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meeting at Sheffield fulfilled these requirements more gaine (being a profit à prendre) is one of those incorfully than any previous meeting, and the result has poreal hereditaments which can be granted by deed been to deepen the conviction that a really valuable alone, and it is established by a succession of decisions purpose is served by these gatherings. No doubt is felt that where there is a leaso with a “reservation" of game in the best-informed quarters that the Brighton meet to the landlord, this is not a reservation at all, strictly ing will be larger than any provincial meeting yet so called, but a re-grant of the profit à prendre by the held. According to some estimates, the Sussex Law tenant to the landlord (see Wickham v. Hawker, 7 M. Society will have to provide for 1,000 visitors. That & W. 63). But the Game Act of 1831 (1 & 2 Will. 4, society has, we believe, about fifty members, as against c. 32), whether purposely or from the draftsman's ignorthe 117 members of the Sheffield Society. Under these ance of the learning of the subject, expressly recogcircumstances there is a natural and honourable feeling nizes a parol reservation in section 8, and protects the among the London solicitors (who will constitute a large landlord in his enjoyment of it by sections 12 and 30. proportion of the visitors) that it is unfair to leave the The words of section 8 are, “nothing in this Act Sussex Society to bear the whole of the heavy expenses contained shall authorize" any person seised of land of such a meeting. There is, moreover, a desire on the to kill the game “in any case where, by deed, grant, part of London members to repay, in some degree, the lease, or any written or parol demise or contract, profuse hospitality invariably bestowed on them at the a right of entry upon such land for the purpose provincial assemblies. Everyone agrees with our able of killing the game hath been, or hereafter shall be, correspondent who first raised the question, that, in some reserved or retained by, or given, or allowed to any way or other, the town members of the society should grantor, lessor, or other person whatsoever." Section 12 co-operate with the Brighton Society, but the difficulty | inflicts a penalty on the occupier for killing game, in is how to do this in such a way as not to be distasteful cases where the right to the game “hath been or shall to the society which has so spiritedly undertaken the be specially reserved by, or granted to, the landlord,” burden of the meeting. It appears to us that the Sussex and section 30, after inflicting a penalty on any person
Society might, without any impropriety, consent to ad. trespassing in pursuit of game, provides that the leave mit as honorary members solicitors resident in London, and licence of the occupier shall not be a sufficient and if this were done a ready means would be afforded defence in any case where the landlord has the right to for the co-operation of town members in the way of sub. the game “by virtue of any reservation or otherwise as scription to the funds of the Sussex Society.
hereinbefore mentioned ”-the reference being obviously to section 8. It has, no doubt, been assumed in more
than one case (see Spicer v. Barnard, 28 L. J. M. C. THE PROCEEDINGS in a prosecution for libel at the
176; Jones v. Williams, 46 L. J. M. C. 270) that a parol Guildhall Police Court on Wednesday seem to show that
reservation is good in law to support a conviction the case of Reg. v. Carden (28 W. R. 133, L. R. 5 Q.
