render of the lease, the lessor would have no remedy against the underl ssee by distress or re-entry for breach of cove nent, and, as was held by the Court of Appeal in Smalley v. Hardinge (29 W. R. 554), the lessor could not after the disclaimer eject the underlessee, and, consequently, the underlessee would be able to bold the property free from the payment of any rent to the lessor. And the 1 ssor offered to undertake not to sue the trustee on the covenants in the lease, and not to prove against the deb'or's estate, thus giving the trustee and the estate every ben fit which they would get by a disclaimer. The court held that this was not necessary, for that the unconditional disclaimer would not affect the rights of the lessor as against the underlessee. JESSEL, M.R., referred to the rule for the construction of statutes, as expressed by Lord Selborne in the recent case of The Caledonian Railway Company ▼. The North British Railway Company (L. R. 6 App. Ca. 104), “that the more literal Construction ought not to prevail, if it is opposed to the inten ion of the Legislature as apparent by the statute, and if the words are sufficiently flexible to admit of some other Construction by which that intention will be better eff-ctuated," aid as thus laid down by Lord Wensleydale in Grey v. Pearson (6 H. L. Cas. 106), "That in construing wills, and, indeed, statutes, and all written instruments, the grammatic and ordinary sense of the words is to be adhered t, unless that would lead to s me absurdity, or some repugnance or inconsistency wi h the rest of the instrument, in which case the grammatical and ordinary sense of the words may be modified, so as to avoid that absurdity and inconsistency, but no further." JESSEL, M.R., said that the objects of section 23 were plain-viz., to set the bankrupt free from personal obligations attaching to his property, and that the trustee should not be compelled to acquire the bankrupt's property subject to the hailities which affected it, and to which he would become personally liable, but that, if the property was not worth more than the liabilities attaching to it, the trustee should be able to disclaim it and the liabili ties. He was not to keep the property and get rid of the liabilities. His lordship thought that these were the only objects of the Legislature. It could not be supposed that they intended to confiscate any man's property without any reason whatever. A construction of the section which would lead to such a result might well be described as an absurdity. But that would be the result of a literal construction. Suppose that a building contract between a landowner and a builder was pledged by the builder as security for a debt of himself or of some other person, and the contract was not worth more than the money advanced upen it, could the Legislature have intended that the lender of the money should lose his security because he trustee in the bankruptcy of the builder chose to disclaim the contract? Could anything be more absurd than that, and yet that would be the result of a literal construction of the section. And, in the case of a contract, there was no provision made, as there was in the case of a lease, that the trustee should not disclaim without the leave of the court. If the section was to be construed literally, the disclaimer of a lease by the tru-te would deprive an equitable mortgagee of the lease of his security; it would, if the lessee had made a legal mortgage by way of underlease, deprive the lessor of his property for the benefit of the mortgagee; and if valuable shares in a company had been pledged as security for a debt, the disclaimer by the trustee of the shareholder would work a forfeiture of the shares for the benefit of the company. The results of a literal

construction of the section would be so nonstrous that it must be considered absurd. It might be said that the provision that the court might order possession of the disclaimed property to be delivered up to any person interested in it, or might make such other order as to the possession as might be just, shows that the Legislature was dealing only with property over which the Court of Bankruptcy had power, and of which it could dispose. But, if the section were restricted to case of that kind, the full relief intended would not be given. The section must, therefore, be read as meaning that the obligation of the bankrupt was to be put an end to by the disclaimer so far only as it created rights and liabilities as between the trustee and the bankrupt and his estate and the other party to the contract -so far, that is, as was necessary to relieve the bankrupt and his estate and the trustee from liability, the persons who were injured by this having a right given to them to prove against the bankrupt's estate in respect of the injury.

