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of which only one-half are English, there being six cases from Scotland, and one from Ireland. The list does not include either of the ecclesiastical appeals, or the appeal relative to the new trial in the Hampstead Smallpox Hospital case.

WE UNDERSTAND that the list, required by rule 91 of the Chancery Funds Rules, 1874, of causes and matters in the books of the Chancery Pay Office, to the credit of which securities or money exceeding £50 are standing which have not been dealt with for fifteen years, is now in course of preparation, and will be published in an early issue of the London Gazette. The last list (which is now several years old) occupied over thirty pages of the Gazette, and the present list is expected to occupy over fifty pages.

A DECISION of the Court of Appeal on Tuesday in a case of Farrow v. Austin, which will be found noted in another column, seems to conflict with a previous decision of the same court in In re Hoskins' Trusts (25 W. R. 779, L. R. 6 Ch. D. 281). In Farrow v. Austin the preliminary objection was raised that the appeal was for costs only, and could not, therefore, be entertained. The action was brought by an executrix for administration; an administration decree was made; and, on further consideration, MALINS, V.C., on the ground that the action was unnecessary, declined to allow the plaintiff any costs, and ordered her to pay the costs of one of the inquiries which had been directed. The Court of Appeal overruled the objection. Now, in In re Hoskins' Trusts JAMES, L.J., laid it down that Taylor v. Dowden (17 W. R. 779, L. R. 4 Ch. 697) "decides that the case where a trustee has been ordered to pay the costs of a suit personally, formed, in general, no exception to the rule that an appeal will not be allowed for costs only. The rule that no such appeal is allowed has been, moreover, recognized by the Legislature by passing section 49 of the Judicature Act, 1873." We understand that neither Taylor v. Dowden nor In re Hoskins' Trusts were cited in the recent case, and it will be well, therefore, to act upon the decision with caution.

REFERRING TO THE DIFFERENCE between the Bristol Urban Sanitary Authority and the solicitors there relative to the restrictive conditions of sale under which the Authority were from time to time selling the city salvages or surplus lands, to which we recently drew attention (ante, p. 609), we learn that on Wednesday, the 8th inst., the Authority issued a writ out of the Chancery Division in the Master of the Rolls' Court for an injunction against the President, Vice-President, and hon. secretary of the Bristol Incorporated Law Society, and other gentlemen named in the advertisement, and next day obtained, ex parte, an order probibiting the defendants from attending at the sale by auction on Friday, the 10th inst., "for the purpose of drawing attention to certain resolutions alleged to have been passed at a meeting of solicitors held

at Bristol on the 3rd of June, 1881, and from drawing attention to such sale, and until after the 14th of June, 1881, from inserting, or causing to be inserted, in any public newspaper any advertisement or notice relating or referring to such resolutions or any of them, and from doing any other act to disparage the title of the plaintiffs to any of their property." The sale by auction

accordingly was held without any interference by the solicitors referred to, and, on Thursday, the 16th inst., the Authority served the defendants with a notice that they, the plaintiffs, thereby discontinued their action. Thus the matter is so far ended for the present, but we are informed that at the meeting of the Streets Improvement Committee of the Authority, held on Tuesday week, notice was given of intention to move at their next meeting that the existing resolution, under the authority of which the Sanitary Authority have hitherto acted in the matter complained of, be rescinded, and that a subcommittee be appointed to inquire into and report on the subject. Thus we hope some good will come of the action taken by the Bristol solicitors in the matter.

as to the implied conditions on the letting of furnished and of unfurnished houses, than intending lessees of the latter class of houses began to protect themselves by requiring express warranties or statements by houseowners that the drains were in good order and the houses fit for habitation. No one who has watched the reports of cases in the daily papers can have failed to observe the number of cases which have arisen of late upon these express warranties or statements. In the case of Muspratt v. Hussey, tried before Mr. Justice HAWKINS on the 17th inst., the plaintiff relied both upon an alleged statement by the houseowner, and also upon an express agreement by him. The statement does not appear to have been clearly proved, but the agreement for a lease provided that the house should be "complete and fit for habitation in all respects" by a specified date, and, if it was not, that no rent should be payable until the house was complete and fit for habitation. This would seem to be a reasonable condition, but express reference should be made to the drains, and it might be well, in order to avoid litigation, to provide that the question whether the drains were in order and the house fit for habitation should be decided, in case of dispute, by some independent surveyor to be named in the agreement.

