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pronounce a somewhat exaggerated eulogy over the grave of every judge. But it is aafe to say that no words of highest commendation that we can use when speaking of the late Lord Hatherley will give rise to any such notion in the mind of any member of our profession who is old enough to remember him as Chancellor, Lord Justice . or Vice-Chancellor. Readiness of apprehension, unflagging industry, jealous husbanding of the public time, patience, courtesy, and learning—these have been, and are, possessed by many past and present occupants of the bench. But in the case of the great man whom we have just lost, there seemed to be as it were around and above, or, perhaps, it would be better to say, at the root and centre, of all these great excellencies, a simplicity and pureness, wholly unattended by any weakness, of personal character, which is rare among all classes of men, and which certainly does not become more common as we pass into the class of men who have made good their footing in high place and office. It was the great charm of ViceChancellor Wood's court that there, at any time, the English law might be seen worthily administered by the very type and model of an English Christian gentleman. It is not too much to say that, throughout the long period during which he had practised at the bar, and sat in Parliament and on the bench, he had preserved a sensitiveness of conscience which made fraud or unfair dealing a positive pain to him. This natural antipathy to wrong was shown, not at all in cheap outbursts of righteous indignation, but in a certain uneasiness of position, and a change of colour and expression, that spoke more eloquently than words. In some instances, no doubt, this characteristic led him to administer rather morality than law; but in by far the majority of cases any ouch tendency was counterbalanced by hie clear perception of the lines laid down by his predecessors, and his conscientious desire not to overstep the real limits of equity jurisprudence. Like every other eminent judge, Lord Hatherlby's most abiding monument most be such of his judgments and decisions as have taken rank as leading cases. But, besidos this, there is the less lasting, but not less precious, monument of his worth which is represented by the memory of those who saw him from day to day, and saw nothing in him that was not good and noble.

It Appeabs to be as yet uncertain when and where the trial for the Brighton Railway Murder will take place in the event of any person being committed to trial for it, and suggestions are said to have already been made that it might be desirable that the trial should take place at the Central Criminal Court under the powers of the "Palmer Act" (19 Vict. c. 16) by which indictments may be removed into that court by certiorari, when it shall appear " expedient to the ends of justice" so to remove them. It does not seem necessary, however, to apply the powers of this Act for the purpose of obtaining a trial at the Central Criminal Court, inasmuch as the case is exactly provided for by 7 Geo. 4, c. 64, s. 13, and 4 & 5 Will. 4, c. 36, s. 2. The first-mentioned section enacts that " for the more effectual prosecution of offences committed during Journeys from place to place, where any felony shall be committed on any person in or upon any coach, waggon, cart, or other carriage whatever employed in any journey, such felony may be dealt with, inquired of, tried, determined, and punished in any county through any part whereof such coach, wagon, cart, or carriage shall have passed in the course of the journey during which such felony shall have been committed, in the same manner as if it had been actually committed in such county." Under 4 & 5 Will. 4, c. 36, s. 2, at least one port of one county through which the carriage passed in which the murder is alleged to have been committed is in the Central Criminal Court district.

There Is Likely to be some difficulty with reference to the reward offered for the discovery of the perpetrator of the Brighton Railway Murder, as to claims made by several persons, and as to the value of several kinds of information. We do not know of auy authority on the title to a reward offered by the police or other public bodies, or relating to the discovery of a murderer, but the books contain four cases at least bearing upon rewards offered by private persons for the discovery of thieves. In Lancaster v. Wahh (4 M. & W. 16), the handbill issued stated that whoever would give information whereby lost notes might be traced should, on conviction of the guilty parties, receive a reward, and it was held that the only person entitled to the reward was he who first gave such information. In Williamt v. Carwardine (4 B. 4 Ad. 621), it was held that the motive of the party giving the information was immaterial. In Smith v. Moore (1 C. B. 438), Tiwdal, C.J., was of opinion that the words of the handbill (which merely followed the common form) were large and general enough to comprehend every mode by which information could be conveyed that might have the effect of discovering and convicting the guilty person, and this view seems to have been confirmed by the Exchequer Chamber, in the most recent case of Tarmr v. Walker (15 W. R. 407. L. R. 2 Q. B. 301). It seems from these authorities (1) that the whole reward falls to the first informer; and (2) that it is a question for the jury whether the information given by the claimant did or did not lead to the apprehension of the criminal, so as to entitle him to the reward.

