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Ray, Joseph Clark, Sunderland, Durham, Tailor. July 12 at 12 at offices of Stokoe, Fawcett st, Sunderland

Rees, Llewellyn, Rhondda Valley, Glamorgan, Draper. July 5 at offices of Beckingham, Albion chbrs, Bristol, in lieu of place originally named

Riley, Edward, Droylesden, Lancaster, Insurance Agent. July 11 at 3 at Falstaff Hotel, Market pl, Manchester. Tremewen, Manchester

Rogers, William, Oldswinford. Worcester, Hay Dealer. July 14 at 3
at offices of Addison, High st, Brierley hill

Shorter, Henry, Prince's st, Barbican, Wholesale Fancy Stationer,
July 14 at 2 at Manchester Hotel, Aldersgate st. Webb and Son,
Barbican

Simpson, Isaac, Queniborough, Leicester, Baker. July 11 at 12 at
offices of Burgess and Williams, Berridge st, Leicester

Smith, Albert Cecil, Birmingham, Draper. July 8 at 3 at offices of
Parry, Colmore row, Birmingham

Smith, Joseph, Cleckheaton, York, Tobacconist. July 7 at 3 at office
of Sykes, Heckmondwike'

Soden, Alfred, New Malden, Surrey, Builder. July 12 at 11 at office
of Blake and Snow, College hill, Cannon st

Spencer, Robert, Ormskirk, Lancaster, Provision Dealer. July 11
at 11 at offices of Brighouse and Brighouse, Ormskirk
Thompson, Thomas, North Shields, Boot Dealer. July 8 at 3 at
offices of Ogilvie, Howard st. North Shields

Tippins, John Alfred, Keane ter, West Kensington, Dairyman.
July 18 at 11 at offices of Cooke and Parkinson. Chancery lane
Tompkin, William, Brookfield-ter, Dartmouth Park-hill, July 8 at
3 at 12, St. Martin's-court, Leicester-square. Willis
Tookey, William, Cheetham, Manchester, Grocer. July 9 at 11 at
offices of Credland, 30, Cross-st, Manchester

Turnbull, John, Hoyland Nether, York, Hatter. July 11 at 12 at
Gray, 7, Eastgate, Barnsley

Turner, Cornelius, Stanley, near Wakefield, Boat Builder. July 12
at 11 at offices of Wainwright and Mason, Townhall-chmbs, King-
st, Wakefield

Vicarage, Thomas, Clevedon, Somerset, Carpenter. July 8 at 11 at offices of Parsons, 16, High-st, Bristol. Woodforde

Wall, Moira, Birmingham, Stone Mason. July 11 at 11 at offices
of Eaden, 21, Bennett's-hill, Birmingham

Weaver, William Richard, Grantham, Lincoln, of no occupation.
July 8 at 3 at St Peter's-hill, Grantham. Schofield

Wells, William Henry, Walsall, Stafford, Baker. July 11 at 11 at
offices of Bill, 5, Bridge-st, Walsall

Whitehouse, George, Gutter-lane, Warehouseman. July 15 at 2 at
offices of Smith and Co, 12, Bread-st, Cheapside

Whitlock, Edwin, Sheffield, Mason. July 11 at 11 at offices of
Porrett, 2, Bank-st, Sheffield

Wilkins, Benjamin, Birkenhead, Chester, Ironmonger. July 9 at 11
at offices of Bleakley and Downham, 51, Hamilton-square, Birken-
head

Williams, Ellen, High Wycombe, Bucks, Chair Manufacturer. July
14 at 3 at Falcon Hotel, High Wycombe. Reynolds, High Wycombe
Wolff, Solomon, Mildmay-grove, Stoke Newington, Manufacturer's
Clerk. July 9 at 3 at offices of Cattlin, 25, Wormwood-st, Old
Broad-st

Young, Thomas, North End, Croydon, Solicitor. July 6 at 3 at
Kennan's Hotel, Crown-court, Cheapside

SCHWEITZER'S

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To Her Majesty, the Lord Chancellor, the Whole f he Judicial Bench
Corporation of London, &c.

