THERE SEEMS TO BE a good deal of justice in the strictures passed in many quarters with reference to the circumstance that in the Bend Or case the Duke of WESTMINSTER was allowed to give evidence from the bench. This objectionable distinction between noble witnesses and ordinary witnesses probably has its origin in the practice of accommodating noble spectators with seats on the beneh during the hearing of sensational trials. We hope that the architect of the new Law Courts will put a stop to this by providing no more seats on the bench than are needed for the judges. A court of justice is the least suitable of all places for the display of deference to rank or social position.

UP TO WEDNESDAY LAST the new list of funds undealt with for fifteen years had not been posted up in the usual place in the corridor adjoining the Chancery Paymaster's office, and the result has been a considerable influx of practitioners to consult the old list.

DIVISIONAL COURTS.

Ir is difficult to exaggerate the importance of the precedent set by the Queen's Bench Division in re-hearing, before a court of five judges, the case of Richardson v. Saunders. The question involved was one of construction of the Education Acts, whether a father causes his child to "attend" school, if he send the child to a school at which the school authorities decline to receive it, on the ground of non-payment of the school fees. A divisional court consisting of two judges, Lindley and Lopes, JJ., had held, in February, that a father could not be convicted in such a case (Richardson, Appellant; Saunders, Respondent, 29 W. R. 631, L. R. 6 Q. B. D. 313). In the present month, the same father was summoned by the same School Board, and the justices declined to convict upon the authority of that decision. But they again stated a case, which came on in due course to be argued before another divisional court, consisting of Lord Coleridge, C.J., and Manisty, J. Upon Richardson, Appellant; Saunders, Respondent, being cited as a binding authority, Lord Coleridge is reported in the Times to have said, that "it had been held by the Court of Appeal that in such a case there would be no appeal, as it was in effect a criminal charge. That being so, recognizing as he did the respect which was due to the judgment of his brethren in a similar case, though he doubted the decision, and was disposed to think that the law as it stood allowed of a conviction in such a case, yet as he should be reluctant, even if his learned brother concurred with him, to overrule that decision, and as even if they did so the decision would not settle the law on the subject, being a decision of two judges against two, he should suggest that it would be well to avail himself of the provision of the Judicature Act, 1876, allowing of a court being constituted with a larger number than three in any case of importance, and therefore he should propose that a court of five judges should sit to hear the case." "" A court of five judges sat accordingly on Monday last, and overruled Richardson, Appellant; Saunders, Respondent. The question was admittedly one of great public importance and difficulty, 80 as to justify this kind of re-hearing, if such a kind of re-hearing could in any instance be justified. But it is material to examine the sections of the Judicature Acts upon which the constitution of the court depended.

By section 45 of the Judicature Act, 1873, all appeals from petty sessions may be heard by divisional courts, whose decision "shall be final" unless special leave to appeal be given. "no By section 47 of the same Act, appeal shall lie from any judgment of the High Court in any criminal cause or matter," and it has been appeal from justices upon a case arising out

held that an

"And any such divisional court shall be constituted of two judges and no more, unless the president of the division to which such divisional court belongs, with the concurrence of the other judges of such division, or a majority thereof, is of opinion that such divisional court should be constituted of a greater number than two, in which case such court may be constituted of such number of judges as the president, with such concurrence as aforesaid, may think expedient: nevertheless the decisions of a divisional court shall of a greater number than two judges." not be invalidated by reason of such court being constituted

The above paragraph is, no doubt, a very salutary one, and its powers have been not unfrequently exercised, especially in registration (see, for instance, Bennett v. Atkins, 27 W. R. 231, L. R. 4 C. P. D. 80); revenue (see, for instance, Gilbertson v. Fergusson, L. R. 5 Ex. D. 57), and otherwise important cases (see, for instance, South-Eastern Railway Company v. The Railway Commissioners, 28 W. R. 464, L. R. 5 Q. B. D. 217), so as to constitute a divisional court of three instead of two judges, but never, so far as we have been able to discover, so as to constitute a court of five judges. ("Five at the least," we may observe, is the quorum for the Court for Crown Cases Reserved under s. 47 of the Judicature Act 1873. "Three" is the quorum for the Court of Appeal under s. 12 of the Judicature Act 1875, and for the House of Lords under s. 5 of the Appellate Jurisdiction Act.) However, it is absolutely clear that a divisional court of five could sit before the amalgamation of the Common Pleas and Exchequer Divisions, although it is equally clear that no more than five could sit, because the concurrence of a division was required; but it seems to follow from the Order in Council under which the amalgamation took place that a divisional court of fifteen judges of the Queen's Bench Division would be legally constituted.

