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meeting at Sheffield fulfilled these requirements more fully than any previous meeting, and the result has been to deepen the conviction that a really valuable purpose is served by these gatherings. No doubt is felt in the best-informed quarters that the Brighton meeting will be larger than any provincial meeting yet held. According to some estimates, the Sussex Law Society will have to provide for 1,000 visitors. That society has, we believe, about fifty members, as against the 117 members of the Sheffield Society. Under these circumstances there is a natural and honourable feeling among the London solicitors (who will constitute a large proportion of the visitors) that it is unfair to leave the Sussex Society to bear the whole of the heavy expenses of such a meeting. There is, moreover, a desire on the part of London members to repay, in somo degree, the profuse hospitality invariably bestowed on them at the provincial assemblies. Everyone agrees with our able correspondent who first raised the question, that, in some way or other, the town members of the society should co-operate with the Brighton Society, but the difficulty is how to do this in such a way as not to be distasteful to the society which has so spiritedly undertaken the burden of the meeting. It appears to us that the Sussex Society might, without any impropriety, consent to admit as honorary members solicitors resident in London, and if this were done a ready means would be afforded for the co-operation of town members in the way of subscription to the funds of the Sussex Society.

The Proceedings in a prosecution for libel at the Guildhall Police Court on Wednesday seem to show that the case of Beg. v. Carden (28 W. R. 133, L. E. 5 Q. B. D. 1) did not entirely settle the practice to be observed in such cases. The solicitor for the prosecution objected to the counsel for the defence cross-examining as to the truth of the libel, but the latter urged that Beg. v. Carden only settled that witnesses could not be called before the magistrate in support of the plea of justification, and that it had in no way limited the general right of cross-examination; and ultimately the presiding alderman adjourned the case, in order that a mandamus might be applied for. The question, as now raised, appears to be still to some extent an open one. The Lord Chief Justice said, in Beg. v. Garden, that " unless there is some further statutory duty imposed upon the magistrate, the evidence be/ore him must be confined to the question whether the case is such as ought to be sent for trial; " and since he especially noticed and overruled the defendant's argument that, in the event of the the prosecutor's death, the defendant would be deprived of the benefit of his cross-examination, he would seem to have contemplated that his decision would have the effect of excluding cross-examination as well as evidence on the part of the accused person. Mr. Justice Lush observed that, before the passing of the 30 & 31 "Vict. c. 35, " all that was to be put into writing was the evidence that was material to the charge against the accused." In Beg. v. Carden (as in the recent case) the objection was taken during the cross-examination of the prosecutor, and the rule nisi was for a mandamus to the magistrate to allow the cross-examination, as well as to hear evidence of the truth of the libel, but the right of cross-examination as to its truth was not expressly dealt with by either of the judges of the Queen's Bench Division.

The Ground Game Act, 1880, it will have been observed, gives the occupier a right to kill and take ground game concurrently with any other person "entitled" so to do, and the person entitled is ordinarily the landlord by virtue of a reservation. It is somewhat curious, however, that it has never been precisely settled whether this reservation must be by deed or whether an oral reservation is good. At common law the right to take