Construing the section in this way, the result would be that the disclaimer of the lease would not affect the right of the lessor to distrain on the underlessee for the rent reserved by the original lease, and to re-enter on the property for breach of the covenants in that lease. JAMES, L.J., said that when a sub-demise is made, the sub-tenant took the property subject to all the original lessor's rights in rem, though he was not liable upon the personal covenants of the original lessee with the lessor. It would be a violation of every principle of law and justice, and against all common sense, to permit two men, by bargaining with each other, to affect any right of property of another man, particularly any right of the owner from whom they both derived title. And it would sem to be equally against principle and against common honesty that a lessee, by becoming bankrupt, should deprive the lessor of his remedies in rem, or release a sub-lessee from the legal liabilities and obligations to which the property was liable in his hands before the bankruptcy. If the lessee were insolvent, but not made a bankrupt; if the lessee had died insolvent, the lessor's remedies as ag-inst the estate itself, and the sub-lessee's liability to distress and forfeiture would remain. Was it possible to conceive that the insolvency resulting in bank. ruptcy should confiscate the lessor's right, and give the sublessee an absolute immunity from such distress and forfeiture? The object of the bankrupt law was merely to regulate the distribution of the bankrupt's assets among his creditors, and to relieve the bankrupt and his estate from future liability to his creditors. But it was never intended to affect rights and liabilities as between the creditor and a third party. The consideration of the hardships which would result from a literal construction of the word "surrender in section 23 might perhaps lead to the conclusion that, when it said that the disclaimer should operate as a surrender, there must be an implied condition that the trustee had full right to surrender, not only the lease, but the property itself, freed and discharged from all estates and interests; that rule 28 was obligatory on the trustee; and the court ought not to give its assent, unless satisfied that it could do so without injustice to the lessor or to anyone else, and without prejudice to any rights or remedies of or against any third person. But as that construction would not give the trustee the immunity which it was intended that he should have, the more complete and satisfactory solution of the riddle might be found in the principle that when a statute enacts that something should be deemed to have been done, which in truth was not done, the court was entitled and bound to ascertain for what purposes and between what persons the statutory fiction was to be resorted to. Having regard, therefore, to the object of the bankruptcy law, when the Act said that a lease which was never surrendered in fact was to be deemed to have been surrendered, the words must be read with this qualification (which was absolutely neces sary to prevent the most grievous injustice, and the most revolting absurdity), "shall, as between the lessor on the one hand, and the bankrupt, his trustee, and estate on the other hand," be deemed to have been surrendered. LUSH, L.J., said that he had felt very great difficulty in coming to a satisfactory conclusion; but, after much consideration, be bad come to the conclusion that the words of the section must be qualified in order to carry out its object. It seemed impossible to construe the section literally without defeating its object and creating a manifest absurdity. The word "surrender" must be read in a qualified sense, the object being merely to put the trustee in the same position as if the lease had never become vested in him. Any qualifying words that might be necessary so to restrict the literal meaning of the section might be inserted. The point was not present to the minds of the court which decided Smalley v. Hardinge; but it did not affect the decision. His lordship said that he thought the object of rule 28 of 1871 was to secure that the trustee should not waste valuable property of the bankrupt. JESSEL, M.R., added that the under-lessee was entitled to prove in the liquidation for the difference between the rent reserved by the under-lease and that reserved by the original lease, which he would now have to pay.-SOLICITORS, Henderson & Buckle; H. Montagu.

RAILWAY COMPANY-ABANDONMENT-JUDGMENT CREDITOR-PARLIAMENTARY DEPOSIT-RECEIVER-" UNDERTAKING"-RAILWAY COMPANIES ACT, 1867.-In a petition of In re The Birmingham and Lichfield Junction Railway Company, before the Master of the Rolls on the 28th ult., a question arose as to the meaning of the term "undertaking" in section 4 of the Railway Companies Act, 1867, and whether it applied to a company which had given no notices to treat and had never commenced their railway. The company was incorporated in 1872, and, by an Act of 1874, was authorized to make certain deviations and other railWays. A sum of £1,780 was deposited in chancery in pursuance of standing orders in respect of the last-mentioned Act. The company had given no notices to treat, and had purchased no lands under the powers in the two Acts, and never commenced the railways authorized, and had not paid up one-half of their capital nor expended one-half of their capital. A petition was now presented by a judgment creditor for £1,274, for a receiver of the undertaking, and for an inquiry what compensation was due to any landowners, and that the parliamentary deposit might be applied in payment of the compensation and of the amount due to the petitioner on his judgment, and to the other creditors of the company. JESSEL, M.R., held that, as the railways authorized by the Ac's had not been commenced,

the company was not an undertaking within the meaning of section 4 of the Railway Companies Act, 1867, and, therefore, that a receiver could not be appointed. He therefore dismissed the petition, but without costs.-SoLICITORS, H. R. T. Alexander; Tilleard, Goaden, & Holme; Kendall, Price, & Francis; Hare & Co.