under these sections. But until there has been an B. D. 1) did not entirely settle the practice to be
express judicial decision to the contrary (for the dictum observed in such cases. The solicitor for the prosecu
of LINDLEY, J., in Jones v. Williams, that it follows tion objected to the counsel for the defence cross-examin
from section 8 of the Game Act and the decisions upon ing as to the truth of the libel, but the latter urged that
it that there may be a parol reservation of game upon Reg. v. Carden only settled that witnesses could not be
a parol demise, is not quite conclusive) we think there is called before the magistrate in support of the plea of justi
some ground for maintaining that the Game Act does not fication, and that it had in no way limited the general
alter the law by altering the mode of transfer of an incorright of cross-examination ; and ultimately the presiding
poreal hereditament (for if that had been intended, it alderman adjourned the case, in order that a mandamus
would have been effected by express words), but merely might be applied for. The question, as now raised, ap
protects the landlord in the enjoyment of a revocable pears to be still to some extent an open one. The
licence so long as it remains unrevoked. Lord Chief Justice said, in Reg. v. Carden, that “unless there is some further statutory duty imposed upon the magistrate, the evidence before him must be confined to THE CHANCERY PAYMASTER's OFFICE appears to be in a the question whether the case is such as ought to be sent condition of discontent which is the natural result of for trial;" and since he especially noticed and overruled excess of work beyond the powers of the existing staff, the defendant's argument that, in the event of the combined with the hope of assistance too long deferred. the prosecutor's death, the defendant would be deprived The authorities of the Treasury, on whom rests the of the benefit of his cross-examination, he would care of providing the requisite addition to the Payseem to have contemplated that his decision would have master's staff of clerks, are taking time to think the effect of excluding cross-examination as well as about doing what must inevitably be done sooner or evidence on the part of the accused person. Mr. Justice later. Not only is the staff inadequate to perform tho LUSH observed that, before the passing of the 30 & 31 existing work, but it is tolerably certain that before many Vict. c. 35," all that was to be put into writing was years it will be called upon to transact a greatly increased the evidence that was material to the charge against the | business. It is probable that the whole of the funds in accused.” In Reg. v. Carden (as in the recent case) court in the common law divisions, will be altimately the objection was taken during the cross-examination of administered by the present Chancery Pay-office; and the prosecutor, and the rule nisi was for a mandamus probably the bankruptcy funds will be sent there after to the magistrate to allow the cross-examination, as well a time. In fact, the office (which is really one of the as to hear evidence of the truth of the libel, but the largest banks in London) is nut only at present right of cross-examination as to its truth was not ex undermanned, but the work is increasing year by pressly dealt with by either of the judges of the Queen's year, and in all probability more work will constantly Bench Division.
fall to its share. By way of some slight help, the Paymoster has been allowed the assistance of two writers,
but their aid is as a drop in the bucket compared with THE GROUND GAME Act, 1880, it will have been ob what is really required. There can be no reason on the served, gives the occupier a right to kill and take ground score of economy for this reluctance to increase the staff. game concurrently with any other person “entitled " 80 The Chancery Pay-office not only pays its way, but to do, and the person entitled is ordinarily the land. brings a large surplus revenue towards the costs of the lord by virtue of a reservation. It is somewhat curious, | administration of justice. Solicitors complain that they however, that it has never been precisely settled whether cannot procure sufficient attention there, and that they this reservation must be. by deed or whether an oral have now to wait several days for the performance of a reservation is good. At common law the right to take duty which used to occupy but one day, or two at the
most. If an ordinary banking business were starved in the same manner as the Paymaster's office is
PARLIAMENTARY TRAINS. starved by the absence of a sufficient working staff, the The Times of Wednesday last contained a short corres. proprietors would soon hear from their customers. When, pondence on the subject of “ Parliamentary” railway however, the business is that of the public, carried on by trains, which deserves a passing notice, not ouly on the Government, the customers find themselves utterly account of the intrinsic importance of the question helpless in the way of complaint.
raised, but also as a signal instance of the perfunctory manner in which cases out of the ordinary routine are treated in public offices. There is probably no depart.
ment of the Government service where the public are THE CONSTITUTION of the Court of Appeal in each of its
treated with more consideration than they are by the divisions is a matter of considerable interest to suitors at
Board of Trade, and it would be hard to find anywhere the present time. Lords Justices BAGGALLAY, BRAMWELL, and Loss, being away, there are not sufficient judges
a more attentive or courteous gentleman than Mr.
Heath's correspondent, and yet, when written to on in town without the aid of the Master of the Rolle, the Lord
a question certainly within the scope of his duties, Chancellor, and an ex-officio judge, to form two full courts
though somewhat out of the common track, he has of appeal. And the change in the constitution of the
returned an answer eminently calculated to give the imdivisions leads to considerable inconvenience. Thus, on
pression-first, that he has never giveu a thougbt to the Wednesday last, at Lincoln's-inn, there were two cases in
question ; and, secondly, that he does not think it worth the paper which had been partly heard before the Ap
his while to look into it. peal Court when differently constituted, and in order to
The facts are few and simple, A Mr. Heath, who save the trouble of their being re-heard de novo, they
appears from his address to be an elector of Marylebone, had to stand out of the paper until precisely the same
seems to have induced the Recorder to ask a question in judges should again form the court as were sitting on the
the House of Commons respecting the parliamentary former occasion. This delay and inconvenience is almost
tickets issued by the Great Western Railway, and being unavoidable so long as some of the Lords Justices are
dissatisfied with the answer given, he wrote to Mr. compelled to go circuit, and although it right at
Chamberlain, giving a number of instances of stations present, by a little more care, be reduced, it is likely to
between which, as he alleges, no tickets are obtainable become a considerable grievance after the time when all the Lords Justices, having been appointed after the
except at rates greatly in excess of the parliamentary
scale. He also gives an instance in which, in order to Judicature Act, are liable to go circuit.
