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CONVEYANCERS TO THE COURT AND THEIR I FEES.

[To the Editor of the Solicitor*' Journal.] Sir,—The question of fees proper to be paid to the conveyancing counsel appointed by the court would appear to be an unsettled one. In matters coming before the court, in which solicitors are ordered to put their papers before one of its conveyancing counsel, it would be more satisfactory to the profession that the amount of fees to be paid to such counsel should be definitely settled.

In two recent matters which have ocourred to myself (and in which I have been referred to two different counsel) the counsel have charged a higher fee (in one case three guineas and in the other two guineas) than that allowed by the taxing-master. With regard to abstracts, the scale allowed by the taxing-masters is one guinea for six sheets of eight folios each, and fees based on this scale I have on both occasions marked, but counsel has refused to deliver up the papers without being paid one guinea for every five sheets, ignoring the fact that there were several sheets of parcels of three or four folios each; and these fees, in order to get back my papers, I have been obliged to pay. It is superfluous to remark that any attempt to induce counsel to refund the difference disallowed has proved futile.

It seems, therefore, that a barrister occupying the position of a court conveyancer is allowed to estimate the value of his own abilities and compel the payment thereof, the result being a loss to the client, or more frequently to the solicitor. I believe the subject of these fees was some time since under judicial observation, but nothing definite resulted.

I would suggest, inasmuch as these conveyancers are officers appointed by the court to transact its business, that the Lord Chancellor or Vice-Chancellors should fix the amount of their remuneration, so that there should be uniformity in the matter.

London. A Solicitor.

PRECEDENTS OF LEASES. [To the Editor of the Solicitors' Journal.] Sir,—I agree that we are badly off for precedents of leases.

What would be most useful, perhaps, would be a set of skeleton forms, with a collection of clauses, from which those appropriate to the case in hand might be selected.

After making full allowance for so much adherence to forms now in use as would secure the benefit of reported decisions on particular expressions, there will remain room for much improvement in the wording.

The order, as well as the wording, of the clauses also admits of advantageous revision. In general, a lease now presents but a jumbled collection of provisions.

By such improvements the parties chiefly concerned would be very much helped to understand their respective rights and duties. As things stand, I believe your correspondent is right in assuming that even solicitors do not, as a rule, fully realize the situation created by an ordinary repairing lease for twenty-one years. Certainly the lay lessee does not. What lay lessee, for example (unless he has been taught by experience), understands that he must be prepared to deliver up the premises on the last day of his term fit for immediate occupation by a successor? Lessee.

In a case heard before Mr. Justice Grove on Monday last, the plaintiff appeared in person, because, as he informed Mr. Collins, Q.C., at the commencement of his cross-examination, he never employed counsel; he did not think anything of the bar, and always won his own cases. He had, moreover, an equal aversion to the medical profession, which had prevented his seeking their aid.

CASES OF THE WEEK.

Removal Of Trustee In BankruptcyDiscretion Of CourtBankruptcy Act, 1869, s. 83, Sub-section 4— Appeal—Locus Standi.—In a case of Ex partt Sluard, before the Court of Appeal on the 18th inst., a question arose with regard to the power given to the court to remove a trustee in bankruptcy, by sub-section 4 of section 83 of the Bankruptcy Act, 1869, the power being "on cause shown." At the meeting of the creditors, at which the trustee was chosen, it was stated that he was an accountant; he was in fact a bookkeeper, at a salary of 45s. a week, in the office of a newspaper of which the editor was a son of the bankrupt. The son was not one of the creditors, but it was at his request that the bookkeeper consented to act as truBtee. It was alleged that after his appointment the trustee had taken no steps to examine the bankrupt or to realize the assets. On the application of some of the creditors, which was supported by other creditors who had voted for the appointment of the trustee, the registrar ordered his removal, and this decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeal (jessf.l, M.B., and James and Lush, L.JJ.). Jessel, M.R., said that the power given to the court was a discretionary one, but it must be exercised according to law, and the Court of Appeal would not interfere if it had been so exercised. The removal must be upon good cause shown, and the registrar had come to the conclusion that sufficient cause had been shown. No doubt his conclusion was to a great extent an inference from the facts, but what the Court of Appeal had to consider was whether the inference had been fairly drawn. His lordship thought the right course was to affirm the registrar's decision. The question then arose, upon an appeal of which the removed trustee had given notice before the registrar's order for his removal, whether, after that order had been made and affirmed, he could sustain the appeal. The appeal was from an order of the registrar admitting a proof against the bankrupt's estate, and the new trustee who had been appointed had taken no steps to prosecute the appeal. The court held that the removed trustee had no locus standi, but they ordered the hearing of the appeal to stand over for a fortnight, in order to give the creditors opportunity of proseouting it, if they should think fit.—Solicitors, Harper, Broad, <fc Batteoek; John Andrews ; S. Toppin.