ADMINISTRATION-LEGACY FOR LIFE WITH REMAINDER OVER-INTEREST FROM DEATH OF TESTATOR OR FROM A YEAR AFTERWARDS-PRACTICE SOLICITOR AND CLIENT COSTS-WHEN GIVEN TO PLAINTIFFS NOT TRUSTEES-COSTS OF ATTENDING ACCOUNTS AND INQUIRIES.-In a case of Re Ruddock, deceased, Ruddock v. Redgrave, before the Master of the Rolls on the 30th ult., a question arose on further consideration whether interest was payable from the death of the testator or only from a year after his death, where a legacy was given to the testator's widow for life, and then to other persons for their lives, with remainders over. JESSEL, M.R., held that it was settled, since the case of Gibson v. Bott (7 Ves. 89), that a legacy under the above circumstances only bore interest from a year from the testator's death. In the case of an annuity, or where a legacy was given to infants, the role was otherwise, but he considered there was no sound reason why interest should not be payable immediately where a sum was given to one for life, with remainders over. In his opinion the law required alteration which prevented, as here, the widow of a testator from receiving interest until two years from the death. According to the minutes in the same case solicitor and client costs were allowed to the plaintiffs who were not trustees. The parties appearing were willing to consent to such an order being made, but it appeared there were infants interested in the residue. JESSEL, M.R., said he could not allow the plaintiffs to have solicitor and client costs under the above circumstances, and the minutes should not have teen drawn on that footing. He never allowed such costs (except to executors and trustees) unless some special cir

cumstances

were mentioned, or where all parties being competent consented, and in fact he should direct the registrars not to draw up in future orders giving solicitor and client costs except to trustees unless the matter were specially brought to his notice. Under an order certain of the residuary legatees had liberty to attend the taking of the accounts so far as concerned the claims of one of the plaintiffs and one of the defendants, an executor, but as to all the other accounts and inquiries the plaintiffs' solicitor was directed to represent them. The result of the parties attending was that the above claims were disallowed. They had in consequence attended the taking of the rest of the accounts, and now asked that they might be allowed their costs of so doing out of the estate, seeing that their attendance had been so beneficial. JESSEL, M.R., said that no persons except parties to the action could get their costs out of the estate except they attended by leave. No doubt their attending under the order had been beneficial, but he could not deviate from his general rule, and they could only have the costs given

them by the order.-SOLICITORS, Holder; Hyde, & Co; M. B. King.

- SEPARATE

USE

MARRIED WOMAN ELECTION RESTRAINT ON ANTICIPATION.-In a case of Smith v. Lucas, also before the Master of the Rolls on the 30th ult., a question arose whether a married woman could be put to her election as between two instruments, under one of which she took for her separate use simply, and under the other for her separate use with a restraint against anticipation. JESSEL, M. R., held that the restraint on anticipation prevented her giving up the property, and so from being put to her election.-SOLICITORS, T. White & Sons : Jones, Blaxland, & Sons.