THE SUMMARY JURISDICTION (Process) Bill has already been read a third time in the House of Commons, and may reasonably be expected to pass in the present session. It may be described as a measure applying to English and Scotch Courts of Summary Jurisdiction interchangeably that power of "backing warrants" which Jervis' Act (11 & 12 Vict. c. 42), ss. 14, 15, gives to England, Scotland, and Ireland interchangeably, but in relation to indictable offences only. Jervis' Act, it will be remembered, is merely consolidating in this respect, repeating with amendments 13 Geo. c. 1, and 54 Geo. 3, c. 186, s. 2, as to Scotland, and 45 Geo. 3, c. 92, s. 3, and 54 Geo. 3, c. 186, s. 6, as to Ireland. As the present Bill applies to England and Scotland only, it is to be regretted that the exact extent of the local application does not appear from the short title, which is to be the "Summary Jurisdiction (Process) Act, 1881." This might perhaps be changed to the "Summary Process (England and Scotland) Act, 1881." The Bill itself contains nine clauses only, which are not many considering the large powers which it gives, but there is a large amount of incorporation by reference. The fourth and principal clause enacts that "any process issued under the Summary Jurisdiction Acts may, if issued by a court of summary jurisdiction in England and indorsed by a court of summary jurisdiction in Scotland, or issued by a court of summary jurisdiction in Scotland, be served and executed within the jurisdiction of the indorsing court in like manner as it may be served and executed within the jurisdiction of the issuing court, and that by the officer either of the issuing court or of the indorsing court." Another clause, the sixth, of nearly equal importance, allows proceedings in bastardy to be enforced in England and Scotland interchangeably, notwithstanding that the putative father "ordinarily resides, or the child has been born, or the mother of it ordinarily resides, where the court is English, in Scotland, or where the court is Scotch, in England, in like manner as the court has jurisdiction in any other case." Not only do not the present Bastardy Acts apply to Scotland or Ireland, but it has been held that in a purely English affiliation case, a service upon a putative father in Scotland is insufficient (Reg. v. Lightfoot, 6 E. & B. 822); so that here we have two important, and we think desirable, alterations of the law. The Bill is, we think, a good one both in form and substance. But surely it should be made to appear more clearly than at present (see clause 4, sub-section 1) whether the indorsement is to be a ministerial act, enforceable by mandamus, or whether the indorsing court is to have any judicial discretion in the matter. words are, that the process may be indorsed upon proof alone of the handwriting of the person issuing it, &c.

The

IT IS INTERESTING to observe how rapidly people find their way out of an inconvenient rule of law. No sooner did the public become generally aware, by the comments of the press on the case of Wilson v. Finch-Hatton (25 W. R. 537, L. R. 2 Ex. D. 336), that a difference exists

WE DO NOT UNDERSTAND Mr. Justice FRY's decision, noted elsewhere, that, because objection had not been taken to an unstamped document on its being tendered in evidence, it could not afterwards be objected to on this ground, on the judge's discovering, during the hearing of the case, that it was unstamped. We have always been under the impression that the judge is, as the Master of the Rolls is fond of saying, an officer of the Revenue, bound to prevent unstamped documents from being admitted in evidence. We presume, however, that the learned judge must have relied on the registrar's refusing to draw up the order until the document had been duly stamped.

