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CASES OF THE WEEK.

CONVEYANCERS TO THE COURT AND THEIR

FEES, [To the Editor of the Solicitors' Journal.]

REMOVAL OF TRUSTEE IN BANKRUPTCY-DISCRETION OF Sir,-The question of fees proper to be paid to the COURT-BANKRUPTCY ACT, 1869, 8. 83, SUB-SECTION 4conveyancing counsel appointed by the court would APPEAL-LOCUS STANDI.-In a case of Ec parte Sheard, appear to be an unsettled one. In matters coming before before the Court of Appeal on the 18th inst., & question the court, in which solicitors are ordered to put their arose with regard to the power given to the court to remove papers before one of its conveyancing counsel, it would be

a trustee in bankruptcy, by sub-section 4 of section 83 of

the Bankruptcy Act, 1869, the power being “on cause more satisfactory to the profession that the amount of

shown." At the meeting of the creditors, at which the fees to be paid to such counsel should be definitely

trustee was chosen, it was stated that he was an accountant;, settled.

he was in fact a bookkeeper, at a salary of 459. & week, in In two recent matters which have occurred to myself

the office of a newspaper of which the editor was a son of (and in which I have been referred to two different counsel) the bankrupt. The son was not one of the creditors, but it the counsel have charged a higher fee (in one case three was at his request that the bookkeeper consented to act 88guineas and in the other two guineae) than that allowed trustee. It was alleged that after his appointment the trustee by the taxing.master. With regard to abstracts, the scale had taken no steps to examine the bankrupt or to realize the allowed by the taxing-masters is one guinea for six sheets assets. On the application of some of the creditors, which of eight folios each, and fees based on this scale I have on was supported by other creditors who bad voted for the apboth occasions marked, but counsel has refused to deliver pointment of the trustee, the registrar ordered his removal, up the papers without being paid one guinea for every five

and this decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeal sheets, ignoring the fact that there were several sheets of

(JESSEL, M.R., and JAMES and LUSH, L.JJ.). JESSEL, M.Pin parcels of three or four folios each; and these fees, in

said that the power given to the court was a discretionary

one, but it must be exercised according to law, and the Court order to get back my papers, I have been obliged to pay.

of Appeal would not interfere if it had been so exercised. The It is superfluous to remark that any attempt to induce

removal must be upon good cause shown, and the registrar counsel to refund the difference disallowed has proved

had come to the conclusion that sufficient cause had been futile.

shown. No doubt his conclusion was to a great extent an It seems, therefore, that a barrister occupying the inference from the facts, but what the Court of Appeal had position of a court conveyancer is allowed to estimate the to consider was whether the inference had been fairly drawn, value of his own abilities and compel the payment thereof, His lordship thought the right course was to affirm the the result being a loss to the client, or more frequently registrar's decision. The question then arose, upon an. to the solicitor. I believe the subject of these fees was appeal of which the removed trustee had given notice before some time since under judicial observation, but nothing the registrar's order for his removal, whether, after that definite resulted.

order had been made and affirmed, he could sustain the . I would suggest, inasmuch as these conveyancers are

appeal. The appeal was from an order of the registrar officers appointed by the court to transact its business,

admitting a proof against the bankrupt's estate, and the now that the Lord Chancellor or Vice-Chancellors should fix

trustee who had been appointed had taken no steps to

prosecute the appeal. The court held that the removed the amount of their remuneration, so that there should

trustee had no locus standi, but they ordered the hearing of be uniformity in the matter.

the appeal to stand over for a fortnight, in order to give the London.

A SOLICITOR. creditors opportunity of prosecuting it, if they should think

fit.-SOLICITORS, Harper, Broad, & Battcock; John

Andrews; S. Toppin.
PRECEDENTS OF LEASES.
[To the Editor of the Solicitors' Journal.]

MORTGAGE – ATTORNMENT CLAUSE — BANKRUPTCY OF Sir-I agree that we are badly off for precedents of MORTGAGOR-FIXTURES. In the case of Ex parte Punnett, leases.

before the Court of Appeal on the 18th inst., the question What would be most useful, perhaps, would be a set

arose whether two attornment clauses under two mortgages of skeleton forms, with a collection of clauses, from

of the same property to different mortgagees can have a

valid operation at the same time, or whether the second in which those appropriate to the case in hand might be

point of time is not wholly inoperative so long as the selected.

tenancy created by the first is subsisting. Two mortgages After making full allowance for so much adherence to (by way of underlease) were executed by the tenant of a forms now in use as would secure the benefit of reported leasebold public-house to different mortgagees, the one in decisions on particular expressions, there will remain April, 1877, the other in February, 1878. Each mortgage room for much improvement in the wording.

contained a clause by which the mortgagor attorned tenant The order, as well as the wording, of the clauses also to the mortgagee at a yearly rent equal to a year's interest admits of advantageous revision. In general, a lease on the mortgage debt, the attornment being expressed to be now presents but a jumbled collection of provisions.

