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of Wells v. Abrahams (L. R. 7 Q. B. 554), great doubt seems to have been thrown on its soundness, and since the case of Ex parte Ball (L. R. 10 Ch. D. 667), it can hardly be considered law. The view expressed by Baggallay, L.J., in this latter case seems to be substantially identical with the third view mentioned by Mr. Justice Watkin Williams, but we do not know that that view is very distinctly formulated anywhere else. Previously to the case of Ex parte Ball, in the case of Wells v. Abrahams, Blackburn, J., had expressed a doubt as to the soundness of the then prevailing view, and Bramwell, L.J., points out in Ex parte Ball the great difficulties that arise with respect to any theory on the subject. He says that there are only four possible ways in which the impediment to the action could arise:-(1) That no cause of action arises out of the felony; (2) that it does not arise until prosecution; (3) that it arises on the act, but is suspended until the prosecution; (4) that there is neither defence to, or suspension of the claim by or at the instance of the felon debtor, but that the court, on its own motion, or at the instance of the Crown, may stay proceedings till public justice is satisfied. But he proceeds to point out that the first alternative is contrary to the later authorities; that the second is to suppose that the cause of action is the debt plus the prosecution, which results in many absurdities, and that the objection both to this and the third alternative is that there are no means by which they can be set up, because the defendant cannot plead his own felony-nemo allegans suam turpitudinem est audiendus. Then with regard to the fourth alternative he points out that practically it too is fraught with difficulties. He says, "Nobody ever heard of such a thing; nobody in any case or book ever suggested it till Mr. Justice Blackburn did as a possibility. Is it left to the court to find it out on the pleadings? If it appears on the trial, is the judge to discharge the jury? How is the Crown to know of it ?"

The view that there is no impediment to the action unless it is shown that the plaintiff has neglected the duty of prosecution enabled Mr. Justice Watkin Williams to dispose of the case before him, on the ground that on demurrer to the statement of claim because it showed a felony it could not be assumed that the plaintiff was guilty of neglect in this respect; but it is to be observed that the difficulties suggested by Bramwell, L.J., in Ex parte Ball apply just as much to this third view as to the second view alluded to by the learned judge, so that in reality the case of Midland Insurance Company v. Smith leaves the whole subject as much wrapped in doubt and difficulty as ever.

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THE value to creditors of the process of foreign attachment, as exercised by certain inferior local courts of record, has been materially diminished by the effect of three recent cases, two of which were decided by the Court of Appeal, and the third by the House of Lords.

The earliest in date of these decisions is Levy v. Lovell (28 W. R. 602, L. R. 14 Ch. D. 230), and the question before the court in that case was whether a creditor who had served a writ of foreign attachment in an action in the Mayor's Court, but had not obtained judgment in the action before the commencement of the bankruptcy or liquidation of his debtor, is a creditor holding security on the property of his debtor within the meaning of section 12 of the Bankruptcy Act, 1869. The Court of Appeal unanimously decided the question in the negative, overruling the decision of the Chief Judge in Bankruptcy, and also a decision of Vice-Chancellor Hall in Re The London Cotton Mills Company (25 W. R. 109), on the grounds that foreign attachment is, in its substance, origin, and intention, a process to compel appearance; that such an attachment cannot be

pleaded by the garnishee in a superior court to an action by the debtor, and that, after the commencement of the bankruptcy or liquidation of the debtor, the debt due by the garnishee to the debtor has ceased, by operation of law, to be due to the debtor and has been transferred to the trustee.

The other case decided by the Court of Appeal is Ex parte Seear, In re Price (W. N. 16th April, 1881), in which the decision of Mr. Registrar Hazlitt, sitting as Chief Judge in Bankruptcy, was overruled by the same Lords Justices who decided Levy v. Lovell. Ex parte Seear differed from the latter case, inasmuch as the attachment was issued out of the Tolzey Court of Bristol. The question raised was whether, by au attachment followed by seizure of goods after, but without notice of, the act of bankruptcy, and before the adjudication founded thereon, a creditor is placed in the position of a secured creditor under section 12 of the Bankruptcy Act, 1869. It was contended for the respondents that the process of foreign attachment in the Tolzey Court differed in important particulars from the process of foreign attachment in the Mayor's Court. It was held, however, upon the evidence, that the processes were identical and only for the purpose of compelling appearance, and consequently that the present ques tion was already decided by Levy v. Lovell in the negative.