SOLICITORS' AND REGISTRARS' GOWNS.
BARRISTERS' AND QUEEN'S COUNSEL'E DITTO,
CORPORATION ROBES UNIVERSITY & CLERGY GOWNS,
ESTABLISHED 1689.

94. CHANCERY LANE, LONDON.

HAMPTON & SONS make NO CHARGE for

inserting particulars in their FREE MONTHLY REGISTER of ESTATES, TOWN and COUNTRY HOUSES, Furnished or Unfurnished, or for Sale, to be had GRATIS at their Offices, or post-free for two stamps. Published on the 1st of the month, and particulars for insertion should be sent not later than five days previous to end of preceding month.

Valuations for Probate and Transfer. Surveys.

Estate and Auction Offices, 8, Pall Mall East, S.W.

SOUTH AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT

SECURITIES.

FOUR PER CENT. BONDS, PRINCIPAL AND INTEREST
PAYABLE IN LONDON.

FOR £977,000 AND £388,300.

The National Bank of Australasia, 149, Leadenhall-street, E.C., is authorized by the undersigned to receive Tenders for South Australian Government Securities amounting to £977,000, being the amount authorized by the Act of the South Australian Parliament, No. 159, of 1879, assented to 25th October, 1879; and for £388,300, being the total amount authorized by the Act of the South Australian Parliament, No. 189, of 1880, assented to 28th October, 1880; for the construction of Railways and for other Public Purposes.

The Bonds, which are for £1,000, £500, £200 and £100, bear interest at the rate of 4 per cent. per annum, commencing on the 1st April, 1881.

Principal and interest are made payable in London; the interest by coupon on the 1st of October and 1st of April of each year, and the principal of the issue of £977,000, herein announced, and the principal of the issue of £388,300, at par on the 1st April, 1916; the first coupon being payable on the 1st October, 1881.

A copy of the authorizing Acts may be inspected at the office of the undersigned.

Tenders, made in accordance with the annexed form, will be received by the National Bank of Australasia until 2 o'clock on Tuesday, the 5th July, when they will be opened in the presence of such of the applicants as may desire to be in attendance.

The Bonds will be allotted to the highest bidders, provided therates offered are not below £102 for every £100 tendered for. Tenders at a price including a fraction of a shilling other than

COCOATINA, sixpence will not be necessarily accepted, and in the event of an

Anti-Dyspeptic Cocoa or Chocolate Powder. Gnaranteed Pure Soluble Cocoa of the Finest Quality, with the excess of fat extracted.

The Faculty pronounce it "the most nutritious, perfectly digestible beverage for Breakfast, Luncheon, or Supper, and invaluable for IL valids and Children."

Highly commended by the entire Medica Press.
Being without sugar, spice, or other admixture, it suits all palates,
Keeps better in all climates, and is four times the strength of cocoas
RICKENED yet WEAKENED with starch, &c., and IN REALITY CHEAPER
than such Mixtures.

Made instantaneously with boiling water, a teaspoonful to a Breakfast Cup, coating less than a halfpenny.

COCOATINA A LA VANILLE is the most delicate, digestible, cheapest Manilla Chocolate, and may be taken when richer chocolate is prohibited.

In tin packets at 18. 6d., 3s., 5s. 6d., &c., by Chemists and Grocers.
Charities on Special Terms by the Sole Proprietors,

H. SCHWEITZER & CO., 10, Adam-street, London, W.C.

HEDOZONE.

THE ORIGINAL (1876) NON-ALCOHOLIC SPARKLING

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BEVERAGE.

MORE REFRESHING

CHAMPAGNE.

THAN

- HEDOZONE IS A GRATEFUL

REFRESHMENT.

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equality of Tenders beyond the amount of these Bonds, a pro rata distribution on such Tenders will be made.

Payments must be made as follows, viz.-£5 per cent. of the nominal amount with the Tender, and the Balance on the 2nd August, 1881, when the Bonds will be delivered.

