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of Appeal, and relieving suitors from the necessity of passing not only a double, but sometimes a treble gate, as not unfrequently happens when questions of new trial, misdirection, and judgment are mixed up, before they can rest from their labour of litigation. To say nothing of this, that the more such multitudinous courts are discontinued, the more is that habit of mind likely to die out which drives learned judges with such an imperative instinct into one another's society upon the bench.

The Attention of persons interested should be directed to Dyson, Appellant; London and North-Western Railway Company, Respondents (29 W. B. 665, now at length reported in this month's issue of the Law Reports, 7 Q. B. D. 32), the short result of which is, that the well-known bye-laws of railway companies providing for the fining of, and the recovery of extra fare from, passengers failing to show their tickets, cannot be enforced, even in a case where an intention to defraud has been found as a fact. Numerous cases, of which Dtarden v. Townsend (14 W. E. 53, L. E. 1 Q. B; 10) is perhaps the best known, and Saunders, Appellant; 8ovth-Eastern Railway Company, Respondents (2i* W. E. 56, L. E. 5 Q. B. D. 456) is the latest, had decided that these bye-laws were " bad," on some ground or other, in the case of an innocent infringement of them, but the case to which we refer is the first instance of a conviction being questioned where fraud was found. The court observed that it would be still open to the company to proceed against the same defendant under the 103rd section of the Bail ways Clauses Act, for "travelling without having paid his fare, and with intent to avoid payment thereof." It may be observed that, in Dyson's case, the court disapprove of the dictum of Cockbubn, C.J., in Saunders, Appellant; SouthEaettrn Railway Company, Respondents, to the effect that section 108 of the Railways Clauses Act, from which a railway company derive all their power to make bye-laws, applies only to the cases where the line is woiked by another than the owning company. Looking to the use of the word "generally" in that section, we incline to think the dictum of Cockburn, C.J., wrong, but it is material to point out that it has not been expressly overruled, and that it it be law, it renders the whole code of railway bye-laws practically useless. Also it must be noted that in one of the earlier cases, Rrown v. Great Eastern Railway Company (L. E. 2 C. P. D. at p. 409), there is a dictum of Lush, J., that the common form bye-law is not bad because it does not impose a specific penalty, and that in London and Brighton Railway Company v. Watson (27 W. E. 614, L. R. 4 C. P. D. 119), while Brett, L.J., was of opinion that it was repugnant to the statute and therefore bad, Bramwell and Cotton, L.JJ., "desired it to be understood that they expressed no opinion either one way or the other on that matter." All which considerations seem to point to the desirability of somedefiuitc legislation on thesubject. It may be suggested as just and reasonable that while the passenger innocently travelling without a ticket should be required to pay a small additional percentage on his fare, the common oheat should be liable to three days' imprisonment with hard labour, without the option of a fine, for the fine of not more than forty shillings is surely an inadequate punishment for this class of offender.

A New Question arose in Quitter v. Mapleton, on Monday last, as to the effect of the section of 22 & 23 Vict. c. 35, enabling relief to be granted against forfeiture for breach of a covenant to insure. The conditions on which according to that statute relief may be given are well known. No loss by fire must have happened; the breach must have been committed by accident or mistake, or otherwise without gross fraud

or negligence, and there must be an insurance on foot at the time of the application to the court in conformity with the covenant to insure. In Quilter v. Mapleton, the policies effected by the tenant Mapleson expired on the 25th of March last, subject to the usual fifteen days' grace. The tenant was in America, aud no premiums were paid to keep alive these policies or to effect new policies immediately upon their expiration ; but the tenant ou the 14th of May effected new insurances for three months in conformity with the covenant, and the policies were post-dated to tha 25th of March. The tenant alleged that he had arranged with the insurance companies that the old policies should not lapse by reason of the non-payment of the premiums due in Maroh. Upou this point Lord Coleridge considered that the result of the evidencewas that "no doubt there was an understanding 'in honour,' that the directors would issue the policies when the premiums were paid, and that the policies, when issued, should cover the theatre from the 25th of March; but there was nothing to show that there was anything more than an 'understanding,' to which the directors were no parties whatever, and no instance was mentioned in which, in a similar case, such an understanding had been held to bind." If this is so, it is obvious that a breach of covenant had been committed. The premises were not "insured" in the proper sense of the term during about a fortnight. It cannot be said that an "understanding" with an insurance company, based on no consideration, is an insurance within the meaning of a covenant to keep premises insured. The only question, therefore, was whether the omission to insure had arisen through accident or mistake, and without gross negligence. This point Lord Coleridge seems, from the report in the Times, to have dismissed rather summarily. "Under the statute," he said, " the defendant would not be entitled to relief) because the facts beintr as stated—he having gone away tn Kjivl'**/ witnout leaving any funds to keep - „ the insurances—the conditions under which the courts of equity were enabled to give relief have not been satisfied." The effect of this would seem to be that it is "gross negligenee " to trait to the honour of an insurance company.