The third and most important case is that of The Mayor and Aldermen of the City of London v. The London Joint Stock Bank (L. R. 1 C. P. D. 1; on app. 28 W. R. 696, L. R. 5 C. P. D. 494; House of Lords, Times of 2nd of April, 1881), which was decided shortly before Ex parte Seear. In this case the bank sued for a prohibition to restrain proceedings in foreign attachment against them as garnishees, having in their hands moneys of a customer. The mayor and aldermen pleaded the custom, and also that it had been followed. The proceedings to attach the customers' property were carried on without notice to him, according to the course of foreign attachmeut as prac tised for the last two centuries, although in making up the record on the appearance of the garnishee it has been the practice to insert fictitious statements, such as that certain proceedings had been taken to procure the defendant's appearance, and that the defendant had made default in appearing. It was held by the Court of Appeal (affirming the Divisional Court, who decided the question on a different ground) that the allegations that certain proceedings had been taken to procure the defendant's appearance, and that the defendant had made default in appearing, were of the substance of the plea and that, as they were untrue, the custom had not been followed, and a prohibition to restrain the proceedings had rightly been granted. The majority of the court expressed an opinion (though it was not necessary in the view they took of the case to decide the point) that proceedings in foreign a'tachment cannot be taken against a corporation as garnishees. In he course of his judgment, Lord Justice James said, "It seems impossible for us, without violating our judicial oaths, to find in point of fact that what has not been done has been done, and to find that that has been followed which has not been followed. The pleas allege a proceeding to compel a man to appear, suit, default, and proceedings based on that default. The whole of that is admitted now to be a mere fiction, nothing of the kind having been done, therefore in point of fact, not only are the pleadings not proved, but they are essentially disproved." mayor and aldermen appealed, and the House of Lords affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeal, deciding that the custom of foreign attachment was not applicable to a corporation, on the ground that it was only by committing the garnishee to prison that he could be compelled to obey the order of the court, and inasmuch as the cases showed that a corporation could not be committed to prison, the only compulsory means of

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enforcing the orders of the court were in their nature absolutely incapable of being applied. In the course of his judgment the Lord Chancellor observed that there was no question raised as to the validity of the custom, and that nothing that had taken place below, nor anything that might take place in that House on that occasion, would throw any doubt on the validity of the custom, if properly followed, where a case really fell within it.

Now as mentioned above, and as our readers are probably aware-the record of foreign attachment made upon the appearance of the garnishee mixes up with the true history of what has been done a number of what are now, at all events, purely fictitious matters, and have for at least two centuries past ceased to be more than formal, such as the statements that certain proceedings have been taken to procure the appearance of the debtor, and that he has made default in appearing. It would seem, therefore, from the Lord Chancellor's judgment that for the custom to apply in any particular case it will be necessary that the record should be substantially a true one, and that for the future all the matters stated upon its face, in so far as they are substantially part of the custom, must be actually carried out. How far this decision may affect the other matters appearing on the record it is impossible to say; but should it become necessary to observe all these, then the custom will have been practically abolished. All that we can at present state with certainty, as to the future, is, that there must be a bona fide return by the serjeant-at-mace that the defendant is not within the jurisdiction (the very ground of applicability of the custom being the fact that the defendant is out of the jurisdiction) and that the proceedings taken to procure his appearance have failed to procure it.

In addition to this, the defendant must be called at three subsequent courts and must have made

default.

THE IRISH LAND BILL.

VI.