“ for the purpose of better securing the punctual payment of By such improvements the parties chiefly concerned

the interest," and the rent being made payable in the one case would be very much helped to understand their re

quarterly and in the other half-yearly. In each case there spective rights and duties. As things stand, I believe

was provision enabling the mortgagee to enter and determine

the tenancy without notice. The first mortgage, and the your correspondent is right in assuming that even

fact that it was unsatisfied, were recited in the second. The solicitors do not, as a rule, fully realize the situation

fair letting value of the property exceeded the amount of the created by an crdinary repairing lease for twenty-one

two rents reserved. In July, 1879, the mortgagor filed & years. Certainly the lay lessee does not. What lay liquidation petition. In Augast the first mortgagee distrained lessee, for example (unless he has been taught by expe on the chattels in the public-house for a quarter's rent. In rience), understands that he must be prepared to deliver September the second mortgagee distrained for half-a-year's up the premises on the last day of his term fit for imme rent. Neither mortgagee had done anything to determine diate occupation by a successor ?

LESSEE, the mortgagor's tenancy. The trustee in the liquidatior.

claimed the amount of the second mortgagee's distress, and Mr. Registrar Hazlitt decided that he was entitled to it, on.

the ground that, so long as the tenancy created by the first In a case heard before Mr. Justice Grove on Monday last, attornment was subsisting, it was impossible that a valid the plaintiff appeared in person, because, as he informed Mr. second tenancy of the property to another mortgagee could Collins, Q.C., at the commencement of his cross-examination, be created, and that the second mortgagee's distress was he never employed counsel ; he did not think anything of therefore invalid. This decision was reversed by the Court the bar, and always won his own cases. He had, moreover, of Appeal (JESSEL, M.R., and JAMES and LUSH, L.JJ.), who an eqnal aversion to the medical profession, which had held that the second mortgagee was entitled to retain theamount prevented his seeking their aid.

I of his distress. The court were in the first instance inclined

to take the same view as the registrar, but ultimately they | POWERS OF EXECUTOR OR ADMINISTRATOR-GRANT OP held that the case was governed by ratio decidendi of the case LEASE WITH RIGHT OP PRE-EMPTION.-In & case of The of Morton v. Woods (16 W. R. 979, 17 W. R. 414, L. R. 3 Oceanic Steam Navigation Company v. Sutherberry, before the Q. B, 658, 4 Q. B. 293), in which the unanimous decision of Court of Appeal on the 22nd inst., an important question arose the Court of Queen's Bench was unanimously affirmed by as to the powers of an executor or administratorin dealing with the Exchequer Chamber. The question there was whether leasehold estate of his testator or intestate. In 1873 an ada distress levied under an attornment clause in a second ministrator granted to the plaintiffs an underlease, for twentymortgage was valid as against the assignees of the bankrupt one years, at an annual rent of £500, of property of which mortgagor, the legal estate in the mortgaged property being the intestate was the lessee for a longer term. The underin the first mortgagee, and the mortgagor having only an lease contained a proviso giving the plaintiffs a right of preempequitable estate at the date of the execution of the second tion of the original lease of the property, at any time during mortgage. It was held that the distress was valid, on the seven years, at the price of £6,500, three months' notice to ground that the mortgagor was estopped, by his agreement be given on either side. On the execution of the underlease with the second mortgages that the relation of landlord and the plaintiffs were let into possession, and they then protenant should be constituted, from setting up that they had ceeded to lay out a large sum of money in buildings and imno legal reversion, and that it was immaterial that the fact provements. In 1878 they gave notice of their desire to that the mortgagor had only an equity of redemption ap exercise their right of purchase. The beneficiarios under peared on the face of the second mortgage deed. In that the intestate objected to the completion of the purcase the first mortgage deed contained no attoroment clause. chase, and the action was brought against them and Bat JESSEL, M.R., said that decided cases ought not to be the administrator for the specific performance of the frittered away, and there was no substantial distinction be agreement. It was proved that the rent of £500 tween Morton v. Woods and the present case. If by a legal was a very good one for the property when the underlease fiction the attornment to the second mortgagee would have was granted, and that there had been a difficulty in fiading created the legal relation of landlord and tenant between a tenant; that the £6,500 exceeded the amount of a valuation himself and the mortgagor, could it make any difference that which had been made of the property with a view to selling there had been a prior attornment by the mortgagor to a it, and that it had been put up for sale before the grant of the first mortgagee? If a mortgagor was entitled to create a underlease without any offer being made; and it appeared that tepancy by estoppel or quasi-estoppel to his mortgagee, if if the underlease had not been granted, the property would not the facts were really known, there was nothing in law or good at the expiration of the seven years have fetched more than sense to prevent the same arrangement being made with £6,500. It appeared also that the plaintiffs would not have more than one mortgagee. The transaction was good be. accepted the 'underlease without the right of pre-emption. tween the parties, and, inasmuch as the sum of the two rents The court (JESSEL, M.R., and James and Lush, L.JJ.) teserved did not exceed the fair value of the property, there thought the case one of extreme hardsbip on the plaintiffs, had been no fraud on the bankrupt law, and the trustee inasmuch as they bad greatly improved the property by their had no title to impeach the transaction.