reach London at parliamentary fares, it is necessary to leave Newbury at 8.50 a.m. for Reading, and remain there till 6.25 p.m. before proceeding further. The
complaint may or may not be well founded; we have The question of the fees of counsel is stated to have no means of investigating the question, and neither recently arisen in Canada upon a claim by Mr. Doutre,
intention nor desire to express any opinion upon it: what Q.C., upon the Dominion Government, for services as we wish to call attention to is the manner in which it is counsel before the Fisheries Commission, which services
treated by the Board of Trade.
The answer of the Board he values at 50 dols. a-day, the aggregate being some
ing some , is in the following terms :20,000 dols. The Canada Legal News says that “Mr. “I am directed by the Board of Trade to acknowledge Doutre deposed that in the test case of Angers v. Queen the receipt of your letter of the 29th inst., addressed to Ins. Co. he received 500 dols. in fees, although he spent the President, in regard to the parliamentary train but two days in court. In another case, in which he arrangements on the Great Western Railway. In reply, I obtained a 12,000 dol. verdict, he was three days in
ani to state that the provisions of the Cbeap Train Act, 7 conrt, and received 1,800 dols. in fees, besides the taxed
& 8 Vict., c. 85, do not make it obligatory upon a railcosts. In the case of Grant v. Beaudry, known as the
way company to do more than convey passengers at parlia
mentary fares by one train at least daily from one end to Orange trial, he was paid 10 dols. per hour. Mr. F. X.
the other of each trunk, branch, or junction line. It thereArchambault, of Montreal, stated that in the case of
fore appears that the Great Western Railway Company meet Wilson v. Citizens' Ins. Co., the amount claimed in the
| the strictly legal requirements of the Act of Parliament, soit was 2,000 dols., but he received 1,000 dols, as a re which do not oblige a company to run a cheap train from tainer, besides other fees. In the case of Rolland v. I every station on a trunk, branch, or junction line to every Citizens' Ing. Co., his retainer was 2,000 dols. In three station on other trank, branch, or junction lines on their capias cases which were presented as one, and which system. lasted about a month, he received 2,800 dols. altogether. "I am to ad] that the reply recently given by the PresiIn the criminal case of a woman charged with stealing dent in the House of Commoos did pot state that parlia some silks, he received a retainer of 1,500 dols. This
mentary tickets are issued at and to all stations on the comclient was merely admitted to bail. To defend a cri
pany's system, but merely that parliamentary tickets were minal case, which would not occupy more than
issued at all stations.' two days, he had received 2,000 dols." These
The effect of this is that, in the opinion of the Board, amounts, says the Albany Law Journal, seems large,
all that a company are bound to do is to run a train no doubt ; but they are by no means unprecedented in
from end to end of their line, carrying, we presume, this country. There are a number of counsel in the
passengers over that distance, but that they are not in
passengers over. city of New York who command 250 dols. a.day. There
any manner obliged to provide for the conveyance of would seem to be no reason why & British lawyer
passengers from any station to any other-except, we supsbould not be paid as much as a British physician, both pose, the terminal stations. If this be the true reading standing equal in their respective professions ; and a
of the Act, it is evident that it is quite inadequate to British jury recently gave Dr. Phillips a verdict of
effect the declared object of Parliament, which was to £16,000 damages for two years' loss of business.