AFTER our last article on this subject was written, though before it had reached the hauds of our readers, the debate on Sir Stafford Northcote's amendment took place in the House of Commons. The debate furnished incidentally a striking illustration, if any were needed, of the character of the defect in the Bill which we pointed out last week. We do not by any means concur in the proposed amendment, which seems to us to narrow the tenant's interest far beyond the necessities of the case, but it is noteworthy that so able a lawyer as Mr. Davey, when pressed as to what it was which the tenant was to be allowed to sell, and therefore the incoming tenant to buy, could give no better answer than "whatever he has got;" which is, being interpreted, a law-suit. But it would be, to say the least of it, a doubtful boon tɔ the tenantry of the future-whatever it might prove tɔ the existing occupiers-to enact that none of them shoul have any reasonable chance of acquiring the possession of a farm except by paying a competition price for the privilege of unlimited litigation. We should have preferred, as we have already stated, to have commenced by defining the nature and extent of the tenant's interest, a term which at present has no tangible meaning over the greater part of the country, and which, even in the North, is of too uncertain a character for the good of the community.

We fear, however, that it would be impracticable to attempt so to alter the present Bill, and, though we do not

hesitate to state that we think the Government would be well advised in withdrawing it and introducing another, proceeding on a different plan, we recognize the hopelessness of pressing such a course at the present stage of the session. And as it is not impossible, however difficult it may be, so to mould the present Bill as to accomplish somewhat of the desired effect, we think it, on the whole, more advisable to follow, in our succeeding suggestions, the frame of the measure before us. Bat in so doing we desire our readers always to bear in mind the object which, as we have, we think, conclusively shown, such a Bill ought to have principally in view viz., to confer upon every tenant a status of practical immoveability, subject to the payment of a rent to be fixed not by competition but by valuation. It will obviously be of little use to limit the amount of that portion of his rent which he pays to the landlord if he is still to be exposed to unrestricted competition as regards that portion which he has to pay to the outgoing tenant, including (as we showed last week would be the inevitable result of the Bill) the landlord himself in the case of lands in hand. Further, the values of the respective interests of landlord and tenant, which must be ascertained in order to arrive at a fair valuation rent, ought to be ascertainable by the parties themselves, even in the absence of agreement, without the intervention of any external authority. The duty of the court should be, not to determine the amount payable in the case of eviction, but merely to enforce the payment of an amount otherwise ascertained. We have repeated these conditions from time to time, at the risk of becoming

As a matter of fact, we are informed that for some time past no writs of attachment have been issued out of the Mayor's Court. This circumstance may be attri buted to the fact that, in most cases, it is practically impossible for the serjeant-at-mace to certify that the defendant is out of the jurisdiction, and that should he so certify, and the defendant happen to be within the jurisdiction at the time of the attachment, then an action for damages would lie against the serjeantat-mace. We believe that it has been mooted in some quarters that an attempt should be made to obtain from the Legislature a modification of the custom. As to the desirability of this we do not give any opinion. We trust, however, that the custom, in the form in which it was resorted to recently, will not be revived. The three cases we have referred to plainly limit the application, while they destroy much of the injustice, of the custom, and this we do not regret. For it has been a curious anomaly that while in proceedings in the superior courts creditors have been obliged to wait until they had obtained judgments before they were able to proceed under the garnishee clauses of the Common Law Procedure Acts and of the Judicature Act, in proceedings in the Mayor's Court, they have been able, by means of a series of fictitious statements of an officer of that court, to obtain a lien on the effects of their debtors before proceeding to final judg-wearisome, because they lie, as it seems to us, at the root ment, and, in fact, by simply issuing writs of attachment; their debtors all the time having had no notice of what was going on. It is high time that the public

should be made aware of the effect of these decisionsviz., that foreign attachment, as resorted to for a couple of centuries, is an illegal method of enforcing a creditor's claims.

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of the whole question, and because they have been so inexplicably disregarded by the framers of the Bill, some of whom, at any rate, were, as we have before stated, by no means ignorant of them.

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Clause 1 then ought to be altered by substituting in line 2 for the word "tenancy" the phrase tenantright as hereinafter defined," and by omitting altogether sub-clause (3), which enables the landlord to buy up the tenant-right at a price to be fixed by the court, and subclause (5), which states the grounds on which the landlord may refuse to admit a purchaser; and by substituting for sub-clause (4) the following provision:-"Where the tenancy is sold to any person other than the landlord,

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Clause 3 is a clumsy attempt to introduce by a sidewind, and as an occasional occurrence, that which ought to be, in a more direct form, the controlling principle of the Bill. It seems to have been inserted by someone who had heard of, but never studied, or, at any rate, never in the least understood, the proposition which goes by the name of "Judge Longfield's Scheme." The section is further objectionable as perpetuating the principle of "compensation for disturbance." Such compensation was, perhaps, necessary under the legislation of 1870, which endeavoured to secure the tenant in his holding by fining the landlord for disturbing him, but it is admittedly an anomaly, and with a proper principle of tenant-right would be useless as well as mischievous. All that is of any value in the section would be necessarily included in the definition of "tenant-right" to be made subsequently, and the clause itself ought, therefore, to be wholly omitted.