The Bill which it is proposed to style the Statuta Law Revision and Civil Procedure Act, 1881, which is just about to pass, if it has not already passed, the House of Lords, is not likely to meet with either oppoaition or criticism in the House of Commons. It may be well, however, at ouce to call attention to its provisions. They are in pari materia with those of the Civil Procedure Acts Repeal Act, 1879, but travel to an important extent beyond the scope of that Act. The Act of 1879 expressly repealed, either wholly or in part, one hundred and fifteen procedure enactments which had been impliedly repealed by subsequent statutes. The present Bill expressly repeal?, wholly or in part, eightytwo similar enactments, but includes in the repeal enactments which were displaced (we purposely abstain from saying impliedly repealed) by rules made by the judges subsequently to the Judicature Act, 1875. By neither Act nor Bill is there (except in a few immaterial instances occurring in the Act) any repeal of the Common Law Procedure Act, 1852, which contains hundreds of provisions totally inconsistent with the Judicature Acts and the Rules scheduled to the Act of 1875. The third column of the schedule to the Bill (which it i- not proposed to print with the Act) contains very fully and neatly the reasons for each separate repeal. It is curious to observe that, whereas the sections of Turner's Act (13 & 14 Vict. c. 35), which are displaced by ord. 34, r. 7, are repealed as being "virtually repealed " by that rule, there is no repeal of Ksating's Act (18 & 19 Vict. c. 55) (the Summary Procedure on Bills of Exchange Act, 1855), which is displaced by ord. 2, r. 6a. Assuming that the provisions of this rule should remam unaltered, why should Turner's Act be repealed, while Keating^ Act is left standing P If the reason be that Turner's Act applied to a superior court only, whereas Keating's Act may be, and has been, applied by Order in Council to inferior courts, we cannot think such reason a ralid one. Surely there might be a repeal with a saving, so as to repeal the Act as to the Supreme Court only, as was done with the Statute of Gloucester, and many other Acts, by the Civil Procedure Acts Repeal Act, 1879. A similar course might be followed with the Common Law Procedure Acts, which may be, and have been, similarly applied to inferior courts. It "is a disgrace to the Statute-book that so many dead Procedure Acts should continue to cumber it.

There Are Some rather surprising statements in a notice furnished to the Times of the dinner given at Maidstone last Tuesday by the members of the South-Eastern -Circuit to Lord Justice Bramwell. Thus there ure mentioned among his "contemporaries and rivals," "when Mr. Bramwell joined the circuit in 1838, . . . HonyHan (a judge for a year or two), . . . Hannen {judge of the Divorce Court), Thesioer (lately Lord justice), and Mr. J. C. Mathew (lately made a judge)." "We should scarcely have thought that Mr. Bramwell would, in 1838, have had much to fear from the rivalry of Sir G. Honyman, who was called to the bar in 1849, or of Mr. Hannev, who was called in 1848, or of Mr. Mathew, who was not called till 1854. And Lord Justice Thesiger's " rivalry" could hardly be very formidable, for, as it happens, he was born in 1838, the year in ■■which Mr. Bramwell joined the circuit.

Some Little Time ago we remarked that one of the questions which must come to the front and press for a solution is, how far the system of trial by jury is to be retained for the purpose of civil actions. A correspondent, by way of pointing this moral, says that in an action by a house agent against a vendor, tried before a learned judge at Westminster on the 8th inst., the house agent sought to prove that the defendant had contracted with him to pay commission. The question for the jury was whether such a contract could be established. The judge summed up strongly in favour of the defendant, and the jury returned a verdict for the defendant, it may be assumed rather to the surprise of the court, as the judge addressing the jury said, " I thank you, gentlemen, very much for your verdict: it is a difficult thing to obtain a verdict from a jury against agents of this sort, and these commission agents seem to think they can do as they liko."


