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Trustee In BankruptcyDisclaimer Op Leasehold Interest Of Bankrupt—Leave Op CourtBankruptcy Act, 1869, ss. 23, 78—Bankruptcy Rules, 1871, R. 28.— In a case of Ex parte The East and West India Dock Company, before the Court of Appeal on the 30th nit., the question arose whether leave ought to be given to the trustee of » liquidating debtor to disclaim a leasehold interest of the debtor under the following oircnmstanoes. The lessee of a public-house, in consideration of a premium, assigned the houBe for the residue of the term to the debtor, the debtor covenanting in the ordinary way to pay the rent and observe and perform the covenants, and to indemnify the lessee against the rent and covenants. A few years afterwards the debtor filed a liquidation petition, and the trustee, finding that the house was not worth the rent, applied to the court for leave to disclaim the debtor's interest under the lease. The lessor opposed the application, on the ground that the effect of the disclaimer might be to destroy his rights against the original lessee under bis covenants in the original lease. But the lessor offered to undertake not to sue the trustee on the covenants, and not to make any claim against the bankrupt's estate. Mr. Registrar Murray gave leave to disclaim, and his decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeal (Lord Selborne, C, and Bagoallay and Lush, L.JJ.). The Lord Chancellor, who delivered the judgment of the court, said that rule 28 no doubt required the court to exercise some judgment as to the propriety of allowing a disclaimer. But the rule was made under the power conferred by section 78 of the Act, which enables the Lord Chancellor, with the advice of the Chief Judge, from time to time to make general rules " for the effectual exeoution of this Act and of the objects thereof, and the regulation of the practice'and procedure of bankruptcy petitions and the proceedings thereon," and, after enumerating certain matters as to which regulations may be made, adds, "and, as to any other matter or thing, whether similar or not to those above enumerated, in respect of which it may be expedient to make rules for carrying into effect the objects of this Act." Therefore the rule was made and only could be made for the effectual execution of the objects of section 23. The object of that section was to cut short by the trustee's disclaimer all liability of the bankrupt's estate in the cases there mentioned, which included future liabilities under leases, leaving any person who was injured to prove against the bankrupt's estate for the injury done to him. On the face of the section it appeared that the power of disclaimer was to be exercised with a view to the administration of the estate and for the benefit of all the persons who were interested in that administration. If, therefore, in any particular case it appeared clear that, looking at that object only, the disclaimer ought to be allowed, the court ought not for any collateral reasons, such as the interest of strangers to the bankruptcy, to refuse to allow it.' In the present case the only reason suggested for refusing leave to disclaim was the interest of the lessor as between himself and the original lessee. And the argument must come to this, that, when the bankrupt was the assignee of a lease, the court ought never to allow his trustee to disclaim the lease if the lessor was willing to give such an undertaking as had been offered in the present case. That was a startling proposition, and it was inconsistent with the policy of section 23, as expressed on the face of it. If the view of the majority of the Court of Exchequer in Smyth v. North (20 W. R. 683, L. R. 7 Ex. 242), and the view of the Court of Appeal in the recent case of Ex parte Walton (ante, p. 585), was correct (and his lordship did not intend to intimate any opinion to tbe contrary), the disclaimer would not affect tbe rights of the lessor against the original lessee. If, on the other hand, tbe view of these learned judges was incorrect, still it would be contrary to the policy of the statute to leave the bankrupt's estate liable to a liability from which it would be relieved if the disclaimer was allowed. Tbe undertaking offered would not give the estate the relief which would be given by the disclaimer. The appeal must, therefore, be dismissed. The appellants' counsel asked that the order giving leave to disclaim might be prefaced (as in Ex parte Walton) with a declaration of the opinion of the court that the rights of the lessors against the original lessee would not be prejudiced. The court deolined to do this, and they also refused to give leave to appeal to the House of .Lords, on the ground that the appeal would be from an exer

cise of the discretion of the conrt, and not from a decision on a point of law.—Solicitors, Fresh/kids & Williams; Soames; Eodgers is Clarkson.