Clause 4 is right save that after the words " statutory term" should be added "as hereinafter defined," which words will have been rendered necessary by the omission of clause 3.

Clause 5 is objectionable for the reasons already mentioned. The clause ought to provide for the total repeal of clause (3) of the Act of 1870, "save in the case of any holding the tenant whereof shall not at the time of his eviction be entitled to any tenant-right under this Act." It is conceivable that some such tenancies may continue to exist (though we think the supposition highly improbable), and it is therefore well to continue to them the protection against capricious eviction which they now enjoy, but as the existence of a proper and wellsecured tenant-right will make such evictions impossible, it is absurd to provide machinery for punishing the act which cannot be committed.

Clause 6 is unobjectionable on principle. Its only operation, indeed, seems to be to extend to tenants who have come in under some informal agreement, and through the machinery of a surrender and admittance, the same rights which they would obviously have had had they directly purchased or inherited the tenancy from the surrenderor.

It is upon clause 7 that the efficiency, or the contrary, of the whole of this part of the Act turns, and that clause is, we conceive, so framed as to produce the maximum of inefficiency with the maximum of friction. The present value of the interest of any particular tenant ought to be readily capable of being fixed, if only there were machinery for doing so, without requiring the tenant to quit his holding. At present no such machinery exists, nor is any provided in the Bill: and yet it must be obvious that until that has been fixed the question what is "a fair rent" under the circumstances of any particular tenancy must be the merest guesswork. The first thing, therefore, that should be done under clause 7 should be to fix the amount of this interest. For this purpose it should be enacted—

1. The landlord and tenant of any holding in respect of which the tenant-right shall not have been previously ascertained under this Act may, by agreement, fix the then present value of the tenant's interest (including any claim he may have for improvements, and including also, in holdings subject to any of the Ulster customs or any analogous custom, any sum which he may have paid to his predecessor in title for the goodwill of the farm).

2. If the parties are unable to agree upon such value, either party may apply to the court to fix the same, and the court shall determine the same after hearing the

parties and considering all the circumstances of the holding and district, and, in particular, having regard to any such claims on the part of the tenant as are mentioned in the previous sub-section.

3. At the same time the parties may, if they shall think fit, determine by agreement what shall be taken to be a fair rent for the holding.

4. If they cannot agree upon such rent, either party may apply to the court to fix the same. If neither party so applies within [say three] months after the value of the tenant's interest has been so ascertained as aforesaid, it shall be taken that the rent then payable is a fair rent.

same.

5. If either party applies to the court to fix the amount of a fair rent, within the time aforesaid, the court shall, after hearing the parties, determine the A fair rent, as determined by the court, shall mean such a rent as, under all the circumstances of the case, holding, and district, a solvent tenant would undertake to pay one year with another in addition to the purchase of the tenant's interest at the price previously ascertained.

6- The amount of the tenant's interest ascertained as aforesaid shall be divided by the amount of a fair rent, when fixed, and the quotient or the nearest integer thereto, whether above or below, shall be declared to be the "statutory tenant-right" of the holding expressed in years' purchase of the farm.

7. If the fair rent ascertained as aforesaid is different from the rent then payable (whether above or below), either party may, at any time before the next rent-day, give notice that from and after such day the fair rent so ascertained shall be substituted for the then present rent.

8. The effect of such notice shall be the creation of a tenancy subject to statutory conditions for a statutory term of [say ten] years from such rent-day at the fair rent so ascertained.

9. If neither party gives such notice before such rentday they shall be deemed to have agreed to a tenancy subject to statutory conditions for the like term at the then existing rent.