game (being a profit d prendre) is one of those incorporeal hereditaments which can be granted by deed alone, and it is established by a succession of decisions that where there is a leaso with a " reservation" of game to the landlord, this is not a reservation at all, strictly so called, but a re-grant of the profit d prendre by the tenant to the landlord (see Wickham v. Hawker, 7 M. & W. 63). But the Game Act of 1831 (1 & 2 Will. 4. c. 32), whether purposely or from the draftsman's ignorance of the learning of the subject, expressly recognizes a parol reservation in section 8, and protects the landlord in his enjoyment of it by sections 12 and 30. The words of section 8 are, "nothing in this Act contained shall authorize" any person seised of land to kill the game "in any case where, by deed, grant, lease, or any written or parol demise or contract, a right of entry upon such land for the purpose of killing the game hath been, or hereafter shall be, reserved or retained by, or given, or allowed to any grantor, lessor, or other person whatsoever." Section 12 inflicts a penalty on the occupier for killing game, in cases where the right to the game "hath been or shall be specially reserved by, or granted to, the landlord," and section 30, after inflicting a penalty on any person trespassing in pursuit of game, provides that the leave and licence of the occupier shall not be a sufflcicut defence in any case where the landlord has the right to the game "by virtue of any reservation or otherwise as hereinbefore mentioned "—the reference being obviously to section 8. It has, no doubt, been assumed in more than one case (see Spicer v. Barnard, 28 L. J. M. C. 176; Jones v. Williams, 46 L. J. M. C. 270) that a parol reservation is good in law to support a conviction under these sections. But until there has been an express judicial decision to the contrary (for the dictum of Lindley, J., in Jones v. Williams, that it follows from section 8 of the Game Act and the decisions upon it that there may be a parol reservation of game upon a parol demise, is not quite conclusive) we think there is some ground for maintaining that the Game Act does not alter the law by altering the mode of transfer of an incorporeal hereditament (for if that had been intended, it would have been effected by express words), but merely protects the landlord in the enjoyment of a revocable licence so long as it remains unrevoked.

The Chancery Paymaster's Office appears to be in a condition of discontent which is the natural result of excess of work beyond the powers of the existing staff, combined with the hope of assistance too long deferred. The authorities of the Treasury, on whom rests the care of providing the requisite addition to the Paymaster's staff of clerks, are taking time to think about doing what must inevitably be done sooner or later. Not only is the staff inadequate to perform tbo existing work, but it is tolerably certain that before m»ny years it will be called upon to transact a greatly increased business. It is probable that the whole of the /unds in court in the common law divisions, will be ultimately administered by the present Chancery Pi>/-office; and probably the bankruptcy funds will be *ent there after a time. In fact, the office (which is really one of the largest banks in London) is not only at present undermanned, but (he work is increasing year by year, and in all probability more work will constantly fall to its share. By way of some slight help, the Paymaster has been allowed the assistance of two writers, but their aid is as a drop in the bucket compared with what is really required. There can be no reason on the score of economy for this reluctance to increase the staff. The Chancery Pay-office not only pays its way, but brings a large surplus revenue towards the costs of the administration of justice. Solicitors complain that they cannot procure sufficient attention there, and that they have now to wait several days for the performance of a. duty which used to occupy but one day, or two at the

moat. If an ordinary banking business were starved in the same manner as the Paymaster's office is starred by the absence of a sufficient working staff, the proprietors would soon hear from their customers. Wh en, however, the business is that of the public, carried on by the Government, the customers find themselves utterly helpless in the way of complaint.

Th« coxsTiTUTioy of the Court of Appeal in each of its divisions is a matter of considerable interest to suitors at tie present time. Lords Justices Baggallay, Bkamwell, and Lush, being away, there are not sufficient judges in town without the aid of the Master of the Rolls, the Lord Chancellor, and an ex-oficio judge, to form two full courts of appeal. And the change in the constitution of the divisions leads to considerable inconvenience. Thus, on Wednesday latt, at Liucoln's-inn, there were two cases in the paper which had been partly heard before the Appeal Court when differently constituted, and in order to save the trouble of their being re-heard de novo, they had to stand out of the paper until precisely the same judges shonld again form the court as were sitting on the former occasion. This delay and inconvenience is almost unavoidable so long as some of the Lords Justices are compelled to go circuit, and although it might at present, by a little more care, be reduced, it is likely to become a considerable grievance after the time when all the Lords Justices, having been appointed after the Judicature Act, are liable to go circuit.

