, the chief clerk is bound to require him to put a value on it. The learned judge, therefore, held that in In re Hopkins the chief clerk had acted in strict accordance with the Bankruptcy Rules.

If this case is to be taken as settling the practice, it would appear that, as soon as the estate has been ascertained, or agreed between all parties, to be insolvent, the mortgagee should apply to have his security realized, and that, if he neglects to do this before the chief clerk comes to ascertain his debt, he will have either to rest on his security or to put a value on it. Probably the result will be to render more common in actions for administration by a mortgagee the form of judgment given in 2 Seton, 823, 4th ed., under which the plaintiff will first realize his security, and, if it proves insufficient, will go on to administer the estate as a creditor for the purpose of obtaining payment of the balance of his debt out of the estate.


DISTRESS ON GOODS OF COMPANY. {Thomas .v. Patent Lionite Company, C.A., 29 W. R. 596; In re Silkstone and Dodworth Coal and Iron Company {Limited), Ex parte Perkins, Fry, J., 29 W. R. 484; In re South Kensington Co-operative Stores {Limited), Fry, J., 29 "W. R. 662.)

In the first mentioned of these cases a landlord distrained on the goods of a company after the passing of a resolution for voluntary winding up, but before the appointment of a liquidator. Vice-Chancellor Malins held (29 W. R. 349) that until the liquidator was appointed there was no "effective winding up," explaining the provision of section 130, that a voluntary winding up shall be deemed to commence at the passing of the resolution, as meaning "at the passing of something which is effective"; hence he thought that there was nothiDg to prevent the distress from being levied. The Court of Appeal, without any hesitation, adhered to the plain meaning of the words of section 130, and held that a distress levied by a landlord after the passing of a winding-up resolution, whether a liquidator is or Is not appointed, will be void under section 163, subject to the discretion of the court under sections 185 and 187. With regard to the exercise of this discretion, the Master of the Rolls took occasion to re-state the rule laid down in In re North Yorkshire Iron Company (26 W. R. 367) and other cases, that "the court ought to exercise this discretion in favour of a landlord or execution creditor when he cannot provo in the winding up for his debt; but where he can prove, the discretion ought not to be exercised. Here the landlords are creditors and can prove. There is, therefore, no ground for exercising this judicial discretion."

In In re Silkstone, &c., Company {Limited), a lease of coal mines to a company contained a power for the lessor, if rent should be in arrear for thirty days, to stop the working and to distrain; and, if no sufficient distress should be found, or if there should be a breach of covenant not capable of being compensated in money, to enter, and that theu the term should cease. An order for a winding up by the court was made on November 5, on a petition presented on October 7. Rent fell due on November 3, and on December 6, the rent not being paid, the lessor required the liquidator to pay the rent, and stated that, if the rent Were not paid, he should apply to the court to restrain the working. The liquidator did not pay the rent, and continued the working, and large quantities of

coal were got. It was contended that the rent should be apportioned, and that the lessor should prove for the proportionate part up to October 7, the commencement of the winding-up. Mr. Justice Fry thought that the question before the court was governed by the principle of In re Lundy Granite Company, Ex parte Heaven (19 "W. R. 609, L. R.6 Ch. 4621, that "in some cases between the landlord and the company, if the company for its own purposes, and with a view to the realization of the property to better advantage, remains in possession of the estate, which the lessor is therefore not able to obtain possession of, common sense and ordinary justice require the court to see that the landlord receives the full value of the property." As the liquidator, after the notice had been given by the landlord under the proviso in the lease, continued working the mines, Mr. Justice Fry held that this was an election by the liquidator to continue in possession of the property for the purposes of the company, entitling the lessor to the fnll rent—that is, to the whole half year's rent due on November 3. The ground on which this decision was put appears to be that the landlord having the power, by compelling the working to cease, to render less valuable an asset of the company, the liquidator must be taken to have purchased from the landlord the right of going on working on the terms of fulfilling tho provisions of the lease.

In In Re South Kensington Co-operative Stores, a company occupied leasehold houses for the purposes of their business, aDd after the presentation of a petition to wind up the company, the provisional and official liquidator continued to carry on the business on the same premises. The rent having fallen into arrear, the landlord applied to the court for liberty to distrain. It appears that the lease contained a proviso for re-entry, but the landlord had not taken any steps to enforce it. Mr. Justice Fry gave leave to the landlord to distrain only for the rent accruing since the commencement of the winding up—i.e., the date of the presentation of tho petition—and held that the court would apportion the rent accruing due before and after that date.