The Decision in Sujfield v. Bank of England, ou Monday last, to the effect that the bauk is bound to pay notes of which the numbers have been alterfd (which seems to be good law) must, sooner or later, give rise to the serious question whether anything can be done by the Legislature to assist the bank and the mercantile public in tracing stolen notes, and this question is one to which the Committee on the " Stolen Goods Bill " may well direct their attention. The present process of "stopping payment" is lame in the extreme. The owner of notes lost or stolen pays through his baukers (from whom, if he had the notes from them, he may generally learn the numbers) a fee of half-a-crown, in return for which the bank will " stop" any number of notes. But the term " stop " is a misnomer. What the bank does is not to refuse payment of the notes (otherwise it would be liable to countless actions upon its promise to pay bearer on demand), but to inform the person paying the half-a-crown that on a particular day a particular stopped note was presented by a particular bearer, almost invariably a bank (in which case the aggregate amount paid in on the same occasion is stated), aud paid, la very few cases indeed does the bank risk an action by the bearer, and probably in those cases the true owner has indemnified the bank from loss. What seems to be desired is, that some more effective process should be defined, and that it should be incorporated in an Act of Parliament. It might be provided, for instance, that the true owner of notes, known to have been either lost or stolen, should be entitled, on making an affidavit of the notes and of the circumstances o( the loss, on entering into a recognizance to prosecute, and on payment of a reasonable fee, at vnce to obtain.

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Government aid towards recovering the notes. This aid could be given {inter alia) by immediate and systematic advertisements of the numbers of the notes, and by indemnifying the bank against actions in the majority of cases.

Thb Death of Mr. Charles Clark, Q.C., who was the father of the present generation of law reporters, severs another link with the past. Called to the bar in 1830 he bad attended the appellate sittings of the House for thirty-one years, and had actually reported decisions of the year 1827. Mr. Clark's courtesy and geniality endeared him to all those who came in contact with him, while his long experience of the House always invested his conversation with interest. It is worthy of note that he reported decisions of Lords Eldon and Redesdale, and that his reporting career extended from the first chancellorship of Lord LyndHurst to the second chancellorship of Lord Selborne.


"whatever differences of opinion may have existed as to some provisions of the Judicature Acts and Orders, there is one point on which a striking unanimity has prevailed. The public and the profession have alike congratulated themselves on the possession of a Court of Appeal, powerful in the weight of its individual members, and in whose decisions, whether winning or losing, they can at least acquiesce. At first, indeedyit was felt that a court of a composite character, such as was constituted by the Judicature Act, was not eatisfactory; and it was impossible to avoid, though most inconvenient to allow, a comparison between its permanent and its transitory elements. But after this defect was remedied by the Appellate Jurisdiction Act, 1876, and all the judges of the Court of Appeal were placed on the same level, the only objection vanished; and the public were well content that judges who were, in effect, the six best men to be found should form the court whose judgment should finally decide all matters short of those whose magnitude and importance carry them to the House of Lords. Since the extinction of the offices of Chief Justice of the Common Pleas and Chief Baron of the Exchequer, there is the more reason for regarding this arrangement with favour; for men of the first rank who would formerly have looked to the chiefships must now be content with, and will therefore occupy, seats in the Court of Appeal; and all that could have been desired would be that the functions of the court should have been enlarged, and that the emoluments of the office should have been more on a par with its relative rank. "With such resources to draw upon, with a choice neither limited to the class of judges of the High Court, nor exclusive of them, there can, it seems manifest, be no difficulty in filling up in a perfectly satisfactory manner, not only six places in the Court of Appeal, but even the entire number of nine originally contemplated; provided only that political services are not allowed to weigh too heavily, and that mere length of service in the High Court is not supposed to entitle to a kind of emeritus appointment to the Court of Appeal.