10. If the tenant is by any act of the landlord compelled to quit the occupation of the holding during the continuance of the statutory term, he shall be entitled to receive the amount of his statutory tenant-right, reckoned in years' purchase of the rent actually pay able. Provided that, if the cause of his dispossession be non-payment of rent, the landlord may retain the amount in arrear and costs out of the statutory tenant-right, and if the cause be the breach of any statutory condition other than the non-payment of rent, the landlord may set off against such tenant-right any claim which he may have for damages for such breach of condition, notwithstanding that the amount is unliquidated; the nount of such claim to be settled by the court in case the parties differ.

11. If the tenant executes any improvements during any statutory term, and is so di spossessed as aforesaid before the expiration of the term, he shall be entitled to be paid the then unexhausted value of his improvements, in addition to the amount of his statutory tenant-right.

These provisions would regulate the creation of the tenant right, and fix its amount for the first term, without more litigation than is inevitable in the absence of agreement. The provisions for the renewal of statutory terms, and the alteration of the rent or tenant-right from time to time, without any further intervention of the court-which are the essence of the scheme-must wait for another opportunity.

CORRESPONDENCE.

THE ATTORNMENT CLAUSE IN A MORTGAGE. [To the Editor of the Solicitors' Journal.] Sir,-Your correspondent, "A Conveyancer," in his letter, which appeared in your number of the 4th inst., does not in terms contest the doctrine he mentions as having been put forward by Lords Justices James and Bramwell in In re Stockton Iron Furnace Company, and as having been adopted by the Master of the Rolls in Ex parte Punnett, yet I understand him to dissent from it, and venture to say a few words in its defence.

He cites a passage relative to the attornment clause from the treatise on mortgages in Davidson's Precedents, and italicises a portion of that passage, supposed, I take it, to be in conflict with the views expressed by the Lords Justices. The portion italicised is in these words" It is obvious that the right of distress incidental to the tenancy thus created may be exercised without increasing the liabilities of a mortgagee in possession." If this passage is in conflict with the views of the Lords Justices, it is, I think, no disrespect to the memory of the author of that treatise to suppose that he may not havo foreseen the result, under all circumstances, of the working of so artificial a provision as the attornment clause. But I doubt whether the passage above quoted can fairly be taken to be in conflict with the Lords Justices' views. May it not have been intended to point to the claims, not of third parties, but only of the mortgagor against the mortgagee, in which case, I suppose, what is said to be obvious is really so; for I think the Lords Justices were only contemplating the mortgagee's liabilities as regards third parties. This seems all that is fairly to be attributed to the passages quoted in your correspondent's letter, who, I think, in quoting from Lord Justice James' judgment, should have continued his quotation with the following pagsage:-"They were mortgagees in possession, liable to account in respect of this £5,000 a year, as against any second mortgagee or incumbrancer for what they had received, or but for their wilful default might have received." And in the course of the argument Lord Justice James said, “Would not a subsequent incumbrancer be entitled to treat a first mortgagee under a clause of this nature as a mortgagee in possession as to the rent thereby reserved, and charge him with it as rent which, but for his wilful neglect or default, he might bave received?" and the Master of the Rolls adds, "Probably the fear of this is the reason why the rent generally is made only equal to the interest."

Coming then to the merits of the question, it seems desirable to consider what the case was that gave rise to the expressions of the Lords Justices. The case of In re Stockton Iron Furnace Company was shortly this: the mortgagees, under the attornment clause, had distrained for two years' rent; three days afterwards a petition for winding up the company (the mortgagors) was presented, an official liquidator was appointed, by arrangement the men in possession under the distress were withdrawn without prejudice, and the goods distrained were sold, and the proceeds, amounting to less than a year's rent under the attornment clause, paid into the bank of the mortgagees, they being bankers; they gave notice to the liquidator that they would appropriate the money towards payment of their claim. Vice-Chancellor Bacon decided against the mortgagees, mainly on the authority of Ex parte Williams. In the Court of Appeal it was contended on behalf of the liquidator that section 34 did not apply to the quasi-tenancy created by the attornment clause, and that there was no authority for saying that it did; in short, that there was no bona fide tenancy created; and that the rent reserved was not a fair rent. The Court of Appeal decided that there was a bona fide tenancy created, and that the rent was a fair rent. The Master of the Rolls said, "As regards one year's reut,