The question of the fees of counsel is stated to have recently arisen in Canada upon a claim by Mr. Doutre, Q.C-, upon the Dominion Government, for services as connsel before the Fisheries Commission, which services he values at 50 dols. a-day, the aggregate being some 20,000 dols. The Canada Legal News says that " Mr. Doutre deposed that in the test case of Angers v. Queen Int. Co. he received 500 dols. in fees, although he spent but two days in court. In another case, in which he obtained a 12,000 dol. verdict, he was three days in court, and received 1,800 dols. in fees, besides the taxed costs. In the case of Grant v. Beaudry, known as the Orange trial, he was paid 10 dols. per hour. Mr. F. X. Archambault. of Montreal, stated that in the case of Wilton v. Citizens' Ins. Co., the amount claimed in the suit was 2,000 dols., but he received 1,000 dols. as a retainer, besides other fees. In the case of Holland v. Citizens' Int. Co., his retainer was 2,000 dols. In three capias cases which were presented as one, and which lasted about a month, he received 2,800 dols. altogether. In the criminal case of a woman charged with stealing some, silks, he received a retainer of 1,500 dols. This client was merely admitted to bail. To defend a criminal case, which would not occupy more than two days, he had received 2,000 dols." These amounts, says the Albany Law Journal, seems large, no doubt j but they aro by 110 means unprecedented in this country. There are a number of counsel in the city of New York who command 250 dols. a-day. There would seem to be no reason why a British lawyer shonld not be paid as much as a British physician, both standing equal in their respective professions ; and a British jury recently gave Dr. Phillips n verdict of £16,000 damages for two years' loss of business.

In a case of concealment of birth tried before Mr. Justice Hawkins at Maidstone, the young woman pleaded " Guilty," tod the learned judge remarked that he wished that in cases of this class—i.e., cases of mere concealment—the prisoners should, where it was possible, be admitted to bail, as their discbarge withont further sentence might create the impression that they suffered no punishment; but, on the other hand, it would be obviously unjust not to take into account liit imprisonment already suffered.


The Times of Wednesday last contained a short correspondence on the subject of "Parliamentary" railway trains, which deserves a passing notice, not only on account of the Intrinsic; importance of the question raised, but also as a signal instance of the perfunctory manner in which cases out of the ordinary routine are treated in public offices. There is probably no department of the Government service where the public are treated with more consideration than they aro by the Board of Trade, and it would be hard to find anywhere a more attentive or courteous gentleman than Mr. Heath's correspondent, and yet, when written to on a question certainly within the scope of his duties, though somewhat out of the common track, he has returned an answer eminently calculated to give the impression—first, that he has never giveu a thought to the question; and, secondly, that he does not think it worth his while to look into it.

The facts are few and simple. A Mr. Heath, who appears from his address to be an elector of Marylebone, seems to have induced the Becorder to ask a question in the House of Commons respecting the parliamentary tickets issued by the Great Western Railway, and being dissatisfied with the answer given, he wrote to Mr. Chamberlain, giving a number of instances of stations between which, as he alleges, no tickets are obtainable except at rates greatly in excess of the parliamentary scale. He also gives an instance in which, in order to reach London at parliamentary fares, it is necessary to leave Newbury at 8.50 a.m. for Reading, and remain there till 6.25 p.m. before proceeding further. The complaint may or may not be well founded; we have no means of investigating the question, and neither intention nor desire to express auy opinion upon it: what we wish to call attention to is the manner in which it is treated by the Board of Trade. * The answer of the Board is in the following terras :—

"I am directed by tho Board of Trade to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 29th inst., addressod to the President, in regard to the parliamentary train arrangements on the Great Western Railway. In reply, I am to state that the provisions of the Cheap Train Act, 7 &8 Vict., c. 85, do not make it obligatory upou a railway company to do more than convey passengers at parliamentary fares by one train at least daily from one end to the other of each trunk, branch, or junction line. It therefore appears that the tit eat Western Railway Company meet the strictly legal requirements of the Act of Parliament^ which do not oblige a company to run a cheap train from every station on a trunk, branch, or junction line to every station on other trunk, branch, or junction lines on their system.

"I am to ad i that the reply recently given by the President in the House of Commons did not state that parliamentary tickets are issued at and to all stations on the company's system, but merely that parliamentary tickets were issued at all stations."