"we have already expressed our opinion upon tho3e clauses in the Judicature Bill by which it is proposed to reinforce the Court of Appeal. We now proceed to say a few words concerning the numerous minor provisions which the Bill contains. There are twenty-eight clauses in all, and the appeal clauses being four only, these "minor provisions " take up twenty-four.

The 6th and 7th clauses provide for the appointment ■of two judges of the Chancery Division, one to be appointed in consequence of the proposed translation of the Master of the Rolls "immediately after the passing of this Act," and the other to be appointed from time to time under the Judicature Act, 1877, "so as at all times to make due provision for the business of the Cbaucery Division of the High Court of Justice: Provided that no such appointment shall be made unless or until the number of judges attached for the time being to the Chancery Division of the High Court, other than the Lord Chancellor, is by death, resignation, or otherwise, reduced below five." The object of this is to rectify the cuiious blunder in the Act of 1877, by reason of which it was doubful whether or not the powers of that Act would be exhausted by one appointment. The clause by which the blunder will now be rectified is, we may observe, taken from the Bankruptcy Bill, so that that measuro will have one little limb the less to drag along.

Clause 8 gives the Lord Chancellor power to direct that the Rolls Court and Chambers may be used "by such judge of the Chancery Division as shall be by order in that -behalf named," and clause 9 in effect provides that future

presidents of the Probate, &c, Division shall be styled justices of the High Court. This is perhaps a step towards the abolition of that division, which might well be consolidated with the Chancery Division by an Order in Council under section 32 of the Act of 1873.

Clause 10 at lttst abolishes that fictitious "Full Court of Divorce," which was shown to have a sufficient legal existence in Westhead v. Westhead (L. R. 2 P. D. 1) and other cases, and very properly provides that divorce appeals shall be brought to the Court of Appeal instead of to such Full Court, while clause 11 furthers the same object in relation to appeals under the Divorce Amendment Aot, 1868. There is no express abolition of the Full Court; it is only impliedly abolished by having its jurisdiction, under 20 & 21 Vict. c. 85, "or under any other Act," taken away from it. Perhaps for the sake of greater clearness and caution an express abolition might be desirable.

The 12th clause is a very precise one. It runs thus: —

"A judge who was not present and aoting as a member of a divisional court of the High Court of Justice at the time when any decision which may be appealed from was made, or at the argument ol the case deoided, shall not for the purpose of the fourth section of the Supreme Court of Judicature Act, 1875, be deem«d to be or to have been a member of auoh divisional court."

The material part of the 4th section of the Act of 1875 is:—

"No judge of the Court of Appeal Bhall ait as a judge on the hearing of an appeal from any judgment or order made by himself or made by any divisional court of the High Court of which he was and is a member."

This section having judicially been held to be nonsense, would it be too much to ask the Legislature to repeal, and re-enact it in decent shape, with the omission of the words "and is" "which must be rejected" (Fisher v. Vol de Trnvers Asphalte Company, 24 W. R. 198, L. R. 1 C. P. D. 259), and with all other proper amendments? The only effect of the proposed amendment which we can discover is that, whereas by the existing law a judge is disqualified by having taken part in a decision only, a taking part in the hearing of an argument also is now to disqualify him. This seems right, and is, of course, an additioual argument, if one were needed, for not having High Court members of the Court of Appeal. Nothing can bo more inconvenient in practice than for parties to come prepared for a hearing, and to have to go away again because the case "cannot be heard by the court as at present constituted." Before leaving this subject it may be well to suggest that the time is come for removing the anomaly by which judges of the Court of Appeal, who may also happen to be members of the Houso of Lords, may still sit on appeal from judgments to which they themselves may have been parties. Three is a quorum of the Court of Appeal, and three is a quorum of the House of Lords. If a case of great political or ecclesiastical interest were to be heard by a Court of Appeal of which peers happened to be acting members, and then came up for revision by the House of Lords, such peers might be in an invidious position. It surely ought to be settled by statute that such peers ought not to take part in the hearing or decision of the second appsal.