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the 34th section of the Bankruptcy Act, 1869, gives the landlord that preference, and he is not the less a real landlord because he is mortgagee. It was part of the bargain that he should become landlord, and no doubt the rent he receives is a security in the event of bankruptcy, but so is the rent of the mortgaged property in that event whether the rent is to be paid by the mortgagor or by third persons," and immediately before the passage quoted by "A Conveyancer from Lord Justice Bramwell's judgment his lordship eays, "The law does not forbid their entering into such an arrangement, taking all the beneficial and all the inconvenient consequences arising from it." The Court of Appeal clearly gave to the attornment clause the most thorough effect. It appears to me, when looked at in this view, that it is scarcely a just ground of complaint that the relationship of landlord and tenant created by the attornment clause is, as regards third parties, to be considered a real one; and, if so, the consequences must surely be the same whether the mortgagor or someone else be tenant to the mortgagee. Appeal taken the view advocated by " A Conveyancer," it seems to me the decision in In re Stockton Iron Furnace Company would have been different.

Had the Court of

If the rent reserved be really a fair rent (as to which, see also Ex parte Jackson (29 W. R. 253, L. R. 14 Ch. D. 725), and do not exceed what is intended to be paid, I see no difficulty in working the clause. The receipt can certainly be so worded as to protect the A. J. W. mortgagee. Temple, June 8.

CASES OF LAST WEEK.

PRACTICE-JUDGMENT IN DEFAULT OF PLEADING-SETTING ASIDE JUDGMENT-LEAVE TO. DEFEND-COSTSORD. 29, R. 14.- In an action of Williams v. Briscoe, before Vice-Chancellor Hall on the 19th ult., the question arose as to what costs should be paid by a defendant against whom judgment has been taken in default, and who subsequently obtains leave to appear and defend the action. The present application was by motion, under ord. 29, r. 14, to set aside the judgment, and obtain liberty for the defendant to appear and defend. The action was for specific performance of a contract, and the plaintiff being unable to effect service upon the defendant, had obtained judgment in default of pleading upon his statement of claim, and upon substituted service. The defendant averred that he first knew of the proceedings by finding a copy of the judgment affixed to his door. This was in issue, and the present application was strenuously opposed on the ground that the defendant had purposely avoided service. HALL, V.C., however, after hearing evidence as to the grounds of defence to the claim, made the order asked for, but at the same time made it part of the order that the defendant should pay to the plaintiff his costs of the action subsequent to delivery of the statement of claim, and including his costs of the motion and condefence within fourteen days from the date of the order.— sequent thereon, and that the defendant should deliver his SOLICITORS, Barrett, for Griffith Jones, Aberystwyth; R.

Biale.

WILL CONSTRUCTION GIFT TO CLASS - FIRST AND SECOND COUSINS.-In an action of Brookes v. Watson, before Vice-Chancellor Hall, upon further consideration, on the 1st inst., the question was argued whether a gift to "first and second cousins" could be extended to first cousins once removed. The testator, whose estate was being administered in the sum of 18 guineas a-piece unto each and every of my the action, by his will made a bequest "upon trust to pay first and second cousins (both on my father's and mother's side) that shall be living at the time of my sister's decease, to which said first and second cousins I give and bequeath the same accordingly.' The chief clerk had found that there were four first cousins, and forty-nine first cousins once removed, of the testator living at the time specified, but no second cousins had come in to prove their relationship. It

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was now sought to establish a claim on behalf of the first cousins once removed to receive the legacies. And it was argued that the principle to be gathered from the text-books and reported cases is that, where there is a gift to first and second cousins together, all within the degree of second cousins can take, and that the decisions of the Master of the Rolls and Court of Appeal in Re Parker, Bentham v. Wilson (28 W. R. 823, L. R. 15 Ch. D. 528), is not repugnant to such a rule. HALL, V.C., however, held that he must give effect to the natural meaning of the words, and could not extend them so as to include the class in question. Their costs were allowed out of the estate.-SOLICITORS, Surr, Gribble, & Bunton, for New, Prance, & Gariard, Evesham.