LANDLORD AND TENANT-LICENCE TO EJECT--FORCIBLE ENTRY-STATUTE 5 RICH. 2, STATUTE 1, c. 8-LEASE OF PUBLIC-HOUSE-COVENANT TO TAKE BEER FROM LESSOR ONLY-IMPLIED COVENANT ON PART OF LESSOR.-In a case of Edwick v. Hawkes, before Fry, J., on the 25th ult., a question arose as to the validity of a licence by a tenant to his landlord to eject him without any process of law, and there was a further question as to the construction of a covenant by the tenant of a public-house with his landlord (a brewer) to buy from the landlord, during the term, all the beer consumed on the premises. The lease of a public-house granted by some brewers to a publican in June, 1880, contained a covenant by the lessee that he would purchase of the lessors during the continuance of the demise ali beer, ale, &c., that should be sold or consumed in, or upon, the demised premises. The lessors entered into no covenant with the lessee as to the supply of beer, they covenanting only for the quiet enjoyment of the premises by him. There was a proviso for re-entry by the lessors in the event of a breach of any of the covenants of the lessee. In September, 1880, the lessors discovered that the lessee had been purchasing through an agent, unknown to them, a species of beer brewed by them for the use of private families, but which they never supplied and always refused to supply to publicans. The lessee had previously complained that the beer supplied to him by the lessors was bad and unfit for consumption. On making this discovery the lessors charged the lessee with a breach of covenant, and told him that he had forfeited his lease, and they induced him to sign a document whereby, in consideration of the lessors not taking immediate steps to eject him, he undertook to give them quiet possession on the 29th of September, and authorized them to use the document as leave and licence to eject him without any process of law on that date. He afterwards, on the advice of his solicitor, repudiated this document, and refused to quit the premises, and a few days after the 29th of September the lessors sent a number of men who ejected the lessee and his wife by force from the house, inflicting injuries on the wife in so doing. The action was brought by the lessee against the lessors, claiming to have the document which he had signed cancelled, and damages for the assaults on himself and his wife. FRY, J., held that the licence to eject was void, on the ground that it was contrary to public policy, inasmuch as it purported to authorize a forcible entry, an act that is made illegal by the Statute of Rich. 2. He held also that if a landlord forcibly ejects a tenant who is wrongfully holding over, this is an illegal act under that statute, even though the landlord does not effect an entry through the outer door of the premises by force, but is allowed to enter peaceably. FRY, J., also held that there had been no breach of the covenant in buying beer made by the lessors indirectly through an agent, instead of directly from them, and that when such a covenant is entered into by a tenant, there is, in the absence of any express covenant, an implied covenant by the landlord that he will supply the tenant with any kind of beer which he makes and which the tenant may require, and that the beer supplied shall be fit for consumption, and that if the landlord does not fulfil this implied covenant, the tenant is at liberty to purchase the beer which he requires wherever he pleases. And his lordship awarded the plaintiff damages and costs.SOLICITORS, H. T. Hardcastle; Walker, Son, & Field.

The Stolen Goods Bill, on which we recently commented, was on Monday last, on the motion of the Lord Chancellor, refered to a select committee.

SOCIETIES.

INCORPORATED LAW SOCIETY.

On Thursday evening a dinner, at which upwards of 120 guests sat down, was given by the metropolitan members of the Incorporated Law Society to the Provincial Law Societies in acknowledgment of the hospitality they had received on their annual visits to the provinces.

Mr. J. MOXON CLABON, president of the society, occupied the chair, and amongst those present and invited were, Mr. C. C. Druce (vice-president), Mr. J. Dodds, M.P., Mr. W. Smith, Mr. Press, Mr. F. H. Janson, Mr. Harper, Mr. B. G. Lake, Mr. J. Yates, Mr. H. Markby, Mr. Darvill, Mr. Foster, Mr. R. Cunliffe, Mr. W. Cox, Mr. W. Melmoth Walters, Mr. C. Lamb, Mr. W. H. Clarke, Mr. G. F. Crowdy, Mr. R. Pennington, Mr. W. A. Stickey, Mr. Bagshawe, Mr. Rider, Mr. Duncan, Mr. Follett, Mr. Cooper, Mr. Holden, Mr. Furniss, Mr. Heelis, Mr. Sydney Gedge, Mr. Fitch, Mr. Arnold, Mr. J. Anderson Rose, Mr. A. E. Finch, Mr. Tweedale, Mr. Burne, Mr. A. Jevons, Mr. Kay, Mr. J. Yates, Mr. Turner, Mr. H. Manisty, Mr. Cartwright, Mr. Burch, Mr. Clarke, Mr. Jones, Mr. W. Peppercorn, Mr. Freeman, Mr. Alsop, Mr. Attlee, Mr. C. Harrison, Mr. Holben, Mr. Yeates, Mr. Theodore Waterhouse, Mr. Wilmer, Mr. Jonas, Mr. Morland, Mr. Crisp, Mr. Eyre, Mr. Aldridge, Mr. E. Bedford, Mr. Monier Williams, Mr. Kennedy, Mr. Sidney Harrison, Mr. Trinder, Mr. L. Desborough, Mr. Scatcherd, Mr. Percy Woolley, Mr. Chamberlain, Mr. J. G. Bristow, Mr. Western, Mr. E. E. Lake, Mr. Rid-dale. jun., Mr. Isaacson, Mr. Goddard, Mr. Sawbridge, Mr. Owles, Mr. Charles Ford, Mr. J. Indermaur, Mr. S. Chapman, Mr. Tillyard, Mr. Peacock, Mr. A. R. Ford, Mr. Baker, Mr. Cronin, Mr. Woollacott, Mr. Pollard, Mr. Hedger, Mr. James Crowdy, Mr. J. Batchelor, Mr. T. D. Bolton, Mr. E. Kimber, Mr. Crossfield, Mr. George Gregory, Mr. F. W. Ommaney, Mr. W. A. Smith, Mr. Farlow, Mr. Shapland, Mr. Sidney Smith, Mr. Eggar, Mr. E. Hughes, Mr. G. B. chelor, Mr. Terry, Mr. Dodd, Mr. W. H. Hazard, Mr. Spiers, Mr. E. W. Williamson (secretary), Mr. S. P. B. Bucknill (assistant secretary), and Mr. Frederick Boase (librarian).

different position held by solicitors in the eyes of the public of the present day compared with what it was in the past.