outlay. But they held that it was impossible to enforce Another curious question arose in this way. The specific performance of the agreement, on the ground that the dirst mortgage contained no assignment of the fixtures adminstrator was really in the position of a trustee, and could in the public-house, and it was admitted that such fix. not fetter the exercise of his power of sale at a future time tures as were in the house when the first mortgage was by an agreement to sell at a price fixed at the date of the executed had passed to the mortgagee as part of the agreement. It would be a breach of trust to carry out the house. But it was contended that, as the tenancy created agreement, and therefore the court would not enforce the by the attornment had not been determined, the mortgagor specific performance of it. But the court held that the would be entitled to remove any trade fixtures which plaintiffs were entitled to the benefit of the agreement so be had attached to the house during his tenancy, and, far as regarded the administrator's own beneficial interest in consequently, that they were the property of his trustee. | the property.-SOLICITORS, Wiliamson, Hill, & Co.; The mortgagee, it was said, must take the tenancy for better,

Gregory, Rowcliffes, d: Co.; Field, Roscoe, & Co.; Wynne & for worse ; he could not elect to take the benefit of the Son. distress as landlord, and refuse to bear the burden of his tenant's right to remove trade fixtures during the tenancy. The court, however, held that this was not a sound argument. Bill Or Sale-RegistRATION-GROWING CROPS—Bills JESSEL, M.R., thooght that on this point the case was really OF SALE Act, 1854, ss. 1, 7.-In a case of Ex parte The governed by In re Stockton Iron Furnace Company (27 W. R. National Mercantile Bank, before the Court of Appeal on the 233, L. R. 10 Ch. D. 335). But, independently of that, he 18th inst., a question arose as to the registration (under the thought that, on principle, the contention could not be main. Act of 1854) of a bill of sale which comprised growing tained. The attornment was only for the purpose of better crops. The bill of sale, executed by a farmer in December, securing the payment of the interest on the mortgage debt. 1878, contained an assignment by way of mortgage of furIt was an additional security for the interest, and the mort- niture, farming stock, and other chattels, and of growing gegee remained a mortgagee, though, for that purpose, he was | crops and future growing crops on the grantor's farm, tomade a landlord. He retained the same right to the fixtures gether with his tenant-right then anexpired in the farm. as if there had been no attornment.-SOLICITORS, Hawks, There was a covenant by the grantor not to remove Stokes, McEwan ; Hindson, Miller, & Vernon.

any of the chattels from the farm without the previous written consent of the grantees. The deed was not registered.

In October, 1879, the grantor filed a liquidation petition. At COURT OF BANKRUPTCY - JURISDICTION-BANKRUPTCY this time the crops which were growing on the farm when Act, 1869, s. 72.-In a case of Exc parte Sherbrook, before the deed was executed, or which had been since the Court of Appeal on the 19th inst., the question arose planted, had been severed, and were stacked on the farm. wbether tbe Court of Bankruptcy ougbt, under the circum- The grantees did not také possession until November. It stances, to exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction under section was admitted that they could not claim the forniture 22 against a stranger to the bankruptcy. The court (JESSEL, and other chattels as against the trustee in the liquidation. MR, and JAMES and Lush, L.JJ.) beld, that under the But it was contended that, inasmuch as, accordiog to circumstances of the case, the jurisdiction ought not to be Brantom v. Griffits (24 W. R. 762, 25 W. R. 313, L. R. I exercised. The only thing worthy of note is that JESSEL, C. P. D. 349, 2C. P. D. 212), the deed did not require reMR, expressed his entire concurrence in the rule as laid gistration in respect of the growing crops, the grantees acdown by James, L.J., in Ex parte Brown (27 W. R. 651, quired a good title to them on its execution, which title LR. 11 Ch. D. 148), that “where the trustee takes only could not be defeated by their subsequent severance from that which the bankrapt himself would have taken, the the land. The court (JÉSSEL, M.R., and JAMES and LUSH, matter sbould be left to the ordinary tribunals. But where, L.JJ.), however, held that, when by the severance the growby the operation of the bankrupt law, the trustee claims by

ing crops became chattels, the Bills of Sale Act applied * higher and better title than the bankrupt, the matter is

to them, and the want of registration prevented the one which was intended to be dealt with by the Court of

grantees from asserting a title to them as agaiost the trustee. Bankruptcy."-SOLICITORS, W. 4. Crump of Son; Wilkins,