Referring to the statement made by the Chancellor of the Exchequer to the House of Commons in Committee on the Customs and Inland Revenue Bill with regard to proposals made for "the remission of the Income-tax on Land (under Schedule A.) which had fallen into the owner's possession, and from which he derived no profit whatever," that he "meant to meet the present distress where farms had been thrown on the hands of the landlords, which they were endeavouring to turn to the best account they could, but on which this year they could not make any profit "-the Board of Inland Revenue have presented a report to the Lords Commissioners of the Treasury, dated June 13, 1881-"That we apprehend the concession of relief from the Income-tax under Schedule A. is to be confined to Cases where the farms are thrown on the owners' hands by reason of their not being able to find tenants at fair and reasonable rents, and not to cases where farms are occupied habitually by the owners either for purposes of husbandry or enjoyment." In reply, Sir R. R. W. Lingen, on the part of the Treasury, is directed, June 14, to approve of the rules proposed in the report for the grant of such relief-viz., "(1) That farms or lands habitually held in hand, for whatever purpose, be excluded from the concession; (2) that the duty assessed under Schedule A, be accounted for to the Revenue before any claim for repayment of any portion thereof be admitted; (3) that the claim for repay. ment of duty be established to the satisfaction of the General Commissioner of Income-tax for the district in which the property is situate within twelve months after the expiration of the year of assessment; (4) that the owner prove, as a condition precedent to relief, that he has made a bona fide, though unsuccessful, attempt to ob tain a tenant or tenants for the farms for the year on reasonable terms and conditions as to rent and tenancy; (5) that this concession be limited to the current year, 1881-2.”

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THE FUSION OF LAW AND EQUITY AND TRIAL BY JURY.

NOTWITHSTANDING all that has been written and said about fusion, for practical purposes the dual system of common law and chancery to a very great extent continues to exist untouched. It is no doubt true that the doctrines of equity are now applicable in the Queen's Bench Division, and so far there is no conflict in the theory of the law as administered by the courts, but to any person who looked at the administration of justice from a materialistic point of view, it would appear as if things were, in most tangible respects, much the same as ever. It is no doubt true that the working of the courts at Westminster has been considerably altered. There is only one chief, and the whole is called the Queen's Bench Division. There is more flexibility of arrangement, and instead of three papers for each class of business, one in each court, there is only one. But notwithstanding all this change (much of which is change of name rather than of substance) the broad features of things remain very largely unaltered. There is still a distinct line of demarcation between chancery and common law judges and chancery and common law barristers; a certain class of cases for the most part go to Lincoln's-inn and a certain class of cases to Westmin

ster.

We doubt very much whether it is not better that it should always be so to a great extent. With regard to certain kinds of judicial work, particularly those of an administrative nature, it seems to us that the principle of division of labour is applicable, and that loss of time and uncertainty of practice are very poorly compensated for by any theoretical considerations. As far as we can see, there cannot be any objection, even in theory, to appropriating special classes of business, such as winding-up of companies, the administration of trusts, matters relating to elections, Crown business, and so forth, to particular divisions of the one court. It may be very well for newspaper articles to imagine a system by which the same judge is to do everything indiscriminately, but it seems to us as foolish a conception as to suppose that it would really be better if every man was a Jack-of-all-trades.

There is no doubt that Jacks-of-all-trades have their merits and their advantages under certain circumstances and in certain stages of development, and too great division of labour tends to narrowness, but the facility and accuracy that are derived from special experience are of very great value. The body of English law and practice are really already, and are daily becoming in a greater degree, too large for one and the same judge to have the whole at his fingers' ends. In a court of appeal we believe that there is a considerable advantage in dealing with all subjects, as it tends to preserve a certain breadth of view and harmony between the different branches of the law, but in a court of first instance it is otherwise. To our mind the present system of sending Vice-Chancellors (for that is what chancery judges really are) to try murders, and common law judges to do administrative work with the details of which they are entirely unfamiliar, and in respect of which they probably know less than the youngest Counsel in court, is deplorably reckless.