The effect of this is that, in the opinion of the Board, all that a company are bound to do is to run a train from end to end of their line, carrying, we presume, passengers over that distance, but that thoy are not in any manner obliged to provide for the conveyance of passengers from any station to any other— except, we suppose, the terminal stations. If this be the true reading of the Act, it is evident that it is quite inadequate to effect the declared object of Parliament, which was to use the railways as a means of cheap intercommunication for all places throughout the country. But a very slight examination of the Act referred to in Mr. Calcraft's letter will show that this is not its true meaning. By the Act the company are required to run from end to end of every trunk, branch, or junction line at least one train each way per diem (1) at hours to be fixed by the directors with the sanction of the Board of Trade (and the declared object of the Act throws upon the Board the duty of seeing that these hours are such as to afford

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reasonable means of transport over the whole system) (2) stopping at every station, if required (why so, if they are not bound to book passengers to and from every station f) (3) in covered carriages at a specified maximum rate of one penny per mile; and (4) at a specified minimum rate of twelve miles per hour, including stoppages.

It is clear, therefore, that the duty of the company is, first, to carry passengers from any station on their line to BDy other station at parliamentary rates; secondly, where these stations are situate upon the same trunk, branch, or junction railway, to carry in through carriages, proceeding continuously, and at a rate of not less than twelve miles an hour, including stoppages; and, thirdly, where these stations are situate on different branches of their railway, so to time the trains as to effect convenient " connections," to the satisfaction of the Board of Trade. It is, of course, impossible so to arrange that passengers who have to change carriages shall not be obliged to wait at the junctions for a reasonable—perhaps in some cases even a considerable—time: on a line like the Great Western, with a multiplicity of junctions, it would be impossible to effect this without seriously interfering with the requirements of the other traffic; but a delay of more than eight hours at a single junction in the course of a journey to London—if it is really imposed by the existing arrangements—is so obviously unreasonable and oppressive as presumptively to call, it seems to us, for the exercise by the Board of Trade of their powers of control over the time table.

The other matters of which Mr. Heath complains admit of a ready remedy, though one which is not, we think, within the province of the Board of Trade. Under Lord Cardwell's Act, it is part of the duty of every railway company to afford "all reasonable facilities" for the conveyance of traffic over its line, and it has been decided by the Bailway Commissioners, and affirmed upon appeal, that to charge rates in excess of those authorized by Parliament is a breach of this duty; and, further, that "booking" from and to any place from and to which the company is bound to carry—or does, in fact, carry —is a reasonable facility within the meaning of this Act; and we cannot doubt that if the company refuse to issue tickets at parliamentary rates from any station on their line to any other station to which they carry, or to permit passengers to travel with such tickets by any parliamentary trains which they actually run; or, if there be any part of their system over which they do not run the required cheap trains—in any of these cases they could, and would, be compelled to afford the requisite facilities by the Bailway Commissioners upon a proper application to them. They could not, we think, interfere with the discretion of the directors as to the hours at which the trains ought to start, unless requested by the Board of Trade to advise them upon this point, but for the purpose of securing to the public the proper enjoyment of such trains as are, in fact, run, this seems to be the proper, and is, so far as we can see, the only available machinery.

But this remedy, like most others, is only open to "a complainant"; and it is idle for Mr. Heath, or any one else, to say that " the individual action of a private person would be futile against a powerful railway company," and thereupon, to call upon a department of the Government to set right, brevi manu, and without authority, that for which there exists a remedy duly provided by law, amply sufficient for the purpose, and available as the result of a judicial investigation, in the absence of which any idea of compulsion against the company would savour too much of arbitrary tyranny to be entertained by any public department. It may be a misfortune that in this case, as in others, a remedy which can only be obtained as the result of litigation is often an expensive luxury; but this is a necessary incident of all civilized life, and is in the present case an objection of less force than usuai, because, first, the

litigation will take place before a tribunal where the proceedings are simpler and the delays less than in any other court in the country, and where, therefore, the necessary costs (we do not speak of the expenses voluntarily incurred by railway companies, such as the employment of parliamentary agents, counsel, &c.) are exceptionally small; aud, secondly, because the defendants are certain to be in every case able to pay any costs which may be awarded against them, so that, if a complaint be well founded, the necessary litigation can be conducted almost without risk. That an ill-founded complaint should entail serious loss is only a proper protection to an innocent defendant.