JESSEL, M.R., said that by the ordinary law a mortgagor was Blyth, $ Fanshawe.

entitled to the rents and profits of mortgaged land so long

as he remained in possession, and he was, therefore, entitled I to sever the growing crops. The covenant not to remove them off the land was a bargain relating to chattels, and it was void as against the trustee by reason of the non-registration of the deed.-SOLICITORS, J. J. Irving ; May, Sykes, & Batten.

liquidation was supported by the appointment of the receiver in the bankruptcy, and he was now entitled to the surplus proceeds of sale. The motion must be refused, with costs.

PRACTICE-ORD. 16, RR. 17, 18—CLAIM OVER AGAINST PRACTICE-JUDGMENT IN COMMON LAW DIVISION— THIRD PARTIES—LEAVE TO SERVE NOTICE-BALANCE OF EQUITABLE EXECUTION—APPOINTMENT OF RECEIVER INCONVENIENCE-NOTICE TO PLAINTIFF.-In a case of The WyeSAME DIVISION-JUDICATURE ACT, 1873, s. 24-ORD, 42, Railway Company v. Hawes, which came before Hall, V.Č., R. 1 - RECEIVER IN BANKRUPTCY — PRIORITY - CHANGE upon an adjourned summons, on the 20th inst., questions. FROM BANKRUPTCY TO LIQUIDATION-CONTINUANCE OF were raised as to the practice under rales 17 and 18 of order RECEIVER.-In a case of Salt v. Cooper, before the Master 16, which provided for the issue of a third-party notice in of the Rolls on the 20th inst., a motion was made to the case of a defendant claiming any relief over against & continue the appointment of a receiver in the aetion | third party. Rule 17 gives the court or a judge power to of certain mortgaged estates of the defendant, and thus determine any questions as between the plaintiff and defend-enforce equitable execution under the following circum ant, and any third party, upon notics being given to the stances. The action was one in the Common Pleas Division, third party ; and rule 18 provides that the defendant may, and judgment had been recovered on a specially.indorsed by leave of the court or a judge, issue a notice in a prewrit for a liquidated sum. After judgment the plaintiff scribed form. In the present action, which was brought by moved ex parte in the vacation, before Stephen, J., in the the company against its directors for the refunding of cersame action, for the appointment of a receiver of the mort tain fictitious dividends alleged to have been paid out of gaged property of the defendant, which was in the hands of capital, the directors claimed to be entitled to indemnity prior incumbrancers and was about to be sold by them. It from the past and present sharebolders of the company, to appeared that on the same day, but earlier, a receiver of the whom the dividends in question had been paid. Those defendant's property was appointed in bankruptcy proceed- shareholders were stated to be about four hundred and fifty ings initiated against him by the court haviog jurisdiction in number. The defendants accordingly had taken out the in the matter. The bankruptcy proceedings had sub- present summops for leave to issue third-party notices under sequently been turned into a liquidation by arrangement, rule 18, and it was contended on their behalf that the applicaand the same person was continued as receiver. The action in tion ought to be heard ex parte, and the plaintiffs had no right the Common Pleas Division had been transferred to the to appear and oppose. His LORDSHIP dealt first with this preMaster of the Rolls, and a motion was now made to continue liminary question, and after hearing counsel for the plaintiffs the appointment of the plaintiff's receiver. Two points were decided that the balance of convenience, being all in favour argued. First, whether the Common Pleas Division had of notice of the application being given to the plaintiffs, jurisdiction to enforce its judgment by equitable execution such notice should be given, and the plaintiffs heard upon according to the dicta of Jesse!, M.R., and Cotton, L.J., in the merits. He held further, upon the merits, that to allow Anglo-Italian Bank v. Davies (L. R. 9 Cb. D. 275), or tbird-party notices to be served upon so large a number of whecher the plaintiff ought not to have issued a fresh writ in persons, whose rights inter sere might not improbably be the Chancery Division, and obtained his receiver in that conflicting, would be most embarrassing to the proper and action; and, secondly, whether the bankruptcy receiver, by i expeditious conduct of the action, and that the defendants virtue of his prior appointment, had not priority so as to ought to be left to establish thelr claim to indemnity in a entitle the trustee in liquidation to the surplus proceeds of separate action.-SOLICITORS, Newman, Stretton, & Hilliard; sale The plaintiff relied on section 24, sub-section 7, of the Wilson, Bristow, f. Carpmael. Judicature Act, 1873, and also on ord. 42, r. 1, giving all the courts jurisdiction to enforce their judgments “by any of