Mr. LAKE proposed the toast of the evening, "Success and prosperity to the Associated Provincial Law Societies," and drew a parallel between the work of the guilds of the Middle Ages-which were instituted for the purpose of educating the various professions and trades with which they were connected and the law societies of the present day. He paid a high tribute to the hospitality which had been shown by the country societies to the members of the London society.

Mr. SMITH (president of the Sheffield Law Society), in acknowledging the compliment, observed that the union of sympathy which brought the solicitors together at the annual meetings was not only of utility to the profession, but also to the public.

by Mr. SMITH, and responded to by Mr. CLABON, and "The The remaining toasts were "The President," proposed Entertainment Committee," given by Mr. J. A. Rose, and acknowledged by Mr. JANSON.

During the evening a selection of music was performed by Miss Annie Williams, Mr. Stedman's choir-boys, Mr. H. Guy, Mr. R. Hilton, and Mr. T. Harper (solo trumpet), under the direction of Mr. J. Davis, who presided at the piano. Messrs. King & Brymer served the dinner. Mr. J. Hayles was toastmaster.

LAW ASSOCIATION.

The toasts of "The Queen," and "The Prince and Princess of Wales and the rest of the Royal Family" having been given by the PRESIDENT, and honoured with the customary enthusiasm,

Mr. FOLLETT proposed "The Houses of Parliament," and said that in such an assembly it was impossible to avoid alluding to what had been done for the improvement of legal procedure, and he thought they ought to be candid enough to admit that what had been done had been done in a right direction, and that there had been a fair disposition on the part of the Legislature to recognize what was the good of the public in the way of legal procedure, and to some extent what was due to the solicitor branch of the profession. Whether any improvement could be made in that respect during the present session was exceedingly doubtful. As far as he could see at present, the only Act relating to England which was likely to fird its way on the Statute-book of 1881 was that called the Customs and Inland Revenue Bill, with which he had a little to do, and in which the member for Stockton-on-Tees took a deep interest.

Mr. DODDS, M.P., in responding, said that there was one fact of great interest in the present Parliament as concerned the solicitor branch of the profession, and that was that there was a greater number of solicitors in the House than in any previous Parliament. When he first went there, there were only three or four members; there were now something like a dozen; and he was sure they were all animated by a sincere desire that the interests of the profession, and the interests committed to the profession, should not suffer either in the House of Commons or elsewhere.

The PRESIDENT, in submitting " The Incorporated Law Society," spoke of the endeavours that had been made by the society to improve the education of the members of the profession, and to raise the general tone of the solicitor branch of the law; and even in performing their most painful duty, that of removing from the roll the names of solicitors who had misconducted themselves, they were actuated by the same idea.

Mr. GEUGE, in acknowledging the toast, referred to the

4. Your directors recommend to the general court that a members for the ensuing year. sum of £150 be placed at their disposal for the cases of non

5. Your directors have the pleasure to report that they have received towards the funds of the association donations of £5 58, from the Principal and Ancients of Staple Inu, £3 from the late Treasurer of the Middle Temple, and £2 28. from Horatio Brandon, Esq. They have also much pleasure in acknowledging the receipt of £18 18s. 10d. from Sir William Charley, the treasurer of the late "Legal Prac titioners' Society.'

6. The several investments now belonging to the association are as follows, viz. :

7. There are now 380 members of the association, 144 are life members and 236 are annual subscribers, the amount received from whom for the past year has been £468 6., which sum, added to the dividends received from the above investments, makes the income for the year £1,727 7s. 21.

