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by the trustee in making the profit have been satisfied. The trustee is bound to satisfy them, and can claim to be indemnified out of the testator's estate iu respect of his own payments in doing so, in so far as the estate wa9 authorized to be employed in the business. If he fails to satisfy these debts, then the creditors are entitled to stand in the trustee's shoes and avail themselves of his right of indemnity. But if the trustee is in default, and indebted to the estate, he can claim no indemnity except on the terms of making good his default, or by showing that the profit brought to the estate by means of the trade debts incurred exceeds the amount in which he is indebted to it. Consequently, in the case under consideration, the fact that he was in default was held to preclude the creditors from making any claim aguiuat the estate except upon the terms above mentioned.

This reference to a specific claim against the testator's assets, apart from the personal remedy against the executor, leads to the inquiry as to the position at any particular moment of the assets of a business continued by an executor. For such assets are not to be considered indiscriminately as assets of the executor as 8 trader, or as assets of the testator. In so far as they consist of goods bought by the executor, or of moneys owing to him in the course of the business done by him, the assets are his property, and if, in the acquisition of such property, he has sold the goods of, or collected the moneys due to, his testator's estate, he is liable to account to the estate for the amount of his receipts in respect of such sale and collection (per James, L.J., Ex parte Morley, 21 W. B. 942, L. B. 8 Ch. 1032). But in so far as the assets consist of property existing in specie at the death of the testator, the position is that, although the legal property in them is in the executor, yet the creditors of the testator have something in the nature of a specific right to them, inasmuch as they can always claim to have such assets administered by the court for their benefit. It is true that their right is not an absolute right tn rem, because it is subject to the executor's power to sell or dispose of the property, and even after a decree for administration, this power of sale or disposition remains in the executor if there has been no order for an injunction or receiver (Berry v. Qibbons, 21 W. E. 754, L. K. 8 Oh. 747). But it is a right tn rem to this extent, that the creditors can demand to have the goods, whilst in possession of the executor, treated as goods of their testator, and not as goods of the executor. Unless they abandon this right, it does not appear how they can, as to such goods, be prejudiced by the fact of the subsequent trading, for the trade creditors of the executor have not, in any case, any claim to the testator's assets, except in the event of their being able to avail themselves of the executor's right to indemnity out of the property authorized by the testator to be employed in the trade, and such a claim to indemnity can scarcely be created by the testator so as to defeat the rights of his own creditors. Therefore, so soon as the assets of the business are separated into those specifically existing at the testator's decease, and those subsequently acquired, it is only necessary, in order to ascertain the relative rights of the testator's creditors and the executor's creditors, to ask, have the former abandoned their rights? It seems that they must be active in asserting such rights or they will be taken to have abandoned them. Although it was long ago settled that property in the hands of an executor in his representative character does not primd facie pass to his creditors as being within his order and disposition or reputed ownership, yet it is otherwise if they are allowed to remain in his possession under such circumstances as may induce his creditors to suppose that they are his own. In Kitchen v. Ibbetton (22 W. E. 68, L. E. 17 Eq. 46), it was held that an administratrix having such possession and continuing the business for fifteen months must be taken to have the order and disposition of the goods with the consent of the true owner so as to entitle her own creditors to them upon her

bankruptcy. And in In re Fells (25 W. E. 382, L. E. 4 Ch. D. 512), it seems to have been held that the rights of the testator's creditors might be defeated without the aid of the doctrine of bankruptcy as to reputed ownership. There the administratrix oarried on business for four years and then married; and Bacon, C.J., ruled that on the second marriage the goods passed absolutely to the husband, aud that a creditor of the testator would have to rely upon his remedy for a devastavit and could not follow tho goods.