use the railways as a means of cheap intercommunica
tion for all places throughout the country. In a case of concealment of birth tried before Mr. Justice
But a very
slight examination of the Act referred to in Mr. Cal. Hawkins at Maidstone, the young woman pleaded “Guilty,"
craft's letter will show that this is not its true meaning. and the learned judge remarked that he wished that in cases of this class-i.e., cases of mere concealment-tbe prisoners
By the Act the company are required to run from end to abould, where it was possible, be admitted to bail, as their
end of every trunk, brauch, or junction line at least one discharge without further sentence might create tbe impres
train each way per diem (1) at hours to be fixed by sion that they suffered no punishment; but, on the other the directors with the sanction of the Board of Trade hand, it would be obviously unjust not to take into account and the declared object of the Act throws upon the Board the imprisonment already suffered.
| the duty of seeing that these hours are such as to afford
reasonable means of transport over the whole system litigation will take place before a tribunal where the (2) stopping at every station, if required (why 80, proceedings are simpler and the delays less than in any if they are not bound to book passengers to and from other court in the country, and where, therefore, the every station ?) (3) in covered carriages at a specified necessary costs (we do not speak of the expenses maximum rate of one penny per mile; and (4) at a voluntarily incurred by railway companies, such as the specified minimum rate of twelve miles per hour, includ. employment of parliamentary agents, counsel, &c.) are ing stoppages.
exceptionally small; and, secondly, because the defendants It is clear, therefore, that the duty of the company is, are certain to be in every case able to pay any costs first, to carry passengers from any station on their line which may be awarded against them, so that, if a comto any other station at parliamentary rates ; secondly, plaint be well founded, the necessary litigation can be where these stations are situate upon the same trunk, conducted almost without risk. That an ill-founded com. branch, or junction railway, to carry in through plaint should entail serious loss is only a proper proteccarriages, proceeding continuously, and at a rate of not tion to an innocent defendant. less than twelve miles an hour, including stoppages; and, thirdly, where these stations are situate on different branches of their railway, so to time the trains as to effect convenient “ connections," to the satisfaction of
BICYCLE LAW. the Board of Trade. It is, of course, impossible so to AMONG the branches of law of recent development, few arrange that passengers who have to change carriages have made such rapid progress as that relating to shall not be obliged to wait at the junctions for a reason. bicycles. As we shall presently see, the bicycle has able-perhaps in some cases even a considerable-time:
already received the attention of the Legislature; it has on a line like the Great Western, with a multiplicity of occupied and perplexed quarter sessions ; it has filled junctions, it would be impossible to effect this without the minds of learned judges of the Queen's Bench Divi. seriously interfering with the requirements of the other sion with doubt; and it has now at length got a case traffic; but a delay of more than eight hours at a single devoted to it in the law reports. These are considerable junction in the course of a journey to London--if it is
| achievements for a machine so recently introduced. really imposed by the existing arrangements is so What is a bicycle ? Definition is not easy, and we obviously unreasonable and oppressive as presumptively do not find in any bye-laws relating to bicycles which to call, it seems to us, for the exercise by the Board of
we have seen, any attempt to define a bicycle. But Trade of their powers of control over the time table. we observe that in one form of bye-laws a bicyclist
The other matters of which Mr. Heath complains admit is defined as “a person riding, or otherwise using, a of a ready remedy, though one which is not, we think, bicycle on any highway”-a definition which bears a within the province of the Board of Trade. Under Lord family resemblance to that of the archdeacon as a person Cardwell's Act, it is part of the duty of every railway exercising archidiaconal functions. We have had, howcompany to afford “all reasonable facilities" for the ever, within the last few days an attempt at a definition. conveyance of traffic over its line, and it has been de- |