It is, then, almost with the surprise of thunder in a clear sky that the ears of the public have been struck by the Lord Chancellor's proposal to re-model the Court of Appeal by depriving it of what has given it weight and steadiness, and endeavouring again to construct a copy of the least valuable and stable part of the image in Nebuchadnezzar's dream. Of all the judges who were ex officio members of the Court of Appeal, the only one who lias sat with any considerable frequency is the Muster of the Rolls—and the Master of the Bolls has

so sat frequently. When, therefore, the Lord Chancellor proposes to confine the functions of the Master of the Bolls to that court, and for that reason finds it unnecessary to fill up the place of the most powerful and most experienced of the Lords Justices, he cannot be said to be making a fresh appointment, or really to have provided for the vacancy. The places, however, once nominally, though seldom really, filled by the Chief Justice of the Common Pleas and the Chief Baron, are now to be occupied by the President of the Probate Division, who comes fresh from the trial of testamentary aud matrimonial causes in that shy corner of our judicial system to assist in the constitution of a court which is henceforth to take appeals from his own division. Still, however, there remains a vacuum the extent of which, after these migrations, it is perhaps a little difficult to estimate, and which the Lord Chancellor proceeds to fill up somewhat in the method of a sheriff who summons the talesmen to fill up the gaps in a special jury. Two judges of the High Court are, it seems, to be elected yearly by their brethren, who, under what inducements and with what circumstances is not quite plain, are to be called upon on occasions to join the ranks of the Court of Appeal. We will not sptculate on the method and the grounds iu and upon which this extremely invidious election is to be decided; whether the post of talesman is one to be sought or to be avoided, to be competed for or to be exchanged against, whether it is to be given on considerations of age, or of freshness of mind, or of knowledge of law, or of experience, or of weak health, or of seniority in the service, or of most recent appointment. In whatever way, and by whatever fluctuating methods and views, this question may from time to time be determined by the electoral constituency of judges, it is at least certain that it can only be by an exception that the judgments of the occasional players will be regarded in the same way as those of the regular company. We have heard of late much, perhaps too much, of the dignity of judges, a dignity which when construed meant a place in tho Court of Appeal; but the gift of dignity thus made will hardly be acceptable except to judges who do not know a stone from bread or a scorpion from a fish.


The history of the law with regard to actions for tortious interference with the right of property in goods affords a very good illustration of the rigidity of our common law in former days, and also of the difficulty there is iu thoroughly eradicating the influence of ancient forms even under a more enlightened and flexible system. The ancient action of trover was based originally upon a fiction, a fictitious finding or a fictitious bailment being supposed antecedent to the conversion complained of ; and though these fictions have long been dropped, difficulty has still arisen, because the conversion may be fictitious also in one sense—that is to say, the wrong actually complained of may not be a conversion to the use of the defendant at all in the natural Sense of the words. The result is that, as must necessarily happen when words are diverted from their natural meanings, it becomes difficult to say at last what is included in the term " conversion." In consequence of this uncertainty there have been several cases in which the j udges have differed in opinion as to what constitutes a conversion.

The recent case of Olyn £ Co. v. The East and West India Dock Company (29 W. R. 316), a case in which Bramwell and Baggallay, L.JJ., dissentiente Brett, LJ., overruled Field, J., is an instance of the difficulty that we refer to, though the leading case on this question is Hollins v. Fowler (L. R. 7 H. L. 757), a case in which the opinions delivered by the judges in the House of Lords almost exhaust the subject. We do

not propose to go into the details of these cases or the other more or less conflicting authorities on the question -what constitutes a conversion. We are rather disposed to suggest that the whole controversy is obsolete, and that the substantial questions that were involved in the old discussion ought now to be fought out on other lines.