Mortgage Attornment Clause Bankruftct Of MortgagorFixtures.—In the case of Ex parte Funnctt, before the Court of Appeal on the 18th inst., the question arose whether two attornment clauses under two mortgages of the same property to different mortgagees can have a valid operation at the same time, or whether the second in point of time is not wholly inoperative so long as the) tenancy created by the first is subsisting. Two mortgages (by way of underlease) were executed by the tenant of a leasehold public-honse to different mortgagees, the one in April, 1877, the other in February, 1878. Each mortgage contained a clause by which the mortgagor attorned tenant to the mortgagee at a yearly rent equal to a year's interest on the mortgage debt, the attornment being expressed to be "for the purpose of better securing the punctual payment of the interest," and the rent being made payable in the one case quarterly and in the other halt-yearly. In each case there was provision enabling the mortgagee to enter and determine the tenancy without notice. The first mortgage, and thefact that it was unsatisfied, were recited in the second. The fair letting value of the property exceeded the amount of the two rents reserved. In July, 1879, the mortgagor filed a liquidation petition. In August the first mortgagee distrained on the chattels in the public-house for a quarter's rent. Ih September the second mortgagee distrained for half-a-year's rent. Neither mortgagee had done anything to determiner the mortgagor's tenancy. The trustee in the liquidation ■ claimed the amount of the second mortgagee's distress, and. Mr. Registrar Hazlitt decided that he was entitled to it, on., the ground that, Bo long as the tenancy created by the first attornment was subsisting, it was impossible that a valid, second tenancy of the property to another mortgagee could be created, and that the second mortgagee's distress was therefore invalid. This decision was reversed by the Court of Appeal (jessel, M.R., and James and Lush, L.JJ.), who held that the second mortgagee was entitled to retain theamonnt of his distress. The court were in the first instance inclined. to take the same view as the registrar, but ultimately they held that the esse was governed by ratio decidendi of the case of Morton v. Woods (16 W. R. 979, 17 W. R. 414, L. R. 3 Q. B. 658, 4 Q. B. 293), in which the unanimous decision of the Court of Queen's Bench was unanimously affirmed by the Exchequer Chamber. The question there was whether a distress levied under en attornment clause iu a second mortgage was valid as against the assignees of the bankrupt mortgagor, the legal estate in the mortgaged property being In the first mortgagee, and the mortgagor having only an equitable estate at the date of the execution of the second mortgage. It was held that the distress was valid, on the ground that the mortgagor was estopped, by his agreement with the second mortgagee that the relation of landlord and "tenant she old be constituted, from setting up that they had no legal reversion, and that it was immaterial that the fact that the mortgagor had only an equity of redemption appeared on the face of the second mortgage deed. In that case the first mortgage deed contained no attornment clause. But Jessel, M.R., said that decided cases ought not to be frittered away, and there was no substantial distinction between Morton T. Woods and the present case. If by a legal fiction the attornment to the second mortgagee would have created the legal relation of landlord and tenant between himself and the mortgagor, could it make any difference that there had been a prior attornment by the mortgagor to a r..-st mortgagee? If a mortgagor was entitled to create a tenancy by estoppel or jtwisi-estoppel to bis mortgagee, if the facts were really known, there was nothing in law or good sense to prevent the same arrangement being made with more than one mortgagee. The transaction was good between the parties, and, inasmuch as the sum of the two rents reserved did not exceed the fair value of the property, there bad been no fraud on the bankrupt law, and the trustee had no title to impeach the transaction.

Another curious question arose in this way. The ■first mortgage contained no assignment of the fixtures in the public-bouse, and it was admitted that such fixtures as were in Ibe house when the first mortgage was executed had passed to the mtrtgsgee as part of the bemse. But it was contended that, as the tenancy created by the attornment had not been determined, the mortgagor would be entitled to remove any trade fixtures which Le had attached to the house during his tenancy, and, consequently, that they were the property of his trustee. The mortgagee, it was said, must take the tenancy for better, for worse; he could not elect to take the benefit of the distress as landlord, and refuse to bear the harden of his tenant's right to remove trade fixtures during the tenancy. The court, however, held that this was not a sonnd argument. JtseEL, M.R., thought that on this point the case was really governed by In re Stockton Iron Furnace Company (27 W. R. 433, L. R. 10 Ch. D. 335). But, independently of that, he thought that, on principle, the contention could not be maintained. The attornment was only for the purpose of better wearing the payment of the interest on the mortgage debt, ft was an additional security for the interest, and the mortgagee remained a mortgagee, though, for that purpose, he was made a landlord. He retained the same right to the fixtures M if there had been no attornment.—Solicitors, Hawks, Sioktt, McExcan; Hindton, Miller, $ Vernon.