over its line, and it has been de- | According to a learned metropolitan police magistrate, cided by the Railway Commissioners, and affirmed upon a bicycle is a machine with two wheels. A man who appeal, that to charge rates in excess of those authorized was summoned last week at the Wandsworth Police. by Parliament is a breach of this duty; and, further, that I court for riding a bicycle between sunset and sunrise “ booking” from and to any place from and to which the without having a light attached thereto, pleaded that company is bound to carry-or does, in fact, carry his machine was not a bicycle but a velocipede; and Mr. -is a reasonable facility within the meaning of this Act; Paget is reported to have laid it down that “if there and we cannot doubt that if the company refuse to were two wheels to the machine it was a bicycle.” Of issue tickets at parliamentary rates from any station on course, it must be understood that the magistrate in. their line to any other station to which they carry, tended to include in the definition, besides the two or to permit passengers to travel with such tickets by any wheels, the fact that one of the wheels is worked by the parliamentary trains which they actually run; or, if feet of the rider ; so qualified the definition would seem there be any part of their system over which they do not to answer all practical purposes. run the required cheap trains-in any of these cases they! A bicycle is a “carriage" within the Highway Act of could, and would, be compelled to afford the requisite 1835. This was decided in Taylor v. Goodwin (27 W. facilities by the Railway Commissioners upon a proper R. 489, L. R. 4 Q. B. D. 228). In that case coupsel for application to them. They could not, we think, interfere the appellant argued with zeal and ingenuity against with the discretion of the directors as to the hours this view. He pointed out that bicycles could not possibly at which the trains ought to start, unless re- have been within the contemplation of the Legislature quested by the Board of Trade to advise them at the time of passing the Act; that you “ride " a bicycle upon this point, but for the purpose of se while you “ drive” a carriage, and that if a bicycle is a curing to the public the proper enjoyment of carriage, a wheelbarrow must be a carriage ; nay, even a such trains as are, in fact, run, this seems to be the man trundling a wheel along a highway must be taken proper, and is, so far as we can see, the only available to be “ driving a carriage.” On the other hand, counsel machinery.
for the respondent contended that anything which carries But this remedy, like most others, is only open people is a “carriage," and that to “drive” means to to “a complainant”; and it is idle for Mr. Heath, * propel." A bicyclist propels something which carries or any one else, to say that “the individual action of a him ; hence he drives a carriage. The Qusen's Bench private person would be futile against a powerful railway Division were a good deal perplexed. Mr. Justice Mellor company," and thereupon, to call upon a department of said that the question which, when stated at first, the Government to set right, brevi manu, and without seemed a very simple one, and one which would not authority, that for which there exists a remedy duly require lawyers to decide, appeared more doubtful when provided by law, amply sufficient for the purpose, and it came to be argued by lawyers. But the court ultiavailable as the result of a judicial investigation, in the mately acceded to the contention of the counsel for the absence of which any idea of compulsion against the respondent. The word “ carriage,” they thought, was company would savour too much of arbitrary tyranny to
large enough to contain a bicycle. The mischief intended be entertained by any public department. It may be to be prevented by the section of the Highway Act in a misfortune that in this case, as in others, & remedy question in the case was the propelling of any vehicle along which can only be obtained as the result of litigation is a highway so as to endanger persons using it. It was im. often an expensive luxury; but this is a necessary in material how it was propelled, whether by ste am, or by cident of all civilized life, and is in the present case a horse, or “by another animal”-e.g., a bicy clist. The an objection of less force than usuai, because, first, the result of this decision is to render the rider of a bicycle
THE YEAR'S SOLICITORS' CASES.
liable to the penalties imposed by section 78 of the Highway Act, 1835, on any person riding or driving fariously so as to endanger life. In Taylor v. Goodwin the bicyclist was driving his machine along a highway at
| The past year has been rather fertile in cases of importthe rate of about fourteen miles an hour, and knocked a person down and injured him. Under the section the
ance to solicitors, and we propose to collect from the penalty for this offence is not to exceed £5, in case the
various series of reports the points in which the law
relating to this branch of the profession has been dedriver is not the owner of the carriage, but if he be the
clared or altered. owner, the penalty may be £10, and in default of payment
There have been three decisions on the subject of the he is liable to hard labour. Wherefore it would appear that a bicyclist who undertakes one of those furious races
lien of solicitors. Newington Local Board v. Eldridge against time which are understood to be essential to
(L. R. 12 Ch. D. 349) was a curious case. A local attaining distinction in the bicycle world, would be
board sought a mandamus to compel their former clerk, prudent to hire, and not to own, his machine. We do
a solicitor, to deliver to the present clerk to the board
all the documents, &c., in his possession belonging to not, however, guarantee that even in that case a court
the plaintiffs, and especially all briefs and other papers destitute of bicycling enthusiasm might not hold that
necessary to enable the present clerk to prosecute an he was the owner during the time of hiring. Another consequence of the decision in Taylor v.