Among the branches of law of recent development, few have made such rapid progress as that relating to bicycles. As we shall presently see, the bicycle has already received the attention of the Legislature; it has occupied and perplexed quarter sessions; it has filled the minds of learned judges of the Queen's Bench Division with doubt; and it has now at length got a case devoted to it in the law reports. These are considerable achievements for a machine so recently introduced.

What is a bicycle f Definition is not easy, and we do not find in any bye-laws [relating to bicycles which we have seen, any attempt to define a bicycle. But we observe that in one form of bye-laws a bicyclist is defined as "a person riding, or otherwise using, a bicycle on any highway"—a definition which bears a family resemblance to that of the archdeacon as a person exercising archidiaconal functions. We have had, however, within the last few days an attempt at a definition. According to a learned metropolitan police magistrate, a bicycle is a machine with two wheels. A man who was summoned last week at the Wandsworth Policecourt for riding a bicycle between sunset and sunrise without having a light attached thereto, pleaded that his machine was not a bicycle but a velocipede; aud Mr. Paget is reported to have laid it down that "it' there were two wheels to the machine it was a bicycle." Of course, it must be understood that the magistrate intended to include in the definition, besides the two wheels, the fact that one of the wheels is worked by the feet of the rider ; so qualified the definition would seem to answer all practical purposes.

A bicycle is a " carriage" within the Highway Act of 1835. This was decided in Taylor v. doodwiu (27 W. R, 489, L. R. 4 Q. B. D. 228). In that case couusel for the appellant argued with zeal and ingenuity against this view. He pointed out that bicycles could not possibly have been within the contemplation of the Legislature at the time of passing the Act; that you "ride" a bicycle while you " drive" a carriage, and that if a bicycle is a carriage, a wheelbarrow must be a carriage; nay, e«n a man trundling a wheel along a highway must be> taken to be "driving a carriage." On the other hand, couusel for the respondent contended that anything which carries people is a "carriage," and that to "drivci" means to "propel." A bicyclist propels something which carries him; hence he drives a carriage. The Qusen's Beuch Division were a good deal perplexed. Mr. Justice Mellor said that the question which, when stated at first, seemed a very simple one, and one which would not require lawyers to decide, appeared more doubtful when it came to be argued by lawyers. But the court ultimately acceded to the contention of the counsel for the respondent. The word " carriage," they thought, was large enough to contain a bicycle. The mischief intended to be prevented by the section of the Highway Act iu question in the case was the propellingof any vehicle along a highway so as to endanger persons using it. It was immaterial how it was propelled, whether by ste am, or by a horse, or " by another animal "—e.g., a bicyclist. The result of this decision is to render the rider of a bicycle liable to the penalties imposed by section 78 of the Highway Act, 1835, on any person riding or driving furiously so as to endanger life. In Taylor v. Goodwin the bicyclist was driving his machine along a highway at the rate of about fourteen miles an hour, and knocked a person down and injured him. Under the section the penalty for this offence is not to exceed £5, in case the driver is not the owner of the carriage, but if he be the owner, the penalty may be £10, and in default of payment he is liable to hard labour. Wherefore it would appear that a bicyclist who undertakes one of those furious races against time which are understood to be essential to attaining distinction in the bicycle world, would be prudent to hire, and not to own, his machine. We do not, however, guarantee that even in that case a court destitute of bicycliug enthusiasm might not hold that he was the owner during the time of hiring.

Another consequence of the decision in Taylor v. Goodwin is to subject the bicycle-rider to the provisions of section 72 of the Highway Act, 1835, imposing a penalty on any person who wilfully drives any carriage upon any footpath or causeway by the side of any road made or set apart for the use or accommodation of foot passengers. Independently of any local regulations, made under the provision to which we shall presently refer, the bicyclist must keep to the carriage way. He must also (unless the contrary is provided by local byelaws) keep on the left side of the road (section 78). He need not, however, have his name and place of abode painted on his bicycle, because section 7G of the Act, which required the owner's name to be painted on every " wagon, cart, or other such carriage" used on any highway, aud imposes a penalty upon default, only includes carriages ejtudem generis with a wagou or cart. (See Danby v. Hunter, 28 W. E. 228, L. It. 5 Q. B. D. 20.)