Eorms of Tender may be obtained at the office of the National Bank of Australasia, or of the undersigned.

ARTHUR BLYTH,

Agent-General for the Government of South Australia.

8, Victoria Chambers, Westminster.

27th June, 1881.

FORM OF Tender.

SOUTH AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT SECURITIES.
FOUR PER CENT. BONDS.

To the Manager of

The National Bank of Australasia, 149, Leadenhall Street, E.C. Sir,-I (or we) hereby tender for £ Bonds of the Government of South Australia, according to the notice of the Agent General, dated the 27th June, 1881, on which I (or we) enclose the required deposit of £ and undertake to pay £ every £100 in Bonds, and to accept the same or any less amount that may be allotted to me (or us) and to pay the instalmenst and balance in conformity with the terms of the said notice.

Name.
Address
Date ....

for

AW UNION FIRE and LIFE INSURANCE
The Funds in hand and Capital subscribed amount to upwards of
£1,600,000 sterling.
Chairman-JAMES CUDDON, Esq., Barrister-at-Law, Goldsmith-
building, Temple.
Deputy-Chairman-C. PEMBERTON, Esq. (Lee & Pembertons), Solici
tor, 44, Lincoln's-inn-fields.

Every description of Fire and Life Insurance business transacted.
Whole World and Unconditional Life Policies granted at a slightly-

increased rate of Premium.

Policies of Insurance granted against the contingency of Issue at moderate rates of Premium.

Advances made on Mortgage of Life Interest and Reversions,. whether absolute or contingent.

Prospectus, Copies of the Accounts as deposited with the Board: of Trade, and every information sent on application to

FRANK MCGEDY, Actuary and Secretary.

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IT DOES NOT CLEARLY APPEAR from the Lord Chancellor's statement in introducing the Judicature Act Amendment Bill, on Tuesday, whether the Master of the Rolls is to cease to be a member of the High Court of Justice, so as to enable a new judge of first instance to be appointed in his place. "The Master of the Rolls," he said, "would be-he did not say transferred -but confined to the Court of Appeal." It is to be presumed, however, that it is intended to appoint a new judge. If this is not done, and the number of judges in the Chancery Division is to be practically reduced to four, this reduction, combined with the frequent absence on circuit of at least one of the four judges, will undoubtedly reproduce long lists of arrears.

IT IS TO BE OBSERVED, that although the Lord Chancellor has doubts as to the power conferred by the Act of 1877 to appoint a successor to Mr. Justice FRY, he has already acted upon the power supposed to be given in appointing Mr. Justice KAY. We presume that the new Bill will contain an indemnity in respect of that appointment.

THE CONVEYANCING and Law of Property Bill, which, it will be remembered, we recently discussed at consider

able length, has been referred to a Select Committee of the House of Commons, which, although mainly composed of lawyers, comprises only four members of the bar of experience in conveyancing matters. We are glad to observe, however, that four solicitor M.P.'s are to serve on the Committee, but among them we regret to miss the names of Mr. DODDS, M.P., and Mr. GREGORY, M.P. It is very much to be hoped, but hardly to be expected, that the Committee will finish its labours in time for the Bill to pass this session. The Bill was considered with unusual care when it was first drafted, and we should have thought that it might have escaped the ordeal of a Select Committee.

A NOTICE respecting certain office regulations of the Chancery Pay Office, which we have been requested to publish, appears in another column. The principal change in the practice of the office which is effected by this notice consists in the alteration of the form of power of attorney for receipt of dividends hitherto in use, and the non-requirement, in future, of an affidavit of the execution of such powers. This will effect a saving of expense, and will not, it may be hoped, leave a door open for mistakes. Certificates of funds in court ought to be issued on the day after being bespoken, instead of three days after, as provided in the notice; and transcripts of accounts might, it would be supposed, be made out in three days, instead of taking a week, as appears from the notice. We believe, however, that the times named in this notice are not such as will be strictly adhered to, but only indicate the maximum period in each case beyond which the delivery of certificates and transcripts will not be delayed.