When both divisions of the court are housed in one

building, the time will come when the question how far, and to what extent, fusion is expedient and possible will

naturally solved" ambulando." We cannot help thinking that one of the questions which, as this comes about,

st come to the front and press for a solution, is how the system of trial by jury is to be retained for the pose of civil actions. It certainly appears to us that s is a crucial question in relation to fusion, and when whole administration of justice takes place in one ilding it will be seen to be so. Perhaps the greatest

substantial distinction of a tangible kind between the two systems which still so largely continue unfused is, that in one division the vast majority of trials are with

juries, and in the other without. There are certain cases for determining the facts of which a jury may be a very proper tribunal. Breaches of promise, malicious prosecution, libels, &c., are cases of this sort. Again, there are certain administrative matters for which juries ar entirely unfitted, and in which the same tribunal must necessarily determine the law and the facts. But there are cases of a substantially similar nature which, under the present system, are sometimes tried by a jury and sometimes not, for the most part merely according as the plaintiff may have preferred to issue his writ in the Chancery or the Common Law Division, as, for instance, cases of obstruction of easements, trespass to laud, and other cases in which, in addition to damges, relief by way of injunction is required. If it is right that all the issues of fact in cases such as these should be tried by a judge without a jury, because 8 claim for an injunction is appended to the rest of the claim, the question must occur to every reasonable mind, why should not many other civil actions be tried before a judge alone f

It is customary among common law judges to lay great stress on the advantages of a special jury in mercantile cases, on the assumption that mercantile men will be found among them. In the present state of the law as to juries it seems doubtful whether this advantage is now to be relied upon, and it is worthy of consideration whether by means of assessors the same advantage could not be secured. The absurdity of acting at the same time on the two incompatible views, one of which lays such stress on the popular nature of the lay tribunal, while the other holds that a trained professional intellect is the better tribunal, will, we feel sure, force itself much more on the public when the two systems are at work in the same building. If the conclusion may be arrived at that the supposed advantages in favour of the jury system are fanciful and unsubstantial, then it is obvious that there are a great many points in favour of the trial by a judge without a jury. Assuming even that, as tribunals for the purpose of arriving at the truth, their substantial advantages are equal, it is at once obvious that in point of practical convenience the judge without the jury has many advantages of detail. In the event of any defect or failure of evidence, or temporary accident, which might affect the justice of the case, he can adjourn the case and take it up from where it was left off at any convenient time. He can very much shorten matters by pointing out on what points he wishes to hear counsel, and on what he is satisfied; he can ask questions of the witness which jurymen cannot do to the same extent : in too many ways for enumeration he constitutes a more flexible and convenient tribunal than a jury, and is, on the whole, more likely to be free from prejudice.

With regard to the question of the balance of substantial merit between the two tribunals, considered as

engines for ascertaining the truth, we do not at present feel disposed to pronounce an opinion. It is, to our mind, a grave question. The old common law system of pleading and trial was based on the idea of the separability of questions of law and fact; that certain facts being ascertained as premisses by the findings of the jury, the law deduced therefrom a distinct uniform result by way of legal consequence or conclusion. The idea is incapable of being fully carried out: law and fact cannot be thus separated; and, so, many issues that on the pleadings seemed to be issues of fact really involved issues of law, such as non assumpsit, and judges necessarily constituted themselves judges of many facts. Again, it is obvious that a system of law based upon this distinction would probably have the merit of clearness and definiteness, while it necessarily, as a correlative of such clearness and definiteness, would have the demerit of rigidity. Flexibility of legal doctrine, a lapt.

ing itself to nice gradations of circumstances and of human conduct, it is obvious a system of this sort cannot have. It seems to us one of the most puzzling things to balance these advantages. Certain judges of great power are notorious for their hostility to the equity system. It does undoubtedly seem to us that in trial by jury there is involved a very great safeguard for clearness and definiteness of legal doctrines. A good common law judge, both by his training as a pleader and for the purpose of summing up to the jury, was constantly obliged to be throwing the law into definite formula or propositions. This is not so much the case when the law and the facts can be blended together, and reliance is rather placed on precedent than principle. We believe equity practitioners have of late come to a better frame of mind, but we remember some years ago reading disquisitions on the nature of equity in which it was compared to the aroma of choice wines-a thing to be apprehended by a sort of subtle instinct, but not to be confined within the four walls of a proposition. The drawback on the one side is uncertainty and vagueness; on the other, a rigidity which sacrifices everything for clearness and certainty, and will not adapt itself sufficiently to the more subtle exigencies of a complicated and constantly-changing civilization.