But the question remains, whether the paragraph which we have extracted was intended to set aside the rule of practice that one court is bound by the decision of a court of co-ordinate jurisdiction. No doubt before the Judicature Acts the rule, or rather exception, was well recognized, that in cases not admitting of an appeal, each court was at liberty to follow its own opinion (see Vaughan v. Weldon, L. R. 10 C. P. 57), and this rule or exception was followed in relation to appeals from summary convictions by cases stated under 20 & 21 Vict. c. 43, from which there was before the Judicature Acts, as well as after them, no further appeal. But now that the pre-existing selfsufficient Courts of Queen's Bench, Exchequer, and Common Pleas have been consolidated into one High Court of Justice, it may be gravely doubted whether the reason for the old practice is not done away with. If the High Court when sitting to hear appeals from petty sessions is a final court of appeal, why should it not follow its own decisions with the same uniformity of practice as the House of Lords does? The precedent, however, is set, and may occasionally be followed in future. It has, of course, much to be said in its favour on the ground of public convenience, at a period when the legislation which is occasionally necessary to correct the mistakes or conflicting decisions of judges cannot easily be set in motion.

The case upon which we are commenting is a "strong" instance of its being exercised, for the new practice is adopted to the prejudice of a person who had been successful by due course of law in a criminal proceeding against him. It is adopted, too, not for the purpose of producing harmony where decisions conflicted, but for

the purpose of reviewing a decision not much more than four months old. A fortiori, therefore, it would seem desirable that a court of more than two strong should, on the first practicable occasion, be convened to decide of the two conflicting decisions, Bury v. Cherryholm (L. P. 1 Ex. D. 467), and Mellor v. Denham (L. R. 4 Q. B. D. 241), which ought to prevail. It was held in the former case that bye-laws under the Education Acts can be enforced although they clash with the Factory Acts. It was held in the latter case that they cannot be enforced if they so clash. "There is a great deal to be said on both sides." There is no appeal (Mellor v. Denham 5 Q. B. D. 467).

THE IRISH LAND BILL.

VIII.

WE resume the consideration of this Bill at the commencement of Part 4, the point at which we had arrived at the end of our last article.

To any legislation founded on the lines which we have pointed out as alone, of all schemes that have been proposed, really efficient, the provisions of this part of the Act would be wholly superfluous: the value of the statutory tenant-right once fixed, and the power of the landlord to evict limited to such right of purchase of that right as already described, all the elaborate machinery of sections 12, 13, and 14 would become inapplicable, and might be removed from the Bill without detriment. But even on the hypothesis that the Legislature is determined to proceed entirely on the lines of the Bill as drafted, these sections will require very considerable alteration if they are to be made workable, or even intelligible. Where a tenant sells without notice of an increase of rent, the purchaser ought to stand precisely in the shoes of the vendor, and should have all the same rights and remedies in case of an attempted increase of rent that his vendor would have had if the tenancy had not been sold, and no others; in other words, he should come in as a "present tenant" within the meaning of the Bill; this right the Bill very properly gives him by the interpretation clause, and any further enactment on the subject is unnecessary and confusing. Moreover, as the clause stands, it would seem to prohibit any rise of rent at any time, however long, after the sale of a tenancy without notice of such intended rise, the effect of which would be to compel every landlord, as a matter of common form, to give notice of rise of rent on every occasion of sale, just as yearly notices to quit used to be given, as matter of course, to every tenant from year to year in Ireland. That such notices would be troublesome and annoying to both landlord and tenant is obvious, and any enactment tending to multiply them can hardly be considered desirable. Section 12 should, therefore, be omitted in any case.