SOCIETIES.

INCORPORATED LAW SOCIETY.

The metropolitan members of this society gave a dinner at their hall, Chancery-lane, on Thursday, the 2nd inst., to the Provincial Law Societies, in recognition of the hospitality which had been extended to them on the occasion of their annual visits to the provinces. A condensed report of the proceedings appeared in our last issue. Mr. J. MoxON CLABON, president of the society, occupied the chair, and about 120 gentlemen accepted invitations, most of whom were present. Amongst them were:-Mr. C. C. Druce (vicepresident), Mr. J. Dodds, M.P., Mr. B. Green Lake, Mr. Henry Markby, Mr. Richard Pennington, Mr. Robert Cunliffe, Mr. W. A. Jevors, Mr. R. H. Barne, Mr. A. E. Finch, Mr. J. Anderson Rose, Mr. C. T. Arnold, Mr. F. G. Fitch, Mr. C. J. Follett, Mr. Sydney Gedge, Mr. C. Goddard, Mr. C. Sawbridge, Mr. E. W. Owles, Mr. R. H. Peacock, Mr. A. R. Ford, Mr. C. Ford, Mr. Baker, Mr. A. C. Cronin, Mr. J. Indermaur, Mr. T. G. Woollacott, Mr. Sidney Chapman, Mr. S. R. Pollard, Mr. E. Tillyard, Mr. L. Desborough, Mr. F. Crisp, Mr. W. W. Aldridge, Mr. V. J. Chamberlain, Mr. G. L. P. Eyre, Mr E. Bedford, Mr. J. G. Bristow, Mr. Monier Williams, Mr. E. Y. Western, Mr. E. Kennedy, Mr. E. E. Lake, Mr. Sidney Harrison, Mr. F. J. Ridsdale, Mr. H. W. Trinder, Mr. J. F. Isaacson, Mr. J. Crowdy, Mr. E. Hedger, Mr. J. Batchelor, Mr. T. D. Bolton, Mr. Edmund Kimber, Mr. W. J. Crossfield, Mr. G. Gregory, Mr. F. Ommaney, Mr. W. A. Smith, Mr. Sidney Smith, Mr. E. Hughes, Mr. G. B. Batchelor, Mr. J. Tarry, Mr. G. R. Dodd, Mr. W. H. Hazard, Mr. E. G. Spiers, Mr. C. P. Farlow, Mr. W. H. Manisty, Mr. T. B. Cartwright, Mr. R. Barch, Mr. E. L. Clarke, Mr C. E. Jones, Mr. J. Alsop, Mr. H. Attlee, Mr. C. Harrison, Mr. F. W. Yeates, Mr. A. Jonas, Mr. T. Waterhouse, and Mr. C. P. Wilmer (Incorporated Law Society, U.K.); Mr. J. D. Kay, Mr. O. Scatcherd, and Mr. J. Rider (Leeds Law Society); Mr. H. C. Duncan, Mr. J. Yates, Mr. J. J. Yates, and Mr. J. W. Alsop (Liverpool Law Society); Mr. J. Cooper, Mr. Perry Woolley, Mr. J. F. Tweedale, Mr. Jas. Heelis, Mr. W. H. Harper, and Mr. C. H. Holden (Manchester Law Society); Mr. J. T. Moreland, Mr. W. Peppercorn, Mr. H. Darvill, Mr. G. T. Crowdy, Mr. Wm Smith, Mr. J. E. Furniss, and Mr. Bagshawe (Sheffield Law Society); Mr. W. A. Stuckey, Mr. J. A. Freeman, Mr. Chas. Lamb, Mr. W. Turner, Mr. A. T. Shapland, and Mr. Thos. Eggar (Sussex Law Society); Mr. J. L. Press, Mr. F. F. Cartwright, Mr. Alfred Cox, and Mr. W. Hurle Clarke (Bristol Law Society); Mr. E. Foster, Mr. Sanders Holber, and Mr. G. W. Fitch (Cambridge Law Society); Mr. E. W. Williamson (secretary), Mr. S. B. P. Bucknill (assistant secretary), and Mr. F. Boase (librarian Incorporated Law Society, U.K.).