A very abundant caution provides in clause 13 for the nomination of election judges by the judges of the Queen's Bench Division, instead of by the judges of the Queen's Bench, Common Pleas, aud Exchequer Divisions. We had hoped, and still upon a renewed perusal of it think, that the Order in Council under section 32 of the Act of 1873 gave " all such further powers as might be necessary" for the purpose of fusing the three divisions into one; but it is, of course, desirable to be on the safe side, especially in dealing with election matters.

The 14th clause is of great importance. It provides that the jurisdiction of tho High Court in election and registration cases " shall henceforth be final and conclupeople that patronage is a perquisite of high office, and not a trust to be exercised for the public benefit.

Clauses 21, 22, and 23 seem to increase the powers of the Treasury over appointments; and we should hare expected that these matters had been sufficiently dealt with by the Aot of 1879. Clause 24 provides for the appointment of persons to keep order, take care of and clean the Royal Courts of Justice.

sive, unless in any case it shall seem fit to the High Court to give special leave to appeal therefrom to her Majesty's Courtof Appeal, whose decision in such case shall be final and conclusive." It would take too much of our space to show (as we think we could show) that the jurisdiction of the High Court in these cases is final under the present law. It may, however, be mentioned as at least certain—and it is a strong argument that such is the law—that no such case has been taken to the Court of Appeal during the five years which have elapsed since the commencement of the Judicature Acts. The clause, therefore, confers, and does not restrict, as it appears to do, the right of appeal; and confers it subject to special leave. We are, therefore, face to face with two questions—(1) ought there to be au appeal at all ? and (2) ought the appeal to be restricted by leave? We incline to think that there ought to be no appeal at all. Election law, though important, is not difficult, and it is law iu which the points raised require speedy settlement.

The 15th clause is also a very important one. It provides that the Winter Assizes Act, 1876, "shall henceforth extend to all assizes to be held at any time of the year." The Act in question, it will be remembered, allows counties to be united for the purpose of holding assizes "where it appears to her Majesty, by reason of the small number of prisoners, or otherwise, that it is usually inexpedient to hold separate winter assizes for any county." The whole machinery of the Act is worked by Orders in Council, to be laid before Parliament indeed, but, while in force, to have effect as if enacted in the Act, which suggests no address by either House, &c, for the purpose of annulling them. We may expect strenuous opposition to this clause, which has, however, a very strong recommendation of the Judicature Commissioners in its favour, and, if carried, will, we think, redound with equal advantage to bench, bar, suitors, and public. But what is to be done with the high sheriffs f Would not this be a good opportunity for abolishing the assize duties of these officials, and for handing them over to the chief constables of the counties in which the assizes should be held? Clause 16 provides for the nomination of sheriffs in the Queen's Bench Division, "at the same time ami in the same manner as liath been heretofore accustomed in the Court of Exchequer," and this clause, which seems useless otherwise, may have its use in giving rise to a debate on the question whether or not the assize duties of a high sheriff ought not to be done away with. Clause 17, which provides for the swearing in of the Lord Mayor of London, might very well, we think, be replaced by a provision abolishing the swearing of that official in court altogether. The ceremony is only a needless interruption of judicial business, and sometimes has given occasion for very ill-judged orations, and the sooner it is dispensed with the better.

Clause 18 very properly reduces the number of judges who are to fix Central Criminal Court Sessions from eight or more to four or more, and clause 19 increases the number of puisne judge members of the Rule Committee of the Supreme Court from three or more out of nine members to four or more out of eight. Of the latter clause we have only to remark that this would be a good opportunity for introducing the elective system. The clause as it stands gives the Lord Chanctllor for the time being and his nominees a clear majority on the Rule Committee.