Coral or BankruptcyJurisdiction—Bankruptcy Act, 1869, 8. 72.—In a case of Ex parte Sherbrook, before the Coart of Appeal on the 19th inst., the question arose vhether the Court of Bankruptcy ought, under the circumstance*, to exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction under section 71 against a stranger to the bankruptcy. The court (jessel, M.R., and James and Lush, L.JJ.) held, tbat under the circumstances of the case, the jurisdiction ought not to he ■arrdted. The only thing worthy of note is that Jessel, MIL, expressed bis entire concurrence in the rule as laid down by James, L.J., in Ex parte Brown (27 W. R. 651, L. R. 11 Ch. D. 148), that " where the trustee takes only that which the bankrupt himself would have taken, the maner should be left to the ordinary tribunals. But where, by the operation of the bankrupt law, the trustee claims by a higher and better title than the bankrupt, the matter is cat which was intended to be dealt with by the Court of Bankruptcy."—Solicitors, W. A. Crump # Son; Wilkins, Myth, | Fanthaue.

Powers Of Executor Or AdministratorGrant Of Lease With Right Of Pre-emption.—In a case of The Oceanic Steam Navigation Company v. Sutherberry, before the Court of Appeal on the 22nd inst., an important question arose as to the powers of an executor or administratorin dealing with leasehold estate of his testator or intestate. In 1873 an administrator granted to the plaintiffs an underlease, for twentyone years, at an annual rent of £500, of property of which the intestate was the lessee for a longer term. The underlease oontained aproviso giving the plaintiffs a right of preemption of the original lease of the property, at any time during seven years, at the price of £6,500, three months' notice to be given on cither side. On the execution of the underlease the plaintiffs were let into possession, and they then proceeded to lay out a large sum of money in buildings and improvements. In 1878 they gave notice of their desire to exercise their right of purchase. The beneficiarios under the intestate objected to the completion of the purchase, and the action was brought against them and the administrator for the specific performance of the agreement. It was proved that the rent of £500 was a very good one for the property when the underlease was granted, and that there had been a difficulty in finding a tenant; tbat the £6,500 exceeded the amount of a valuation which had been made of the property with a view to selling it, and that it had been put up for sale before the grant of the underlease without any offer being made ; and it appeared that if the underlease had not been granted, the property would not at the expiration of the seven years have fetched more than £6,600. It appeared also that the plaintiffs would not have accepted the'underlease without the right of pre-emption. The court (jessel, M.R., and James and Lush, L.JJ.) thought the case one of extreme hardship on the plaintiffs, inasmuch as they bad greatly improved the property by their outlay. But they held that it was impossible to enforce specific performance of the agreement, on the ground that the adminstrator was really in the position of a trustee, and could not fetter the exercise of his power of sale at a future time by an agreement to sell at a price fixed at the date of the agreement. It would be a breach of trust to carry out the agreement, and therefore the court would not enforce the specific performance of it. But the court held that the plaintiffs were entitled to the benefit of the agreement so far as regarded the administrator's own beueSoial interest in the property.—Solicitors, IViliamson, Bill, i Co.; Gregory, Sowcliffes, <fc Co.; Field, Roscoe, Jr Co.; Wynne $ Son.

Bill or SaleRegistrationGrowing CRors—Bills or Sale Act, 1854, ss. 1, 7.—In a case of Ex parte The National Mercantile Bank, before the Court of Appeal on the 18th inst., a question arose as to the registration {tinder the Act of 1854) of a bill of sale which comprised growing crops. The bill of sale, executed by a farmer in December, 1878, contained an assignment by way of mortgage of furniture, farming stock, and other chattels, and of growing crops 'and future growing crops on the grantor's farm, together with his tenant-right then unexpired in the farm. There was a covenant by the grantor not to remove any of the chattels from the farm without the previous written consent of the grantees. The deed was not registered. In October, 1879, the grantor filed a liquidation petition. At this time the crops which were growing on the farm when the deed was exeouted, or which hal been since planted, had been severed, and were stacked on the farm. The grantees did not take possession until November. It was admitted that they could not claim the furniture and other chattels as against the trustee in the liquidation. But it was contended that, inasmuch as, according to Brantom v. Griffils (24 W. R. 762, 25 "V. R. 813, L. R. I C. P. D. 349, 2 C. P. D. 212), the deed did not require registration in respect of the growing crops, the grantees acquired a good title to them on its execution, which title could not be defeated by their subsequent severance from the land. The court (jessel, U.K., and James and Lush, L.JJ.), however, held that, when by the severance the growing crops became chattels, the Bills of Sale Act applied to them, and tbe want of registration prevented the grantees from asserting a title to them as against the trustee. Jessel, M. R., said that by the ordinary law a mortgagor was entitled to the rents and profits of mortgaged land so long as he remained in possession, and he was, therefore, entitled to sever the growing crops. The covenant not to remove them off tbe land was a bargain relating to chattels, and it was void as against the t'ustee by reason of the non-registration of the deed.—Solicitous, /. J. Irving; May, Sykes, & Batten.