The object of section 13 would be better attained by an enactment that the landlord's only remedy for nonpayment of rent should be a sale, by the sheriff, of the tenant's interest, without prejudice to the right of the tenant to redeem within the six months now allowed by law, in cases where he did not concur in the sale. As his concurrence would, by getting rid of the redemption, largely increase the selling price of his interest, he would have an obvious inducement to concur in every case where his right was of any real value. The provisoes at the end of this section are wrong in principle. Proviso (1) we have already dealt with. The remedy in the case of the breach of a statutory condition other than for payment of rent should be by action on the covenant, with a right to sell the tenant's interest without power of redemption-for the payment of the damages and costs. The tenant ought, however, to be entitled to the surplus proceeds of such sale.

Section 15 is obscure. If it means that the sub-tenant is to be liable to the superior landlord for the rent, and to

be entitled to the tenancy, payable and enjoyed by the evicted tenant, it deprives the tenancy of such mesue tenant of any saleable value if it means that he is to have as against the superior landlord the same rights and to be subject to the same obligations as he had, and was to be subject to, as against his immediate lessor, it is manifestly unjust, as it would enable the mesne lessor to confer, as against his own lessor, greater rights on a third party than he possessed himself. If the section is to stand at all, it should be limited to those cases where the sub-tenancy was created with the knowledge and consent of the superior landlord, or where its incidents were not less favourable to him than the possession of the land.

Section 16 is simply absurd, and would give to an artist to whom a cottage and potato-garden was let for the summer season all the rights and immunities of a copyholder of the land.

Section 17 is an extension of the most objectionable provision of the Land Act of 1870: one which has in practice been of the most serious injury to the tenantry, as it has prevented the landlords in numberless instances from "meeting them half-way," or at least has given them a plausible excuse for refusing to do so, for fear that any such concession might hereafter, notwithstanding an agreement to the contrary, be deemed to have permanently increased the value of the tenant-right. Besides, the idea that tenants of holdings rated between £50 and £150 are incapable of making independent bargains for themselves is an insult to the whole population of Ireland, however plausibly the like allegation may have been made with respect to persons little (if at all) better off than daily labourers. Section 18 is unobjectionable, and may even, as the Bill is framed, be occasionally useful.

Part 5 of the Act is not only unobjectionable but desirable, though we think that it would have been much better in a separate Bill; at any rate, the Commission required to work it should not have been in any way mixed up with the question of landlord and tenant. It is always an error to submit to the same body administrative and judicial functions, aud it is doubly an error-it is an injustice-to do so when the duties of the Commissioners as administrators are inconsistent with the exercise of judicial impartiality.

The peculiarity of part 6 of the Bill is, that no one, outside of official circles, has a word to say in its favour. There are, indeed, men found to prefer that the questions of tenant-right and fair rent shall for all time be subjects of litigation, perpetually renewable at intervals of fifteen years, rather than concede the principle of quasi-partnership involved in " Judge Longfield's scheme," and there are men found, amongst those well acquainted with Ireland, to prefer that all questions relating to the occupancy of land should be controlled by "a really strong court," rather than left to the mutual action of owners and would-be occupiers. But there is no one anywhere, landlord or tenant, Liberal or Tory, who does not say that, with the very best inten tions, the County Chairmen have proved, in the past ten years, wholly incompetent to undertake this duty, and that any attempt to intrust to them the working out of the extensive powers and enormous discretion conferred on "the court" by the present Bill, must inevitably end in disastrous failure. It is the one point upon which Messrs. Gibson, Shaw, and Parnell (and anyone interme diate between those limits) speak with the same mouth.