IT WERE HEARTILY to be wished that the Lord Chancellor, freed from the temptation to ruin the fair creations of his own hand, would direct his attention to the task of completing the structure which he has done so large a part in building up. On the one hand we cannot look for any machinery which is likely to work more smoothly, easily, and steadily than the Court of Appeal as at present constituted. On the other hand, notwithstanding the variety and multiplicity, both of its judges and its business, the Queen's Bench Division has, since Lord COLERIDGE's reform, dealt with its work, on the whole, with great success. But there remains in force the curious arrangement by which it still acts in part as a Court of Appeal from itself; and the other not less singular peculiarity, that only groups of from two to three judges at Westminster can do what one judge is competent to do at Lincoln's-inn, a peculiarity which to the extent that the same judge who has feared to sit alone at the one place during the legal sittings, boldly encounters the responsibility of sitting alone at the other place during the vacation. For the loss of labour and of time produced by the latter peculiarity, it may be doubted whether any cure will be effectual but change of place. But the former might be, without difficulty, remedied by adding to the duties of the Court of Appeal that of hearing all appeals of whatever kind, from every tribunal presided over by a single judge of the High Court. That the number of the Court of Appeal would need to be increased is possible-perhaps even to the full number of nine originally contemplated; but the extra cost to the nation would be amply saved by relieving the judges of the High Court from the necessity of constantly sitting in double and treble strength, as a kind of passage to the Court

goes even

of Appeal, and relieving suitors from the necessity of passing not only a double, but sometimes a treble gate, as not unfrequently happens when questions of new trial, misdirection, and judgment are mixed up, before they can rest from their labour of litigation. To say nothing of this, that the more such multitudinous courts are discontinued, the more is that habit of mind likely to die out which drives learned judges with such an imperative instinct into one another's society upon the bench.

THE ATTENTION of persons interested should be directed to Dyson, Appellant; London and North-Western Rallway Company, Respondents (29 W. R. 565, now at length reported in this month's issue of the Law Reports, 7 Q. B. D. 32), the short result of which is, that the well-known bye-laws of railway companies providing for the fining of, and the recovery of extra fare from, passengers failing to show their tickets, cannot be enforced, even in a case where an intention to defraud has been found as a fact. Numerous cases, of which Dearden v. Townsend (14 W. R. 53, L. R. 1 Q. B. 10) is perhaps the best known, and Saunders, Appellant; South-Eastern Railway Company, Respondents (29 W. R. 56, L. R. 5 Q. B. D. 456) is the latest, had decided that theɛe bye-laws were 66 bad," on some ground or other, in the case of an innocent infringement of them, but the case to which we refer is the first instance of a conviction being questioned where fraud was found. The court observed that it would be still open to the company to proceed against the same defendant under the 103rd section of the Railways Clauses Act, for "travelling without having paid his fare, and with intent to avoid payment thereof." It may be observed that, in Dyson's case, the court disapprove of the dictum of COCKBURN, C.J., in Saunders, Appellant; SouthEastern Railway Company, Respondents, to the effect that section 108 of the Railways Clauses Act, from which a railway company derive all their power to make bye-laws, applies only to the cases where the line is worked by another than the owning company. Looking to the use of the word generally' " in that section, we incline to think the dictum of COCKBURN, C.J., wrong, but it is material to point out that it has not been expressly overruled, and that if it be law, it renders the whole code of railway bye-laws practically useless. Also it must be noted that in one of the earlier cases, Brown v. Great Eastern Railway Company (L. R. 2 C. P. D. at p. 409), there is a dictum of LUSH, J., that the form bye-law is not bad because it does not impose a specific penalty, and that in London and Brighton Railway Company v. Watson (27 W. R. 614, L. R. 4 C. P. D. 119), while BRETT, L.J., was of opinion that it was repugnant to the statute and therefore bad, BRAMWELL and COTTON, L.JJ., "desired it to be understood that they expressed no opinion either one way or the other on that matter." All which considerations seem to point to the desirability of some definite legislation on the subject. It may be suggested as just and reasonable that while the passenger innocently travelling without a ticket should be required to pay a small additional percentage on his fare, the common cheat should be liable to three days' imprisonment with hard labour, without the option of a fine, for the fine of not more than forty shillings is surely an inadequate punishment for this class of

offender.