Is the recent case of Bowen v. Hall (29 W. E. 367, L. E. 6 Q. B. D. 333) a point of considerable importance was decided by the Court of Appeal. It was there held that an action lies against a person who maliciously induces another to break his contract of exclusive personal service with an employer where the natural consequence of such breach of contract is to cause damage to the employer, although the relation of master and servant does not exist between the employer and employed. The question here raised is the same as that raised in Lumley v. <7ye(lW. E.432, 2 E. & B. 216), the decision in which case was, of course, not binding on the Court of Appeal. The question has been considered to be one of a doubtful character, inasmuch as Sir John Coleridge, in a very powerfully reasoned judgment, dissented from the view expressed by the majority of the court. In the case of Bowen v. Hall the Lord Chief Justioe also dissented from the decision of the majority (Lord Selborne, 0., and Brett, J.). He stated in his judgment that there had been great lawyers who are well known to have thought that Lumley v. Oye was wrongly decided, and in particular Willea, J.

There is much to be said on both sides. We are not disposed to think that abstract and technical reasoning carries one very far towards a solutiou of this sort of question. The law on such a matter does, or ought to, depend on general expediency. Brett, L.J., in giving judgment, says, "The deeision of the majority (in Lumley v. Oye) will be seen on a careful consideration of their judgments to have been founded on two chains of reasoning. First, that wherever a man does an act which, iu law and iu fact, is a wrongful act, and such an act as may, as a natural and probable consequence of it, produoe injury to another, and which in the particular case does produce such an injury, an action on the case would lie. This is the proposition to be deduced from the case of Ashby v. White (1 Sm. L. 0., 8th ed., p. 264). If these conditions are satisfied, the action does not the less lie because the natural and probable consequence of the act complained of is an act done by a third person, or because such act so done by the third person is a breach of duty or contract by him, or an act illegal on his part, or an aot otherwise imposing an actionable liability on him." The learned Lord Justice then proceeds to dispose of the reasoning founded on the well-known case of Vicars v. Wilcox (8 East. 1), a decision which has been treated by some as establishing that, wherever the damage results from the voluntary act of a third party intervening between the act of the defendant and such damage, the damage is too remote. It seems to us that the reasoning of the learned Lord Justice successfully disposes of this line of argument. If it be established that the voluntary act of the third party immediately occasioning the damage can be reasonably considered as the natural result of the act of the defendant, it seems to us that there is no ground for suggesting that the damage is too remote. Many cases might be instanced as showing this. If a man procures the commission of a murder, he is guilty of murder. Why should not the same principle apply with regard to civil ability? The question seems to be whether the act of

the third party can be reasonably considered, though voluntary, the natural result of the defendant's act. There may be cases where the act, though in fact resulting from the defendant's act, may be considered as not a natural or probable result of it, as, for instance, if in consequence of a slander persons had assembled and thrown the person slandered into a pond, the case suggested by Lord Ellenborough in Vicars v. Wilcox. Where the reasoning of Lord Justice Brett does not seem so conclusive is in the preceding step. Tho difficulty does not seem to us really to be as to the remoteness of the damage, but as to the foundation of the cause of action. The passage we have cited really assumes the datum which is the foundation of the doctrine of Athby v. White. The judgment all through, as it seems to us, assumes rather than proves that the act of the defendant is a wrongful act. The Lord Justice says later on," Wo think it cannot be doubted that a malicious act, such as is above described, is a wrongful act both in law and in fact" It is clear that the cause of action is not ex contractu, and therefore it must be ex delicto, or a tort. A tort involves as its correlative, a duty. We feel a shade of difficulty as to the duty. It will be observed that the exact nature of the duty is not very distinctly denned. Malice is stated to be essential to the action. It is clear from the language of the judges, and indeed from the facts of the case itself, that malice includes, not only the malicious intention of injuring the plaintiff, but the desire to benefit self at the expense of the plaintiff. Lord Justice Brett says: "If the persuasion be used for the indirect purpose of injuring the plaintiff, or of benefiting the defendant at the expense of the plaintiff, it is a malicious act, which is in law and in fact a wrong act, and therefore a wrongful act, and therefore an actionable act, if injury ensues from it." Is the proposition to be considered to be us wide as this—viz., that wherever a person induces another to break his contract, knowing that such contract exists, and, therefore, that the act he is procuring is wrongful on the part of the contractor as against the other party to the contract, there is a cause of action? We are afraid this must be too wide a definition, and might possibly lead to surprising results. Suppose a man has made an improvident promise of marriage, and a sensible friend, for his welfare, persuades him to break it. That could hardly be thought actionable, though the friend undoubtedly procures a wrongful act in one sense. Again, suppose a young man of high birth promises to marry a young woman of very humble station, and his high-born and haughty parents, as in a transpontine melodrama, with no regard for his welfare, but for their own pride only, as the jury might find, procure a breach of his promise. It may be said that these are not serious illustrations, but we are seeking the principle, and it may fairly be tested by any possible oases.