Coming now to the recent legislation on the subject of bicycles, the Highway Act of 1878 provides, by section 20, that the county authority—that is, the justices in quarter sessions—may from time to time make, with respect to all 01 any main roads or other highways within any highway area in their county, and, when made, alter or repeal, bye-laws "for regulating the use of bicycles." But by section 35, such bye-laws are (not to be of any validity until they have been submitted to, aud confirmed by, the Local Government Board. There is no power for the Local Government Board to make bye-laws, or compel the justices to make bye-laws. The result must be, if the power is exercised by quarter sessions, to introduce a singular variety of regulations in different counties. A recent learned writer on the subject of highways says that bye-laws have been lramed which practically prevent the use of bicycles; for instance, it has been provided that the bicyclist must place his lamp, after dark, in such a position as to make it impossible for the driver to see anyone approaching on foot; and it has even been provided that the regulations with reference to locomotives on highways, compelling them to stop on any driver or rider on the road holding up his hand, shall apply to bicycles. This is absurd. All that is needed are a few simple rules declaring the law as to the use of the carriage way only by the bicyclist, and as to the side on which he shall pass all vehicles; as to his carrying a lighted lamp attached to his bicycle between certain hours; as to his carrying a whistle or horn when overtaking carriages or foot passengers, and rendering assistance to restive horses. It would be a great advantage to the bicyclist, aud probably also to the public who use the highways, if in the next session of Parliament power were given to the Local Government Board to frame and publish regulations as to bicycles which shall be generally binding. It is certainly hard that the bicyclist who undertakes one of those long journeys which are the means of rising to a distinguished position in the fraternity should have to stop on the borders of each county, and inquire what bye-laws are in force there.


The past year has been rather fertile in cases of importance to solicitors, and wo propose to collect from the various series of Teports the points in which the law relating to this branch of the profession has been declared or altered.

There have been three decisions on the subject of the lien of solicitors. Newington Local Board v. Eldridge (L. B. 12 Ch. D. 349) was a curious oase. A local board sought a mandamus to compel their former clerk, a solicitor, to deliver to the present clerk to the board all the documents, &c, in his possession belonging to the plaintiffs, and especially all briefs and other papers necessary to enable the present clerk to prosecute an appeal in an action brought by the present plaintiffs against the Cottingham Local Board, and also for an injunction restraining the defendant from parting with such documents, &c, to any other parties. The defendant had been elected clerk to the board at a salary of £50 a year, which had been afterwards raised to £80 a year, not to include actions, arbitrations, parliamentary proceedings, journeys, &c. The plaintiffs afterwards called upon the defendant to resign the clerkship, and upon his refusing to do so they passed a resolution removing him from his office aud directing him to hand over all documents belonging to the board which were in his possession, and they also obtained an order for change of solicitors in the pending action against the Cottingham Local Board. The defeudaut claimed a lien upon certain of the documents in respect of the costs of the action. Bacon, V.C., made an order in the terms asked for, holding that the defendant's claim in respect of professional services rendered could not justify him, as the servant of the board, in refusing to produce documents which belonged to the plaintiffs. This order was, however, varied by the Court of Appeal, on the ground that it might prejudice the defendant's lien, and ought not to have been made before the trial of the action. They ordered the giving up of the documents on payment into court by the plaintiffs of a sum sufficient to meet the defendant's claim, the defendant to have the same lien upon the sum paid in as he would have had upon the documents. In Ex parte Bramble, In re Toleman (28 W. K. 676, L. R. 13 Oh. D. 885), the question of a solicitor's lien was raised in a bankruptcy proceeding. The solicitor, who had prepared a deed of partnership between two liquidating debtors, refused to produce the deed, or any other papers in his custody belonging to the debtors, to the trustee in the liquidation, on the ground of a lien upon them for the coats of preparing the deed. It was contended on the solicitor's behalf that the trustee could not stand in a better position than the clients themselves, and that the lien was a "lawful impediment" to the production of the documents within section 96 of the Bankruptcy Act, 1869; but the Chief Judge, affirming the decision of the county court judge, ordered the production of the documents, holding that the lien of the solicitor was not prejudiced, since he was not required to give them up, but merely to produce them for the trustee's inspection. In Shippey v. Grey (28 W. R. 877), the solicitors for the plaintiff in an action against the Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway Company had signed judgment for £400 damages with costs, but, before the costs had been taxed, a judgment creditor of the plaintiff obtained, ex parte, a garnishee order attaching all debts due to the plaintiff to answer his judgment. The plaintiff's solicitors then served upon the judgment creditor a notice that they claimed a lien on the sum recovered in the action against the railway company in respect of their cost!) in that action. The Court of Appeal, affirming the decision of the Common Pleas Division, held that the solicitors were en titled, as against the judgment creditor, to a charging order, under the 23 & 24 Vict. c. 127, e. 28, upon the sum recovered, and that the case was governed by Faith/all v. Ewen (26 W. B. 270, L. E. 7 Ch. D. 495).