It is common knowledge acquired by every student of law in reference to the origin of the action on the case that the old common law provided certain definite forms of action. The actions provided with regard to tortious interference with the right of property in chattels were trespass, trover, and detinue. The idea of the action of trover was of goods not actually seized while in the owner's possession, but found or bailed and afterwards tortiously converted by the finder or bailee to his own use; and by the very hypothesis on which the action was based, the measure of damages was the valuo of the goods. This being the form of action, the next question is, what are the facts that can be fitted into it—in other words, what facts are evidence of a conversion? With regard to that question the course of things is, as might be expected, this. Legal experience constantly shows that the mould or form of action is by no means suited to all the requirements of real life, and to meet all the cases of injuries to the right of property in chattels. It is consequently every now and then more or leas stretched by judges desirous of doing justice. Theresuit is that attempts are made to stretch it still further, but then the divergence from the natural meaning of words becomes too glaring, and other judges resist the tendency towards expansion. A struggle is apparent in the course of the decisions, and the meaning of the word "conversion" fluctuates and becomes uncertain, the opinions of tho the judges tending sometimes one way sometimes the other. The opinions of Blackburn, J., and Brett, J., in Hollins v. Fowler in the House of Lords, aud the judgment of Bramwell, B., in that case in the court below, and his judgment in Olyn & Co. v. East and West India Dock Company, are most instructive reading, as showing the nature and scope of this controversy. It is difficult to summarize the views therein expressed with regard to the points at issue, but it seems to us that there are involved two questions, one of which is a question of form, the other one of substance, and the two became mixed up together in the discussions about what constituted a conversion in such wise, that the formal and technical question much obscured and confused the substantial one.

We will endeavour to state what, in our opinion, the two questions are. To begin with the question of form. The action of trover was an action in which the alleged grievance was that the defendant had converted the plaintiff's goods to his owu use. The question thereupon arises, what acts amount to a conversion of goods to a person's use? The answer mode by the text-books is too vague to be of much use. Some such expression is generally used as, that any exercise of dominion inconsistent with the plaintiff s right of property in the goods is a couveision. That is very much like answering a question by stating it again in more elaborate terms, because the question immediately arises, what exercise of dominion is inconsistent with the plaintiff's right of property? Some acts obviously do not amount to an exercise of dominion, as if I pat a man's horse as it stands in the street; while some obviously do, as if I drink a man's wiur. Some acts, again, are on the line. A man may do acts which may fairly be described as the exercise of dominion over property without the authority of the owner, but it may be doubtful how far they can be said to be inconsistent with his rights of property. For instance, a man without negligence, in ignorance of the true owner's title, may become bailee of goods from a person who has no title to them, aud prcceed to do acts of domiujon to the goods which may, more or less, prejudice the true owner. Take the cases

put by Bramwell, L.J., in Olyn & Co. Y. East & Wttt India Dock Company, of goods of one person stolen or taken by mistake by another person, and by him delivered to a carrier to be carried to a distance, and then delivered to a third person, and so carried and delivered accord, ingly. The learned Lord Justice says that the carrier clearly would not be guilty of a conversion, but we do not think the case of a carrier is a good one to select, because the carrier may be entitled to a special protection, being obliged to carry goods offered to him for carriage. We would rather take the cose of an innocent bailee, not entitled to any special protection, who does some act to goods of a nature such as their carriage to a distant place, but not meaning to assert any title or right of dominion antagonistic to the true owner's title. The question arises, Has there been a " conversion to his own use''? It will at once be apparent what the second or substantial question is from the instance we have given—viz., how far a dealing with a person's chattel in ignorance of his title by the direction of another, and in the bond fide belief of such other's title is, in the absence of negligence, tortious as against the true owner if damage thereby accrues to him.

The two questions are dreadfully confused together ex necessitate rei under the old law, but they really do not seem to have any necessary counection with one another. The decisions with regard to conversion have heretofore exhibited two different points of view. One is that, as a general rule, every exercise of dominion over a chattel without the authority of the true owner, whereby the true owner's enjoyment of the chattel is lost or substantially derogated from, is a conversion, although, in one sense, there may be no conversion to the use of the defendant, and no intention on his part in derogation of the plaintiff's title, of which he may be necessarily ignorant. Every act done to a ohattel, except some trifling acts which do not substantially alter the condition of the thing, is pro tanto an exercise of dominion over it, and if it causes or conduces to the loss of the chattel by the plaintiff, or deprives the plaintiff of the full enjoyment of it, may be said to be a conversion. This is one point of view. The other seeks rather w narrow the meauing of the terms "conversion to the defendant's use" in the interests of the innocent bailee. Its holders seem to say, if we rightly understand it, that conversion implies some act in derogation of the plaintiffs title in assertion of a title inconsistent therewith; that a bailee who, without any knowledge whatever of the true owner's title, merely fulfils the mandate of the party who has bailed the chattel to him cannot be supposed to assert any title inconsistent with the plaintiffs, or to convert the goods to his owu use.