PracticeJudgment In Common Law DivisionEquitable ExecutionAppointment Of Receiver In Same DivisionJudicature Act, 1873, s. 24—Ord. 42, B. 1 — Receiver In Bankruptcy Priority Change From Bankruptcy To LiquidationContinuancf. Of Receiver.—In a case of Salt v. Cooper, before the Master of tbe Rolls on tbe 20th inst., a motion was made to continue tbe appointment of a receiver in the aetion of certain mortgaged estates of tbe defendant, and thus enforce equitable execution under the following circumstances. The action was one in tbe Common Plens Division, and judgment bad been recovered on a specially-indorsed writ for a liquidated sum. After judgment the plaintiff moved ex parte in the vacation, before Stephen, J., in the same action, for the appointment of a receiver of the mortgaged property of the defendant, which was in the hands of prior incumbrancers and was about to be sold by them. It appeared that on tbe same day, but earlier, a receiver of the defendant's property was appointed in bankruptcy proceedings initiated against him by tbe court having jurisdiction in the matter. The bankruptcy proceedings had subsequently been turned into a liquidation by arrangement, and tbe same person was continued as receiver. The action in tbe Common Fleas Division bad been transferred to tbe Master of the Rolls, and a motion was now made to continue the appointment of the plaintiff's receiver. Two points were argued. First, whether the Common Pleas Division had jurisdiction to enforce its judgment by equitable execution according to the dicta of Jesse!, M.R., and Cotton, L.J., in Anglo-Italian Bank v. Davies (L. R. 9 Cb. D. 275), or whether the plaintiff osght not to have issued a fresh writ in the Chancery Division, and obtained his receiver in that action; and, secondly, whether the bankruptcy receiver, by virtue of his prior appointment, bad not priority so as to entitle the trnBtee in liquidation to the surplus proceeds of »ale> The plaintiff relied on section 34, sub-section 7, of the Judicature Act, 1873, and also on ord. 42, r. 1, giving all the courts jurisdiction to enforce their judgments "by any of the modes by which a judgment for the payment of money, of any court whose jurisdiction bad been transferred, might have been enforced at tbe time of the passing of the Judicature Act." Jkssel, M.R., said that the points argued were of importance, and as they depended on the construction of several sections of the Judicature Act and Rules, he could not say they were altogether clear. He should be glad if tbe parties took the case to the Appeal Court so as to have tbe law finally settled. In the meantime, he should not advise practitioners to rely upon his opinion, and save a sum of 5s. for the issue of a new writ, for that was what the matter really came to. Section 24, sub-section 7, of the Judicature Act, 1873, gave the different courts all the powers which any of the various courts had at the time of tbe passing of the Act, and in his opinion, notwithstanding judgment, and until that judgment bad been satisfied, tbe action must be said to be "pending" within tbe section, so as in this case to give tbe Common Pleas Division the jurisdiction previously exercised by the Chancery Division. The whole purview and object of the Judicature Acts was to enable a plaintiff to have bis case finally determined in one court, and so avoid multiplicity of suits; and as the equitable execution was merely a mode of enforcing tbe judgment, he thought the intention of the Legislature was that each court should be able to enforce its own judgments in any way previously allowed by any of the transferred courts. He therefore thought that under the Judicature Act, and ord. 42, r. 1, the judge of the Common Pleas Division had rightly made the order for a receiver. On the second point, however, as a receiver had been first appointed in bankruptcy, the effect of that appo'ntment was to give him a right to actual possession against all persons except the mortgagee, and, no donbt, if the fact hail been mentioned to Stephen, J., he would not have appointed the receiver in the action. It had been argued that as the bankruptcy had been subsequently turned into a liquidation by arrangement, and the receiver continued in the liquidation, the effect of that was to make the previous appointment of a receiver of no avail. In bis opinion such a dootrine would be most disastrous, and the title, therefore, of the trustee in

liquidation was supported by tbe appointment of the receiver in tbe bankruptcy, and be was now entitled to the surplus proceeds of sale. The motion must be refused, with costs.