Such a court, however, though very objectionable, might possibly not prove absolutely unworkable, if there were provided an efficient court of appeal. The cases under the Act of 1870 which were capable of being taken to "the Court for Land Cases Reserved" (consisting practically of all the Irish judges of law and equity) were, on the whole, settled to the general satisfaction: that is to say, the law was authoritatively, and by common consent correctly, determined: even those who thought the law wrong admitted that the decisions were right, and the murmurs, such as they

were, were in no case directed against the court. In most of the cases, however, which arose under this Act, the appeal lay, not to the court we have mentioned, but to the judge who happened to take the civil business at the next assizes held in the county, and very different was the estimation in which these were held. Not that anyone doubted either the ability or the impartiality of the judges, but it was the universal feeling, at least in Ulster, that such questions could only be satisfactorily settled by a permanent tribunal, of special qualifications, of which the highest legal authority was one, but only one, out of several. Such a court is, we presume, intended to be supplied by the proposed Land Commission. Let us see how that may be. We pass over the objection to any judicial body, and most of all a Court of Ultimate Appeal, holding a lucrative office at the pleasure of the Crown, because we understand that the Government have intimated their intention of abandoning that proposal, which would, we should have thought, have been sufficient to condemn any scheme, however well conceived in other respects.

The first thing that strikes us is the recurrence of what may be called the "fixed Whig idea": three allpowerful, irresponsible "Commissioners." The results of this idea, as successively embodied in the Endowed Schools Commission, the Irish Church Temporalities Commission, and the Railway Commission, are hardly such as to recommend it for universal adoption, and the admixture of judicial and administrative duties, which ruined the first-named of these, converted the second into an intolerable tyranny, and would probably have rendered the third odious had they not cut the knot by simply ignoring the administrative part of their work altogether, is here reproduced in an aggravated form. How can any landlord have confidence in the decisions of a tribunal on the question of fair rent, when he knows, and they know, that the very next day the same men may be engaged, in the discharge of their duty to the public, in depreciating the selling value of his land, under the powers of section 28 (1)? How can any tenant feel satisfied with the decision, without appeal, on a question of tenants' improvements of three gentlemen who will in all probability be, as trustees for the public, the largest landholders in the kingdom, and who will, at all events, have constantly before their eyes the probability of having to act on the provisions of section 24?

But, grave as this objection is, it is by no means the most formidable. The Commission may act in any case by any one of their body. Therefore, although weight is supposed to be given to its decisions by the presence on it of a judge or ex-judge (we assume from section 34 that he is not meant to be its chairman, as he clearly ought to be), either of the other two, as to whose qualifications we know absolutely nothing, may decide, in his absence, the most important questions of law, and that without even the power of appeal, given in all the preceding cases, from any one Commissioner to the whole body sitting together. As we presume that "A. B." is intended to be someone of higher rank than a judge (or he would not be named before him in the Commis. sion), he is probably meant to be some peer or Privy Councillor whose only or principal recommendation for the office will have been political partizanship either in relation to this Bill or otherwise. And this gentleman is to have in his power, without appeal, save at his own option, the valuation and regulation of all the land in Ireland! Nay, more, he must necessarily be such that, were he the Archangel Gabriel in person, he would displease everbody: the landlords, who would see in him merely a hostile politician: the tenants, who could not forget that he was either himself a landlord, or belonging at any rate to the landlord class: and the county court judges, whose decisions would be at the mercy of a man without even such qualifications for the task as they themselves possessed. But this is not all: all these tremendous powers may be delegated to an assistant commissioner, who may be a local valuer, or

:

the landlord of an adjoining estate, or the tenant of the next farm, who is to have full power to decide all questions of law and fact, and whose proceedings are not to be questioned by appeal, restrained by prohibition, or removed by certiorari ! Ex pede Herculem. Take one quite possible case, The estate of an infant requiring adjustment of rents, a person appointed by the Lord Chancellor is directed to re-value it he does so, and on his report the chief clerk certifies that there ought to be a moderate increase of rent: the case is taken before the Master of the Rolls, who orders the increase, and this is confirmed by the Court of Appeal in Ireland: thereupon one of the tenants appeals to the county court judge-a sufficiently startling proceedingbut that gentleman not unnaturally declines to overrule the discretion of the superior judges, and dismisses the case: thereupon the tenant appeals to the Land Commission, who have in the meantime authorized someone-no matter who-to act as assistant commissioner in the county, and this gentleman, who may be anybody, and will most probably be nobody, may not only override the decisions of the judges named, but proceed to fine the unfortunate minor severely for the judicial error (?) of the Master of the Rolls and the Court of Appeal. And this decision cannot be questioned in any way, unless the Land Commission, as a matter of discretion, choose to rehear it under the powers of section 40 (5). Is it necessary to say anything more to show why the proposed court has been unanimously disapproved in Ireland? Need we add another word to justify the terms in which we spoke of this court when we had occasion to refer to it in a former article?