Let us illustrate the extreme difficulty that arises between these conflicting views by instances. A person who has stolen goods bails them to another (we will not say a common carrier) to be carried to a dictaint place, and then delivered to a third person. The bailee performs the mandate in ignorance of the true owner's title. Again, the stealer of goods bails them to another person to be taken care of at the place of such bailment uutil application for their re-delivery. The bailee perform* the mandate in ignorance of the true owner's title. Are both, or is either of these cases, a case of conversion by the bailee? We have selected these cases because they seem to us to be illustrations of the way in which the two questions of form and substance are confused together by the question of conversion. We do uot know that they are the best illustrations that could be selected, but we think they may suffice to give an inkling of our meaning. The cases are not, to our mind, necessarily identical in point of justice, but to make the whole question one of conversion may render it difficult to give effect to any distinction between them.

It seems to us that under the present system of 'a,f and pleading, which kuows nothing of forms of action, to make the question whether there has been a conversion or not, is oftentimes to apply a wholly obselete test. We cannot say that we hold with the notion that makes the tortiousneas of an act done to another in respect of his property depend upon knowledge of the right of the true owner, or the intention to contravene that right. A man who voluntarily does an act to property not his own must take the risk. He chooses to rely on the title of the person giving him the mandate. Unless the carrier's case put by Bramwell, L.J., is to be regarded as depending on the carrier's being compelled to carry the goods, and so his act being not voluntary, we cannot think the law ought to be as the Lord Justice says it is. There is no such very great practical hardship. If the bailment is in the course of a business carried on for profit, as is generally the case, it is an ordinary incident of the business, for which the bailee must be taken to recoup himself from his profits, if not by suing his bailor. On the other hand, it is a general incident of property, and necessary to its effectual protection, that no one should be entitled to deal with property except the true owner, or those authorized by him, without being responsible for damage thereby occasioned. Assume that an act would be tortious if done by someone other than the true owner, without a mandate at all; how can it make any difference that some one gives a mandate who has no title do so?

The law at present seems to us to be in great confusion on this subject, and very uncertain, and it seems to us that the existing decisions are vitiated by the fact that they proceed on the assumption, derived from the old system, that the tortious act must amount to a conversion. But why should this be so? The true question seems to us to be whether there has been a dealing with property unauthorized by the true owner which has caused damage to the true owner. The question was further complicated under the old system by the fact that, as a necessary concomitant of the nature of conversion, the damages were the whole value of the goods. Some modern cases, such as Johnson v. Steer (15 C. B. N. 8. 320), had, however to some extent broken in on that doctrine. The damage caused by the tortious net need not necessarily be the value of the goods, but the damage actually caused, when once the absolute necessity for a conversion is gone. If by the dealing of the innocent bailee with the goods the owner is not really damnified, as may be the case when the act of the bailee is merely the performance of the mandate of a bailor, then no action ought to lie, because there is no damage. This would in most cases dispose of the case of the warehouseman merely keeping goods and restoring them to the person who has deposited them, and other such cases. (See judgment of Blackburn, J., in HolUna v. Fowler, at page 767). On the other hand, we cannot see why, if the act of the bailee has occasioned the damage to the true owner, he should not bear the loss. For instance, if the bailee removes the goods to a distant place, and the plaintiff s title is then discovered by him, and he does not deliver them there to the bailor or his order, but refuses to bring them back, then the measure of damage would be the damage sustained by the true owner, by roason of his goods being at the distant place instead of where they were taken from. Under the old system it apparently would be conversion or nothing in such a case.

We think if the matter is really analyzed to the bottom, the case of the innocent bailee is analogous to that of a person who has innocently bought chattels to which the vendor had no title. Unless possession of personal property is to be held as against the true owner to be conclusive evidence of title in favour of innocent parties dealing with it on the strength of such possession, we cannot understand on what principle the innocent bailee is to be protected.

Whatever the true rule may be, it is much to be wished that, forms of action being abolished, the law on the subject could be put on a more certain footing without regard to antiquated nomenclature and the former decisions of j udges hampered by the then existing forms of action.


The excitement which has been caused by the Brighton Railway Murder, and the many mistaken arrests which have been made in consequence, lead naturally to the examination of the extent of the power to arrest suspected persons. It will be found that this power differs very much according as the arrest is (1) by a constable with warrant; (2) by a constable without warrant; (3) by a private person.