Mortgage—Attornment ClauseDistressApplicaTion Of Proceeds.—In a case of Exparte Harrison, before the Court of Appeal on the 30th nit., a question arose as to tbe right of a mortgagee to apply the proceeds of a distress, levied under an attornment clause in the mortgage, in payment of the principal of the mortgage debt as well as of the interest due. Tbe mortgage deed contained a reoital that the mortgagee had agreed to advance the money upon having the repayment thereof, with interest, "secured in manner hereinafter appearing." The deed was executed on the 8th of November, 1873. The mortgagee covenanted that, if the interest was punctually paid, he would not call in the principal before tbe 8th of November,' 1880. A power of sale was given, and the mortgager, "for the consideration aforesaid)" attorned tenant from year to year of the mortgaged property (which was in his occupation) to the mortgagee at a yearly rent which was equal in amount to a year's interest on the principal at the rate reserved, the rent being made payable half-yearly. The deed contained a provision for the reduction of the interest by one per cent, per annum in case it should be paid within thirty days aft?r it should become due. In March, 1880, the mortgagor filed a liquidation petition. On the 1st of June, 1880, the mortgagee gave six months' notice to pay off the mortgage. The trustee in the liquidation paid the interest up to the 1st of July, 1880. In November, 1880, the mortgagee distrained for half a year's rent nnder the attornment clause up to the 8th of November, and the question tben arose whether be was entitled to retain out of the proceeds of the distress more than the interest which was due from tbe 1st of July to tbe 8th of November. He claimed to retain the excess of the proceeds of the distress, beyond that interest, on account of principal. Bacon, C.J., held (29 W.R. 668) that the mortgagee was entitlod to do this, and the Court of Appeal (Lord Selborne, C, and Bagoallay and Lush, L.JJ.) affirmed the decision. The Lord Chancellor said that, looking at the recital that the payment of prinoipal and interest was to be secured "in manner hereinafter appearing," primd facie the rent reserved by the attornment clause was applicable to the payment of interest when it became due, and of principal when it became due. At the time when the distress was levied the whole of the principal was due, and some interest. Why was not the fruit of the distress to be applied to payment of tbe whole which was due? There was nothing to the contrary in the deed, except the fact that the amount fixed for the rent coincided exactly wirh the amount of the interest, which was made payable on the same day, but which was made reducible at tbe option of ti c mortgagor, for the exercise of which option be was allowed a period of thirty days. But there was nothing to suspend the right of distress during those thirty days. There was nothing to prevent the mortgagee from applying the fruits of the distress to payment of principal, and even if there was not a shilling of interest due, there was nothing to prevent him from distraining for principal. This decision appears to conflict with that of Malins, V.C, in the case of Hampton v. Fellows (L. R. 6 Eq. 575).—solicitors, Stvann <t Co.; Cole $ Jackson.

Bill Op SaleDescription Of Grantor—" Widow'' —Bills Of Sale Act, 1878, s. 10.—In a casa of Ex parte Chapman, on the 30tb ult., the Court of Appeal (Lord Sblbornb, 0., and Bagoallay and Lush, L.J.I.) affirmed the decision of Bacon, C.J., that a widow who, until a few weeks before she executed a bill of sale, had been carrying on the business of a licensed victualler, and who was not then carrying on any business, but who was in treaty for the taking of another public-house,

iwas sufficiently described on the registration of the bill of sale simply as a widow.—Solicitors, John Scaife; Brownlovo <fc Howe.

Chose In Action Of BankruptReversionary InTerestTrustee In BankruptcyParticular Assignee Priority—NoticeVendor And PurchasbrBankRuptcy Act, 1869, s. 22.—In a case of Palmer v. Locke, before the Court of Appeal on the 1st inst., a question was raised upon the construction of section 23 of the Bankruptcy Act, 1869, which presides that, "where any portion of the property of the bankrupt consists of things in action, any action, suit, or other proceeding for the recovery of such things instituted by the trustee shall be instituted in bis official name, as in this Act provided, and such things shall, for the purpose of such action, suit, or other proceeding, be deemed to be assignable in law, and to have been duly assigned to the trustee in his official capacity." But there are no negative words such as there were in the corresponding section (section 141) of the Bankruptcy Act of 1849, which provided that "neither the bankrupt, nor any person claiming through or under him shall have power to recover the same, nor to make any relea«e or discharge thereof; . . . . but such assignees shall have the remedy to recover the same in their own names as the bankrupt himself might have had if be had not been arijnuged a bankrupt." The question arose thus :—A debtrr, who was entitled to a reversionary interest in a sum of stock, filed a liquidation petition in Maic'i, 1873, under which, in June, 1873, a traBtee was appointed. No discharge was given to the debtor. In July, 1873, he mortgaged ,his reversionary interest to A. In April, 1875, he mortgaged it again to B. The fund was in court in an administration action, and, in October, 1875, B. obtained a stop order on the fund. On tbe 8th of November, 1S75, A. obtained a Btop order. On the 26th of November, 1875, the debtor made a third mortgage to C, and in December, 1875, C. obtained a stop order. In March, 1876, tbe trustee obtained a stop order. The plaintiff in Palmer v. Locke, who had purchased the rights of A. and