appeal in an action brought by the present plainGoodwin is to subject the bicycle-rider to the provisions
tiffs against the Cottingham Local Board, and also for of section 72 of the Highway Act, 1835, imposing a
an injunction restraining the defendant from parting penalty on any person who wilfully drives any carriage
with such documents, &c., to any other parties. The
defendant had been elected cierk to the board at a upon any footpath or causeway by the side of any road
salary of £50 a year, which had been afterwards raised made or set apart for the use or accommodation of foot
to $80 a year, not to include actions, arbitrations, par. passengers. Independently of any local regulations,
liamentary proceedings, journeys, &c. The plaintiffs made under the provision to which we shall presently refer, the bicyclist must keep to the carriage way. He
afterwards called upon the defendant to resign the clerk
ship, and upon his refusing to do so they passed a resolumust also (unless the contrary is provided by local byelaws keep on the left side of the road (section 78).
tion removing him from his office and directing him to He need not, however, have his name and place of
hand over all documents belonging to the board which
were in his possession, and they also obtained an order abode painted on his bicycle, because section 76 of the
for change of solicitors in the pendir.g action against the Act, which requires the owner's name to be painted on
Cottingham Local Board. The defendant claimed a every " wagon, cart, or other such carriage " used on any highway, and imposes a penalty upon default, only in
lien upon certain of the documents in respect of the
costs of the action. Bacon, V.C., made an order in cludes carriages ejusdem generis with a wagon or cart. (See Danby v. Hunter, 28 W. R. 228, L. R. 5 Q. B. D.
the terms asked for, holding that the defendant's claim in respect of professional services rendered
could not justify him, as the servant of the board, in Coming now to the recent legislation on the subject of
refusing to produce documents which belonged to bicycles, the Highway Act of 1878 provides, by section
the plaintiffs. This order was, however, varied by the 26, that the county authority-that is, the justices in
Court of Appeal, on the ground that it might preju. quarter sessions may from time to time make, with re
dice the defendant's lien, and ought not to have been spect to all or any main roads or other highways within
made before the trial of the action. They ordered any highway area in their county, and, when made, alter or repeal, bye-laws "for regulating the use of bicycles.”
the giving up of the documents on payment into
court by the plaintiffs of a sum sufficient to meet But by section 35, such bye-laws are inot to be of any
the defendant's claim, the defendant to have the same lien validity until they have been submitted to, and con
upon the sum paid in as he would have had upon the docu. firmed by, the Local Government Board. There is
ments. In Ex parte Bramble, In re Toleman (28 W. R. no power for the Local Government Board to make
676, L. R. 13 Ch. D. 885), the question of a solicitor's lien bye-laws, or compel the justices to make bye-laws.
was raised in a bankruptcy proceeding. The solicitor, The result must be, if the power is exercised by
who had prepared a deed of partnership between two quarter sessions, to introduce a singular variety of regu.
liquidating debtors, refused to produce the deed, or any lations in different counties. A recent learned writer on
other papers in his custody belonging to the debtors, to the subject of highways says that bye-laws hava been
the trustee in the liquidation, on the ground of a lien framed which practically prevent the use of bicycles;
upon them for the costs of preparing the deed. It was for instance, it has been provided that the bicyclist must
contended on the solicitor's behalf that the trustee could place his lamp, after dark, in such a position as to make
not stand in a better position than the clients themselves, it impossible for the driver to see anyone approaching
and that the lien was a “lawful impediment" to the on foot; and it has even been provided that the regula
production of the documents within section 96 of the tions with reference to locomotives on highways, com.