In all earnestness we are disposed to think that the decision of the majority was Tight in the particular case, and was in accordance with the expediency of the case; but we are puzzled with regard to the limitations of the doctrine. It is one which does not seem to stop at the particular sort of breach of contract which was maliciously procured by the defendant. It is very easy to say that "malice" is a necessary ingredient of the cause of action, but are we really driven, upon translating legal terms into plain English, and dealing with them as realities, to say that it is for the jury, upon consideration of all the circumstances of the particular case, to say when it is wrongful to procure a breach of contract and when it is not P We believe it to have been, and to be, a strong tendency—perhaps a growing tendency—of the judges whom we may, notwithstanding the Judicature Acts, still call the common law judges, to leave the essence of legal questions to the decision of juries under cover cf such terms as " malice." There have, no doubt, been struggles in the other direction, as in the cases with regard to negligence on the part

of railway companies. Certain judges, who might, perhaps, be termed by some narrow-minded, strive to very clearly define, and almost, one might say, contract, the limits which separate what is tortious or wrongful from what is lawful, on the principle that it is better on the whole for the community that fat and nefat should be separated by plain, clearly distinguishable lines, about which there can be no doubt or fluctuation. Others, on the other hand, tend rather to think that such hard and fast lines are not really suited to the exigencies of civilization, but only Berve as charts to the tortioasly minded, advertizing them how they may pursue their wrongful enterprizes without running on to legal rocks or shoals. It is difficult to Bay which tendency is the safer; probably every lawyer is conacioui of being at one time actuated by one of these tendencies, and at another by the other, and possibly neither ought to be the entirely governing tendency. The difficulty that we feel with regard to the ratio decidendi of the majority is, we believe, somewhat similar to that expressed by the Lord Chief Justice in the latter part of his judgment. He seems there to feel a difficulty in seeing how the malicious motive can make that actionable which, without it, Would not be actionable. If a man acts within his right, then the motive is immaterial. If there is no duty apart from motive not to abstain from persuading another to break his contract, and if a man, endeavouring to persuade another to break his contract, and succeeding, but doing so without malice, cannot be sued, then why should the action lie if there be malice f It is only the case of a man maliciously availing himself of his rights. This, if we do not misunderstand it, is somewhat the line of his lordship's argument. We are not quite sure that we go the whole length with it, for it seems to us that it would, if pushed to its full length, be fatal to the action for malicious prosecution; but, though it may possibly go too far, it strongly confirms what we have before said. In this class of actions, where malice is made au essential element, you practically leave the legality or otherwise of what the defendant has done to depend on whether the jury think, on the whole, he ought or ought not to have done it, subject, of course, to some amount of restraint on the part of the court. It may be inevitable that this should be so, but in such cases "jut ett vdgum." Lord Coleridge, C.J., suggests this consideration when he says, "I do not know, except in the case of Lumlty v. Oye, that it has ever been held that the same person, for doing the same thing, under the same circumstances, with the same result, is actionable or not actionable according to whether his inward motive was selfish or unselfish for what he did. I think the inquiries to which this view of the law would lead arc dangerous, and inexpedient inquiries for courts of justice ; judges are not very fit for them and juries are very unfit."

It seems to us that the safest way to look at the decisions in Lumley v. Oye and Brown v. Hall is to regard the case with which they deal as analogous to the action for seducing a servant from service, and not to endeaTour to extract any very sweeping principle from them with regard to the actionability or otherwise of procuring » breach of contract. Regarded in this narrow light, we are disposed to think the decisions right, notwithstanding the eminence of the dissentients; but we should think if the decisions are to be regarded as establishing the more sweeping proposition to which we have adverted, that there would be grave reasons for questioning how the application of such a principle would be found to work in other cases.