B. , and of the trustee, entered into an agreement to sell the reversionary interest. The purchaser, after an abstract of tit'e had been furnished to him, discovered the existence of

C. 's stop order, and he then required to he furnished with an abstract of C.'b incumbrance. The vendor declined to furnish it, on the ground that, by the operation of section 22, the trustee had obtained an absolute legal title, which no subsequent dealing by the debtor, even with a person who had no notice of the liquidation, could displace. Jeesel, M.R., held that an abstract of C.'s incumbrance must be furnished, and that if that incumbrance were no', shown to have been discharged, it would be an incumbrance on tbe plaintiff's title. His lordship paid that the case was distinguishable from In re Bright's Settlement (28 "W. R. 551, L. E. 13Ch.D. 413), which arose under section 141 of the Act of 1849, in which there were the negative woids which did not occur in section 22 of the Act of 1869. This decision was affirmed by the Court of Apreal (Lord Selborne, C, and Baggallat and Lush, L.JJ ), who were of opinion that the question whether, if C. had^no notice of the liquidation when he obtained his mortgage, seeing that he obtained a stop order before the trustee,|hi3 title might not be better than that of tbe trustee, Whs too doubtful to be decided against the purchaser in the absence ol C.—Solicitors, Last <fc Sons; Bume <£• Bunt.

Will— Construction—Gin To CharityUncertainty. —In a case of Manden v. Graham, before the Court of Appeal on the 4th inst., the question arose whether a gift by will to trustees for the benefit of a specified parish was a good charitable pift, or was void for uncertainty. The testatrix gave the residue of her personal estate to trustees upon trust to apply the same as to them in their uncontrolled discretion should seem expedient, " in, for, or towards snch end, intent, object, or purpose, or for or towards such ends, intents, object 8, or purposes in or in connection with or in relation to t lie parish, as they should think fit, without being in any manner accountable to or responsible for the mode of such application, or the end, intent, object, or purpose tht reof to any person or persons or body of persons whatsoever." The court (jessel, M.R., and Brbtt and Cotton, L.JJ.) held that the gift was void for uncertainty, there being, as Jkssf.l, M.R., said, nothing to limit the application of the gift to those purposes which the court considered charitable. The trustees might apply it to any object or purpose they tliought fit, provided that it was some object or purpose in the particular parish. The case of Dolan v. McDeimot (L. R. 3 Ch. 676) was distinguishable.—SoliCitors, Pritchard, £ngle/ield, & Co.

Railway Company—Purchase Op Land By Agreement


TION—Trustee Appointed SurveyorLands Clauses. Consolidation Act, J 845, ss. 7, 9.—In a case of Peters j. The Lewes and East Orinstead Railway Company, on the 5th inst., the Court of Appeal (JsbSEL, M.U., and Biett and Cotton, L.JJ.) held that the power given by section 7 of the Lands Classes Consolidation Aot, 1845, to trnetees of land for {inter alia) femes covert, to sell and to convey the land on behalf of their cestui* que truttent to s railway oompany, does not extend to trustees on behalf of a married woman of an absolute estate in fee simple for her Beparate nee, snah a married woman not being a person nnder disability, but being competent to convey tbe larjd herself. Tbe court also beld that when trustees of land had appointed one of themselves, who happened to be a surveyor, to act as a surveyor, under seotion 9 of the Act, in determining the prioe to be paid by a railway company for a part of tbe land, snch an appointment was not a valid one under section 9, and that, consequently, there bad been no proper valuation, and the sale to the oompany was invalid as against the cestui que trust.Solicitors, Cope <t Co; Wyatt $ Barraud.

PracticeExtbndikg Time Por Appealing—Petition Ord. 58, Br. 9, 15.—In a case of Jn re Jaquts, before tbe Court of Appeal on the 6th inst., an application wu made for an extension of the time for appealing, under the following circumstances. An order had been made, on petition, for the division of a fund which had been paid into court by a corporation for the purchase of land taken by them under the Lands Clauses Act. Some of the persons entitled, who had claimed a larger share of the fund than the order bad given them, were resident in America, and the court was asked on their behalf to extend the three weeks allowed for appealing, in order to enable their solicitors in England to receive instructions from them whether they desired to present an appeal. The solicitors held a power of attorney, but it did not distinctly authorize them to present an appeal. The court (jessel, M.R., and Brett and Cotton, L.JJ.) extended the time for a month. JesSel, M.R., said that the order, though in form an interlocutory one, was really a final one. It was a mere accident that it came to be made in a " matter." Rule 8, which provides that " the time for appealing from any order or decision made or given in the matter of the winding up of any company, .... or any order or decision made in the matter of any bankruptcy, or in any matter not being an action, shall be the same as the time limited for appeal from an inttrlccutory order under rule 15," wsj made because, as a general rule, "matters" ought to bs disposed of quickly. Tho rule was really intended to provide for "other matters" of a similar nature to bankruptcy and winding up of companies, though the word " similar" had not been used. The present case, though it was within the letter of the rule, was not within its spirit. Bat the applicants must pay the costs of the application, for they were asking for an indulgence. They should have given fuller instructions to their solicitors.—Solicitors, Jaina,Sm, <fc James.