Bankruptcy Act, 1869; but the Chief Judge, affirming pelling them to stop on any driver or rider on the road
the decision of the county court judge, ordered the pro. holding up his hand, shall apply to bicycles. This is
duction of the documents, holding that the lien of the absurd. All that is needed are a few simple rules
solicitor was not prejudiced, since he was not required declaring the law as to the use of the carriage way only
to give them up, but merely to produce them for the by the bicyclist, and as to the side on which he shall pass
trustee's inspection. In Shippey v. Grey (28 W. R. all vehicles; as to his carrying a lighted lamp attached
877), the solicitors for the plaintiff in an action against to his bicycle between certain hours; as to his carrying
the Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway Company had a whistle or horn when overtaking carriages or foot
signed judgment for £400 damages with costs, but, passengers, and rendering assistance to restive horses.
before the costs had been taxed, a judgment creditor of It would be a great advantage to the bicyclist, and
the plaintiff obtained, exc parte, a garnishee order probably also to the public who use the highways, if in
attaching all debts due to the plaintiff to answer his the next session of Parliament power were given to the
judgment. The plaintiff's solicitors then served upon the Local Government Board to frame and publish regula
judgment creditor a notice that they claimed a lien on tions as to bicycles which shall be generally binding. It is certainly hard that the bicyclist who undertakes one
the sum recovered in the action against the railway com
pany in respect of their costs in that action. The Court of those long journeys which are the means of rising to a
of Appeal, affirming the decision of the Common Pleas distinguished position in the fraternity should have to
Division, held that the solicitors were en titled, as against stop on the borders of each county, and inquire what
the judgment creditor, to a charging order, under the 23 bye-laws are in force there.
& 24 Vict. c. 127, e. 28, upon the sum recovered, and
that the case was governed by Faithfull v. Ewen (26 bound to specify the items to which he objects, and W. R. 270, L. R. 7 Ch. D. 495).
need not state his reasons for objecting. Ex parte Ward v. Eyre (28 W. R. 712) is an important deci Ditton, In re Woods (28 W. R. 402, L. R. 13 Ch. D. sion as to the respective rights of a country solicitor and | 318), raised a question as to the right of a trustee in his town agent. In a suit by a country solicitor for an bankruptcy to disallow items in a bill of costs tendered account against his town agents, the latter claimed a | by way of proof by & solicitor. It was argued that the specific balance, with interest. A balance smaller than solicitor was entitled, under 6 & 7 Vict.'c. 73, s. 37, to that claimed was found to be due, and the Court of have his costs taxed in the ordinary way, but the Court Appeal, affirming the decision of the Master of the Rolls, of Appeal held that this enactment does not apply to a held that the defendants could not recover interest on proof in bankruptcy ; that a solicitor has no absolute the disbursements or upon the balance due to them. right to insist upon his charges being referred to taxaReliance had been placed by the defendant's counsel tion, and that the registrar had power, with the assist. upon the 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 42, s. 28, and 33 & 34 Vict, ance (if required) of the taxing-master, to determine the c. 28, s. 17, but the Lords Justices held, with reference to amount due. With reference to the particular items in the former statute, that no “ demand of payment” had dispute, the court held that charges by a solicitor for been made, and that no “sum certain" had become addressing and posting circulars were improper. payable, since the balance claimed by the defendant had Two cases during the year involved questions as to proved to be inaccurate. With reference to the argu- setting off costs. In Barker v. Hemming (28 W. R. ment founded upou 33 & 34 Vict. c. 28, the court decided 1 764) the plaintiff had obtained judgment by default that section 17 of that Act was not applicable to the I against the drawer and acceptor of a bill of exchange, case of a country solicitor and his town agent, since the and issued an execution against the goods of the former. former was not a “client” within section 3, and also The acceptor afterwards got the judgment set aside with that the statute had no retrospective operation.