At an auction held at Henstridge last Friday by Messr. Chinnock, Galsworthy, & Cbinnook, the total quantity of land offered being 104a. Or. 36p.. with a rental of £220, the whole realized the sum of £6,910, being 31 years' purchase, or £68 per acre.


RIGHT OF "RESIDUARY LEGATEE" TO UNDISPOSED OF REALTY. (/» re Methuen and Blare's Contract, M.R., 29 W. E. 656.)

Though the words " residuary legatee" in a will are, of course, prima facie, applicable only to personalty, they will include realty if the context sufficiently shows an intention that they should do so. Thus, where a testator stated at the commencement of his will that he had disposed by will of his estate, and then disposed of parts of his real property and appointed a " residuary legatee," it was held that the testator intended the "residuary legatee " to take the residue of the real as well as of the personal property {Hughes v. Pritchard, 25 W. R. 761, L. R 6 Ch. D. 24). The real ground of this decision was more clearly put by Lord Justice Bramwoll than by the other members of the court. He said, "After giving gifts of personalty and devises of realty, the testator finishes this way: 'I make my sister and others residuary legatees,' that is to say, legatees of the residue. Residue of what? Why residue of that of which he had been previously disposing of parts. Of what had he been previously disposing of parts? Of his realty and personalty, and it seems to me almost a matter of demonstration that he is saying here residue of my real and personal estate." In other words, the question whether the residue of the Teal estate is dealt with is to be settled by ascertaining whether the testator has previously disposed of parts of his real estate.

In In re Methuen and Blore's Contract, a testatrix commenced her will by saying, " I commit to paper my wishes respecting the disposal of my property, and give this as my last will and testament. Everything I am possessed of I leave to my sister, S. P., for her life. After her decease I give and devise as here annexed." After some pecuniary bequests she proceeded to "leave" F. P. M. "residuary legatee after the demise of her sister." There was here, it will be observed, no specific gift of real property, although, under the words " everything I am possessed of," the sister S. P. took a life interest in the realty. The Master of the Rolls thought th-tt there was no indication of an intention that the residuary legatee Bhould take, after the death of the tenant for life, the real property which was given to her for life. The result would seem to be that, in order for the words " residuary legatee" to operate as a gift of the residue of real estate, the testator must have previously made specific devises of parts of his real property.

The following special questions will be treated at the Dublin Congress of the Social Soience Association on October 3—8 :—I.—Department of Jurisprudence and the Amendment of the Law.—International and Municipal Law Sections—1. Is it desirable that there should be periodical meetings of representatives of various States to which all disputed international questions should be referred? 2. Should the procednre on private Bill legislation in reference to local improvements be amended so as to facilitate inquiries on the spot by Parliamentary Committees or otherwise? 3. Ate any and what alterations in the jury laws desirable? Repression of Crime Section—1. How can the work of Discharged Prisoners' Aid Societies be improved, and is it desirable to secure the co-operation of the police with liberated prisoner* on their reform? 2. What results have been brought about by the Irish Sunday Closing Aot in connection with orime in Ireland, and what further steps can the Legislature take for the deorease of intemperance? 3. It is desirable that persona oonvioted of serious offences, instead of being sentenced to confinement for different periods, should remain in prison until reformed. (This question has been submitted by the president of the American Sooial Science Association, Professor Wayland, who will arrange for the sending over of a paper).



[To the Editor of the Solicitors' Journal."]

Sir,—In a written judgment of the Court of Appeal (read by Baggallay, L.J.), in the recent case of Alderson v. Maddison (29 W. R 556), there occurs a statement of the law to which I venture to take exception.

The object of the passage in which the statement is found is to show that acts of part performance of a parol agreement as to an interest in land must, in order to be held sufficient to exclude the operation of the Statute of Frauds, be such as are unequivocally referable to the agreement; and the statement, in illustration of this, to which I refer, is as follows :—" Thus, payment of part, or even of the whole, of the purchase-money is not sufficient to exclude the operation of the statute, unless it is shown that the payment was made in respect of the particular lani and the particular interest in the land which is the subject of the parol agreement."