Clause 20 deals with "patronage." The patronages which fall vacant by the abolition of the two ehiefships arc to go equally amongst the surviving chiefs—i.e., tho Lord Chancellor, the Lord Chief Justice, and the Master of the Rolls, " in rotation." We should have been better pleased if it had been proposed to give them to a •' Patronage Committee" of five or three puisne judges. Or might it not be convenient that the Rule Committee for the time being should have the patronage? Such a provision would at least utterly extinguish any notion which may still possibly exist in the minds of unthinking

Clause 25 provides for the transfer to the Master of the Rolls (with the concurrence of the Lord Chancellor and the Lord Chief Justice) of the power given by section 14 of the Judicature Act, 1875, to the Chief Justice of England, the Master of the Rolls, the Chief Justice of the Common Pleas, and the Chief Baron, of adapting enactments relating to solicitors. Clause 27 expressly makes valid appointments made by the Lord Chief Justice of commissioners to take acknowledgment?.

Last, but not least, clause 28, reciting that "it is expedient that the jurisdiction of county courts should be exercised as far as conveniently may be in a manner similar to that of the High Court," provides that toepower of making county court rules shall extend to all cases within the j urisdiction of county courts as to which Rules of the Supreme Court might be made. Is this provision in anticipation of that reform which was recommended in the second report of the Judicature Commission, "that the county courts should become parts of the High Court, and should have unlimited jurisdiction, subject to a power of transfer when a claim should exceed £50 " P


The legitimation of children by the subsequent marriage of their parents has never been acknowledged by the law of England. He alone by English law is legitimate who is born of parents married before the time of his birth. Yet the doctrine that children born illegitimate may be legitimated per subsequens matrimonium is of a very ancient date, and was first established in the Roman law by Constantine, and in the canon law by Pope Alexander III., and it now prevails in Scotland, and also in France, Holland, and, it is believed, other countries of Europe. An unsuccessful attempt was indeed made in the reign of Henry III. to introduce the rule of canon law into the common law of England, and resulted in the passing of the famous Statute of Merton (20 Henry III.), containing a declaration by "all the earls and barons, with one voice, that they would not change the laws of the realm" by making those bom before matrimony legitimate. Although, however, legitimation is unknown to English law, yet, inasmuch as it has been adopted by several foreign nations, questions have from time to time arisen in our courts involving the point how far our law, in determining the succession to property in England, is bound to recognize legitimation, either by the doctrines of international law or by what is known as "the comity of nations." One of such questions has just been settled by the recent judgment of the Court of Appeal in the case of Re Goodman's Trusts, reversing a decision of the Master to the Rolls (reported 28 W. R. 902, L. R 14 Cb. D. 619). This judgment deserves the attention of all who are interested in the progress of our English jurisprudence.

The question raised by the appeal was whether or not a child, legitimate for all purposes by the law of its birthplace, but illegitimate by English law. can take any share of the estate of an English intestate as one of the next of kin. The following were briefly the only material facts of the case :—A legacy, having lapsed by the death of the legatee in the testatrix's lifetime, became divisible amongst her next of kin. The testatrix had six brothers and sisters, but they all predeceased her, and only two left any issu e. One of these two, having bad children in England by a woman not his wife, went with them and their mother to Holland, where he became domiciled, and where he had another child by the same woman. After this child's birth the parents married in Holland, and the child was legitimated according to the law of that country. The question accordingly arose whether or not this child was one of the next of kin of the testatrix, and, as such, entitled to share in tho lapsed legacy. The Master of the Rolls decided without hesitation in the negative, holding that children in the 7th section of the statute of 22 & 23 Car. II., c. 10, means children according to English law, and excludes a legitimated child, and that, therefore, a legitimated child could not take under any section of the statute. On the appeal Lord Justice Lush agreed with that decision; but the majority of the court (Lords Justices James and Cotton) held the contrary opinion; and, atter taking time to consider the point, they have deliberately decided that in administering tho estate of an intestate dying domiciled in England, the English courts will recognize children legitimate according to the law of a foreign country, though illegitimate by English law, as legitimate for the purpose of succeeding to the intestate's personal estate.