8. The names of above 4,000 solicitors appear in the Law List for 1880, as practising within the metropolitan district (where the operations of the society are carried on), but there are only 400 members of the association. Your directors feel that it only needs a little personal effort on the part of individual members in explaining the objects of the association, and in inviting professional friends and neighbours to become subscribers, to obtain a large addition to the list of members, and thus enable the directors to comply with more of the numerous applications made to them for assistance.

9. By the regulations of the association, the president, vice-president, treasurers, directors, and auditors for the ensuing year are to be elected at the present meeting.

LAW STUDENTS' JOURNAL.

INCORPORATED LAW SOCIETY.

HONOURS EXAMINATION.
April, 1881.

At the examination for honours of candidates for admission on the roll of solicitors of the Supreme Court, the ex. amination committee recommended the following gentlemen as being entitled to honorary distinction:

FIRST CLASS.

[In order of Merit.]

Henry James Brown, B.A., who served his clerkship to Messrs. Cottrell & Son, of Birmingham; and Messrs. Gamlen & Son, of London.

Arthur Chichester Borlase, who served his clerkship to Mr. John Penn Milton, of Penzance.

Alfred Steele Sheldon, who served his clerkship to Mr. Robert Bygott, of Sandbach; and Mr. John Warwick Hickin, of London.

Angus Scott Lewis, who served his clerkship to Mr. Charles William Rees Stokes, of Tenby.

James Turner Jackson, who served his clerkship to Mr. William Robert Clark, of Oldham.

James Moxon, who served his clerkship to Mr. John Foster, of the firm of Messrs. Foster & Raper, of Pontefract.

Vallance Edgar Leonard, who served his clerkship to Mr. H. N. Abbott, of the firm of Messrs. Fry, Abbott, Pope, & Brown, of Bristol; and Mr. H. S. Leonard, of London.

William Swinburne, who served his clerkship to Mr. Joseph Willis Swinburne, of Gateshead-on-Tyne.

Henry Hollier Hood Barrs, LL.B., who served his clerkship to Mr. James Bouskell, of the firm of Messrs. Miles, Bouskell, & Place, of Leicester; and Mr. Charles John Mander, of London.

George Walker Luis Fernandes, who served his clerkship to Mr. Charles Bathurst Luis Fernandez, of Wakefield.

SECOND CLASS.

[In Alphabetical Order.]

Francis Barber, who served his clerkship to Mr. Andrew Malcolm Bateson, of Harrogate; and Messrs. Ullithorne, Currey, & Villiers, of London.

James Capstack Calvert, who served his clerkship to Messrs. Coppock, Marsh, & Coppock, of Stockport.

George Dickinson, who served his clerkship to Mr. Augustus Helder, of the firm of Messrs. Brockbank, Helder, & Brockbank, of Whitehaven.

Templer Lethbridge Down, who served his clerkship to Mr. George Alfred Daniel, of the firm of Messrs. Cruttwell, Daniel, & Cruttwells, of Frome; and Messrs. Prior, Bigg, Church, & Adams, of Londor..

John Eagleton, who served his clerkship to Mr. O. C. T. Eagleton, of London.

James Edwin Hodson, who served his clerkship to Mr. John Smallshaw, of Southport.

Patrick William Mayo, who served his clerkship to Mr. William Marsh, of the firm of Messrs. Mayo & Marsh, of Yeovil; and Messrs. Bower & Cotton, of London.

Herbert Rooke Oldfield, LL.B., who served his clerkship to Mr. Arthur William Rooke, of the firm of Messrs. Rooke & Sons, of London.

Atkinson Pickering, jun., who served his clerkship to Mr. William Hodgson, of the firm of Messrs. Holden, Sons, & Hodgson, of Hull; and Messrs. Chester, Mayhew, of London.

Co.,

Richard Procter, who served his clerkship to Mr. Thomas James Backhouse, of the firm of Messrs. T. J. & H. Backhouse, of Blackburn and Burnley.

John Davies Pryce, who served his clerkship to Mr. Richard Williams, of Newtown, Montgomery.

William Showell Rogers, M.A., LL.M., who served his clerkship to Mr. John Henry Barclay, of the firm of Messrs. Johnson, Barclay, & Johnson, of Birmingham; and Messrs. Burton, Yeates, Hart, & Burton, of London.

Frank James Sykes, who served his clerkship to Mr. James Edward Hawksford, of the firm of Messrs. Saunders, Hawksford, & Bennett, of London.

Edward Woodhouse Veale, LL.B., who served his clerkship to Mr. Edgar Everard Salmon, of Bristol.