PracticeOrd. 16, Rr. 17, 18—Claim Oyer, Against Third PartiesLeave To Serve NoticeBalance Of ConvenienceNotice To Plaintiff.—In a case of The Wye Railway Company v. Satces, which came before Hall, V.C., upon an adjourned summons, on the 20th inst., questions wpre raised as to the practice under rules 17 and 18 of order 16, which provided for the issue of a third-party notice in tbe case of a defendant claiming any relief over against a third party. Rule 17 gives the court or a judge power to determine any questions as between the plaintiff and defendant, and any third party, upon notice being given to the third party ; and rule 18 provides that the defendant may, by leave of the court or a judge, issue a notice in a prescribed form. In the present action, which was brought by the company against its directors for the refunding of certain fictitious dividends alleged to have been paid out of capital, the directors claimed to be entitled to indemnity from the past and present shareholders of the company, to whom the dividends in question had been paid. Those shareholders were Btated to be about four hundred and fifty in number. The defendants accordingly had taken out the present summons for leave to issue third-party notices under rule 18, and it was contended on.their behalf that the applica1 ion ought to be heard ex parte, and the plaintiffs had no right to appear and oppose. His Lordship dealt first with this preliminary question, and after hearing counsel for the plaintiffs decided that the balance of convenience, being all in favour of notice of the application being given to tbe plaintiffs, such notice should be given, and the plaintiffs beard upon the merits. He held further, upon the merits, that to allow third-party notices to be served upon so large a number of persons, whose rights inter sere might not improbably be conflicting, would be most embarrassing to the proper and expeditious conduct of the action, and that the defendants ought to be left to establish their claim to indemnity in a separate action.—Solicitors, Neteman, Stretton, <fr Milliard; Wilson, Bristow, % Carpmael,

PracticeInquiry As To DamagesCosts.—In a case of Slack v. The Midland Railway Company, before Fry, J., on the 20th inst., an injunction was granted to restrain the fouling of a stream by the defendants, and an inquiry was direoted as to damages, and it was ordered that the defendants should pay the general oosts of the action. The defendants' counsel asked that the inquiry might be proseouted before one of the offloial referees, but Fry, J., said that the usual course was to send it to the chief clerk Tbe defendants' counsel also asked that the costs of the in quiry might be reserved, on the ground that unnecessary affidavits might be filed by the plaintiffs. Fry, J., said that be had adopted this course in other cases, and thought it was a very good practice. He shonld reserve the oosts of the inquiry, and his reason fordoing so was this—not with, tbe view of exousing tbe defendants from paying them, but in order that tbe judge before whom the inquiry would be conducted might have full control o er tbe costs, and see that they were not unreasonably aggravated.—SoliCitors, Field, Roscoe, § Co.; Beale, Marigold, <£.- Co.

SlanderDefamatory WordsPrimary SenseInNuendo.—A case of Ruel v. Tatnell, which came before the> Common Pleas Division on the 17th inst., was a motion for judgment on behalf of the plaintiff. The aotion, one for slander, was tried before Grove, J., in June last, and resulted in a verdiot for the plaintiff for £25, judgment being; reserved. It appeared that both parties were in the same line of business, and that the plaintiff had established a> Christmas club at his shop to which persons paid money in such amounts as they found convenient. Referring bo the plaintiff, the defendant said to certain persons " His shop is in the market," and these words the plaintiff asserted constituted slander, bis construction of them being that be waB going to leave his shop and would take with him the money received by him by way of subscriptions to his Christmas clnb. It was argued for the plaintiff that the jnry had found that tbe words constituting the alleged Blander were defamatory, and that the question was 00s for the jury, and not for the oonrt. For the defendant, it was contended that the judge Bhould have stopped the case, because the words were not defamatory by themselves, bat only when coupled with the innuendo suggested by the plaintiff, proof of which was not supported by the evidence at the trial. The court (lindley and Lopes, JJ.) were of opinion that the words were not defamatory in themselves, and that the innuendo might be rejected altogether; that, on the authority of The Capital and Ccwitui Banl r. Srnty (28 W. R. 852), if words not in themselves delamatory when taken in their primary sense, are taken by a plaintiff in a secondary sense, the plaintiff mnat show the existence of facts which would prove the innuecdo contained in the secondary sense ; and that, if the plaint!S fails to prove the troth of the secondary meaning aa alleged by him, the judge at the trial shonld direot the jury that the words were not defamatory. Judgment was given for the defendant nnder ord. 40, r. 10.—SoliciTor, Cttttin; Sutton f Co.