PRACTICE–INQUIRY AS TO DAMAGES—Costs.-In a case the modes by which a judgment for the payment of money,

oney: of any court whose jurisdiction had been transferred, might!

of Slack v. The Midland Railway Company, before Fry, J., have been enforced at the time of the passing of the Judica

| on the 20th inst., an injunction was granted to restrain the ture Act.” JESSEL, M.R., said that the points argued were

j fouling of a stream by the defendants, and an inquiry was of importance, and as they depended on the construction of

directed as to damages, and it was ordered that the deseveral sections of the Judicature Act and Rules, he could

fendants should pay the general costs of the action. The not say they were altogether clear. He should be glad if

defendants' counsel asked that the inqairy might be prosethe parties took the case to the Appeal Court so as to have

cated before one of the official referees, bat Fry, J., said the law finally settled. In the meantime, he should not

that the usual course was to send it to the chief clerk advise practitioners to rely opon his opinion, and save a sum

The defendants' counsel also asked that the costs of the id. of 58. for the issue of a new writ, for that was what the

| quiry might be reserved, on the ground that unnecessary matter really came to. Section 24, sub-section 7, of the

affidavits might be filed by the plaintiffs. Fry, J., said Judicature Act, 1873, gave the different courts all the

that he had adopted this course in other cases, and thought powers which any of the various courts had at the time

it was a very good practice. He should reserve the costs of of the passing of the Act, and in his opinion, notwith

the inquiry, and his reason for doing so was this-pot with standing judgment, and until that judgment had been

the view of excusing the defendants from paying them, satisfied, the action must be said to be " pending" within

but in order that the judge before whom the inquiry would the section, so as in this case to give the Common Pleas

be conducted might have full control o er the costs, and Division the jurisdiction previously exercised by the Chancery

see that they were not unreasonably aggravated.-SOLIDivision. The whole purview and object of the Judicature CITORS, Field, Roscoe, & Co.; Beale, Marigold, & Co. Acts was to enable å plaintiff to have bis case finally determined in one court, and so avoid multiplicity of suits; and as the equitable execution was merely a mode of enforcing

SLANDER-DEFAMATORY WORDS-PRIMARY SENSE-INthe judgment, he thought the intention of the Legislature

NUENDO.- A case of Ruel v. Tatnell, which came before the was that each court should be able to enforce its own judg

Common Pleas Division on the 17th ingt., was a motion for ments in any way previously allowed by any of the transferred judgment on

judgment on behalf of the plaintiff. The action, one for courts. He therefore thought that under the Judicature | slander, was tried before Grove, J., in Jone last, and resulted Act, and ord. 42, r. 1, the judge of the Common Pleas

in a verdict for the plaintiff for £25, judgment being Division had rightly made the order for a receiver. On the

reserved. It appeared that both parties were in the same second point, however, as a receiver had been first appointed | line of business, and that the plaintiff had established & in bankruptcy, the effect of that appointment was to Christmas club at his shop to which persons paid money give him a right to actual possession against all persons in such amounts as they found convenient. Referring to except the mortgagee, and, no doubt, if the fact had been the plaintiff, the defendant said to certain persons " His shop mentioned to Stephen, J., he would not have appointed the is in the market," and these words the plaintiff asserted receiver in the action. It had been argued that as the constituted slander, his construction of them being that tankruptcy had been subsequently turned into a liquidation he was going to leave his shop and would take with him by arrangement, and the receiver continued in the liquidation, the money received by him by way of subscriptions to his the effect of that was to make the previous appointment of a Christmas clab. It was argued for the plaintiff that the receiver of no avail. In bis opinion such a doctrine would be jury had found that the words constituting the alleged most disastrous, and the title, therefore, of the trustee in Islander were defamatory, and that the question was one

rates.

for the jory, and not for the court. For the defendant, at the first meeting the creditors passed a resolution for it was contended that the judge should have stopped the liquidation by arrangement, and appointed a trustee. Upon case, because the words were not defamatory by them the trustee endeavouring to take possession of the premises selves, but only when coupled with the innuendo suggested