The toasts of "The Queen," and "The Prince and Princess of Wales and the rest of the Royal Family," having been given by the PRESIDENT, and honoured with the cus tomary enthusiasm,

Mr. W. A. FOLLETT proposed "The Houses of Parliament," and remarked that the toast was one which would be regarded at the present moment as one of more than ordinary importance. He did not think there was any person, however waim an adherent he might be of the parliamentary system, who would not admit that that system which had done so much for the nation in past years, and which had teen so long and so justly the admiration of other countries, was passing through rather a critical crdeal. He could not

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be hypocritical enough to maintain that he was a very ardent admirer of the present House of Commons; but at the same time it would not be appropriate for him to approach the toast in anything like a spirit of partizanship. Still he did not think it possible to avoid a passing allusion to the somewhat peculiar phenomena which these august assemblies presented at the present time. Although they were in session assembled under their most gracious Sovereign, yet one of them could absolutely find nothing whatever to do, and the other, although it had more than enough work to occupy several such assemblies, could not succeed in doing anything at all except indulging for a few hours every evening in that interesting sport which one saw chronicled in the papers every day, which was something like the game played by children called "Cross questions and crooked answers. But when the congestion which prevailed had been overcome, the Houses of Parliament would be found to be returning again to the great work which had done so much for the well-being of the country, and to the discharge of their normal duties. He could not help alluding in the ball of the Incorporated Law Society to what has been in progress with regard to the improvement of legal procedure, and also with regard to the recognition of the solicitor branch of the profession. He thought those present would be candid enough to admit that what had been done had been done in a right direction, and that there had been a fair disposition on the part of the Legislature to recognize what was for the good of the public in the way of legal procedure, and to some extent what was due to the solicitor branch of the profession. He hoped that there might be further time went on. Whether any improvement still as improvement would be made during the present session appeared to be exceedingly doubtful. As far as one could see at present, the only Act of Parliament relating to England which was likely to find a place on the Statute Book of 1881 would be the Customs and Inland Revenue Act, with which he had had a little to do, and in which the member for Stockton-on-Tees had taken so deep an interest, and which he successfully carried to an issue, to the benefit it was to be hoped of himself, and undoubtedly to the advantage of the community at large. The Legislature was very much blocked by that colossal produc tion-the Irish Land Bill, which he would not be considered guilty of partisanship if he said they were all rather weary of. He thought there were many difficulties in its way. It had, however, a certain amount of interest for the members of the solicitor branch of the profession, because it had been said by one of the gentlemen enjoying a retreat in Kilmain ham Gaol, that it would tend to make the fortunes of all the lawyers in Ireland. It had been suggested that if the Act became law in Ireland, it might very possibly become the law of England, and then it would be a very interesting them to drink the toast most cordially in the hope that for thing for the lawyers, especially in the country. He asked many years to come, as had been the case in the past, the Houses of Parliament might maintain the establishments of truth and justice, religion and piety, and uphold the peace, prosperity, bonour, and glory of this great empire.

Mr. J. DODDS, M.P., responded, and was bound to admit that the present was a most critical period in the history of the House of Commons. That House had for the last two or three centuries been the great bulwark of the liberties of the country. It had done much to promote civil and religious liberty, and to uphold everything that was dear to the British nation, regardless of the different parties to which the members might belong. But it bad been subjected during the present, and for one or two preceding sessions, to a very severe strair, and it had been a source of the deepest regret to the great majority of the members of the House of Commons that the liberties they had enjoyed for so long a period bad necessarily been reduced to a very considerable extent. His apprehension was that it would be necessary to still further restrain these liberties, in order to guard against the legislative machinery being still further blocked. The rules of the House of Commons were made under the impression that the members would all be gentlemen, or at any rate, that they would be possessed of sufficiently gentlemanly feelings to cause them to remember that when they came amongst a great body of gentlemen, they should conduct themselves in that gentlemanly manner which had characterized the House of Commons in the past. It was a matter of regret to everyone anxious for the interests of his country that the state of things which had existed in days gone by was no longer the rule. The members of the House

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