It is to the words italicised that I take exception. In Clinan v. Cooke (1 Sch. & Lef. 22), Lord Redesdale held that payment of money was not a part performance to take a case cut of the statute; he there said (p. 41):— "Payment of money is not part performance, for it may be repaid "; and in Freme v. Dawson (14 Ves. 386, at p. 388), Sir William Grant explains the doctrine of payment of purchase-money not being a part performance in a way inconsistent with the notion of the doctrine's arising from there being anything equivocal about the purpose for which the money is paid. Sir William Grant said:—" Lord Redesdale, in a case before him [Clinan v. Cooke], states bis opinion that payment of money is not a part performance: yet there the act can hardly be said to be equivocal in its nature; as the payment of a price presupposes a sale: but the money may be repaid, and the parties are restored to their former situation."

It hardly seems necessary further to quote authorities; but I may mention Watt v. Evans (4 Y. & C. 579.) This was a distinct decision that part payment of purchase-money was insufficient to take a case out of the statute, and, certainly, no question was made about the fact of the money having been paid for the particular estate. I may also refer to what was said by Lord Justice Knight Bruce in Hughes v. Morris (2 De G. M. & G. 356), and by Lord Justice Cotton in Brittain v. Rossiter (27 W. R 482), in confirmation of the doctrine that payment of purchase-money is not a part performance sufficient to take a case out of the statute.

I will now only, in further support of this doctrine, draw attention to the ciroumstance that, in many of the cases which have arisen upon the question whether a particular written contract, sought to be enforced against a vendor, was sufficient to satisfy the statute, a deDOsit must have been paid, as it was in the recent cases of Sale v. Lambert (22 W. R. 478, L. R. 18 Eq. 1), and PofJer v. Duffield (22 W. R. 585, L. R. 18 Eq. 4). Now it is obvious that if part payment of the purchasemoney for speciflo land is a sufficient part performance to take a case out of the statute, the question whether the written contract complies with the statute must be immaterial.

I am aware that I have not referred particularly to the case of payment of the whole of the purchase-money, but the dictum of Lord Justice Knight Bruce above referred to extends even to that; it does not, however, seem to have Lord St. Leonards' concurrence : see Sug. V. & P. (14th edition), p. 152. The case seems not very likely to arise. A J. W.

Temple, July 20.


[To the Editor of the Solicitors' Journal.]

Sir,—In their annual report the committee say, " It was proposed at the meetings held in May that an outside committee should be formed to make suggestions before the special general meeting should be held. The council assent with pleasure to this, and suggest that at the general meeting u committee of this character be appointed, and that it consist of some of the members who have tnken part in the debates, with any additions that may be suggested."

Now, what was this outside committee, and how was it proposed? By my following resolution, which was then in print, it was proposed :—

"That a committee be chosen from the mernbers of the society for the purpose of recommending what changes might be beneficial in the organization and functions of the society, so as to make it more useful to the public and the members, and more representative of the wishes and interests of the profession at large, and that such committee consist of the following gentlemen :—"

It is true this was not in terms a committee upon legal procedure, but it was the only committee proposed at the meetings in May last, and its scope was sufficiently wide to have embraced that subject. But how did the council treat it at the adjourned general meeting in July under the presidency of Mr. Druce f First, Mr. Lake gets up and says with hot haste that he shall resent it as a vote of censure if passed. Then when Mr. Munton moves an amendment, making it exactly in terms consonant with the report, Mr. Paine gets up and makes three or four speeches saying it is not an amendment and is out of order. The meeting gradually dwindles away iu both numbers and disgust, until a mere handful of members, in sheer despair at doing anything, throw themselves upon the council, in the hope that a committee will be conceded. Nothing of the kind. Mr. Grinham Keen and Mr. Melmoth Walters magnanimously but vainly endeavoured to correct their colleagues on the council, and prevent a fiasco. It was all to no purpose. Although the members met and adopted the report, the council prevented them from carrying it into effect. If the appointment of an independent committee be a vote of censure, why did the council acquiesce in itf How would the appointment of a committee suoh as I sug. gested in May be any more a vote of censure than that which the council themselves in their report agree to? The observation of Mr. Paine, that " the state of things which existed when the promise in the report was made no longer existed" was perfectly idle. Whether the Legal Procedure Committee published their proceedings or not, it would be equally necessary for the society to hold special meetings and to appoint committees to look after the public interests and our own. The judges cannot, and do not, do this properly, and unless solicitors make their voices heard upon this question they might just as well wipe themselves out of existence.