We cannot help thinking that trial by jury, and the essential characteristics of the common law way of looking at things, are more essentially connected than perhaps at first sight might appear. The question how far the advantages of either system preponderate, and to what extent they may concurrently exist, or which should chiefly obtain, are questions time must solve; but we cannot help thinking that when the new law courts are open the solution of these questions will receive a considerable impetus.

ESTOPPEL AS A PROTECTION FOR A PURCHASER FOR VALUE WITHOUT NOTICE.

In deciding an intricate case of Keate v. Phillips, arising out of the Dimsdale forgeries, Vice-Chancellor Bacon seems to have taken a somewhat novel view of the application of the doctrine that innocent parties with conflicting claims have a right, as among themselves, to insist upon any legal advantage which they may respectively have the luck to possess. Three innocent parties, who had all been cheated, brought forward conflicting claims to the same parcel of land. (1) The plaintiffs, whose claim was foremost in order of time, claimed under a fraudulent mortgage of a fictitious lease for years of the land; and they claimed upon the ground that Tait, the maker of the fraudulent mortgage, was an agent and accomplice of Dimsdale; and that, at the time of bringing the action, the legal estate in the lands had got into the hands of one Moore upon trust for Dimsdale. They therefore contended that Dimsdale was bound, on acquiring the power so to do, to give effect to the pretended assurance of his agent. (2) The defendant Phillips, whose claim came second in order of time, also claimed under a fraudulent mortgage of a fictitious lease of the land; but his claim differed from that of the plaintiffs in this, that Phillips' mortgage was an underlease purporting to be made by Moore, who, as above mentioned, afterwards did actually acquire the legal estate, thus enabling Phillips to contend that he had, by Moore's underlease, acquired an estate by estoppel, which was "fed" and turned to an estate in interest as soon as the true legal estate got into Moore's hands. (3) The claim of the defendants McStephens & Co. came last in order of time, but it had the great advantage of resting upon no fictions. They claimed under an equitable mortgage created by deposit of the genuine

title deeds, accompanied by a memorandum of charge made by Moore after that he had acquired the legal estate. Being forced to decide between these claims, the Vice-Chancellor held that the equitable mortgage of McStephens & Co. was entitled to rank first; and, as the value of the lands was insufficient in full to satisfy this charge, it was unnecessary to pronounce any formal decision between the respective claims of the plaintiffs and Phillips.

We find no difficulty whatever in following the ViceChancellor in the strictures which he passed upon the claim of the plaintiffs, the first claimants. No doubt their contention was unanswerable, as against Dimsdale, supposing Tait to have been Dimsdale's agent; but they were urging it, not against Dimsdale, but against somebody else who had nothing to do with him. As the ViceChancellor put it, Dimsdale's fraud might give rise to a personal claim against him, but did not touch the estatei.e., bind the land in whosesoever hands it might be.

But in respect of the claim made by the defendant Phillips, we find much greater difficulty in following the judgment of the Vice-Chancellor. Phillips claimed that, by the strict rules of law, which ex vi termini must settle the whereabouts of the legal estate, he was actually possessed of a legal estate for a term of years in the land, which he had purchased without fraud or notice of fraud and for valuable consideration; and he contended that uo one had a right to disturb his possession. Granting his premisses, we do not know how to avoid his conclusion. For it is impossible at law to disturb the true owner of the legal estate; and it is equally impossible in equity to disturb a purchaser for value without notice. The learned counsel for the other claimants did, indeed, contend at great length that the doctrine of estates by estoppel was inapplicable to the case; and if the ViceChancellor had rested his judgment upon this ground, we might perhaps have found nothing to urge against it. But, without precisely deciding that Phillips had got the legal estate (though his language suits that hypothesis much better than the other), he laid it down in the plainest terms that, under such circumstances, the possession of the legal estate would be no defence to his title. The common law doctrine of estoppel," he said, "was a device to which the Common Law courts resorted at a very early period to strengthen and lengthen their arm; and, not venturing to exercise an equitable jurisdiction over the subject before them, they converted their own special pleading tactics into an instrument by which they could obtain an end which the Court of Chancery at all times put into force in order to do justice. But the doctrine of estoppel is purely legal. There is no case in which a trustee, having made a fraudulent representation by which he was bound, or even a fraudulent conveyance, when he got his legal estate confirmed (he still remaining a trustee) was so estopped as to deprive the persons beneficially entitled to the estate which was theirs and of which he was the trustee and the trustee only. The doctrine of estoppel has, therefore, in my opinion, no place whatever in the case before me."