The rest of the Act is mere detail and definition, and does not seem to call for any observation on our part.

REVIEWS.

WILLS.

A TREATISE ON WILLS. BY THOMAS JARMAN, Esq. The FOURTH EDITION. By S. VINCENT, Esq., Barrister-atLaw. H. Sweet.

In this edition Mr. Vincent has had to deal with the decisions of twenty years, and we think he deserves no little credit for the way in which he has dealt with them. So far as our investigations have gone (and we have had occasion to test the book in practice on several points) we are disposed to think that there is no falling off from the standard of the third edition, in which Mr. Vincent had the advantage of the assistance of Mr. Wolstenholme. The recent cases are clearly and carefully etated, and their relative importance is well estimated. Moreover, we are glad to observe a judicious ignoring of what we may venture to term the random utterances and obiter dicta of eminent judges. For instance, the singular and gratuitous attack made in Ralph v. Carrick (L. R. 11 Ch. D. 873) on the rule in Sibley v. Perry, by Lords Justices James, Cotton, and Brett (which latter Lord Justice, having perhaps sidered the rule before it was mentioned in the case before him, volunteered the observation that "he should have no objection to be present at the funeral of Sibley v. Perry "), is not referred to by Mr. Vincent, who is certainly justified by the authority both of Vice-Chancellor Shadwell, in Pruen v. Osborne (11 Sim. 138), and of Sir William Grant, in Harrington v. Lawrence (referred to in 11 Sim. 138), in treating Sibley v. Perry as a leading case laying down a rule or canon of construction. The decision in Ralph v. Carrick is of course properly stated. The book seems to us to be well edited, and it ought to find its way on to the shelves of many practitioners.

never

con

CONVEYANCING.

By

A PRACTICAL INTRODUCTION TO CONVEYANCING. HOWARD WARBURTON ELPHINSTONE, Barrister-at-Law. SECOND EDITION. W. Maxwell & Son.

This is an excellent book to put into the hands of the tyro in conveyancing. Principles are well and succinctly stated; sufficient detail is added to impart interest to the statement, and the book is written in an easy and familiar style. On most of the leading branches of conveyancing, the information given is accurate and thorough. The new chapter on partnership deeds does not, however, strike us as one of the best in the book; it is too sketchy and too much of a mere catalogue of the ordinary provisions of these deeds. It would have been useful to the student to have had some suggestions on the important modern field of conveyancing known as company drafting," and we may perhaps also suggest that the treatment of agricultural leases is unduly meagre. But the book is a very useful one, and this edition has been edited with care.

66

Yates v. Rawlings.-The account of the shareholders who have not come in to substantiate their claims.

There are many other items deserving of a passing notice, but I have already trespassed greatly on your valuable space. EDWARD PRESTON.

1, Great College-street, Westminster, S. W., June 27.

ADMISSION OF SOLICITORS IN AUSTRALIA.

[To the Editor of the Solicitors' Journal.] Sir,-Can you inform me upon what terms a solicitor will be allowed to practise in the Australian colonies and in New Zealand ?

I was admitted in July, 1879, but have never taken out a certificate. I now desire to go out to Australia or New Zealand, and would go to the colony which would admit me to practise upon the easiest terms, as I have neither the means nor the wish to begin my articles de

novo out there.

Any information on the above subject will greatly oblige INQUIRER. [We have not yet been able to obtain information on these matters, and shall be glad if any reader can furnish it.-ED. S. J.]

CORRESPONDENCE.