Lands Clauses Act, 1845—Purchase Prom Limitsd OwnerPayment Out Of CourtCosts Op Discharob Op Incumbrances.—In a case of Re Thorney's Trait*, before the Master of the Rolls, on tbe 2nd inst., certain lands had been taken by the Hall Dock Company, under tteir special Aots, incorporating tbe Lands Clauses Act, from a limited owner, who held the lands for life, with remainders over. The money was paid into court, and the trustees of the settlement, the tenant for life and some of tbe persons interested in remainder now petitioned for payment oat and for the application of the money in diichargs of certain incumbrances on other parts of the settled estates. The petitioners asked that in addition to the costs of, and incidental to, taking the land, the company might also ba ordered to pay the costs of and incidental to the discharge of the incumbrances, and they relied on the cases of Garnttt v. Bradley (L. R. 3 App. Cas. 944), and In re Merc." Company (L. R. 10 Ch. D. 481), as showiog that the court had a discretion in the matter, and could give tbe petitioners their costs. It was admitted that no provision had been made by section 80 of the Lands Clauses Act for payment of the costs of disohargmg the inoumbr.ii;ce>, and that in several cases it had been decided that the om

pany were not bound to pay such costs, but it was submitted that it was a casus omissus from the Act, and that now the court had a discretion as to such costs. J Essel, M. It., said that all that he had decided in In re Mercers' Company Was that all costs of and incidental to application'! to the court were in the discretion of the court, but the present costs were not relative to the application, but were subsequent costs, and therefore not in the discretion of the court. Under the circumstances, therefore, the company were not bound to pay them, but as they were liable to pay the costs of an investment in land, he should give the petitioners a fortnight, if they liked, within which to amend their petition and ask for an investment in land.—Solicitors. Iliffe, Russell, & Iliffe; Chester $ Co.

PracticeForeclosureJudgment Against Mortgagor Payment Within One Month.—In an aotion of Thorndon v. Tell, which was an ordinary action by mortgagees for foreclosure, the plaintiffs by their minutes asked for judgment against the defendant for payment of the amount to be found due within one month, instead of the period of six months given in the forms in Seton on Decrees. Hall, V.C., gave judgment as asked.—Solicitors, Jones, Blaxland, $ Son.

Estate Pur Autre VieLimitation In Fee With Executory Devise OverPower Op Alienation Of First TakerLease For LivesTrust For Renewal Out Op RentsRefusal Of Reversioner To RenewSale Under Settled Estates ActApplication Of PurChase-money.—In a case of In re Barber's Settled Estates, before Fry, J., on the 2nd inst., a question arose as to the extent of the power of alienation of the first taker of an estate pur autre vie, of which successive limitations had been created by will. The holder of a lease of land to himself and his heirs, for the lives of three other persons, devised it by his will to trustees, their heirs and assigns, upon the trusts therein declared, and he directed his trustees from time to time to let the land and to receive the rents and profits thereof, and thereout to keep the estate renewed and full lived. And he declared that his trustees should stand seised of the land upon trust for J., his heirs and assigns, but if he should die without leaving lawful issue living at his death, then upon trust for W., bis heirs and assigns. After the death of the testator, the lease was, on the dropping of one of the lives, renewed by the reversioner on the payment o! a fine by the trustees. The amount of the fine was raised by J. on the security of an agreement by him to give an equitable charge upon the estate. On a subsequent occasion the reversioner refused to renew the lease or to sell the reversion, and the estate was then sold, with the sanation of the court, under the Settled Estates Act. A petition was presented by J., asking that the mortgage money might be paid out of the proceeds of sale, and that the rights of himself and W. in the balance of the purchase-money might be declared. It was contended on behalf of the petitioner that he, being the first taker of an estate pur autre vie, had the whole estate in him, and had the right to dispose of it, and thus to defeat the }H«si-executory devise over after his own gusii-estate in fee, and, consequently, that he was entitled to the whole purchase-in mey, subject to the mortgage-. The precise point, it was said, bad never been actually determined. Pry, J., said, that though, when an estate pur autre vie was given to a man, all he could take was au estate for life, and anyone who came in after him came in as a special occupant, and not through him, yet in many cases the Legislature and the oourts had enforced an analogy between successive limitations of an estate pur autre vie, and similar limitations of an estate in fee, and had given effect to the analogy with regard to the capacity and the incapacity of the first taker to alienate. His power of alienation had been limited by the intention, expressed by the settlor or donor, that a particular person should be the special occupant after him. The Statute of Frauds enforced that analogy by enaoting that the heir, though only a special occupant, should hold the estate pur autre vie as assets for tbe payment of the ancestor's debts. In the same way a number of decisions of the courts had permitted the creation of a series of limitations of an estate pur autre vie, guosi-estates for life, i/Mdsi-estates in tail, and (fiiasi-estates in fee with executory devises over. The courts had permitted an alienation by a jucwi-tenant in tail in