The question whether or not a legitimated child could succeed to lands as heir of his father in England was discussed in the case of Birtwhiatle v. Vardill (5 B. & C. 438)—a case probably more fully and elaborately argued than any other; and finally, after the opinion of the judges had twice been taken, it was decided by the House of Lords, in 1840, that a child, legitimate according to tho law of Scotland by the marriage of his parents there subsequently to his birth, could not succeed to land in England as heir to his father (see 7 CI. & F. 895). Now, it is to be remarked that the law of Scotland as to legitimation is peculiar in this respect, that the subsequent marriage of the parents is, by a presumption or fiction of law, antedated to the birth of the child; if, therefore, a child, legitimate by Scotch law by reason of such subsequent marriage, cannot inherit land as heir to his father iu England, it would seem, d fortiori, that the result would be the same in the case of a child legitimated according to the law of a country in which no euch presumption or fiction of law prevails—indeed, it has never been questioned since Birtwhittle v. Vardill that, according to English law in the succession to real estate in England, no child can take as heir who was not born after the marriage of its parents.

Again, with regard to personal estate, it was decided in 1863, in Boyes v. Bedale (12 W. R. 232, 1 H. & M. 798), by Vice-Chancellor Wood, that in construing a bequest by a testator domiciled in England, the word "children" does not include a legitimated child; and the result is the same whether the word be qualified by the epithet "legitimate" or not. As to the precise question, however, raised by the case of Be Goodman's Trusts, there appears to have been no direct authority prior to the decision of the Master of the Soils, except a dictum of Vice-Chancellor Wood in the case of Boyes v. Bedale cited above, in which the Vicechancellor expresses himself thus: "I take it that the language of the Statute of Distributions must bo dealt with in the same way. If an intestate dies domiciled in England, the division of his property is governed throughout by English law, and no person could take by representation under that statute unless legitimate by the law of England" (see 1 H. & M. 805). This case, however, was followed and entirely concurred in by Vice-Chancellor Kindersley in 1865 in a case of Be Wilson's Trusts (14 W. R. 161, L. E. 1 Eq. 247), afterwards affirmed in the House of Lords in Shaw v. Gould (L R. 3 H. L. 55), and the dictum of Vice-Chancellor Wood was not called in question; moreover, the Master of the Bolls, in deciding lie Goodman's Trusts, stated that had he felt any doubt upon the subject, he should have fol

lowed that dictum, and it may therefore be taken to have expressed the law on this point prior to the recent decision of the Court of Appeal. Another point as to legitimation came before Vice-Chancellor Stuart in 1871, and he there, in a case of Skottowe v. Young (L. R. 11 Eq. 474), decided that a child, legitimated according to French law, ranks as a child under the English Legaoy and Succession Duty Acts. Indeed it is, as was pointed out by the Vice-Chancellor in that case, difficult to sea how such a child could, in any sense, be a "stranger in blood."

On the whole, the law on the subject under consideration does not seem to be in a satisfactory state, and it would appear to lead to these rather anomalous result?, that, while a child duly legitimated by the subsequent marriage of his parents would not inherit his intestate father's lands in England, yet he would share iu the personal estate as one of the next of kin; and, though such a child would take as a " child," and therefore one of the next of kin under an intestacy, yet he would not take under a bequest by will to children.


CLERK OF THE PEACE. [To the Editor of the Solicitors' Journal.] Sir,—In reply to the letter of your correspondent "Lex," in this week's Solicitors' Journal, I believe Mr. R. H. Wyatt, clerk of the peace for Surrey, is a deputy-lieutenant for counties Kent and Merioneth. Teddington, July 8. Edward F. M. Ryan.

[We believe that the point of our correspondent's inquiry was whether the same person could be both clerk of the peace and a deputy-lieutenant for the same county.Ed. S. J.]

[To the Editor of the Solicitors' Journal.] Sir,—In answer to the inquiry of " Lex," in your last week's issue, I would refer him to the Law List, where be will find that it is not at all unusual for a clerk of the peace to be either a deputy-lieutenant or under-sheriff.

As an example, Mr. F. W. Jones, of this city, is, and has been for some years past, both clerk of the peace and under-sheriff for the city of Gloucester at one and the same time. Henry Morton York.

Gloucester, July 12.

[To the Editor of the Solicitors' Journal.] Sir,—In reply to " Lex's" query, I beg to state that Mr. John M. Davenport, a solicitor at Oxford, and clerk of the peace for the county, formerly held, in addition to the latter office, the position of under-sheriff for the county of Oxford (see Law Lists previous to 1876).