DORMANT FUNDS IN CHANCERY. [To the Editor of the Solicitors' Journal.] Sir,-The newly-issued list of funds undealt with for fifteen years prior to the 1st of September, 1880, contains some four thousand entries. There has, however, been great delay in the issue of this valuable document, as by the rules under the Chancery Funds Act, 1872, the list should be published triennially, the first being due in 1873; it did not, however, see the light till March, 1877, and the second is only just issued. If a little gentle pressure were brought to bear on the authorities, more prompt compliance with the rules, as well as improvement in form of the list, might be looked for. The list should, I venture to suggest, be strictly alphabetically arranged, with cross-references to sub-titles. Solicitors and others have now to wade through the entire list with a very fair chance of missing the name sought. The last-known addresses of persons supposed to be interested, with the amount awaiting distribution in each case, might also be usefully added, together with the date of the last deeree or order.

If these suggested improvements in the form of the list were made, there is no reason why the greater part of the dormant funds should not be transferred out of court to their legitimate owners, and it is satisfactory to see that Mr. Stanley Leighton has drawn attention to the matter in the House of Commons.

In going through the list the following entries struck me as likely to interest those of your readers who are lovers of the curious :

Bryant v. Story.-Account of the legacy bequeathed for the relief of widows and orphans of soldiers killed in

war.

In the matter of the proceeds of derelict property brought into the Port of Nassau in New Providence, and sold for the benefit of the rightful owner when appear. ing.

Drever v. Mawdesley.-The 100 years' term account. Heyden v. Owen.-The account of the seamen belonging to his Majesty's ships Decade and Argonaut. Kirkby v. Falconer.-The account of the unclaimed legacy of Sebastian Nash de Brissac.

Matthew v. Brown.-The account of Ann, servant to Jose Maria Ribiero, captain of a frigate, a legatee. Mellor v. Woodward.-The account of John Mellor, convicted of felony.

Neave v. Miller.-The slave compensation account. Price v. Bourgot.-The ten hogsheads' account. Shepherd v. Houghton.-The unpaid legacy account.

CASES OF THE WEEK.

OP BANKRUPTCY-TRADING

INFANT-ADJUDICATION FILING OF LIQUIDATION PETITION-BANKRUPTCY ACT, 1869, ss. 6, 125.-On the 23rd ult., the Court of Appeal (JESSEL, M.R., and BAGGALLAY and LUSH, L.JJ.) reversed the decision. of Bacon, C.J., in Ex parte Jones, upon which we commented ante, p. 520. The question was whether an adjudication of bankruptcy could be made against an infant who had traded and had contracted (so far as an infant could do so) debts for the purposes of his trade, and who had him self filed a liquidation petition, the proceedings in which had become abortive by reason of the failure of the creditors to pass any resolution. He had not made any representation to his creditors that he was of full age, unless the mere act of trading amounted, as it was contended it did, to such a representation. Bacon, C.J., followed his own previous decision in Ex parte Lynch (24 W. R. 375, L. R. 2 Ch. D. 227), the only difference in which was that the adjudication was made after the infant had attained twenty-one, the trading and the filing of the liquidation petition having been, as in Ex parte Jones, before he attained twenty-one. Bacon, C.J., held that, by filing the liquidation petition, the infant had submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court, and had surrendered the whole of his property for division among his creditors (whether their debts were recoverable in an action was immaterial), and therefore be could not be heard to say that he ought not to be made a bankrupt. JESSEL, M.R., said that, if the infant was not a debtor, he was not a person who was entitled to file s How was it it made out that he was a debtor? It liquidation petition, or who could be made a bankrupt. was not suggested that the goods which had been supplied to him by the petitioning creditors were necessaries; they were bought for the purpose of selling again. There was, therefore, no common law liability. The fact that he had had the goods was not material in the view of our law. If persons chose to trust an infant they took their chance of being paid. It was said, however, that where an infant had committed a fraud by representing that he was not an infant, he was liable in equity to the person whom he bad thus defrauded. In such a case, the appearance of the infant was material. If he was a boy of ten years old the creditor could not have relied on the representation. If he was a young man, apparently of full age, the creditor might be deceived. But there must be an express represenation, and such a representation as would deceive the person to whom it was made. In such a case it had been decided that if the person who had committed the fraud became a bankrupt after he was of full age, the person who had been defrauded could prove in the bankruptcy in respect of the