If the council imagine that they can run away from their own report in this way with impunity, they are greatly mistaken. I have been urged to claim a seat upon the council, and to take stronger measures than I have done, but my object solely is to unite the profession into one harmonious whole, to put down envy and jealousy, and, in making our work more profitable to ourselves, to see that it is far more serviceable than it has been to the general public. Edmund Ktmbeb.

22, Queen-street, City, E.C., July 26.

where it was held that the husband was liable for the costs of the marriage settlement, has been overruled?

Helps v. Clayton was commented upon in your issue of May 29, 1880. J. L. P.

COSTS OF MARRIAGE SETTLEMENT. [To the Editor of the Solicitors' Journal.] Sir,—Will any of your readers kindly inform the writer through your columns whether Helps v. Clayton,


Bill Of Sale—Act Of BankbuttcyAssiokvext or Whole Property To Secure Past DebtFbesh EquivaLent Goodwill Of Hotel. — In a case of £z ptrti Setvers, before the Court of Appeal on the 21st inst, the question arose whether a bill of sale, whioh had been executed by a liquidating debtor a few months before the filing of his petition, was void as against the trustee in the liquidation, on the ground that it was an assignment of substantially the whole of the debtor's property, to secure a pre-existing debt, without any freah equivalent. The debtor kept a hotel, of which he held a lease. The bill of sale was executed on the loth of June, 1880, to secure tbe repayment of a loan of £800, whioh had been made by the grantees to the grantor in Marob, 1879, without an/ security being then given by the grantor. The grantees had been pressing him for repayment, and bad threatened to take immediate proceedings against him, and the deed contained a recital that at his request they had agreed to allow him a further period of three months for repayment of the £800, upon having the same further secured 11 thereinafter appeared, and on tbe conditions thereinafter set forth. Tbe deed then, in consideration of the premises, assigned to tbe grantees ail the stockin-trade, fixtures, furniture, utensils, and other effects belonging to or nsed in or about the hotel, or in the business carried on there, and alto the goodwill of the hotel, and the justices', excise, and customs licences granted or to be granted in respect of the hotel, to hold to the grantees absolutely, subject to a proviso for redemption on payment of the £800 with interest, on September 10, 1880. The proviso for redemption was, however, expressed to be "subject, however, to all the covenants, powers, provisoes, and conditions hereinafter set forth." It wis also provided that, " but subject as aforesaid," until default should be made in payment of tbe moneys thereby secured or any part thereof, the grantor should retain the enjoyment and possession of the property assigned. And then it wit provided that, if he should make default in payment on the diy thereinbefore appointed, or (whether such default should have been made or not) when, and so often as the grantees should, at any time or times thereafter, in their absolute discretion, consider the deed or the property thereby assigned, or their title thereto, to be in any wise endangered or prejudiced, it should be lawful for them, without any previous notice or demand, verbal, written, or otherwise, to lib possession of and thenceforth to hold tbe property assigned, and to sell the same aod retaiu the amount due to them out of the proceeds of sale. The lease of the hotel was not included in the deed. On September 21, 1880, the grantor assigned the lease of the hotel to some other persons for .£500, ind on October 1 he filed a liquidation petition. The trustee in the liquidation claimed to have the bill of sale declared void as attains! him, on the ground that it comprised substantial'* the whole of the debtor's, and that no fresh equiviltnt wis given for it. There was evidence that the lease of the hotel was worth nothing without the goodwill aod the licences. It was contended on behalf of the grantees of the bill of sale that the lease of the hotel formed the substantial exception from the assignment, as was indeed shown by its sellinj for £500. The goodwill of tbe hotel, as w«s tsid by Jeesd. M.R., in Ex parts Funnstt (29 W. B. 129, L. B. Id Ch. p. 226, 233), was not a personal goodwill, but passed with the lease. It, therefore, passed by the assignment of September 21, and the assignment of it by tbe bill of sale pi»»d notl1' ing to the grantees. Consequently the bill of sale **» D<;! an assignment of substantially tbe whole of the debtors property. But, if it was, still a fresh equivalent wis giTM|> for it by the granteea in the three months' forbearinc* wW"1 they allowed tht debtor. The court (Lord Ssxboen*. J^J and Brett and Cotton, LJ" ground could the bill of sale I that tbe deed purported months' forbearance by the 1