Of arrest by a constable with warrant little need be said. Since the consolidation of the numerous preexisting statutes on the subject by Jervis' Act (11 & 12 Vict. c. 42), the practice has become pretty well known and settled, and there has been little, if any, doubt as to the law. It is well to point out, however, that whereas the warrant of a justice of the peace in one county must be backed by another justice in another county, before it can be executed in such latter county, " a warrant from the chief or other justice of the Queen's Bench extends all over the kingdom," and is tested England, so that it can be executed anywhere (see 4 Steph. Com., p. 347).

As to arrest by a constable without warrant, it seems that at common law this may be done upon a reasonable belief that the party has committed a felony. (See Griffin v. Coleman, 4 H. & N. 265, in which case it was held that this power to arrest does not extend to cases of misdemeanor. It is also laid down that in acting upon a charge made by a third person the constable must exercise ordinary care and caution, and that, if having done so, he apprehend a supposed felon upon a reasonable charge with reference to the circumstances, he is justified, although it ultimately turn out that no felony was committed (Burn's Justice, vol. 1, p. 295, citing Hogg v. Ward, 3 H. & N. 417, and other cases). So much for the common law, but it is material to observe that tho power of a constable to arrest without warrant is very precisely dealt with by statute. By 24 & 25 Vict. cc. 97, 100, ss. 61, 66, "auy constable or peace officer may take into custody without warrant any person whom he shall find lying or loitering in any highway, yard, or other place during the night, and whom he shall have good cause to suspect of having committed a felouy" against either of those Acts. The felonies against those Acts include murder, larceny, and most of the felonies known to the law, but it is rather singular that neither by these or any other Acts (or, for the matter of that, at common law) has a constable any greater power of arrest where the crime suspected to have been committed is murder than where it is a larceny of the most petty character. Within the metropolitan police district, however, the power is more extensive. By 2 & 3 Vict. c. 47, s. 64, amending, but not repealing, 10 Geo. 4, c. 44, s. 7, any policeman may "take into custody without warrant all loose, idle, and disorderly persons whom he shall find disturbing the public peace, or whom he shall have good cause to suspect of having committed any felony, misdemeanor, or breach of the peace, and all persons whom he shall find between sunset and the hour of eight in the morning lying or loitering in any highway, yard, or other place, and not giving a satisfactory account of themselves." It is clear, however, that the words, " loose, idle, or disorderly persons," are governing words in the first part of this section, and it has been so held upon Bimilar words in the City Police Act (2 & 3 Vict. c. xciv.), s. 8: Bowditch v. Balchin (5 Ex. 378.)

Upon these statutes, as compared with the common law, the question arises whether they repeal that part of the common law which they do not re-enact, thus limiting the power of arrest to the four corners of the statutes, or whether they leave all the common law standing. We can find no authority upon this question, unless, indeed, the interpretation put upon them by the executive can be called an authority. It appears from Bum's Justice, vol. 1, p. 1059, that the following (inter alia) "instructions" have been issued for the guidance of constables :—

"The constable must arrest anyone whom he sees in the aot of committing a felony, or anyone whom another positively charges with having committed a felony, or whom another suspects of having committed a felony, if the snspioion appear to be well founded, and provided the person Bo suspecting go with the constable.

"Though no charge be made, yet if the constable snspeots a person to have committed a felony, he should arrest him; and if he have reasonable grounds for his snspioion he will be justified, even thongh it should afterwards appear that no felony wag in fact committed, but the constable must be cautious in thus acting on his own suspioionB.

"Generally, if the arrest was made discreetly and fairly in pursuit of an offender, and not from any private malice or ill-will, the constable need not doubt that the law will proteot him,"

These instructions, which are followed by others in relation to rescue, breaking open doors, &c, seem to be clearly justified by the decided cases, and to include the case of a mistaken arrest arising out of a mistaken identity. They make no distinction between the various degrees of felony. But the decided cases, as we have alreedy remarked, do not touch the question whether the statutes narrow the law—and for this very plain rerson (bo far as we have been able to discover), that the cases were decided before the statutes were passed.