CASES BEFORE THE BANKRUPTCY REGISTRARS. (Before Mr. Registrar Pepts, acting as Chief Judge.) Nov. 16.—Be Butcher.

Abaolnta injunction granted ex parte to restrain police magistrates ud their officers from executing a warrant granted for a bankrupt's arrest in respect of unpaid arrears of paroohial rates.

This vu an application made ex parte on behalf of the bankrupt for an absolute injunction to restrain the magistrates of the Clerkenwell Police Court and their officers from executing a warrant for the bankrupt's arrest. The adjudication, it appeared, was made on the 23rd of September last, and at the first meeting the creditors appointed a trustee, but the sitting for public examination had not yet been held. Previously to the adjudication an order had been made by the magistrates at Clerkenwell for payment by the bankrupt of £22, being the amonnt of parochial rates due from him in respect of his business premises and also his private residence. The money was not paid, and the parish authorities applied to the magistrates for an order for the bankrupt's committal, and they granted the application.

Brough, for the applicant.—Section 12 of the Bankruptcy Act, 1S69, provided that no creditor in respect of a proveable debt shonld have any remedy against the property or person cf the bankrupt except in manner directed by the Act. The rates were proveable nnder section 31, and should be paid in full nnless the property of the bankrupt was insufficient to meet them: section 32.

Mr. Registrar Pepts—I think the rates are proveable, and as an adjudication has actually been made, I think you may have an injunction, which will be absolute in the first i stance.

Solicitors, Plunkett <& Leader.

(Before Mr. Registrar Brougham, acting as Chief Judge.) Nov. 18.— Ex parte Shubrook Re Elford and another (No. 1). The Court of Bankruptcy has no jurisdiction npon the application of the trustee, to restrain the allege! owner of property, claimed a) a poition of thsjasaets of liquidating debtors, from dealing with such property, although the debtors in liquidation ttate that the alleged owner is their manager merely. This was an application by the trustee nnder liquidation proceeding s |for an order that Donald Munro shonld be restrained from parting with or otherwise dealing with any sums of money which he might have collected in respect of debts doe to the Victoria Wharfing and Manufactnring Company, or from parting or dealing with the oils in his possession belonging to the Victoria Wharfing and Manufacturing Company, or from receiving any debts due to the company, or from detaining the horses and good-, and from trespismog npon the premises belonging to the company.

The debtors, Messrs. Albert Elford and Geoffrey Barnet, wi re esparto and general merchants, carrying on bosineas in Mark-lane as Elford & Co., and at Victoria Wharf, Lea Lock, Old Ford, under the style of the Victoria Wharfing end Manufacturing Company. They presented a petition for liquidation nnder the 126th and 126th sections of lbs Bankruptcy Act, 1869, on the 20th of October last, and

at the first meeting the creditors passed a resolution for liquidation by arrangement, and appointed a trustee. Upon the trustee endeavouring to take possession of the premises of the company, he found Mr. Munro, the respondent, there. He then ascertained that Mr. Munro claimed the property as the owner. To this it was replied that he was manager only of the bnsiness at a salary eqnal to fifty per cent on the net profits, with liberty to draw in anticipation of profits at the rate of £6 per week. Munro, on the other hand, denied that he was engaged as manager of the bnsiness, or that he was at any time a servant or employe" of the firm, or that he had received any salary or wages from the debtors. He stated that he took the business, and Elford agreed to find the capital necessary for carrying it on, and in respect of the money advanced Elford was to receive fifty per cent, of the profits, and at the end of seven years to have his money back1 He carried on the business entirely free from any control, supervision, or direction on the part of the debtors, simply applyingto them from time to time, when it became necessary, for any sum of money that might be requisite for the purpose of carrying on the business. On the 14th of September last he received from Elford & Co. a statement of ac-ount, showing their olaim against him to be £2,536. The trustee alleged that Munro was an undischarged baukrupt.

F. 0. Crump, in support of the application.

E. C. Willie, for the respondent, took the preliminary objeotion that the court had no jurisdiction to entertain the application. The trustee in the present ease, be contended, did not take by any higher or better title than the debtors, and the oase of Ex parte Sicken, Be Pollard (27 W. K.J7S1, L. E. 8 Oh. D. 884), applied. If this application had been an endeavour to reoover a debt from a third person, a common law oonrt would have been the proper tribunal to entertain the matter. The respondent was a stranger to the bankruptcy, and the oonrt bad no authority over him.

Crump.—The trustee olaimed the property as his, and he baBed his right to the injunction npon the 72ad seotion of the Bankruptcy Aot, 1869. Assuming the property to belong to the debtors, the oourt had jurisdiction, whether it was in the possession of a third person or a mortgagee, or any one else: Ex parte Anderson (18 W. B. 1124, L. K. 6 Ch. App. 473).