C. Gouqh.

7, Granville-square, Pentonville, July 8.

On the 7th inst., in the House of Commons, Mr. Gregory asked the Attorney-General whether any report or recommendations had been agreed upon by the committee appointed to consider the operation of the Judicature Acts and the procedure under them; and, if not, when such report or recommendations might be expected. The Attorney-General replied that the report and tbe recommendations wre made some seven or eight weeks ago. They had been circulated by tbe Lord Chancellor among the judges, in order that the Committee of Judaea might act on the reporr. The Lord Chanoellor thought it better to place it iu the hands of tho judges before he laid it on the table.


Liquidation PetitionRecbiverInterference With PossessionContempt Of CourtLiability To Account SolicitorCourt Op BankruptcyJurisdiction.—Io • case of Ex parte Hayward, before the Court of Appeal on the 7th iost., a qneetion arose as to the liability to acoonnt in the Court of Bankruptcy of a person who bad interfered with the discharge of the duties of a receiver appointed by the court under a liquidation petition. Immediately after the filing of a liquidation petition by some traders a reoeiver of their property wns appointed hy the court, but no manager of their business was appointed. The debtors were advised by their solicitor, who had filed the petition, to continue carrying on their business, and they acted on this advice. The reoeiver on bis appointment took possession of the debtors' property and effects at their place of business, and sent ont notioes to the debtors to tbe estate, calling on them to pay their debts to him. The solicitor then told him not to collect any further sums, or to apply to tbe debtors to tbe estate to pay their debts to him, as it would ruin the business and the goodwitl. He told the receiver that the debtors intended to pay a composition, and that it would be unnecessary for him to interfere with the management of tbe business, beyond holding possession as reoeiver, fnrther than he (the solicitor) directed him from time to time, as the business was being properly attended to by the debtors under his (tbe solicitor's) soperintendenoe. Tbe receiver raised some objection to this, bnt the solicitor told him that be would see that tbe management of tbe business was properly attended to, and offered to indemnify him against any liability, and wrote him a letter to that effect. The business was carried on in this way for two months, at the end of which time tbe debtors were adjudicated bankrupts, resolutions which bad been passed to accept a composition having fallen through in consequence of some informality. In carrying on the business the bankrnpts bad received and paid various sums of money. Upon tbe application of the trustee in tbe bankruptcy, Mr. Registrar Hazlitt ordered the solicitor to file an account of all transactions and dealings of the bankrupts, from the date of the appointment of the reoeiver to the date of the adjudication, and of all sums of money received by or on account of tbe bankrnpts, or either of them, or by any person or persons on behalf of their estate during the same period with his or their consent or permission ; and also of all snms paid by or on aooount of the bankrupts, or by acy person or persons on their behalf, or on behalf of their estate, during tbe same period, prefacing the order with a declaration that the solicitor was liable for any loss which might appear on tbe taking of tbe accounts to to have been suffered by the estate by reason of the management or carrying on of the business by the bankrupts or either of them, or by the solicitor on their behalf, during the same period. It was urged on the solicitor's behalf that there was no jurisdiction in the Bankruptcy Court to make him responsible for giving his cli nts bad advice. But the Court of Appeal (Lord Selbohnk, C, and Brett and Cotton, L.JJ.) held that the order was sub-taotujlly right, though the accounts ought to have been directed against the solicitor jointly with the receiver; and the trustee then gave an undertaking to apply for an order against the receiver. The court also said that there should be an inquiry whether any and what loss had been sustained by reason of the carrying on of tbe business, having regard to the price afterwards realized by the sale of the business, and that the trustee must undertake to render all the assistance he could to the solicitor in the making; ont of the acconnts, and to use any powers which he possessed an trnstee to compel the bankrupts to do the same. Lord Sei.borne. C, said that the solicitor was held liable, not for the advice which he had given to his clients, but for taking on himself to give instructions to the receiver not to discharge the duties of his offioe. The undertaking he gave to indemnify the reoeiver against liahility showed that he himself thought be ought not to interfere with the reoeiver, except on the terms of becoming personally responsible. Cotton, L.J., said that, if it Whs considered desirable that the business should be carried on, an appli.

oation should have been made to the court for the. purpose. But, instead of doing that, the solioi or took on himself the responsibility of directing the reoeiver not to act on the order of the court. This was a contempt of court, and a person wbo bad thus acted ought to be in ads accountable in the [ John Hayward; Jama Neal.