diability which resulted from the fraud. It was difficult to understand how this came first to be decided, for at that time "liabilities were not proveable in bankruptcy as they are now. But none of the decisions had laid it down that this liability was a legal debt; it was not a debt, but only an equitable liability, and when by law a "debt" was required as the foundation of a proceeding, an equitable liability would not do. But in the present case there was no such liability on the part of the infant, for he had made no express representation to the creditor that he was of age. The petitioning creditor's counsel were driven to argue that if an infant, whose appearance was such that you would not necessarily know that he was an infant, carried on trade, this amounted to a fraudulent representation that he was of full age. But fraud could not be invented in this way. There was nothing illegal in an infant's carrying on a trade, and thousands of infants did so every day. No representation that the infant was of full age arose from the mere fact of his carrying on trade. That this was the true view of the law was shown by the judgment of Knight Bruce, L.J., in Ex parte The Unity Joint Stock Mutual Banking Association (3 De G. & J. 63). It was impossible, therefore, that the adjudication on the petition could be maintained. It was said, however, that the court had power, under sub-section 12 of section 125, to adjudicate a liquidating debtor a bankrupt. But, in order to do this, there must be a debtor; a man who had no debts could not be adjudicated a bankrupt. And, moreover, the power given by that sub-section could only be put in motion by a person who was a creditor, and who had, therefore, a right to intervene in the proceedings. His lordship added that he respectfully, but entirely, dissented from the decision of the Chief Judge in Ex parte Lynch, which case must now be considered as overruled. He could not agree with any of the propositions there laid down. The words of the Infants Relief Act of 1874 were perfectly general, and could not be restricted so as not to apply to trade debts. And, again, an infant could not, by filing a liquidation petition, either obtain the advantages, or entail on himself the disadvantages, of such a proceeding. By adopting a proceeding which would only be valid if he were an adult, he did not make himself an adult. He could not thus alter his status. BAGGALLAY, L.J., and Lush, L.J., also expressed their dissent from Ex parte Lynch, and BAGGALLAY, L.J., pointed out that in Ex parte Charlton (25 W. R. 800, L. R. 6 Ch. D. 45), which had been relied on as an authority upon the power of the court to make an adjudication under sub-section 12 of section 125, composition resolutions had been registered, and the debtor had afterwards failed to perform his engagement. A petition in bankruptcy had then beer presented in the ordinary form by an undoubted creditor, and the debtor was of full age. And the decision was only that it was not necessary that an act of bankruptcy should have been com. mitted within six months before the petition. And LUSH. L.J., said that the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeal in Reg. v. Wilson (L. R. 5 Q. B. D. 28) was based on the same ground as the present decision.-SOLICITORS, Swann & Co.; Sharpe, Parkers, & Co.

APPEAL FOR COSTS-CLAIM AND COUNTER-CLAIM-DISCRETION OF JUDGE-JUDICATURE ACT, 1873, s. 49.In a case of Willmott v. Barber, before the Court of Appeal on the 24th ult., an objection was raised to an appeal, on the ground that it was brought for costs only. The defendant had delivered a counter-claim. At the trial, Fry, J., dismissed the action without costs, and he dismissed the counter-claim with costs, but, being of opinion that the costs of the action had been unnecessarily increased by some frivolous defences which the defendant had raised, he directed that the plaintiff's costs of the counter-claim should not be less than half the whole costs

of the litigation. The judgment, as drawn up by the registrar, ordered that the action should stand dismissed without costs, and that the costs of the plaintiff of the action and counter-claim should be taxed. And it was ordered that the defendant's counter-claim should stand dismissed, with costs to be taxed and paid by the defendant to the plaintiff. And in case the last - mentioned costs when taxed should not amount to one-half of the plaintiff's costs of the action and counter-claim, then it was ordered that the defendant should pay to the plaintiff such a sum as would, with such costs when taxed, amount to half of the plaintiff's entire costs of the action and counter-claim. The taxing master taxed the plaintiff's costs of the action and