Mr, Reoistkab Brougham.—That oase is scaroely applicable now.

Crump.—The oourt had jurisdiction to do oomplete justice, and it was only a question of discretion. The respondent was in the position of an undischarged bankrupt, and it was absurd to think that the debtors were insane enough to pnt the whole of their property in his hands.

Mr. Reoistbar Brougham said there was a oase recently before him—Re Elliott—whioh was very similar to this. It was an application to this oourt by a trustee for an injunction to restrain the manager of a club from selling the property alleged to belong to the debtor, and the case set up on tbe other side was that the respondent was not the manager, but that he had become tbe proprietor of the club. There the question of jurisdiction was raised, but after some discussion the parties agreed that this court should decide the question. That case was exactly similar to the present, and the question was whether this oourt ought to exercise a discretion. [His Honour then referred to the facts.] He thought this was one of those cases in which, according to the later decisions of the Court of A ppeal, it was not proper that this court shonld exercise its discretion, but that the matter should be left to the decision of one of the ordinary tribunals of the conntry. In the case of Elliott he only decided tbe question because all parties agreed that the court should do so, and, if Mr. Munro in this case had submitted to the jurisdiction of the court, and bad said that he would allow the question to be decided by it, he would have been glad to have gone on with the case for the granting of the injunction, but having come to that conclusion he must dismiss the application, on the ground that this was one of those cases in which—the respondent not consenting—onght to be tried by one of the ordinary tribunals of the country. The application would therefore be dismissed, with costs.

Solicitors for the trustee, Crump <fc Son.

Solicitors for the respondent, Wilkim, Blyth, & Tansfiawc.

OBITUARY.

LORD CHIEF JUSTICE COCKBURN. The Eight Hon. Sir Alexander James Edmund Cockburn, Baronet, G.C.B., Lord Chief Justice of England, died suddenly at his residence, 40, Hertford-street, on the 20th inst., at the age of seventy-eight. Sir A. Cockburn was the eldest son of Mr. Alexander Cockbnm, formerly British Minister in Columbia. He was born in 1802, and succeeded to a baronetcy in 1858, on the death of his uncle the Very Reverend Sir William Cockburn, D.D., Dean of York. He was formerly fellow of Trinity Hall, Cambridge, where he graduated first class in civil law in 1824. He was called to the bar at the Middle Temple in Hilary Term, 1829, when he joined the Western Circuit, and the Devonshire Sessions. He soon obtained a good share of junior business at the assizes and sessions, and he was also employed in several election petitions, and published (in [conjunction with the late Sir William Eowe) a Collection of Reports of Election Cases. He also served as a member of the Municipal Election Commission. He obtained a silk gown in 1841, and soon became one of the recognized leaders of the Western Circuit. During the "railway mania" of 1844-45, he made a large snm of money by practising before parliamentary committees. He was for some years recorder of Southampton, and in 1847 was elected M.P. for that borough in the Liberal interest, and he retained a seat until he became a judge. He steadily supported the Government of Lord John Russell, and in 1850 he established his reputation as a first-class parliamentary speaker by his speech in support of Lord Palmerston's proceedings in the matter of "Don Pacifico," when the Ministry obtained a vote of confidence by a very narrow majority. A month or two later he was appointed Solioitor-General, and received the honour of knighthood, and in the following spring he succeeded the late Lord Romilly as Attorney-General. He retired with bis party in February, 1852, but in the following December he resumed the office of AttorneyGeneral in the Ministry of the Earl of Aberdeen. He filled the same post under Lord Palmerston, and in November, 1856, on the death of Sir John Jervis, he was appointed Lord Chief Justice of the Court of Common Pleas, and was sworn in as a member of the Privy Council. He was a benooer of the Middle Temple and was treasurer of the eooiety in 1853, and from 1854 till his promotion to the bench he was recorder of the oity of Bristol. As a debater be rendered valuable Bupport to his party in the House of Commons, especially during the Crimean war. As a finished advocate Sir A. Cockburn was for many years without a rival, his powerful but melodious voice, his dignified and courteous bearing, and his powers of humour being always most effective with a jury. He was retained in all the most celebrated trials of tbe day, and among his most successful professional achievements may be mentioned his defence of McNaghten for tbe murder of Mr. Drummond, his defence of the present Cardinal Newman for a libel upon Dr. Aehilli, and the oase of Swynfen v. Swynfen. The last great case in whioh he waa engaged was the prosecution of William Palmer for murder, when, after a trial extending over many days, his eloquent reply was delivered without a single note. In June, 1859, on the formation of Lord Palmerston's seoond Government, Lord Campbell beoame Lord Chancellor, and Sir A. Cockburn was transferred from the presidency of the Court of Common Pleas to that of the Court of Queen's Bench, and he retained the latter office until his death. Althongh less eminent as a oase lawyer than many of his predecessors and contemporaries, Sir A. Cockburn was most successful as a judge at ATtsi Prim, owing to his quiokness of apprehension and the clearness with whioh he was accustomed to marshal the facts in snmmiDg up a oase to the jury. He presided over many long and intrioate trials, both criminal and oivil, among which may be mentioned Saurin v. Starr, the prosecution arising out of the Clerkenwell explosion in 1867, the Waiuwright cose, and the Tichborne writ of error. His best known judgments were those whioh dealt with broad legal principles, aa in The Franconia oase and Campbell v. Spottiswood (11 W. R. 569, 8 B. & S. 769), where bis direction at Nisi Frius was acoepted by the other jndges of the Court of Queen's Bench, and has