The result of the two cases last mentioned seems to be, first of all, to confirm the view of Vice-Chancellor Hall in In re North Yorkshire Iron Company (26 W. R. 367, L. R. 7 Ch. D. 661), that a landlord is entitled to be paid in full the rent accruing from day to day after the commencement of the liquidation whenever the liquidator has retained possession of the property let, either with a view of carrying on the business or of disposing of it as a going concern. It is also decided that the period after which the landlord is entitled to the rent is the presentation of the petition for wiuding up; and that in ordinary cases the court will apportion the rent accruing before aud after that date. But it appears that where the landlord has shown an intention to enforce his proviso for re-entry, he may, in some cases, become entitled to the whole of the rent which becomes due in respect of the preceding term of payment on a day after the commencement of tho liquidation.


ENROLLING DEED IN CHANCERY. [To the Editor of the Solicitors' Journal.] Sir,—Can any of yonr readers tell me the effect of enrolling a deed in chancery? A question has arisen whether enrolment makes a deed absolutely unimpeachable, and I shall be glad to be referred to some authority on the point. A SuBSCKiBEa.


CompanyWinding UpAction By Debenture-Holder Costs.—In a oase of In re Province of Brescia Steam Tramway Company {Limited), before Cave, J., Vacation Judge, on tbe 17th inat., a petition by creditors was presented for tbe compulsory winding np of the company, and subsequently actions were commenced by debentureholders to enforce their securitiee, and for the usual accounts in reference thereto. By the direotion of the judge motions for the appointment of receivers in the actions were directed to come on with the windirg-np petition. One order was eventually made in the petition and in the actions, and a voluntary winding up, agreed to by the company, was continued under the supervision of the court, and the liquidators already appointed were continued, and were also appointed reoeivers in the aotions. A question was then raised as to whether the costs of the plaintiffs in the two actions should be ooets in the winding up, and this was objected to by the company. Cave, J., held that the costs of the aotions were properly costs in the winding up, and on these terms all further proceedings in the actions were stayed.—Solicitobs, Bellamy, Strong, <fc Co.; Maims § Long den; Taylor.

Bubble CompanyWinding Up.—In the case of the Wheal Elizabeth Company (Limited), also before Cave, J., Vacation Judge, on the 17th inst., a petition was presented for the winding up of the company by a shareholder, on the ground that the same was a fraud and a bubble company. The company did not oppose the application, and Cavb, J., made the usual compulsory order.—Solicitors, Heal I; J. Davis.

CompanyWinding UpConduct Op Order.—In the caae of another company, called the Silver Valley Mines (Limited), also before Cave, J., on tbe 17th inst., a compnlBory order was made for the winding up of the company on a similar ground to that in the last-mentioned case, and certain creditors of the company, who were so by virtue of an order of Bacon, V.C., directing their names to be removed from the list of shareholders, on the ground that their applications for shares had been induced by fraud and misrepresentations in the prospectus, applied to have the conduct of the winding-Bp order. Reliance was placed upon a decision of Bacon, V.C., in an analogous case of the Great Wheal Polgooth Company, where he bad taken the conduct of the winding up from the petitioner, and had given it to the shareholders whose names bad been struck off the list of shareholders. The grounds in the present case, in which this was sought to be done, were that the petitioner had only a small interest in tbe company as a shareholder, and that the whereabouts of the petitioner, whose name and address were given in the petition, could not be ascertained on inquiry at that address. Cave, J., said that be saw no sufficient reason for departing from the usual course, and taking the conduct of the winding up from the petitioner, and, therefore, he made the usual compulsory order, and also the usual order as to the costs of persons appearing on the petition Solicitobs, Bcall; J. Davit; Bntll <fc Grecuip.

ground of the application was not any cruelty or misconduct of the father to the children themselves, bat hi cruelty to his wife. Cave, J., considered this no ground for depriving the father of his lawful right to tbe custody of the children, and made the order absolute, with cost?.—SoliCitors, Britten $ Co.; Farmer.