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A NEW QUESTION arose in Quilter v. Mapleson, on Monday last, as to the effect of the section of 22 & 23 Vict. c. 35, enabling relief to be granted against forfeiture for breach of a covenant to insure. The conditions on which according to that statute relief may be given are well known. No loss by fire must have happened; the breach must have been committed by accident or mistake, or otherwise without gross fraud

or negligence, and there must be an insurance on foot at the time of the application to the court in conformity with the covenant to insure. In Quilter v. Mapleson, the policies effected by the tenant MAPLESON expired on the 25th of March last, subject to the usual fifteen days' grace. The tenant was in America, and no premiums were paid to keep alive these policies or to effect new policies immediately upon their expiration; but the tenant on the 14th of May effected new insurances for three months in conformity with the covenant, and the policies were post-dated to the 25th of March. The tenant alleged that he had arranged with the insurance companies that the old policies should not lapse by reason of the non-payment of the premiums due in March. Upon this point Lord COLERIDGE considered that the result of the evidence was that "no doubt there was an understanding 'in honour,' that the directors would issue the policies when the premiums were paid, and that the policies, when issued, should cover the theatre from the 25th of March; but there was nothing to show that there was anything more than an understanding,' to which the directors in which, in a similar case, such an understanding had were no parties whatever, and no instance was mentioned been held to bind." If this is so, it is obvious that a breach of covenant had been committed. The premises were not "insured" in the proper sense of the term during about a fortnight. It cannot be said that an "understanding" with an insurance company, based on no consideration, is an insurance within the meaning of a covenant to keep premises insured. The only question, therefore, was whether the omission to insure had arisen through accident or mistake, and without gross negligence. This point Lord COLERIDGE seems, from the report in the Times, to have dismissed rather summarily. "Under the statute," he said, "the defendant would not be entitled to relief, because the facts being as stated he having gone away to America witnout leaving any funds to keep the insurances-the condi

tions under which the courts of equity were enabled to give relief have not been satisfied." The effect of this would seem to be that it is " gross negligence" to trust to the honour of an insurance company.

66

THE DECISION in Suffield v. Bank of England, ou Monday last, to the effect that the bank is bound to pay notes of which the numbers have been altered (which seems to be good law) must, sooner or later, give rise to the serious question whether anything can be done by the Legislature to assist the bank and the mercantile public in tracing stolen notes, and this question is one to which the Committee on the "Stolen Goods Bill" may well direct their attention. The present process of stopping payment" is lame in the extreme. The owner of notes lost or stolen pays through his baukers (from whom, if he had the notes from them, he may generally learn the numbers) a fee of half-a-crown, in return for which the bank will "stop" any number of notes. But the term " stop" is a misnomer. What the bank does is not to refuse payment of the notes (otherwise it would be liable to countless actions upon its promise to pay bearer on demand), but to inform the person paying the half-a-crown that on a particular day a particular stopped note was presented by a particular bearer, almost invariably a bank (in which case the aggregate amount paid in on the same occasion is stated), and paid. In very few cases indeed does the bank risk an action by the bearer, and probably in those cases the true owner has indemnified the bank from loss. What seems to be

desired is, that some more effective process should be defined, and that it should be incorporated in an Act of Parliament. It might be provided, for instance, that the true owner of notes, known to have been either lost or stolen, should be entitled, on making an affidavit of the notes and of the circumstances of the loss, on entering into a recognizance to prosecute, and on payment of a reasonable fee, at once to obtain

Government aid towards recovering the notes. This aid could be given (inter alia) by immediate and systematic advertisements of the numbers of the notes, and by indemnifying the bank against actions in the majority of cases.