| of the company, he found Mr. Muoro, the respondent, there. by the plaintiff, proof of wbich was not supported by the He then ascertained that Mr. Munro claimed the property as evidence at the trial. The court (LINDLEY and LOPES, the owner. To this it was replied that he was manager only JJ.) were of opinion that the words were not defamatory of the business at a salary equal to fifty per cent. on the net in themselves, and that the induendo might be rejected profits, with liberty to draw in anticipation of profits at the altogether; that, on the authority of The Capital and rate of £6 per week. Munro, on the other hand, denied Counties Bank v. Henty (28 W. R. 852), if words not in that he was engaged as manager of the business, or that he themselves defamatory when taken in their primary sense, was at any time a servant or employé of the firm, or that he are taken by a plaintiff in a secondary sense, the plaintiff bad received any salary or wages from the debtors. He must show the existence of facts which would prove the stated that he took the business, and Elford agreed to find the inndendo contained in the secondary sense ; and that, if the capital necessary for carrying it on, and in respect of the plaintiff fails to prove the truth of the secondary meaning

money advanced Elford was to receive fifty per cent. of the as alleged by him, the judge at the trial should direct the

profits, and at the end of seven years to have his money back jury that tbe words were not defamatory. Judgment was

He carried on the business entirely free from any control, given for the defendant ander ord. 40, r. 10.-SOLICI

supervision, or direction on the part of the debtors, simply apTORS, Cattlin; Button & Co.

plying to them from time to time, when it became necessary, for any sum of money that might be requisite for the purpose of carrying on the business. On the 14th of September last he received from Elford & Co. a statement of account,

showing their claim against him to be 62,536. The trustee CASES BEFORE THE BANKRUPTCY

alleged that Munro was an undischarged bankrupt. REGISTRARS.

F. 0. Crump, in support of the application. (Before Mr. REGISTRAR PEPys, acting as Chief Judge.)

E. C. Willis, for tbe respondent, took the preliminary Nov. 16.-Re Butcher,

objection that the court had no jurisdiction to entertain Absolute injunction granted ex parte to restrain police magis tbe application. The trastee in the present case, he con

trates and their officers from executing a warrant granted for tended, did not take by any higher or better title than the a bankrupt's arrest in respect of unpaid arrears of parochial debtors, and the case of Ex parte Dicken, Re Pollard (27

W.R.731, L. R. 8 Cb. D. 884), applied. If this application This was an application made ex parte on behalf of the

had been an endeavour to recover a debt from a third bankrupt for an absolute injunction to restrain the niagis.

person, a common law court would have been the proper trates of the Clerkenwell Police Court and their officers

tribunal to entertain the matter. The respondent was from executing a warrant for the bankrupt's arrest. The

| a stranger to the bankruptoy, and the court had no adjudication, it appeared, was made on the 23rd of September last, and at the first meeting the creditors appointed a trustee,

authority over him. but the sitting for public examination had not yet been

Crump.-The trustee olaimed the property as his, and hel). Previously to the adjudication an order had been

he based his right to the injanotion upon the 72ad section made by the magistrates at Clerkenwell for payment by the

of the Bankraptcy Act, 1869. Assuming the property bankrupt of £22, being the amount of parochial rates due

to belong to the debtors, the court bad jarisdiotion, from him in respect of his business premises and also his

whether it was in the possession of a third person or a private residence. The money was not paid, and the parish

mortgagee, or any one else : Ex parte Anderson (18 W. R. authorities applied to the magistrates for an order for the

1124, L. R. 5 Ch. App. 473). bankrupt's committal, and they granted the application. Mr. REGISTRAR BROUGHAM.-That cage is scarcely ap

Brough, for the applicant.-Section 12 of the Bankruptcy plicable now. Act, 1869, provided that no creditor in respect of a proveable Crump.—The court had jurisdiction to do complete debt should have any remedy against the property or person justice, and it was only a question of discretion. The of the bankrupt except in manner directed by the Act. The respondent was in the position of an undisobarged bank. rates were proveable under section 31, and should be paid in rapt, and it was absurd to think that the debtors were fall unless the property of the bankrupt was insufficient to insane enough to put the whole of their property in his meet them: section 32.

hands. Mr. REGISTRAR PEPYS.-I think the rates are proveable,

Mr. REGISTRAR BROUGHAM said there was a case recently and as an adjudication has actually been made, I think you before him-Re Elliott-which was very similar to this. It may have an injunction, which will be absolate in the first

was an application to this court by & trustee for an ininstance.

junction to restrain the manager of a club from selling Solicitors, Plunkett & Leader.

the property alleged to belong to the debtor, and the case set up on tbe other side was that the respondent

was not the manager, but that he had become the (Before Mr. REGISTBAR BROUGHAM, acting as Chief Judge.) proprietor of the club. There the question of Nov. 18.- Ex parte Shubrook Re Elford and another (No. 1). jurisdiction was raised, but after some discussion The Court of Bankruptcy has no jurisdiction upon the applica the parties agreed that this court should decide the tion of the trustee, to restrain the alleged owner of property, question. That case was exactly similar to the present, and claimed as a portion of thefassets of liquidating debtors, from the question was whether this court ought to exercise a disdealing with such property, although the debtors in liquida cretion. [His Honour then referred to the facts.] He tion state that the alleged owner is their manager merely. thought this was one of those cases in which, according to