Company Application To Restrain PresentaTion Of Petition Disputed Debt Bona Fides.— In the case9 of Anglo-Universal Bank v. Tram, ways and General Works Company, and Same v. Eaton, also before Cave, J., Vacation Judge, on the 17th inst., motions were made to restrain the presentation of petitions to wind up the company, on the ground that the same would not be bond fide, as the petitioners' debts in each case were disputed. In tbe first case the claim was for calls on 3,000 shares in tbe defendant company, which shares had been underwritten by the plaintiff company, but which liability was denied by the plaintiff company, on the ground that their agent had no power to enter into the contract. Cave, J., considered that the defendants had not made out a primd facie case of liability on the part of the plaintiff company, and be made an order restraining the presentation of a petition until the trial. In the second case, the defendant alleging that he did not threaten or intend to present a petition, Cavb, J., also granted an injunction until the trial.—Solicitors, Ashurst, Morris, i Co.; BurchelU; Terrell.

CoMrANY—Liquidation Sale By Liquidator To DirectorsSanction Of Court—Companies Act, 1862, 8. 138.—In the case of Ri Yarmouth and GorlestonTramways, also before Cave, J., on the 17th inst., a motion was made by tbe liquidator of the company for the sanction of the court to a proposed sale of the assets to certain directors of the company. Objection was made to the moiion, and reliance was plsced on upon Aberdeen Railway Company v. Blaelie (1 Macq. 461). Cave, J., considered the sale n proper one, and gave his sanction thereto.—Solicitors, Druee ; Jackson AAttlee.

Habeas CorpusInfantsCustodyMisconduct Of Father.—In a case of Re Wtbber, also before Cave, J., on the 17th inst., an application was made to make a rule nisi for a habeas corpus absolute against the grandfather and grandmother of two infants, both under seven years old, who had possession of the infants and refused to give them up to their father. The mother of the infants was dead, and the

HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE. Chancery DivisionRolls Court. . July 22.—Ross v. Baker. Silas Galsworthy made his will, dated 2nd of September, 1868, and thereby appointed his wife, Mary Galsworthy, and George William Rich, executrix and executor, and devised all his real estate (including chattels real) unto and to the use of the said Mary Galsworthy and George William Rich, their heirs, executors, and administrators respectively, upon trait that the raid Mary Galsworthy and George William Rich,or tbe survivor of them, or the heirs, executors, or administrators respectively of such survivor, should sell the same. The testator died on the 21st of September, 1869. George William Rich declined acting in the trusts of the will and executed a deed poll renouncing the trusts thereof, and the will was duly proved by Mary Galsworthy, the widow of lh» testator, who took upon herself the execution of the tram. None of the estates of the testator were disposed of during the life of Mary Galsworthy, who made her will on the 8th of April, 1870, and thereby devised and bequeathed all estates vested in her upon any trust to Thomas Baker upon the trusts and subject to the equities affecting the same. Miry Galsworthy died on the 19th of May, 1870, and her will wit duly proved by Thomas Baker. On the 10th of February,

1880, an action was commenced by some of the beneficiaries under the testator's will against Thomas Baker for the administration of his real and personal estate. On tbe 10th of July, 1880, the judgment of the court declaring that the trusts of the will of the testator ought to be performed and carried into execution, and directing tbe usual accounts and inquiries, was obtained. On the 8th of March, 188L an order was made that tbe testator's real and leasehold estate} be sold with tbe approbation of the judge, and directing the purchase-money to go into court. On the 17th of Hay,

1881, the plaintiffs applied that, notwithstanding the order of the 8ih of March, 1881, the plaintiffs might be at liberty to proceed to sell out of court the real and leasehold estates mentioned in the said order by public auction. The application coming before tbe chief clerk he made the following note," I will not order the sale out of court, because it ■ directed by the court, but as all parties wish it, let them sell and come here for confirmation." The plaintiffs laid the abstract of title to the testator's estate before convayancinr counsel. The estates were both freehold and leaseho.J. Counsel advised that, having regard to Cooke v. Cr**rfa* (13 Sim. 91), Thomas Baker could not execute the tnut Jot sale contained in the testator's will, and that an appli"*" should be made to the court to appoint new trustees.

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waa in the testator's will a defective power to appoint n trustees. Having regard to Re Jackson (16 W. R- 5'2'' was thought unsafe for Thomas Baker to appoint new tru«tr» of the testator's will nnder Lord Cranworth i Act (23 «

Vict. 0. 145, 8. 27). The plaintiffs, therefore, moved under the Trustee Act, 1850, and the 15 & 16 Vict. c. 55, for the appointment of a new trustee, and for a vesting; order.

Whiteftorne, Q.C., and A. 3. Leach, for the plaintiff*.

Cutler, for Baker.