But, in the first place, we humbly submit that, even granting all this, Phillips was not attempting to do anything of the kind supposed; the parallel drawn by the Vice-Chancellor would require that the innocent cestui que trust, Dimsdale, should be in peril of losing his land by the fraud of his wicked trustee Moore-a picture which does not at all suit the circumstances of the case. And, in the second place, as to the general doctrine that an estate origiually acquired by estoppel and afterwards fed by accruer will not, in a court of equity, protect a purchaser for value without notice, we humbly submit that it is very hard to reconcile this doctrine with the judgment of the Lord Chancellor and Lords Justices in Heath v. Crealock (23 W. R. 95, L. R. 10 Ch. 22). It is true that some expressions used by the Lord Justice James are suscep tible of the interpretation that, when an interest has

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(if rules they may be called) is very unreasonable, and we are glad to see that it is proposed to apply a reasonable remedy. But could not the enactment be made more comprehensive by consolidating with it the enactments of Lord Campbell's Act as to the plea of apology, and by codifying, as far as newspapers are concerned, the few undoubted rules of privilege which exist? If the Bill passes, we shall still have to consult Davis v. Duncan for the privilege of comments on a public meet

'been acquired by fraud, this interest will not be allowed to feed an estoppel, even for the purpose of protecting a purchaser for value without notice. But, granting this to have been his meaning, it has no application to the circumstances of Keate v. Phillips. There is nothing to show that Moore had acquired the legal estate by fraud; and therefore, granting for the sake of argument (what we should not be quite prepared to grant absolutely) that an interest acquired by fraud cannot, under any circumstances, feed an estate by estoppel, this is no bar to the|ing, and Wason v. Walter (L. R. 4 Q. B. 73), and Campcontention of Phillips. And if he had actually acquired | the legal estate, some other words of Lord Justice James, which he styles a "rule without exception," seem to be peculiarly applicable to his position-namely, "that from a purchaser for value without notice this court takes away nothing which he has honestly acquired."

THE NEWSPAPER BILL.

THE Bill which it is proposed to style the Newspaper Libel and Registration Act, 1881, is a measure of considerable importance to the press and the public, and from the fairness with which it is drawn, and the unanimity of opinion as to the present unsatisfactory state of the law, it will, in all probability, pass. Shortly put, the Bill relieves the press in respect of reports of public meetings and criminal prosecutions, and relieves the public in respect of "proof of publication." Reports of public meetings are made "privileged," and the fiat of the Attorney-General is interposed between a prosecutor and his prosecution. On the other hand, there is to be so complete a system of registration, that anyone will be able to discover in a few hours, if not minutes, who the proprietor of any particular newspaper is.

The definition of 66 newspaper," which has hitherto had no statutory definition, is

"Any paper containing public news, intelligence, or occurrences, or any remarks or observations therein (sic), printed for sale and published in England or Ireland periodically, or in parts or numbers at intervals not exceeding twenty-six days between the publication of any two such papers, parts, or numbers.

"Also any paper printed in order to be dispersed and made public weekly or oftener, or at intervals not exceeding twenty-six days, containing only or principally advertisements."