possession, and also by a j«n«!-tenaut ij tail in remainder, with the concurrence of the quasi-tenant for life in possession. But the oourts had declined to allow an alienation by a quasitenant in tail in remainder without the conourrenca of the fisast-tenant for life in possession, at least so far as it would have the effect of barring the remainders expectant on the estate tail, though probably such an alienation would have been held to create a base fee. They had also disallowed a disposition by will by a ^uaat-tenant in tail in possession, though he was, in one sense, entitled to the whole interest in the property. The designation by the settlor of a person to take as special occupant alter the first taker had been held sufficient to limit his power of disposition. Lord St. Leonards acted on this analogy in Allen v. Allen (2 D. & W. 307). His lordship said he should act upon it in the present case. If the limitations created by the will had been created of an estate in fee, J. could not have defeated by his alienation the executory devise in favour of W., and by analogy he could not be allowed to do so in the present case. His lordship then held, on the authority of Allan v. Backhouse (2 V. & B. 65), that the will had created a charge on the estate for the purpose of renewing the lease, and that consequently the mortgage debt must be paid out of the purchase-money. The further question arose how the remainder of the purchase-money was to be applied. The petitioner contended that it ought to be laid out in the purchase of an annuity for the lives upon which the lease was held, and that the annuity should be paid to him for his life. Fry, J., held that the case was governed by the principle of the decisions in In re Wood's Estate (19 W. R. 59, L. R. 10 Eq. 572), Hollier v. Borne (21 W. R. 805, L. R. 16 Eq. 183), and Muddy v. Male (24 W. R. 1005, L. R. 3 Cli. D. 327). The primary intention of the testator was to create a perpetuity by means of a continual renewal of the lease. And when by^tbe action of a third person, the estate was converted into money, the court would leave it in the condition of money invested, and thus create another property of a perpetual character which would take the place of the original property of the same character. The principle applied where there had been a sale under the general power conferred by the Settled Estates Act. The balance of the purchase-money must therefore be invested in ordinary securities, and the interest paid to the first taker.—Solicitors, Janson, Cobb, & Pearson; Hunt f Son; Ch,ureh, Sons, $ Clarke.


(Before Mr. Registrar Hazlitt acting as Chief Judge.)

June 8.—Ex parte Miller and amther, Re Levy.

Costs of solicitors incident to meeting of separate creditors of one of two partners allowed out of the joint estate of tbe partners in liquidation

This was an application on behalf of Messrs. A. Hiudson, Miller, & Vernon, solicitors, for an order that the trustees of the property of Messrs. H. Levy & M. H. Levy should, out of the joint estate in their hands, pay to the applic mts the sum of £24, being the amount of their costs of and relatins; to the meetings of the separate creditors of M. H, Levy, as taxed by the taxing master.

Tne debtors filed their petition on the 17th of January, 1881, and the general meetings of creditors, both of the joint estate and of the separate estate of each of the partners, were duly held.

Under the joint estate it was resolved to liquidate by arrangement, and the creditors appointed trustees. In the case of the senior partner, H. Levy, liquidation by arrangement was alsn resolved npon, and the same trustees were appointed, but at tbe meeting of the separate creditors of M. H. Levy a resolution was passed t j accept a composition of two shillings in the pound, and such resolution was duly confirmed at a second meeting, and alHhe resolutions before mentioned were duly registered.

Messrs. Miller & Vornon were the solicitors aoting for the debtors, and presented the petition on their behalf, and they taxed three separate bills of costs against the joint estates and the separate estates of the respective partners. The trustee duly paid the amount of the allocators obtained in respect of the joint estate, and also the' separate estate of H. Levy, but, with respect to the costs now claimed by Mesurs. Miller & Vernon, they disclaimed all liability.

From the joint estate a large sum of money had been realized hy the trusters.