Composition ResolutionsSubsequent Aomemsnt Bv Debtor To Pay Ose Creditor In FullBankruptcy Acr, 1869, s. 126.—In tbe oase of Ex parte Barrow, belore lis Court of Appeal on the 8th ingt., the question arose whether, after resolutions accepting a composition bave been pawed by creditors under section 126 of the Bankruptcy Act, 1869, and before the time has come for carrying out the provisions of tbe resolutions, a valid agreement can be entered into between the debtor and one of the creditors, who is bound by the composition, for the payment of his debt in full. Ia Ex parte Barrow, the creditors had resolved to accept a composition, payable in three instalments, respectively two, four, and six months from the registration of the resolutions. Before the flrst instalment became due, tbe debtor agreed with one of the creditors, who was bound by tbe 1 to pay him his debt in full, the creditor agreeing to t supplying the debtor with goods on credit. tie afterwards gave tbe creditor bills for the balance of his original debt, after allowing for the composition, and the creditor claimed to prove for the amount of the bills in other liquidation proceedings subsequently instituted by the debtor. Bacon, C.J.. held that the proof had heen rightly rejected by the trustee, and his decision was affirmed by tbe Court of Appeal (Lord Selborne, C, and Brett and Cotton, L.JJ.). Reliance was placed on the principle which has been often laid down by the coutt, that after composition resolutions have been passed, the debtor is master of his estate, and the creditors have no lien upon it. And the case of Jakeman v. Cool (27 W. R, 171, L. R. 4 Ex. D. 26), was cited, in which it was beld that an agreement by a liquidating debtor, who had obtained 1 discharge from his creditors, to pay one of the creditors in fall,io consideration of the creditor agreeing to supply him witb meat on ciedit, wag a valid agreement,and that the creditor could maintain an action against the debtor for hia origin-1 debt Lord Selborne, C, who delivered fie judgment of the court, said that the composition was a statutory one under sction 126, which provided that, if at two successive rreetings ot the creditors there were certain majorities in number and value of the creditors present in favour of a proposed composition, that composition should be absolutely binding, not only on the creditors who assen'ed to it, but also on those who dis«ent»d from it, provided that their names ant the amounts of their deb't) were inserted in the stat-ment produced by the debtor at tho meetings, and by the eiprm words of the section a composiiion thus accepted was to be accepted in satisfaction of the debts due to the creditor*, and its provisions were not to be added to or varied, except by resolutions passed at a subsequent meeting of the creditor*, and in a similar manner. Bills given for a d-bt which was satisfied by the bankruptcy law were prima fatit given without any consideration. The onus of proving that the dehtor had made default in fulfilling the terms of the composition was on the appellant, and be had failed satisfactorily to discharge that onus. Jakema* v. Cook was a case, not of composition, but of liquidation by arrangement, and appeared to h*ve no b-annt; whatever on the preseut ca«e, which was one of s'atutory composition. The agreement was made, not only be'ore the statutory composition was exhaus'ed by the fulfilment of its terms, but even hfire the first instalment had become due. It might be that after a composition h<d been fully worked out and all the instalments paid, the posit on of the debtor might be like that of a discharged bankrupt or liquidating debtor, and that an agreement made by him with a creditor, auch as in Jakeman v. don't, would he supported. But in the preseut case everything was done before any of the instalments had been paid to any of the creditors. By section 126 it was expressly provided that no addition o or variation in acompo-ition should be made without a resolution of tbe creditors. If there ecu d be no addition for the benefit of all the creditors, how comd there b« an addition for the benefit of one creditor, and that behind the hacks of the others, and without any coTimutiication to them? It appeared to hi« lordship iiiimstible that a composition for the benefit of all the creditors and such

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