costs, on the ground that his acceptance had been forged, The subject of the taxation of costs was dealt with in and he also set up a claim to the goods seized in the four cases. In re Fisher (42 L. T. N. S. 261) involved l execution against the drawer, and an interpleader issue the question, what are “special circumstances " within 6 was tried, in which judgment was ultimately entered & 7 Vict. c. 73, s. 41, justifying the taxation of a bill against him, with costs. In taxing the defendant's of costs after it has been settled in account ? A charge costs in the action upon the bill of exchange, the master of felony was pending against the managing clerk of the allowed the plaintiff to deduct the costs due to him from solicitors, and the case against him involved the bona the defendant as the unsuccessful claimant in the interfides and legality of certain items in the bill of costs pleader issue. This decision was upheld by Lindley, J., which referred to a period before the charge was pre and the defendant appealed to the Queen's Bench Diviferred. The Exchequer Division, upon the solicitor's sion. It was urged by the plaintiff's counsel that the application, crdered that the bill should be taxed, costs could be set off because they both arose Pollock, B., observing that the fact of the pendency of out of the same matter-namely, the question of the oriminal proceedings was not a sufficient ground for ownership of the goods—but Cockburn, C.J., and Bowen, depriving a solicitor of his right, as an officer of the J., held that the two proceedings were distinct, and court, to have his bill referred to the proper officer for that the set-off should not have been allowed. This taxation, the only question being whether there were decision has been reviewed by the Court of Appeal “special circumstances" to warrant the taxation. In (see 24 SOLICITORS' JOURNAL, 779), and reliance was the absence of any proof that the application was a placed by the appellant's counsel upon rule 19 of the sham one, the circumstances of the present case rendered Additional Rules as to Costs, 1875, but the court took it fair and reasonable that the items in the bill the same view as the Queen's Bench Division. James, should be investigated by the taxing officer. In | L.J., pointed out that the rule meant that the set-off Philipps v. Philipps (28 W. R. 376, L. R. 5 Q. B. D. must be not merely between two persons, but between 60), the Queen's Bench Division had refused an applica- two parties-i.e., parties to the same proceedingstion to strike out the statement of claim as embarrassing, whereas the interpleader was a distinct and collateral but the Court of Appeal reversed this decision, and gave proceeding as to a matter which was not in question the costs of the appeal and of the proceedings in the in the action itself, the identity of the parties to the court below. The master declined to tax these costs respective proceedings being a mere accident. In Er during the pendency of the action, and Field, J., refused parte Griffin, In re Adams (2) (28 W. R. 714, L. R. an order referring them to taxation. The defendants 14 Ch. D. 37), the question of setting off costs arose in then brought the matter before the Court of Appeal, who a bankruptcy proceeding, and the Court of Appeal held held that the costs must be taxed and paid forthwith, that the Bankruptcy Court ought not to allow the costs on the ground that the express order of the Court of of a proceeding in the High Court to be set off against Appeal overrode the practice of the Queen's Bench costs in a bankruptcy. James, L.J., pointed out Division, according to which the taxation of the costs of that, as was observed by Lord Eldon in Hall v. an interlocutory application is postponed till the termi- | Ody (2 B. & P. 28), the allowance of such a set-off would nation of the action. In Simmons v. Storer (28 W. R. have a tendency to prejudice the lien of the solicitor, who 408, L. R. 14 Ch. D. 154) the plaintiff had obtained was the equitable owner of the costs. judgment in an action in the Exchequer Division, to enforce which he had taken out several garnishee summonses on which no further proceedings had been taken. The defendant afterwards brought an action against the At the Garstang Sessions on Thursday week, Mr. G. plaintiff in the Chancery Division in which action an Dickson, solicitor, applied on behalf of the overseers of order was made directing an account of the amount due the Union for a warrant against Police-constable Lee, of to the defendant in respect of his judgment in the first the County Lancaster Constabulary, for the non-payment action, and of the proceedings taken by him to enforce it.
of 5s. 1d. for poor-rate due on the 29th of September last. The chief clerk referred the bill of costs for taxation to a
Mr. C. H. Sadler, deputy-clerk of the peace for Lancashire master of the Exchequer Division, who disallowed the costs
appeared for the county police authorities, who denied the
liability of the building, which was used for Crown purposes, of the abortive garnishee summonses. The Master of the
to be rated. It was stated that the application was made Rolls held that these costs had been properly disallowed,
by the overseers in consequence of the threat of the district and that, under the Rules of the Supreme Court (Costs),
auditor of the Local Government Board to surcharge. It 1875, ord. 7. r. 26, the master was bound to disallow
was stated that the liability of the police to be thus rated them. He also held that when a party makes an objec would be determined by appeal. No warrant was grantet tion in writing, under ord. 7, r. 30, to the allowance pending the appeal, but Mr. Dickson said he would apply or disallowance of any item by a taxing master, he is only for a mandamus.