Lastly, with regard to the power of a private person to arrest without warrant, it seems that at common law this is coincident with the power of a constable (see Guppy v. Briitiebank, 5 Price, 525), subject to this important limitation expressed by Lord Tenterden in Beckwith v. Philby (6 B. & C. 635): "There is this distinction between a private individual and a constable; in order to justify the former in causing the imprisonment of a person, he must not only make out a reasonable ground of suspicion, but he must prove that a felony has actually been committed [by someone], whereas a constable having reasonable ground to suspect that a felony has been committed, is authorized to detain the party suspected until inquiry can be made by the proper authorities." But by statute 14 & 15 Vict. c. 19, s. 11, express authority is given to any person to apprehend persons found committing indictable offences in the tiight, and a similar authority without restriction as to hour, except in respect to "anything in the day-time," is given by the Larceny Act, 1861, in respect to persons found committing offences against that Act. Again arises the awkward question—do these statutes limit the common law power? We cannot say for certain that they do not. At any rate, the whole law of "arrest without warrant"' is in a very unsatisfactory state. Nil- is it the least of its defects that no compensation whatever is provided for those unfortunate persons who are arrested by mistake, but "on reasonable grounds." Even the "shilling and the breakfast," which were lately awarded as compensation in one of the numerous coses of which we have lately heard, ought, we presume, to be disallowed as a charge upon the public, when the account of the funds out of which this pitiful compensation was paid comes to be audited.

Mr. Justice Eay, having to attend the North-Eastern Circuit, has risen for the present sittings.

The Western Juriit says that a judge who had to sentence a prisoner in Danville to prison for eighteen years, for mnrdfr, the jury having made a "compromise verdict," informed the prisoner that the sentence was due to the "moral cowardice of twelve men." Telling him that he considered him guilty, the judge added, "You should rejoice that you fell into the hands of, and were tried by, a jury of your


EFFECT OF DISCLAIMER. [To the Editor of the Solicitors' Journal.] Sir,—A landlord verbally lets two shops to A. on a yearly tenancy, at a rent of £200 per annum. A. afterwards verbally sublets one of the shops to B. on a yearly tenancy at a rent of £100 per annum. A. subsequently files his petition for liquidation, and the trustee under the liquidation wishes to disclaim the lease. What effect will such disclaimer have upon the sub-lease? Can the landlord distrain on the goods in B.'s shop for the rent of the two shops accruing subsequently to the disclaimer? If so, an amendment of the law in this respect would not, I am sure, be out of place; for it oertainly seems hard on B. (in the case supposed, and I should think similar coses ore constantly occurring) who cannot insist, as of right, on taking A.'s shop. The recent casesof Smalley v. Sardinge and Ex parte Walton seem to bear on the question; but, unfortunately in the latter case, the sub-lease comprised the whole of the premises demised by the original lease, and not part only as in the case in question. Inqciblb.

[We should think that the landlord could distrain on the goods in B.'s shop for the rent of both shops. In Ex parte Walton (ante, p. 586) James, L.J., Baid that "When a sub-demise is made, the sub-tenant took the property subject to all the original lessor's rights in rem, though he was not liable upon the personal covenants of the original lessee with the lessor. It would be a violation of every principle of law and justice, and against all common sense, to permit two men, by bargaining with each other, to affect any right of property of another man, particularly any right of the owner from whom they both derived title. And it would seem to be equally against principle and against common honesty that a lessee, by becoming bankrupt, should deprive the lessor of his remedies in rem, or release a sub-lessee from the legal liabilities and obligations to which the property wot liable in his hands before the bankruptcy."—En. S. J.]

ADMISSION OF SOLICITORS IN AUSTRALIA, [To the Editor of the Solicitors' Journal.]

Sir,—I think the following is an answer to "Inquirer's " question in your last week's issue. A Supreme Court of New Zealand was established by Ordinance No. 1 of the 5th Vict, of the Legislative Ordinances of New Zealand. Section 13 of the Ordinance enacts that "the court shall inrol to practise therein as solicitors such persons only as shall have been admitted as solicitors, attorneys, or writers in one of the courts at Westminster,. Dublin, or Edinburgh; or shall have served such term of clerkship with a solicitor of the court as shall be required by the general rule thereof." Thia Ordinance is still in force.

In New South Wales, Queensland, and South Australia, persons admitted in England are similarly entitled to be admitted solicitors of the Supreme Courts. As to Victoria, I cannot speak positively, but I believe the same rule applies. F. B. De M. Ginuoxs.

CLERK OF THE PEACE. [To the Editor of the Solicitors' Journal.] Sir,—Will you allow me access to your columns to inquiie whether any of your subscribers can refer me to any instance in which a Clerk of the Peace has been either a deputy-lieutenant or under-sheriff P Lu. July 4.

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