Vernon (solicitor), in support of the application, referred to rule 113, and was then stopped.

E. M. Micholls, for the trustees.—Under rnle 113, the order must be made on the application of the trustee. The pr ypnt application is misconceived, and Me«srs. Miller & Vernon have no locus standi to make it. Rule 113 is no doubt framed in pursuance of section 20, which in-t ructs trustees in regard to their conduct in certain matters. This is not an ordinary case, and the rule most be strictly construed. It cannot apply in a case of composition. The applicants mast obtain the amount of the costs from the debtor; the trustees cannot allow them out of the joint estate. He also referred to rules 76, 102, and 285.

Vernon, in reply.—The court has a discretion as to all costs : rules 186 and 188. The joint creditors hare had the benefit of the proceedings as to the separate estate of M. H. Levy, and unless the meeting of the separate creditors had been convened, they could not have passed any valid resolution with the joint estate. The solicitor has no control over the resolutions which the creditors may pass.

Mr. Registrar Hazlitt.— I think the question is whether the meetings of the separate creditors were convened with a reasonable prospect of benefit to the joint creditors.

Vernon.—The meeting of the separate creditors of M. H. Levy was a necessary step in the proceedings, and all the applicants ask is that the incidental costs be paid.

Mr. Registrar Hazlitt said he thought he had a discretion in the matter, and he should act npon it by allowing the costs out of the joint es'ate. A large amount had been realized by the trustees, and they must pay the applicants the sum mentioned in the allocatur, and the costs of the present application.

Solicitor for the trustees, Montagu.

SOLICITORS' CASES. Queen's Bench Division. (Sittings in Banc before Grove and Denman, JJ.) July 4.—Re E. Edmondt, a Solicitor.* In this case the usual rnle had been served npon Mr. Edmonds, calling npon him to answer the matters contained in certain affidavits, or, in default, to show cause why he should not be struck off the rolls.

With, Q.C., and Hollans, appeared for the Incorporated Law Society, and from their statements it appeared that a person of the name of Wood died in the year 1832 possessed of certain real estate. In 1875 Wood's trustees sold a part of the trust property, and Mr. Edmonds received the purchase-money, £3,250, of which he paid the greater portion, but retained a part in his own hands. In 1877 the trustees sold more of the property, and Mr. Edmonds again received tie purchase-money, £4,100, but this time be retained the larger portion of the money, and refused to account for it.

In Augos', 1878, the trustees brought an action against the solicitor, calling upon him to account for the money in his hands, and an order was made for the payment of money into court by the solicitor. In April, 1879, persons beneficially entitled under Wood's will brcught an action against the trustees for an account. The solicitor failed to comply with the order made, and subsequently filed a petition for liquidation, his creditors, with the exception of the trustees who took nothing, receiving one shilling in the ponnd. The solicitor was unrepresented, and had done nothing beyond asking that the case should be postponed.

Grove, J. (after stating the facts).—It does not appear to me that the court has any opiion in this matter. The rule must therefore be made absolute to strike Mr. Edmonds off the rolls.

Rule absolute.

Solioitor for the Incorporated Law Society, Williamson.

July 4.—In the Matter of Edwin Hunt. This was a case in which a rule for an attachment had been g ranted against the defendant for having, contrary to the st atute, acted as a solicitor without being duly quali

• Reported by W. Blew, Esq., Barrister-at-Law.

fied. The matter had been referred to one of the masters of the court for inquiry, and his report was now read to the court.

Wills, Q.C., and Murray, appeared for the Incorporated Law Society.

According to the evidence taken before the master, at embodied in his report, the defendant was an accountant, living in Charlotte-street, Bedford-square, when he inserted an advertisement in the Timet addressed to solicitor* without practice, offering them business at a good remuneration. A solicitor named Cotton responded to the advertisement, and an arrangement was entered into between him and the defendant, which, however, was not reduced to writing, and as to which the parties to it did not quite agree in their description. It was cleir, however, from the defendant's own statement, that he was to have a certain share in the profits of the business, and there was ample evidence that in various matters of a legal character he had acted as an attorney, using the name of Cotton, but without his knowledge or authority. Notice of the rule had been duly served npon the defendant, and he had written in reply that be would instruct counsel to attend. No counsel, however, appeared on his behalf.

Grove, J., said the rule must be made absolute for an attachment, but the defendant would be allowed a week to purge himself, if he could, of bis contempt of court. — Times.