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promise to the ear while it broke it to the, hope. Power was given to the grantees in their absolute discretion at any time without any notice to take possession of the property, and they might thus set at nought entirely the agreement for forbearance, and treat as a nullity the contract for redemption on a certain day. There was really no forbearance at all and therefore no (resh equivalent for the deed. And, as to tbe goodwill of the hotel, the debtor had done all that he could do to assign it to the grantees. It was in evidence that the lease of the hotel without the goodwill and the licences would be worthless, and therefore the £500 paid by the purchaser of the lease really represented the value of the goodwill, and if the deed was valid the grantees would have been on titled to the whole of the proceeds of the sale of the lease. There was, therefore, no exception from the deed, and it was void as against the trustee in the liquidation. Cotton, ~Li.J., said that Ex parte Punnett was distinguishable beause there had been no dealing with the goodwill before the sale of the public-house, and in such a case a sale of the publichouse might well, and indeed did, carry with it the goodwill of the business.—Solicitors, Hamlin $ Gramma-; H. B. Clarke # Son.

EasementPrescription Act (2 & 3 Will. 4, c. 71), s. 8—Computation Of Period Of Forty YearsExclusion or Life Estate—" Person Entitled To Any Reversion." — In a case of Laird v. Briggs, before the Court of Appeal on tbe 26th inst., a question arose upon the constrnction of seotion 8 of the Prescription Act, which provides that, "when any land or water upon, over, or from which any such way or other convenient watercourse or use of water shall have been, or shall be enjoyed or derived, shall have been, or shall be held under or by virtue of any term of life, or any term of years exceeding three years from the granting thereof, the time of the enjoyment of any such way or other matter as herein last before mentioned, during the continuance of such term, shall be excluded in the computation of the si id period of forty years, in case the claim shall, within three years next after the end or sooner determination of such term, be resisted by any person entitled to any reversion expectant on the determination thereof." It was decided by Fry, J. (29 W. R. 197, L. R. 16 Ch. D. 440) that the words "any person entitled to any reversion expectant on the determination" of a life estate, are not limited to an owner of the whole reversion, but include a tenant at will to such an owner, and consequently that, if within three years after the determination of a life estate in land, an action is brought by a tenant at will to the reversioner against the claimant by virtue of an agreement with the tenant for life of an easement over the land, the term of the tenancy for life is to be excluded from the computation of the period of forty years. In the Court of Appeal it became unnecessary actually to decide the point, because the court (jessel, M.R., and Brett and Cotton, L.J J.) allowed an amendment of the pleadings, tbe effect of whioh was to introduce some facts which were not before Fry, J. But the court said that the question of the construction of the section was a very difficult one, and one upon which, even if it had been fully arnued before them, they should not wish to express an opinion, without mature consideration. They must not be supposed to agree with the decision of Fry, J., but the question must be considered ss fully open to discussion, notwithstanding his decision.—Solicitors, Remnant, Penley, & Gruibe; Harrisons.

County Court—JurisdictionOrder For Production Of DocumentsPower To Commit For DisobedienceJudicature Act, 1873, s. 89.—In a caso of Richards v. CulUrne, before the Court of Appeal on the 27th inst., the question arose whether the judge of a county court has power to commit for contempt for disobedience .to an order for the production of doouments. The question arose upon the constrnction of section 89 of the Judicature Act of 1873, which provides that "every inferior court which now has, or which may after the passing of this Act have, jurisdiction in equity, or at law and in equity, and in admiralty respectirely, shall, as regards all causes of action within its jurisdiction for the time being, have power to grant, and shall grant, in any proceeding before such court, such relief, distress, or remedy, or combination of remedies, either absolute or conditional, in as full and ample a manner as might and onght to be done in the like case by the High Court of Jus. tioe." The court (jessel, M R., and Brett and CoTTONf