counter-claim at £333, and he assessed the plaintiff's costs of the counter-claim at £50, consequently, under the judgment, the defendant was liable to pay to the plaintiff £116 10s., in addition to his costs of the counter-claim. The defendant appealed from the judgment so far as it directed that, if the plaintiff's costs of counter-claim should not amount to half his costs of the action and counter-claim, the defendant should pay the difference. On the opening of the appeal, it was objected on behalf of the plaintiff that the appeal was for costs only, which are in the discretion of the judge. To this it was replied that the order appealed from was one which, in effect, imposed on the defendant a penalty, in addition to the costs of the counter-claim which he was ordered to pay. The Court of Appeal (JESSEL, M.R., and BAGGALLAY and LUSH, L.JJ.) held that the objection was well founded. JESSEL, M. R., said that the order was wrong in form. It was clear that a judge had no power to give anything in the nature of a penalty beyond the costs of an action or a counter-claim. This had been well settled for many years, and no judge would think of departing from the rule. As the order stood in form it directed the defendant to pay a penalty. But this would not have been so if the order had been that the action should be dismissed without costs, except so far as they were ordered to be paid, and this was what was really intended. It was a mere matter of form, and the appeal was really brought for costs. It was not disputed that the judge had jurisdiction to make the order in that form. He might say that the plaintiff should get half the costs of an action if he succeeded, and the same rule applied to a defendant. A judge had also power to fix a sum for costs without a taxation. His lordship said that he was often requested to exercise this power, and he often did so. In such a case he generally fixed a less sum than would be given on taxation, because the costs of taxation were saved. Section 49 of the Judicature Act meant that if a judge had fairly exercised his discretion as to costs there should be no appeal, and that was what the judge had done in the present case, though the order was wrong in form. The right order would be to dismiss both action and counter-claim, and to direct that the defendant should pay half of the whole costs of the claim and counter-claim. The judge intended also that the defendant should pay all the costs of the counter-claim if they were more than half the whole costs, but the Master of the Rolls said that he preferred not to make such fanciful orders as to costs. He preferred simply to order the defendant to pay half the costs of the action and counterclaim. BAGGALLAY, L.J., thought that what Fry, J., really intended was to make each party pay half the costs of the whole action. The order was altered accordingly, but no costs of the appeal were given.-SOLICITORS, G. J. & P. Vanderpump; Badham & Williams.

APPEAL-CROSS-APPEAL-COSTS.-In a case of Harrison v. The Cornwall Minerals Railway Company, before the Court of Appeal on the 24th ult., one of the defeudants brought an appeal, and a second defendant then gave notice that, on the hearing of the first defendant's appeal, he should cont-nd that the order appealed from should be altered in another respect adversely to the plaintiff. The first defendant's appeal was unsuccessful; the second defendant succeeded in his contention, and the question then arose bow the costs ought to be borne. The court (JESSEL, M.R., and BAGGALLAY and LUSH, L.JJ.) held that the first defendant must pay half the costs of the appeal, and the plaintiff the other half.-SOLICITORS, Murray, Hutchins, & Stirling; Cope & Co.; Maples & Teesdale; Norton, Rose, & Co.

SUPPOSED INTESTACY-ASSIGNMENT TO CROWN-SUBSEQUENT DISCOVERY OF NEXT OF KIN-INTEREST.-In a case of In re Gosman, before the Court of Appeal on the 24th ult., the question arose whether the Crown was liable to pay interest under the following circumstances. A testator bequeathed the residue of his personal estate to five persons, whom he also appointed executors. It was held by the court that this bequest was void, on the ground that there was a secret trust for a charity, and that, there appearing to be no next of kin of the testator, such part of the property as was leasehold belonged to the Crown, and it was ordered that possession should be delivered to such person as her Majesty should by warrant under the sign-manual appoint. The leasehold property was afterwards assigned by the executors to the Solicitor to the Treasury, who was appointed