THE DEATH of Mr. CHARLES CLARK, Q.C., who was the father of the present generation of law reporters, severs another link with the past. Called to the bar in 1830 he had attended the appellate sittings of the House for thirty-one years, and had actually reported decisions of the year 1827. Mr. CLARK'S courtesy and geniality endeared him to all those who came in contact with him, while his long experience of the House always invested his conversation with interest. It is worthy of note that he reported decisions of Lords ELDON and REDESDALE, and that his reporting career extended from the first chancellorship of Lord LYND. HURST to the second chancellorship of Lord SELBORNE.

THE PROPOSED CHANGES IN THE COURT OF APPEAL, WHATEVER differences of opinion may have existed as to some provisions of the Judicature Acts and Orders, there is one point on which a striking unanimity has prevailed. The public and the profession have alike congratulated themselves on the possession of a Court of Appeal, powerful in the weight of its individual members, and in whose decisions, whether winning or losing, they can at least acquiesce. At first, indeed, it was felt that a court of a composite character, such as was constituted by the Judicature Act, was not satisfactory; and it was impossible to avoid, though most inconvenient to allow, a comparison between its permanent and its transitory elements. But after this defect was remedied by the Appellate Jurisdiction Act, 1876, and all the judges of the Court of Appeal were placed on the same level, the only objection vanished; and the public were well content that judges who were, in effect, the six best men to be found should form the court whose judgment should finally decide all matters short of those whose magnitude and importance carry them to the House of Lords. Since the extinction of the offices of Chief Justice of the Common Pleas and Chief Baron of the Exchequer, there is the more reason for regarding this arrangement with favour; for men of the first rank who would formerly have looked to the chiefships must now be content with, and will therefore occupy, seats in the Court of Appeal; and all that could have been desired would be that the functions of the court should have been enlarged, and that the emoluments of the office should have been more on a par with its relative rank. With such resources to draw upon, with a choice neither limited to the class of judges of the High Court, nor exclusive of them, there can, it seems manifest, be no difficulty in filling up in a perfectly satisfactory manner, not only six places in the Court of Appeal, but even the entire number of nine originally contemplated; provided only that political services are not allowed to weigh too heavily, and that mere length of service in the High Court is not supposed to entitle to a kind of emeritus appointment to the Court of Appeal.

It is, then, almost with the surprise of thunder in a clear sky that the ears of the public have been struck by the Lord Chancellor's proposal to re-model the Court of Appeal by depriving it of what has given it weight and steadiness, and endeavouring again to construct a copy of the least valuable and stable part of the image in Nebuchadnezzar's dream. Of all the judges who were ex officio members of the Court of Appeal, the only one who has sat with any considerable frequency is the Master of the Rolls-and the Master of the Rolls has

so sat frequently. When, therefore, the Lord Chancellor proposes to confine the functions of the Master of the Rolls to that court, and for that reason finds it unnecessary to fill up the place of the most powerful and most experienced of the Lords Justices, he cannot be said to be making a fresh appointment, or really to have provided for the vacancy. The places, however, once nominally, though seldom really, filled by the Chief Justice of the Common Pleas and the Chief Baron, are now to be occupied by the President of the Probate Division, who comes fresh from the trial of testamentary and matrimonial causes in that shy corner of our judicial system to assist in the constitution of a court which is henceforth to take appeals from his own division. Still, however, there remains a vacuum the extent of which, after these migrations, it is perhaps a little difficult to estimate, and which the Lord Chancellor proceeds to fill up somewhat in the method of a sheriff who summons the talesmen to fill up the gaps in a special jury. Two judges of the High Court are, it seems, to be elected yearly by their brethren, who, under what inducements and with what circumstances is not quite plain, are to be called upon on occasions to join the ranks of the Court of Appeal. We will not speculate on the method and the grounds in and upon which this extremely invidious election is to be decided; whether the post of talesman is one to be sought or to be avoided, to be competed for or to be exchanged against, whether it is to be given on considerations of age, or of freshness of mind, or of knowledge of law, or of experience, or of weak health, or of seniority in the service, or of most recent appointment. In whatever way, and by whatever fluctuating methods and views, this question may from time to time be determined by the electoral constituency of judges, it is at least certain that it can only be by an exception that the judgments of the occasional players will be regarded in the same way as those of the regular company. We have heard of late much, perhaps too much, of the dignity of judges, a dignity which when construed meant a place in the Court of Appeal; but the gift of dignity thus made will hardly be acceptable except to judges who do not know a stone from bread or a scorpion from a fish.