L.JJi) held that the case was governed by the decision of the Court of Appeal in Martin v. Bannister (28 W. R. 143, L. R. 4 Q. B. D. 491), that a county court has power to imprison for disobedience to an injunction restraining the commission of a nuisance. In that case it was held that the power existed for the purpose of enforcing obedience to a final judgment, but there was nothing to limit the provisions of section 89 to a final judgment; they applied equally to any order made in the course of an action.—Solicitors, G. L. P. Eyre 4/ Co.

Collision In River Thames Thames Navigation Rules (march, 1880), RR. 22, 23—In a case of The Libra, before the Court of Appeal on the 19th inst., a question arose on the construction of rules 22 and 23 of the Thames Navigation Rules of March, 1880. Rule 22 provides that "when two steam vessels prooeeding in opposite directions, the one up and the other down the river, are approaching one another so as to involve risk of collision, they shall pass one another port side to port side." And by rule 23, "steam vessels navigating against the tide shall, before ronnding the following points—viz. (inter alia) Tilbury Ness— ease their engines, and wait until any other vessels rounding the point with the tide have passed clear." In the case before the court a collision had taken place off Tilbury Nesa between the steamships Libra and Joseph Ricketts. The Libra was going down the river on the north shore against tide; The Joseph Riekctts was coming up with the tide. The Libra starboarded her helm, and it was contended that she was justified by rule 23. The Joseph Ricketts had ported her helm, and it was contended that she was justified by rule22. The court (jessel, M.R., and Brett, and Cotton, L.JJ.), affirming the decision of Sir R. Phillimore, held that The Libra was to blame for the collision.—Solicitors, W. Batham,; T. Cooper.

PracticeDivorce SuitCosts Of Wife's UnsucCessful DefenceAmount Pa*ABLr. By HusbandRules Of Divorce Court Of December, 1865, RR. 158, 159.— In a case of Robertson v. Robertson, before the Court of Appeal on the 19th inst., a question arose as to the correctnets of the practice which has prevailed for many years, first in the Divorce Court, and subsequently in the Divorce Division, in fixing the amount to be paid by a husband for the costs of bis wife's unsuccessful defence to a suit for a divorce instituted by him. Rule 158 of the Rules of December, 1865, provides for tho ascertaining by the registrar (after directions have been given as to the mode of trial), what is a sufficient sum of money to be paid into the registry, or what is a sufficient security to be given by the husband to cover the costs of the wife of and incidental to the trial of the cause. And rule 159 provides that, when on the hearing or trial the decision or verdict is against the wife, "no costs of the wife of and incidental to such hearing or trial shall be allowed as against the husband, except such as shall be applied for and ordered to be allowed by the judge ordinary at the time of such hearing or trial." In Robertson v. Robertson the President of the Divorce Division made a decree nisi for a divorce against the wife on the ground of her adultery, and ordered that the costs incurred by the respondent (tbe wife) should be paid, "but not exceeding the amount paid into court or secured by the petitioner (the husband) for the purpose." This order, it appeared, was in the form always adopted in such cases, tbe practice having been so settled at the time when Sir C. Cresswell was the jndge ordinary. The amount at which the wife's costs had been estimated, and for which the husband had been ordered to give security, was £370; her coats when taxed amounted to nearly double that sum. She appealed from the decree, and also contended that the excess of her costs above the £370 ought to be paid by the husband. Tbe court (jessel, M.R., and Brett and Cotton, L.JJ.) affirmed the decree on the merits, but they held that the husband ought to have been ordered to pay tbe whole of the reasonable costs of tbe wife, and that his liability ought not to have been limited to the estimate made before the trial. Their lordships were of opinion that the practice had not been in accordance with rule 159. Jessel, M.R., said that, according to the practice of the old ecclesiastical court, the order was to tax and pay the whole of the wife's costs before the hearing, without limiting them to any sum secured or deposited by the husband, and his lordship

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