This was an application by the trustee under liquidation the later decisions of the Court of Appeal, it was not proper proceedings {for an order that Donald Munro should be that this court should exercise its discretion, but that the jestrained from parting with or otherwise dealing with any matter should be left to the decision of one of the ordinary sums of money which he might have collected in respect of tribunals of the conntry. In the case of Elliott he only debts due to the Victoria Wharfing and Manufacturing decided the question because all parties agreed that the Company, or from parting or dealing with the oils in his court should do so, and, if Mr. Munro in this case had subpossession belonging to the Victoria Wharfing and Manufac- mitted to the jurisdiction of the court, and had said that he turing Company, or from receiving any debts due to the would allow the question to be decided by it, he would have company, or from detaining the horses and goods, and from been glad to have gone on with the case for the granting of trespassing upon the premises belonging to the company. the injunction, but having come to that conclusion he must

The debtors, Messrs. Albert Elford and Geoffrey dismiss the application, on the ground that this was one of Barnet, were esparto and general merchants, carrying on those cases in wbich-the respondent not consenting-ought bosiness in Mark.lane as Elford & Co., and at Victoria to be tried by one of the ordinary tribunals of the country. Wharf, Lea Lock, Old Ford, under the style of the Victoria The application would therefore be dismissed, with costs. Wharfing and Manufacturing Company. They presented a Solicitors for the trustee, Crump & Son. petition for liquidation under the 125th and 126th sections Solicitors for the respondent,' Wilkins, Blyth, & l'anof tbe Bankruptcy Act, 1869, on the 20th of October last, and shawe.

always been considered as the leading authority as to the law OBITUARY.

of libel in reference to newspaper artioleg. Sir A. Cook

burn aoted at the Geneva Arbitration in 1872 as repreLORD CHIEF JUSTICE COCKBURN.

sentative of this country under the Alabama Treaty, and

it will be remembered that he afterwards pablished an The Right Alon. Sir Alexander James Edmund Cockburn, elaborate protest against the indirect olaims which had Baronet, G.C.B., Lord Chief Justice of England, died sudo been brona

been brought before the arbitrators. He was soon afterdenly at his residence, 40, Hertford-street, on the 20th inst.,

wards created a Knight Grand Cross of the Order of at the age of seventy-eight. Sir A. Cockburn was the eldest

the Bath, and he had more than once declined the offer son of Mr. Alexander Cockburn, formerly British Minister in

of a peerage. He was a man of very wide and varied scoomColumbia. He was born in 1802, and succeeded to a

plishments. He was a good musician, and had devoted much baronetcy in 1858, on the death of his uncle the Very Rever.

of his leisure to literary pursuits. He was understood to have end Sir William Cockburn, D.D., Dean of York. He was for.

colleoted some materials for an essay upon the question of merly fellow of Trinity Hall, Cambridge, where he graduated

the authorship of the Letters of Junius, and he had also first class in civil law in 1824. He was called to the bar

recently commenced a series of articles in the Nineteenth at the Middle Temple in Hilary Term, 1829, when he joined

Century upon “The Chase and its History." Although he the Western Circuit, and the Devonshire Sessions. He soon obtained a good share of junior business at the assizes and

was seventy-eight years old, his mental powers were ansessions, and he was also employed in several election peti.

impaired, but he bad for several months suffered from tions, and published (in (conjunction with the late Sir

an affection of the heart. With the exception of two or William Rowe) a Collection of Reports of Election Cases.

three days' absence be sat for the first fortnight of the He also served as a member of the Municipal Election Com.

present sittings, either in the Queen's Bench Division or mission. He obtained a silk gown in 1841, and soon became

in the Court of Appeal. On Satarday, the 20th inst., he one of the recognized leaders of the Western Circuit. During

| presided over the Court for the Consideration of Crown the railway mania" of 1844-45, he made a large sum of

Cases Reserved, and appeared to be in his usual health money by practising before parliamentary committees. He

and spirits. He walked home, dined at bis usual bour, re. was for some years recorder of Southampton, and in 1847 |

tired to bed, and died suddenly about half-past twelve, was elected M.P. for that borough in the Liberal interest. 1 apparently without any pain. and he retained a seat until he became a jadge. He steadily supported the Government of Lord John Russell, and in

A writer in the World says of the Lord Chief Justice :1850 he established his reputation as a first-class par.