Ward v. Eyre (28 W. E. 712) is an important decision as to the respective rights of a country solicitor and his town agent. In a suit by a country solicitor for an account against his town agents, the latter claimed a specific balance, with interest. A balance smaller than that claimed was found to be due, and the Court of Appeal, affirming the decision of the Master of the Bolls, held that the defendants could not recover interest on the disbursements or upon the balance due to them. Eeliance had been placed by the defendant's counsel upon the 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 42, a. 28, and 33 & 34 Vict, c. 28, s. 17, but the Lords Justices held, with reference to the former statute, that no " demand of payment " had been made, and that no "sum certain" had become payable, since the balance claimed by the defendant had proved to be inaccurate. With reference to the argument founded upon 33 & 34 Vict. c. 28, the court decided that section 17 of that Act was not applicable to the case of a country solicitor and his town agent, since the former was not a "client" within section 3, and also that the statute had no retrospective operation.

The subject of the taxation of costs was dealt with in four cases. In re Fisher (42 L. T. N. S. 261) involved the question, what are "special circumstances" within 6 & 7 Vict. c. 73, s. 41, justifying the taxation of a bill of costs after it has been settled in account? A charge of felony was pending against the managing clerk: of the solicitors, and the case against him involved tho bona fides and legality of certain items in the bill of costs which referred to a period before the charge was preferred. The Exchequer Division, upon the solicitor's application, ordered that the bill should be taxed, Pollock, B., observing that the fact of the pendency of criminal proceedings was not a sufficient ground for depriving a solicitor of his right, as an officer of the court, to have his bill referred to the proper officer for taxation, the only question being whether there were "special circumstances" to warrant the taxation. In the absence of any proof that the application was a sham one, the circumstances of the present case rendered it fair and reasonable that the items in the bill should be investigated by the taxing officer. In Philipps v. Philipps (28 W. B. 376, L. B. 5 Q. B. D. 60), the Queen's Bench Division had refused an application to strike out the statement of claim as embarrassing, but the Court of Appeal reversed this decision, and gave the costs of the appeal and of the proceedings in the court below. The master declined to tax these costs during the pendency of the action, and Field, J., refused an order referring them to taxation. The defendants then brought the matter before the Court of Appeal, who held that the costs must be taxed and paid forthwith, on the ground that the express order of the Court of Appeal overrode the practice of the Queen's Bench Division, according to which the taxation of the costs of on interlocutory application is postponed till the termination of the action. In Simmons v. Storer (28 W. B. 408, L. B. 14 Ch. D. 154) the plaintiff had obtained judgment in an action in the Exchequer Division, to enforce which he had taken out several garnishee summonses on which no further proceedings had been taken. The defendant afterwards brought an action against the plaintiff in the Chancery Division in which action an order was made directing an account of the amount due to the defendant in respect of his judgment in the first action, and of the proceedings taken by him to enforce it. The chief clerk referred the bill of costs for taxation to a master of the Exchequer Division, who disallowed the costs of the abortive garnishee summonses. The Master of the Bolls held that these costs had been properly disallowed, and that, under the Rules of the Supreme Court (Costs), 1875, ord. 7. r. 26, the master was bound to disallow them. He also held that when a party makes an objection in writing, under ord. 7, r. 30, to the allowance or disallowance of any item by a taxing master, he is only