Toe Master or The Rolls held that the case was distinguishable from Cooke v. Crawford. The sale was not made by the devisee of the trust estate, but by the Cbancery Division. The devisee had the legal estate. Cooke v. Crawford ■only decided that the devisee of trust estates could not exercise the trust. The court had exercised the trust. Cooke v. Crawford had nothing to do with the devolution of -estates. The equitable estate was derived under the order. The title was perfectly good. The order for sale was the equitable title.

Solicitors for the plaintiffs, Nash $ Field.

Solicitors for the defendants, HiUearys <fc Taylor.


July 9; August 1.—The Corporation and the Chamber of Commerce of Huddersfield v. The Great Northern Railway Company, and Tlie Manchester, Sheffield, and Lincolnshire Railway Company.

'Working agreement—Revision of by Railway Commissioners— The Regulation of Railways Aot, 1873 (36 & 37 Vict 0. 48), a. 10.

A special Act was passed whioh enabled the G. N. Railway Company and the M. Railway Company to enter into working agreements, and in pursuance of that Act an agreement was entered into, the 14th clause of which was as follows:—"Neither company shall make any bargain, treaty, agreement, or arrangement with any other company, or do any other Act, directly or indirectly, to affect injuriously the traffic • of the other company, or to prejudice this agreement, without the consent of such other company." Upon an application by the Corporation and Chamber of Commerce of Huddersfield to the Railway Commissioners, under section 10 of the Regulation of Railways Aot, 1873, to revise the above agreement in the interests of the pnblic, by declaring the said 14th clause to be invalid or to be modified,

Held, that such clause acted prejudicially to the interests of the public, because it did not leave the railway companies at liberty to accommodate the use of their line to what was advantageous for traffic, and that the agreement must be modified either by the omission of the article or by the addition thereto of a proviso to the following effect:—" Provided that nothing in this agreement shall be used or operate to prevent either of the oompanies parties hereto from agreeing to any through rate, or entering into any agreement with any other ■ company or companies with reference to the conveyance of traffic by any route hereafter to be opened, or which has been opened for the first time any time since October 1, 1860, or to -the interehange of running powers in respeot of any suoh route or any part of it.

This was an application to the Railway Commissioners under section 10 of the Regulation of Railways Act, 1873, "by the Corporation and Chamber of Commerce of Huddersfield, asking the commissioners to revise certain parts of a -working agreement between the Great Northern Railway Company and the Manchester, Sheffield, and Lincolnshire Railway Company, which were alleged to operate prejudicially to the town and district of Huddersfield.

The application alleged that thi 14th clause of the agreement (which was as follows:—" Neither company shall make any bargain, treaty, agreement, or arrangement with any other company, or do any other act, directly or indirectly, to affect injuriously the traffic of the other company, or to prejudice this agreement, without the consent of suoh other company ") had operated very prejudicially to the public interests of the borough of Huddersfield and adjoining districts, and bad been instrumental in debarring the inhabitants of the said borough and districts from railway facilities of great importance to their prosperity and well-being. The applicants asked the commissioners to revise the agreement in the interests of the public, and that the 14th clause be declared invalid and void, and that the same be expuoged from the agreement, or be so modified as to enable either of the companies to make such bargains, treaties, agreements, and arrangements with any other company or person, and to do such acts as may serve or promote the public interests of the inhabitants of Huddersfield and the adjacent districts, -whether or not any such bargain, treaty, agreement, or such

* Reported by W. H. Macxamaka, Esq., Barrister-at-Law.

acts injuriously affect the traffic of the other companies parties to the agreement, or prejudice the agreement.

R. E. Webster, Q.C., and Roland Williams, appeared for the applicants.

Pope, Q.C., and Dug&ah, for the Great Northern Railway Company.

LittUr, Q.C., and Wonliy, for the Manchester, Sheffield, and Lincolnshire Railway Company.