We do not wish to be hypercritical, but we must say that this definition strikes us as very fussy, and quite unnecessary, except as regards the intervals of publication. Why not be satisfied with the "any public newspaper or other periodical publication" of Lord Campbell's Act (6 & 7 Vict. c. 86), s. 2, upon the meaning of which there has never been any doubt raised?

The clause protecting reports of public meetings is

this:

bell v. Spottiswoode (32 L. J. Q. B. 185), for other branches of privilege. At any rate, effect might be given to Davis v. Duncan by adding after the words "any report" the words "with or without comment." Again, what is the use of requiring that the meeting should be "lawfully convened," so long as the purpose must be lawful? An accidental defect of notices, &c., ought not to deprive a newspaper proprietor of the benefit of the section.

To the clause (3) that no prosecution of a newspaper "proprietor, publisher, or editor," shall be instituted without the fiat of the Attorney-General, there can be no reasonable objection, and the sooner it passes the better. We have had enough, and more than enough, of criminal prosecutions, and rules for criminal informations, in matters of this kind.

Passing, lastly, to the clauses for registration, we observe that in substance, but with much greater neatness and precision, they propose to bring back a state of the law which existed for the first sixty or seventy years of the present century, and the repeal of which, by the Newspapers, Printers, and Reading Rooms Repeal Act, 1869 (32 & 33 Vict. c. 24), has long been universally regretted by the advisers of plaintiffs in actions for newspaper libel (see Roscoe on Evidence, 11th ed., p. 511; 13th ed., p. 827). It seems that the Act 6 & 7 Will. 4, c. 76, repealing but re-enacting 38 Geo. 3, c. 78, obliged declarations specifying names of publishers, &c., to be delivered to the Stamp Commissioners, and provided that a certified copy should be evidence of the contents of such declaration upon the production of any newspaper corresponding with the description in the declaration. See Mayne v. Fletcher (9 B. & C. 382), in which it was vainly contended that it was necessary to produce the particular newspaper lodged with the Stamp Commissioners. The repeal of 6 & 7 Will. 4, c. 76, by the repealing Act of 1869-which preserved section 19 only, compelling discovery -no doubt has thrown great difficulty in the way of "proof of publication," and occasioned not a few unexpected nonsuits in actions for libel.

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The clauses by which registration is enforced are well and simply drawn, but we think that the penalties of ten and twenty pounds for non-registration and false regis tration are far too low, and might well be altered to £100 and £500 respectively, with an additional penalty of £50 a month for every month's omission to register. The particulars which are to be placed upon the register are (1) the title of the newspaper, and (2) the names of all the proprietors of such newspaper, together with their respective occupations, places of business (if any), and "Any report published in any newspaper of the proceed-places of residence. The necessity of publishing these ings of a public meeting shall be privileged, if such meeting particulars to the world will no doubt weigh rather was lawfully convened for a lawful purpose, and open to the public, and if such report was fair and accurate, and pub- heavily upon those gentlemen who like to carry on a lished without malice, and if the publication of the matter newspaper business anonymously, but we see no reason complained of was for the public benefit; provided always, why they should be allowed to escape from their just that the protection intended to be afforded by this section responsibilities. shall not be available as a defence in any proceedings, if the plaintiff or prosecutor can show that the defendant has refused to insert in the newspaper in which the report

appeared a reasonable letter or statement or explanation or contradiction by, or on behalf of, such plaintiff or prosecutor."

The present law seems to be that comments upon the conduct of persons at a parliamentary election meeting are privileged (Davis v. Duncan, L. R. 9 C. P. 396); but that a true report of a public meeting "held under a local Act for the improvement of a town" is not (Davison 7. Duncan, 7 E. & B. 229). This combination of rules

We observe, with some little surprise, that it does not appear to be made compulsory to enter transmissions or transfers upon the register. New proprietors, it is proposed, "may" [not must], by clause 7, make entries of their succession in interest.

By clause 11 every extract from the register duly certified is conclusive evidence of the contents of the

register, and "sufficient prima facie evidence of all the matters and things [why "things" ?] thereby appearing, unless and until the contrary thereof be proved."

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