Edwin Williams, B.A., who served his clerkship to Mr.

William Frederick Gush, of the firm of Messrs. Gush & Phillips, of London.

THIRD CLASS.

[In Alphabetical Order.]

Francis Jacob Peregrine Birch, who served his clerkship to Mr. Frank William Stone, of the firm of Messre. Stone & Simpson, of Tunbridge Wells; and Messrs. Collyer-Bristow, Withers, & Russell, of London.

George Lawrence Bulleid, who served his clerkship to Mr. J. G. L. Bulleid, of Glastonbury; and Messrs. Crowder, Anstie, & Vizard, of London.

Arthur Constantine, who served his clerkship to Mr. Thomas Jas. Backhouse, of the firm of Messrs. T. J. & H. Backhouse, of Blackburn.

Robert Dowse, who served his clerkship to Messrs. Welsh & Son, of Manchester; and Messrs. Gregory, Rowcliffes, & Rawle, of London.

William Frederick Oscar Edmonds, who served his clerkship to Mr. Edmund Edmonds, of Newent.

John Estill, who served his clerkship to Mr. Edward Peters, of the firm of Messrs. E. & J. Peters, of York.

Joseph Henry Farmer, who served his clerkship to Mr. Samuel George Johnson, of Nottingham.

Alfred Robert Orton Gery, who served his clerkship to Mr. Robert Orton Gery, of Aberdare; and Mr. William Maude, of the firm of Messrs. Rickards, Maude, & Maude, of London. Thomas Risley Hearn, who served his clerkship to Messrs. Gepp & Son, of Chelmsford; and Messrs. Paterson, Snow, & Bloxam, of London.

George Courtenay Henderson, who served his clerkship to Messrs. Weston, Grover, & Lees, of Manchester; Mr. Johu Herbert Slater, of the firm of Messrs. Kearsley, Slater, & Watts, of Manchester; and Messrs. Field, Roscoe, & Co., of London.

Edward Frederick Knott, who served his clerkship to Mr. John Hammett Knott, of the firm of Messrs. Pownall, Son, Cross, & Knott, of London.

Alexander Ward Lamond, who served his clerkship to Mr. Robert Hart, of the firm of Messrs. Burton, Yeates, Hart, & Burton, of London.

Frederick William Martin, who served his clerkship to Mr. George Edward Sharland, of the firm of Messrs. Sharland & Hatten, of Gravesend.

George Hugh Morgan, who served his clerkship to Mr. John Arthur Talbot, and to Mr. Richard Burgass Woosnam, both of Newtown, Montgomery.

Arthur James O'Connor, who served his clerkship to Mr. Crowther Davies, of Birmingham.

Frank Samuel Preston, who served his clerkship to Mr. Samuel Preston, of Hinckley.

Samuel Raby, who served his clerkship to Mr. Henry Brearey, of York.

William Emsley Raley, who served his clerkship to Mr. C. J. Dibb, of the firm of Messrs. Dibb, Raley, & Clegg, of Barnsley.

Albert Sargeant, who served his clerkship to Mr. John Howard Russell; and to Mr. Howard Carlile Morris, both of London.

Gay Shute, jun., who served his clerkship to Mr. H. W. Trinder, of the firm of Messrs. Trinders & Curtis-Hayward, of London.

George Edward Wade, who served his clerkship to Mr. A. C. Curtis-Hayward, of the firm of Messrs. Trinders & Curtis. Hayward, of London.

Arthur William Weldon, who served his clerkship to Mr. Henry Druit Phillips, of the firm of Messrs. Phillips & Son, of London.

George Lawrence Welford, who served his clerkship to Mr. Robert Frederick Kidd, of North Shields.

Samuel Yearsley, jun., who served his clerkship to Mr. John Henry Cooke, of the firm of Messrs. J. & J. H. Cooke, of Over, near Winsford, Cheshire.

The Council of the Incorporated Law Society have accordingly given class certificates and awarded the following prizes of books :

To Mr. Brown, the prize of the Honourable Society of Clement's Inn. Value ten guineas.

To Mr. Borlase, the prize of the Honourable Society of Clifford's Inn. Value five guineas.

To Mr. Sheldon, the prize of the Honourable Society of New Inn. Value five guineas.

To Mr. Lewis, Mr. Jackson, Mr. Moxon, Mr. Leonard,