The Commissioners delivered the following judgment:—

The question to be determined is whether an agreement, dated October, 1860, and made between the Great Northern Company and the Manchester, Sheffield, and Lincolnshire Company, requires, in our opinion, to be modified in the public interest. The agreement, which was entered into under the powers given by the Great Northern and Manchester, Sheffield, and Lincolnshire Railway Companies Aot, 1858, was one securing mutual facilities tor the interchange of traffic, with contingent running powers to eaoh company in the event of the facilities failing to be afforded. The facilities given, subject to the earnings from the through traffic being divided in the proportions fixed by the agreement, were the right and privilege of free passage for each company's carriages and wagons over the railways of the other company, to be conveyed by such other company as fully and freely as it might convey its own carriages and wagons. The agreement then provided that traffic originating upon either company's lines, for which the joint railways might form a convenient ronte, and which might not be otherwise specially consigned or addressed, or be the subject of agreements, if any, then subsisting with other companies, should be booked, or invoiced, or conveyed by that route. It also contained the following article:—(14) "Neither company shall make any bargain, treaty, agreement, or arrangement with any other company, or do any other act, directly or indirectly, to affect injuriously the traffic of the other company, or to prejudice this agreement, without the consent of such other company." It is to this article that exception has been taken by the Corporation and Chamber of Commerce of Huddersfield, and their contention is that, having regard to the public interests, the article ought to be disallowed.

In the view of the Sheffield Company, the agreement prevents either company, without the consent of the other, from co-operating in the forwarding of traffic covered by the agreement by any other route than that indicated by it. Neither company is to do or agree to anything directly or indirectly to affect injuriously the traffic of the other oompany. The traffic protected by these words means probably the traffio of lines already existing and worked by the oompanies in 1860, and, therefore, might not include traffic of railways acquired sinoe 1860; but as to traffic of railways which either company had in 1860, the other company would seem bound not to divert such traffic from these railways. Traffic vid those railways, or either of them, between Manchester or Liverpool and London, or places south of Retford, would be within the article, and the article, as above interpreted, means that neither company is to carry such traffio by a route which would oause the interest the other company would have in also carrying it to be injuriously affected.

Now it does not seem to us consistent with the public interest that any company should have the power, by agreement or otherwise, of thus interfering to exclude another company from the use of any particular route whioh may from time to time be opened for the transmission of traffic, and we consider that a stipulation which affords a reasonable ground for such a contention as that advanced, whether successfully or not, is one which cannot but act to the prejudice of the public interest. So far as such a stipulation might be looked upon as confined to routes in actual existence at the time when this agreement was approved by the Board of Trade, it might possibly be considered as conceded by that authority in consideration of the other advantages gained by the public through the agreement, and if the operation of the clause were thus confined we should not think it necessary to interfere with it. In the uncertainty that a route convenient at one time will always continue to be so, it seems inexpedient that a railwar company, if occasion should arise, should not be free to accommodate the use of its line to what is advantageous for traffic. The article in question does not leave these companies at liberty so to act, and the term is a long one for which the restrictions are imposed. During its continuance, so far as traffio the subject of the agreement is concerned, the two companies engage to deal exclusively with each other and to make no bargains with otber companies. A private trader can, of course, if he thinks fit, agree to forward all his traffic by a particular railway to all places to which the railway gives access. But a railway company is not in the position of an ordinary trader. It has duties and services to perform in which the public are interested, and if it binds itself in the way the trader may do, and, during the continuance of the agreement, new lines or routes are opened, and it has not the option of combining with them for the working of traffic, tbe restriction cannot but operate as a detriment to tbe public. These considerations compel us to refuse to sanction the continuance of this agreement unless the companies will consent to its being modified either by the omission of the article or by the addition thereto of a proviso to the following effect:—" Provided that nothing in this agreement shall be used or operate to prevent either of the companies parties hereto from agreeing to any through rate, or entering into any agreement with any other company or companies with reference to the conveyance of traffic by any route hereafter to be opened, or which bas been opened for tbe first time any time since October 1, 1860, or to the interchange of running powers in respect of any such route or any part of it," hut we do not mean to tie tbe companies to the words of this proviso if thoy prefer any other form which will effect, substantially, tbe same object.

Solicitors for the applicants, Van Banaau, for Batley M. . Huddersfield.

Solicitors for the Great Northern Company, Nelson, Bart; $ Ntleon.

Solicitor for the Manchester, Shiffield, &c, Company, It. S. M. Lingard Monk.



The usual monthly meeting of the board of directors of this association was held at the Law Institution, Chancery, lane, London, on Wednesday, August 10, Mr. F. T. Veley (Chelmsford) in tlie chair, the other directors present being Messrs. Asker (Norwich), Brook, Hedger, and Mellersh (—ilr. Eiffe, secretary. A sum of £205 was distributed in grants of assistance among necessitous solicitors and their widows and families; six new members were added to tbe association; and otber general business transacted.


Mjchaeluas Course Of I Ictukes, 1881.
Troipectus of the Lecturts if the Projeaari.