always been considered as the leading authority as to the law of libel in reference to newspaper articles. Sir A. Cockburn acted at the Geneva Arbitration in 1872 as representative of this country under the Alabama Treaty, and it will be remembered that he afterwards published an elaborate protest against the indirect olaims whioh had been brought before the arbitrators. He was soon afterwards created a Enight Grand Cross of the Order of the Bath, and he had more than once deolined the offer of a peerage. He was a man of very wide and varied accomplishments. He was a good musician, and had devoted much of his leisure to literary pursuits. He was understood to have colleoted some materials for an essay upon the question of the authorship of the Letters of Junius, and he had also recently commenced a series of articles in the Nineteenth Century upon " The Chase and its History." Although he was seventy-eight years old, his mental powers were unimpaired, but he had for several months suffered from an affection of the heart. With the exoeption of two or three days' absence he sat for tbe first fortnight of the present sittings, either in the Queen's Bench Division or in the Court of Appeal. On Saturday, the 20th inst., he presided over the Court for the Consideration of Crown Cases Reserved, and appeared to be in his nsnal health and spirits. He walked home, dined at his usual hour, retired to bed, and died suddenly about half-past twelve, apparently without any pain.

A writer in the World says of the Lord Chief Justice :— He was an admirable host, told stories quietly, but with much dramatic power, in a voice the musical qualities of which I never heard equalled; and possessed that rare quality in a clever man, the faculty of listening. He was, perhaps, seen at his best when, most of his guests having gone, be would adjourn with two or three to his library, and over his cigar would pour forth his reminiscences of personal history, in whioh he, during his long and splendid career, had played a distinguished part. There have I listened to his wonderful story of the great Palmer trial, from its commencement to its closo; how he, then Attorney-General, read the notes of the case and of tbe earlier examinations, and became convinced, not merely of Palmer's guilt, but of the manner in which the crime was carried out; how he worked night and day in studying the effects of various poisons, and finally submitted himself to an examination by friendly experts to prove to himself that he had mastered the subject; how he elected to have the prisoner tried on Cook's case, though it was the weakest of the several indiotmenta which he could have brought forward, feeling certain that if he failed to hang Palmer for the murder of Cook, he would indubitably convict him for the murder of his wife. I remember his telling me how, having been called away by his duties as Attorney-General to Westminster, he returned to the Old Bailey as Lord Campbell was summing up, and looking down from a gallery into the court, "I knew," said he, " by the look of John Campbell's face, that Palmer waa a dead man." It was in connection with the Palmer trial that he told me he experienced what he considered the greatest compliment ever paid to him. Palmer was in the habit, as he stood in the dock, of writing instructions or suggestions to his attorney, Mr. Smith, screwing them up into little pellets, and tossing them over to their destination. One of these, which he wrote immediately after the verdict of guilty had been pronounoed by the jury, was afterwards handed to Sir Alexander Cockburn. It merely contained these words: "It's the riding that has done itj" conveying thereby, in sporting metaphor, which Palmer was constantly using, the prisoner's opinion that it was solely due to the Attorney-General's conduct of the case that the verdict against him had been obtained.

Among the judicial tributes which have been paid to the late judge, by far the best was that of the Master of the Rolls in the Court of Appeal. He said:—Before commencing the business of the day, we think it right to express in a few words the great sorrow felt by the members of the court to whioh that most eminent judge, the late Lord Chief Justice of England, belonged, at the sudden and unexpected termination of his life on Saturday last. He was admitted by his competitors at the bar to have been a consummate advocate, and was recognized by his fellow-members of the House of Commons as a brilliant orator. But it

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