bound to specify the items to which he objects, and need not state his reasons for objecting. Ex parte Ditton, In re Woods (28 W. R. 402, L. B 13 Ch. D. 318), raised a question as to the right of a trustee in bankruptcy to disallow items in a bill of costs tendered by way of proof by a solicitor. It was argued that the solicitor was entitled, under 6 & 7 Vict. c. 73, s. 37, to have his costs taxed in the ordinary way, but the Court of Appeal held that this enactment does not apply to a proof in bankruptcy; that a solicitor has no absolute right to insist upon his charges being referred to taxation, and that the registrar bad power, with the assistance (if required) of the taxing-master, to determine tho amount due. With reference to the particular items in dispute, the court held that charges by a solicitor for addressing and posting circulars were improper.

Two cases during the year involved questions as to setting off costs. In Barker v. Hemming (28 W. R. 764) the plaintiff had obtained judgment by default against the drawer and acceptor of a bill of exchange, and issued an execution against the goods of the former. The acceptor afterwards got the judgment set aside with costs, on the ground that his acceptance had been forged, and he also set up a claim to the goods seized in the execution against the drawer, and an interpleader issue was tried, in which judgment was ultimately entered against him, with costs. In taxing the defendant's costs in the action upon the bill of exchange, the master allowed the plaintiff to deduct the costs due to him from the defendant as the unsuccessful claimant in the interpleader issue. This decision was upheld by Lindley. J., and the defendant appealed to the Queen's Bench Division. It was urged by the plaintiff's counsel that the costs could be set off because they both arose out of the same matter—namely, the question of the ownership of the goods—but Cockburn, C.J., and Bowen, J., held that the two proceedings were distinct, and that the set-off should not have been allowed. This decision has been reviewed by the Court of Appeal (see 24 Solicitors' Journal, 779), and reliance was placed by the appellant's counsel upon rule 19 of the Additional Eules as to Costs, 1875, but the court took the same view as the Queen's Bench Division. James, L.J., pointed out that the rule meant that the set-off must be not merely between two persons, but between two parties—i.e., parties to the same proceedings— whereas the interpleader was a distinct and collateral proceeding as to a matter which was not in question in the action itself, the identity of the parties to the respective proceedings being a mere accident. In Ex parte Griffin, In re Adams (2) (28 W. E. 714, L. E. 14 Ch. D. 37), the question of setting off costs arose in a bankruptcy proceeding, and the Court of Appeal held that the Bankruptcy Court ought not to allow the coats of a proceeding in the High Court to be set off against costs in a bankruptcy. James, L.J., pointed out that, as was observed by Lord Eldon in Hall v. Ody (2 B. & P. 28), the allowance of such a set-off would have a tendency to prejudice the lien of the solicitor, who was the equitable owner of the costs.

At the Garstang Sessions on Thursday week, Mr. G. Dickson, solicitor, applied on behalf of the overseers of the Union for a warrant against Police-constable Lee, of the County Lancaster Constabulary, for the non-paymenc of 5s. Id. for poor-rate due on tho 29th of September last. Mr. C. H. Sadler, deputy-clerk of the peace for Lancashire appeared for the couuty police authorities, who denied the liability of the building, which was used for Crown purposes, to be rated. It was stated that the application was made by the overseers in consequence of the threat of the district auditor of the L •>• tl Government Board to surcharge. It was stated that the liability of the police to be thus rated would be determined by appeal. No warrant was granted pending the appeal, but Mr. Dickson said he would apply tor a mandamus.

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