The Lord Chancellor on Tuesday last, in introducing a Bill to amend the Supreme Court of Judicature Acts, said that the Bill was in some respects of considerable importance, but he hoped that it would not excite much differencs of opinion. A number of changes were proposed, sums of considerable magnitnde, others comparatively simple. Their lordships were aware that the High Conrt of Justice had contained the three separate divisions called respectively the Queen's Bench, the Common Fleas, and the Exchequer Divisions, and that these three divisions had recently been consolidated. In consequence of the consolidation there was now but one division of what w.n popularly called the common law side of the High Court and one Lord Chief Justice. He would first address himself to the moat important parts of the Bill. There had been five ex officio judges of the Conrt of Appeal—viz., the Lord Chancellor, the Lord Chief Justice, the Master of the Rolls, the Chief Justice of the Com-non Pleas, aud the Lord Chief Baros. Owing to the cessation of the two latter office the ex officio judges were reduced to three. The Court of Appeal further consisted of six ordinary judges; and that number had recently been reduced by the loss of a judge whose merits it would bs very difficult by any language to do justice to, and impossible to exaggerate—Lord Justice James. He spoke from long knowledge, and an intimate person*! friendship of many years; and he could not Bpeak of his official services to the country without recollecting ths generosity of his noble nature. But, speaking of him only as a judge, he would say that the country had never been served by a judge of higher character—of a sounder and more rapid discrimination; a more ardent love of justice as distinguished from technicalities; a more accurate knowledge of law, and a greater power of immediately applying that knowledge to the determination of the cases which came before him. For several years those qialities had been exhibited by the late Lord Justice as a Vice-Cbsncellor, and for more than ten years in the Court of Appeal. It would be very difficult for any man to bring to tba duties higher qualities as a lawyer or as a man. Now, with regard to the Court of Appeal, although the business of the court had been ably administered and arrests prevented from accumulating, yet the business was of an arduous and important character, and it required strong judges, as well as able judges, to prevent it falling into arrear. When the question arose what should be done to meet this stnte of things, it was impossible not to call to mind the proposals which had been made by the Judic»tur» Commission. He had examined carefully into the recommendations and the various changes which had been made

•down to the Aotof 1875, when his noble and learned friend proposed a scheme to meet the want which was felt by the judicial power. It waa then proposed to introdnoe into the Conrt of Appeal three judges of first iostanoe, and nnder extreme ciroumstanoes it wonld hare been possible to have fonr additional judges affording temporary assistance. Now, they had 00me to a time when the nnmber of •ex officio judges was redaoed from fife to three. What he asked their lordships to do with regard to the constitution of the Conrt of Appeal was this :—He proposed to take the opportunity of reverting to the recommendation of the Judicature Commission with regard to the position of the -Muster of the Rolls in connection with the Conrt of Appeal. Of the special qualifications of the Master of the Rolls be need not speak; they were well known and appreciated by the conntry at large. It was not his proposal that the present Maser of the Rolls should be transferred from bis position to the Conrt of Appeal. He reverted to the proposal of the Judicature Commission. The Master of the Rolls was perfectly willing to undertake the position. Instead, therefore, of filling np the vaoancy now existing among the ordinary judges in the Court of Appeal, he proposed that the Master of the Rolls should take up the position which seemed more in aooordanoe with his office than that of beingone of a nnmber of judges of co-ordinate position, exoept in the matter of salary and a few other matters. The Master of the Rolls, therefore, wonld be—he did not any transferred—but oonfined to the Court of Appeal ; and practically, therefore, that would make it unnecessary to Jgii op the vacancy. Then he oame to the consideration of ex officio judges. There were now two less than had been contemplated, and if the Master of the Rolls ceased to be one of these judges, of course three ex officio judges would have cea«ed to exist. He proposed in the first place that the President of the Probate, Divorce, and Admiralty ■Division, who was not now an ex officio judge of the Court of Appeal, should become such an ex officio judge. He proposed in the next place that two other judges should be appointed annually, to be at the service of the Court of Appeal when their other duties permitted. The question remained—in what way should these annual appointments be made? He did not propose that they should be nominated annually by the Crown. Some other mode of selection, he thought, might be found; they might be selected as the election judges were now chosen. The judges of the High Court could meet together, and from year to year nominate for the succeeding year three of their body to serve in the Court of Appeal. Of course, they would 11 >t be called upon to do duty in the Court of Appeal so as to interfere with their primary obligations as judges in the High Court; they would be called upon to assist when the state of business in their own courts admitted of that assistance being given. Those proposals would not subject the country to any substantial increase of expense. It was also sought to remove some doubt as to the effect of the Act of 1877, under which an additional judge of first instance was to be appointed for the Chancery Division of the High Court. The language of that Act did not make it absolutely clear to his mind whether it authorized an appointment on a single occasion only or an appointment from time to time. He proposed to remove that doubt, and to enable the power given by the Act to bs exeroised from time to time. Occasion had also been taken to regulate some portions of the existing law as to certain appeals. By the Divorce and Matrimonial Causes Acts certain appeals from the Divorce Court J udge were given to a court which was oalled the Full Court for Matrimonial Causes. He had consulted with the learned jud.e wbo presided overthat court, and found that he, as well as others, was of opinion that it would be desirable that that appeal, which was practioally to that judge himself, wi'h the assistance of others, should no longer be to the Full Court for Matrimonial Causes, but should, like all other cases, go the Court of Appeal. He also proposed, very much at the instance of that judge, to correct wliat in practice had turned out to be an unsatisfactory provision in the same Acts, whiob gave the right to appeal from decrees for the dissolution or the nullity of marriage, not in the first instance when the decree nisi was given, but when it had been made absolute after a certain lapse of time, as if no cause were shown in the meantime it might be made as a matter of course. He proposed that for the future the appeal should be from the deerei nisi, and •that there should not be another appeal. With regard