Tbe professor of jurisprudence will deliver, during the ensuing educational term, a oourse of fonr leotures on "General Principles of the Law of Contract," to be followed by a course of eight lectures on "The Law of Contract viewed as a Part of Private International Law."

There will be twelve lectures during tbe term. The first lecture of this course will be delivered on Thursday, the 3rd of November, at 3 p.m., and tbe subsequent lectures at tbe sane hoor on Mondays and Thursdays.


Tbe professor of equity will deliver, daring tbe ensuing educational term, twelve lectures upon "Equity as Connected with Partnership."

Tbe first lecture will be delivered on Friday, the 4th of November, at 4.15 p.m., and the subsequent lectures at the same hoar on Wednesdays and Fridays during the term.

Law of Heal and Ttreotul Property. Tbe professor of tbe law of real and personal property will deliver, during the ensuing educational term, twelve lectures on "Tbe Law of Vendors and Purchasers of Eeal Estate."

The first leotnre on this subject will be delivered on Friday, the 4th of November, at 3.5 p.m.

The subsequent leotures will be delivered on TaasdajE at 4 p.m., and on Fridays at 3.5 p.m.

Common Law.

The professor of common law will deliver, daring the ensuing eduoational term, twelve lectures on "Tbe Principles of the Law of Torts."

The first leotnre on this subject will be delivered on Thursday, the 3rd of November, at 4.15 p.m.

The subsequent lectures will be delivered on Monday.? and Thursdays at the same hoar.


"W. B." has addressed tbe following letter to the editor of the Times:

"Her Majesty's Government are of opinion ' that it ii expedient to alter the constitution of the Court of Appeal.' The meaning most be that it is expedient to strengthen that court, in order that it may efficiently fulfil the dunes imposed on it. I do not think that the Government are of opinion that np to this time the court has failed. If they are of th at opinion they are wrong. Their opinion, more probably, is that tbe court, unless its constitution is altered, will fail in tbe future. Intimately acquainted with tbe working of the court, I agree with the Government in this view. But, in crder to determine rightly what is the proper alteration, one should understand correctly why the court has not hitherto failed, and why it is probable that it will fail in the future unless its constitution is altered. The coart has succeeded beoause the members of it have in fact been, and have been admitted to be, lawyers of more than usiiil knowledge, experience, and authority. The court baa gained the respect of suitors, the profession, and the public, because its decisions Lave been mainly right, and because its members have conducted its arduous business with calmness and firmness. Tbe court has not hitherto failed to gab the acquiescence of the judges of the High Court, became the majority of those judges have not unwillingly yielded to tbe personal authority of most, if not all, of the judges of the Court of Appeal, and because the judges of the Coart of Appeal have understood the feelings of the judges of the High Court, Bnt there bas been no inconsiderable difficulty in the way of the Court of Appeal in respect of their relation to the High Court. If ever the business of the Coart of Appeal is conducted in temperately, or without a careful abstinence from harsh expression, it will fail. The judges of the High Court are men of eminent talent, of great reputation, of high spirit; it is inevitable, because it is natural, that they should feel considerable tenderness when other judges differ from and alter tbeir matte decisions. They will not submit to, they are far too able not to find means to avoid, the consequences of a dilfereDce of opinion as to the law on any point, unless they willingly submit to the authority of those who differ from them. This friction bas existed between tbe Court of Appeil urd some of the judges of the High Court, notwithstanding the age, experience, and admitted personal talent of most ol those who have been members of tbe Couit of AppealThis has been, and is, and will always be, the chief difficulty of the Court of Appeal. Lord Coleridge expresses the feeling which causes the difficulty when be speaks of the decision of three jadgf sitting in one room being overruled by the decision of three judges sitting in another room. Tnia feeling mast be soothed. Tbe feeling which is required is that the decision of three judges of tbe High Court may sometimes be properly overruled by three judges of recognized we*5^j sitting in a Court of Appeal. This feeling of unwounded acquiescence e n only be created and maintained by so constituting the Court of Appeal as to make it always consist, not only, in fact, of the greatest lawyers of the d«y, hot °> those who are reoognized and admi'.ted to bo so. It is essential that the judges of tbe Court of Appeal should, w fact, be the greatest lawyers; it is equally essentiil that they should be so recognized to be such as to make it Bflhecoming and useless to dispute tbeir authority. Tbj presence of such lawyers in the court cau only be secared at this time in this country by a greater and more visible difference being made between the position of the juices of the Court of Appeal and of the judges of the Hie* Oota.

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