He was an admirable host, told stories quietly, but with Jiamentary speaker by his speech in support of Lord

much dramatic power, in a voice the musical qualities of Palmerston's proceedings in the matter of “Don

which I never heard equalled ; and possessed that rare Pacifico," when the Ministry obtained a vote of con

quality in a clever man, the faculty of listening. He was, fidence by a very Darrow majority. A month or

perhaps, seen at his best when, most of his guests having two later he was appointed Solicitor-General, and received

gone, be would adjourn with two or three to his library, and the honour of knighthood, and in the following spring he

over his cigar would pour forth his reminiscences of personal succeeded the late Lord Romilly as Attorney-General. He

history, in which he, during his long and splendid career, retired with bis party in February, 1852, but in the fol.

had played a distinguished part. There bave I listened to lowing December he resumed the office of Attorney

his wonderful story of the great Palmer trial, from its comGeneral in the Ministry of the Earl of Aberdeen. He filled

mencement to its close; how he, then Attorney-General, read the same post under Lord Palmerston, and in November,

the uotes of the case and of the earlier examinations, and 1856, on the death of Sir Jobo Jervis, he was appointed

became convinced, not merely of Palmer's guilt, but of the Lord Chief Justice of the Court of Common Pleas, and manner in which the crime was carried out; how he worked was sworn in as a member of 'ho Privy Council. He was night and day in studying the effects of various poisons, and a bencher of the Middle Temple and was treasurer of the finally submitted himself to an examination by friendly exsociety in 1853, and from 1854 till his promotion to the perts to prove to himself that he had mastered the subject; bench he was recorder of the city of Bristol. As a debater how be elected to have the prisoner tried on Cook's case, he rendered valuable support to his party in the House though it was the weakest of the several indictments of Commons, especially during the Crimean war. As a which he could have brought forward, feeling certain finished advocate Bir A. Cookborn was for many years tbat if he failed to hang Palmer for the murder of Cook, he without a rival, his powerful but melodious voice, his would indubitably convict him for the murder of his wife. dignified and courteous bearing, and his powers of I remember bis telling me how, having been called away by humoor being always most effective with a jury. his duties as Attorney-General to Westminster, he returned He was retained in all the most celebrated trials of to the Old Bailey as Lord Campbell was summing up, and the day, and among his most successful professional looking down from a gallery into the court, “I knew," said achievements may be mentioned his defence of McNaghten he, “ by the look of Jobn Campbell's face, that Palmer was for the murder of Mr. Drummond, bis defence of the a dead man.” It was in connection with the Palmer trial present Cardinal Newman for a libel upon Dr. Achilli, that he told me he experienced what he considered the and the case of Swynfen V. Swynfen. The last greatest compliment ever paid to him. Palmer was in the great case in which he was engaged was the prosecn. habit, as he stood in the dock, of writing instructions or tion of William Palmer for murder, when, after & suggestions to his attorney, Mr. Smith, screwing them up trial extending over many daye, bis eloquent reply was into little pellets, and tossing them over to their destination. delivered without a single note. In June, 1859, on the One of these, which he wrote immediately after the verdict formation of Lord Palmerston's second Government, Lord of guilty had been pronounced by the jury, was afterwards Campbell became Lord Chanoellor, and Sir A. Cookburn

handed to Sir Alexander Cockburn. It merely contained was transferred from the presidency of the Court of Com

these words: “It's the riding that has done it;" conveying mon Pleas to that of the Court of Queen's Bench, and he thereby, in sporting metaphor, wbich Palmer was constantly retained the latter office until his death. Although less using, the prisoner's opinion that it was solely due to the eminent as a case lawyer than many of his predecessors Attorney-General's conduct of the case that the verdict and contemporaries, Sir A. Cockburn was most successful | against him had been obtained. as a judge at Nisi Prius, owing to his quickness of appre. hedeion and the clearness with wbich he was accustomed among the judicial tributes which have been paid to the to marsbal the facts in somming up a cage to the jury. late judge, by far the best was that of the Master He presided over many long and intricate triala, both cri. of the Rolls in the Court of Appeal. He said:- Before minal and civil, among which may be mentioned Saurin v.

commencing the business of the day, we think it right Starr, the prosecution arising out of the Clerkenwell explo- to express in a few words the great sorrow felt by the sion in 1867, the Wainwright case, and the Tichborne members of the court to which that most eminent judge, the writ of error. His best known judgments were those late Lord Chief Justice of England, belonged, at the sudden which dealt with broad legal principles, as in The Franco. and unexpected termination of his life on Saturday last. He nia cage and Campbell v. Spottiswood (11 W. R. 569, 3 B. & was admitted by his competitors at the bar to have been a 8. 769), where bis direction at Nisi Prius was accepted by consummate advocate, and was recognized by his fellow-memthe other jodges of the Court of Queen's Bench, and has | bers of the House of Commons as a brilliant orator. But it

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