to the Acts which related to parliamentary registration and elections, the Acts proceeded on the footing of giving the final authority on matters of law to the court to which Parliament had thought fit to intrust that class of oases. It was now proposed to make the deoision final and conclusive, unless the oourt thought fit to give a right to appeal, in which oase the Conrt of Appeal would have jurisdiction. The Bill also gave some useful powers to regulate the holding of assizes, and that power would not be limited to winter assizes only, but would extend to all assizes, by which means it was hoped that an inoonvenienoe at present felt would be mitigated. The measure likewise dealt with the power under tbe Act of 1875 for making rnles to govern the practice of the High Court. It also oontained a olause enabling the time of holding the sessions of the Central Criminal Court to be fixed, no', as was now requirod by Aot of Parliament, by eight judges, but by four judges of the Qieen's Bench Division. It further oontained provisions as to the appointment of offioers of the courts and the filling up of vacancies in the staff of all the courtf. There were various other minor provisions in the Bill, on which he need not now trouble their lordships.


MR. FREDERICK OUVRY. Mr. Frederick Ouvry, solicitor (of the firm of Farrer, Ouvry, & Farrer), of 66, Lincoln's-iun-fields, died at his residence, 12, Queen Anne-street, on the 26th ult. Mr. Ouvry was the third son of the lite Mr. Peter Aime Ouvry, and was born in 1815. He was admitted a solicitor in 1337, and had for many years carried on business at 66, Liucolu's-innfields in partnership with his brothers-in-law, Messrs. William James Farrer (the high badiff of Westminster) and Frederick Willis Farrer. He was a perpetual commissioner for the county of Middlesex and the cities of Loudon and Westminster, and he had a large private practice, being solicitor to Lady Burdett-Coutts, and 10 others of tbe nobility. He had been, since 1858, solicitor to the regiment of Scots Guards. Mr. Ouvry took a great interest in literary and antiquarian pursuits, and he was a vice-president of tlie Society of Antiquaries, and one of the treasurers of the Royal Literary Fund.

MR. CHARLES CLARK, Q.C. Mr. Charles Clark, Q.C, died rather suddenly at his residenoe, 10, Albert-road, li^gent'-park, on the 25th ult. Mr. Clark was in early life a parliamentary reporter on the staff of the Sliming Chronicle, and he was oalled to the bar at the Middle Temple in Easter Term, 1830, when be joined the Home Circuit. He was the author of a work on Colonial Law, and aoted about twenty-five years ago as a commissioner to inquire into the laws of the Channel Islands. Ha was, however, best known as a law reporter in the House of Lords, where his reports dated back as far as the year 1827. They ranga through several volumes of "Dow and Clark," "Clark and Finnelly," and the "House of Lords Cases." About forty years ago he was appointed official reporter to the House, and Binoe the establishment of the Law Hi-ports he had continued to furnish the reports of Eugliali and Irish appeals. Mr. Clark was for many years a revisiug barristnr. He waa eleoted a benaher of the Middle Temple in 1872, and in the followiog year be reoeived a silk gown from Lord Selborne. tie was formerly seoretary to the Juridioal Sioiety, and he was an active member of the Association for the Reform of International Law. He had also been for many years treasurer of the lioyal Sooiety of Literature, the meetings of whiob ha oonstantly attended. Mr. Clark was a man of most amiable and courteous disposition, and the reoolleotions of his long professional career imparted great interest to his conversation. Notwithstanding his great age he retained all his aotive habits. He canght a severe oold while taking a country holiday at Whitsuntide, but he still persevered in bis work, and be was actually reporting in the House of Lords on the day before his death. The deceased was a baohelor.

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