WHAT CONSTITUTES A
CONVERSION?

THE history of the law with regard to actions for tortious interference with the right of property in goods affords a very good illustration of the rigidity of our common law in former days, and also of the difficulty there is in thoroughly eradicating the influence of ancient forms even under a more enlightened and flexible system. The ancient action of trover was based originally upon a fiction, a fictitious finding or a fictitious bailment being supposed antecedent to the conversion complained of; and though these fictions have long been dropped, difficulty has still arisen, because the conversion may be fictitious also in one sense-that is to say, the wrong actually complained of may not be a conversion to the use of the defendant at all in the natural sense of the words. The result is that, as must necessarily happen when words are diverted from their natural meanings, it becomes difficult to say at last what is included in the term "conversion." In consequence of this uncertainty there have been several cases in which the judges have differed in opinion as to what constitutes a conversion.

The recent case of Glyn & Co. v. The East and West India Dock Company (29 W. R. 316), a case in which Bramwell and Baggallay, L.JJ., dissentiente Brett, LJ., overruled Field, J., is an instance of the difficulty that we refer to, though the leading case on this question is Hollins v. Fowler (L. R. 7 H. L. 757), a case in which the opinions delivered by the judges in the House of Lords almost exhaust the subject. We do

not propose to go into the details of these cases or the other more or less conflicting authorities on the question what constitutes a conversion. We are rather disposed to suggest that the whole controversy is obsolete, and that the substantial questions that were involved in the old discussion ought now to be fought out on other lines. It is common knowledge acquired by every student of law in reference to the origin of the action on the case that the old common law provided certain definite forms of action. The actions provided with regard to tortious interference with the right of property in chattels were trespass, trover, and detinue. The idea of the action of trover was of goods not actually seized while in the owner's possession, but found or bailed and afterwards tortiously converted by the finder or bailee to his own use; and by the very hypothesis on which the action was based, the measure of damages was the value of the goods. This being the form of action, the next question is, what are the facts that can be fitted into it-in other words, what facts are evidence of a conversion? With regard to that question the course of things is, as might be expected, this. Legal experience constantly shows that the mould or form of action is by no means suited to all the requirements of real life, and to meet all the cases of injuries to the right of property in chattels. It is consequently every now and then more or less stretched by judges desirous of doing justice. The result is that attempts are made to stretch it still further, but then the divergence from the natural meaning of words becomes too glaring, and other judges resist the tendency towards expansion. A struggle is apparent in the course of the decisions, and the meaning of the word "conversion fluctuates

and becomes uncertain, the opinions of the the judges tending sometimes one way sometimes the other. The opinions of Blackburn, J., and Brett, J., in Hollins v. Fowler in the House of Lords, and the judgment of Bramwell, B., in that case in the court below, and his judgment in Glyn & Co. v. East and West India Dock Company, are most instructive reading, as showing the nature and scope of this controversy. It is difficult to summarize the views therein expressed with regard to the points at issue, but it seems to us that there are involved two questions, one of which is a question of form, the other one of substance, and the two became mixed up together in the discussions about what constituted a conversion in such wise, that the formal and technical question much obscured and confused the sub. stantial one.

We will endeavour to state what, in our opinion, the two questions are. To begin with the question of form. The action of trover was an action in which the alleged grievance was that the defendant had converted the plaintiff's goods to his own use. The question thereupon arises, what acts amount to a conversion of goods to a person's use? The answer made by the text-books is too vague to be of much use. Some such expression is generally used as, that any exercise of dominion inconsistent with the plaintiff's right of property in the goods is a conversion. That is very much like answering a question by stating it again in more elaborate terms, because the question immediately arises, what exercise of dominion is inconsistent with the plaintiff's right of property? Some acts obviously do not amount to an exercise of dominion, as if I pat a man's horse as it stands in the street; while some obviously do, as if I drink a man's wine. Some acts, again, are on the line. A man may do acts which may fairly be described as the exercise of dominion over property without the authority of the owner, but it may be doubtful how far they can be said to be inconsistent with his rights of property. For instance, a man without negligence, in ignorance of the true owner's title, may become bailee of goods from a person who has no title to them, and proceed to do acts of dominion to the goods which may, more or less, prejudice the true owner. Take the cases

put by Bramwell, L.J., in Glyn & Co. v. East & West India Dock Company, of goods of one person stolen or taken by mistake by another person, and by him delivered to a carrier to be carried to a distance, and then delivered to a third person, and so carried and delivered accordingly. The learned Lord Justice says that the carrier clearly would not be guilty of a conversion, but we do not think the case of a carrier is a good one to select, because the carrier may be entitled to a special protection, being obliged to carry goods offered to him for carriage. We would rather take the case of an innocent bailee, not entitled to any special protection, who does some act to goods of a nature such as their carriage to a distant place, but not meaning to assert any title or right of dominion antagonistic to the true owner's title. The question arises, Has there been a conversion to his own use"? It will at once be apparent what the second or substantial question is from the instance we have given―viz., how far a dealing with a person's chattel in ignorance of his title by the direction of another, and in the bona fide belief of such other's title is, in the absence of negligence, tortious as against the true owner if damage thereby accrues to him.

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The two questions are dreadfully confused together ex necessitate rei under the old law, but they really do not seem to have any necessary connection with one another. The decisions with regard to conversion have heretofore exhibited two different points of view. One is that, as a general rule, every exercise of dominion over a chattel without the authority of the true owner, whereby the true owner's enjoyment of the chattel is lost or substantially derogated from, is a conversion, although, in one sense, there may be no conversion to the use of the defendant, and no intention on his part in derogation of the plaintiff's title, of which he may be necessarily ignorant. Every act done to a chattel, except some trifling acts which do not substantially alter the condition of the thing, is pro tanto an exercise of dominion over it, and if it causes or conduces to the loss of the chattel by the plaintiff, or deprives the plaintiff of the full enjoyment of it, may be said to be a conversion. This is one point of view. The other seeks rather to narrow the meaning of the terms "conversion to the defendant's use" in the interests of the innocent bailee. Its holders seem to say, if we rightly understand it, that conversion implies some act in derogation of the plaintiff's title in assertion of a title inconsistent therewith; that a bailee who, without any knowledge whatever of the true owner's title, merely fulfils the mandate of the party who has bailed the chattel to him cannot be supposed to assert any title inconsistent with the plaintiff's, or to convert the goods to his own use.

Let us illustrate the extreme difficulty that arises between these conflicting views by instances. A person who has stolen goods bails them to another (we will not say a common carrier) to be carried to a distant place, and then delivered to a third person. The bailee performs the mandate in ignorance of the true owner's title. Again, the stealer of goods bails them to another person to be taken care of at the place of such bailment until application for their re-delivery. The bailee performs the mandate in ignorance of the true owner's title. Are both, or is either of these cases, a case of conversion by the bailee? We have selected these cases because they seem to us to be illustrations of the way in which the two questions of form and substance are confused together by the question of conversion. We do not know that they are the best illustrations that could be selected, but we think they may suffice to give an inkling of our meaning. The cases are not, to our mind, necessarily identical in point of justice, but to make the whole question one of conversion may render it difficult to give effect to any distinction between them.

It seems to us that under the present system of law and pleading, which knows nothing of forms of action, to make the question whether there has been a conversion or not, is oftentimes to apply a wholly obselete test.

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