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date of the issue of the writ. The Court of Appeal (JESSEL, M.R., and JAMES and LUSH, L.JJ.) held that in such a case the proper date of the dissolution was the date of the judgment.-SOLICITORS, Rogerson & Ford; Shum, Crossman, &

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APPEAL DEATH OF APPELLANT APPLICATION FOR ORDER OF REVIVOR-JUDICATURE ACT, 1873, s. 52-ORD. 50, RR. 2. 4.-In a case of Rawson v. Patton, before the Court of Appeal on the 20th inst., a question arose as to the proper mode of obtaining an order for the continuance of an appeal after the death of the appellant. The defendant had delivered a counter-claim, and at the trial it was dismissed, with costs. The defendant gave notice of appeal, and before the appeal came on for hearing he died. His executrix obtained an order of course at the Rolls that the appeal should be carried on and prosecuted by her. On the opening of the appeal the respondent's counsel took the objection that, as the counter-claim had been dismissed, there was no proceeding pending in the High Court, and that that court had no jurisdiction to make any order with regard to the prosecution of the appeal. And it was said that under section 52 of the Judicature Act, 1873, which provides that "in any cause or matter pending before the Court of Appeal, any direction incidental thereto, not involving the decision of the appeal, may be given by a single judge of the Court of Appeal," an order for the continuance of the appeal might have been obtained from one of the judges of the Court of Appeal. The court (JESSEL, M.R., and JAMES and LUSH, L.JJ.) held that the order had been properly made by the High Court. They said that section 52 did not apply, and the Court of Appeal had no original jurisdiction.-SOLICITORS, Paterson, Snow, & Bloxam; McDiarmid.

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PRACTICE APPEAL FOR COSTS JUDICATURE ACT, 1873, s. 49.-In a case of Dicks v. Yates, before the Court of Appeal on the 20th inst., the preliminary objection was taken that the appeal was for costs. The action was brought to restrain an alleged infringement by the defendant of the plaintiff's copyright. Bacon, V.C., held (29 W. R. 135) that there had been an infringement; but, as the defendant had discontinued the infringement, it was unnecessary to grant an injunction, and, therefore, without making any declaration of the plaintiff's right, the judgment simply ordered the defendant to pay the costs of the action. The Court of Appeal (JESSEL, M.R., and JAMES and LUSH, L.JJ.) held that this was not an appeal for costs within section 49. JESSEL, M.R., said that the costs of an action were not in the discretion of the court, to the extent of ordering the defendant to pay them if the plaintiff had no title to relief. The Vice-Chancellor had ordered the defendant to pay the costs as a result of his decision that the plaintiff had a title to relief. It was for this purpose immaterial whether there was an actual declaration of the plaintiff's right, or a declaration by necessary inference. But his lordship did not intend to say that the court bad no discretion to deprive a successful defendant of his costs of the action.-SOLICITORS, Lewis & Lewis; Montagu, Scott, & Baker.

PRACTICE CHANGE OF JUDGE - REHEARING ORDER MADE IN CHAMBERS.-In a case of Stuckey v. Warton, before the Court of Appeal on the 25th inst., the question arose whether, when an order had been made by a judge of the Chancery Division personally in chambers, and he afterwards resigned his office, his successor ought to hear an application in court to discharge the order. Malins, V.C., before his resignation had personally settled in chambers a certificate of the chief clerk in the action. A summons was taken out to vary the certificate, and it came on to be heard in conrt before Fry, J., after the business attached to Malins, V.C., had been transferred to him. He thought that he ought not to rehear a matter which the ViceChancellor had personally decided, and he, therefore, pro forma dismissed the summons, leaving the parties to go to the Court of Appeal. The Court of Appeal (JESSEL, M.R., and JAMES and LUSH, L.JJ.) were of opinion that Fry, J., ought to have heard the summons just as Malins, V.C., must have done if he had retained his office. The result of his not hearing it was that the parties were compelled to incur double costs. They might have been content with

the decision of Fry, J., on the merits without coming to the Court of Appeal.-SOLICITORS, Patey & Warren; Gellatly, Son, & Warton; R. Miller & Wiggins.

UNDISCHARGED BANKRUPT-RIGHT OF TRUSTEE-PROP· PRACTICE ERTY-PERSONAL EARNINGS ADDITION OF PLAINTIFF-Order 16, R. 13-On the 25th inst. the Court of Appeal (JESSEL, M.R., and JAMES and Lusн, L.JJ.) affirmed the decision of Fry, J., in the case of Emden v. Carte (29 W. R. 600). The action was brought by an undischarged bankrupt, who was an architect, to recover a sum of £1,790, which he alleged to be due to him for services rendered by him as an architect to the deferdant, since the adjudication of bankruptcy, under an agreement entered into before the bankruptcy, and a sum of £8,000, which the plaintiff claimed as damages for his wrongful dismissal by the defendant. The trustee in the bankruptcy took out a summons in the action, asking that he might be substituted as plaintiff for the bankrupt, and be at liberty to carry on the proceedings. Fry, J., held that the sums claimed in the action were not the mere results of the personal labour or service of the bankrupt, and that they would pass to the trustee, and he made an order joining the trustee as co-plaintiff, and giving him the conduct of the action. The Court of Appeal agreed as to the title of the trustee, and held that he had been rightly joined as co-plaintiff.-SOLICITORS, F. C. Tudor; J. J. Winser; Beyfus & Beyfus.

LAND DRAINAGE ACT, 1861-" DRAIN"-ARTIFICIAL OR NATURAL WATERCOURSE-POWER OF LANDOWNER TO ALTER DRAIN. In a case of Healey v. Bates, before the Master of the Rolls on the 21st inst., a question arose as to the meaning of the term "drain" in the Land Drainage Act, 1861. By section 72 of that Act, "any person interested in land who is desirous to drain the same, and in order thereto deems it necessary that new drains should be opened through lands belonging to another owner, or that existing drains in lands belonging to another owner should be cleansed, widened, straightened, or otherwise improved, may apply to such owner, who is hereinafter referred to as the adjoining owner, for leave to make such drains, or improvements in drains, through or on the lands of such owner." Section 73 provides that the application is to be made by notice in writing stating the nature of the intended improvements, and to be accompanied by a map. If the adjoining owner fail to express his assent within a month after service, he shall, by section 76, be deemed to have dissented, and then the questions shall be decided by two or more justices, in petty sessions, whether the proposed drains or improvements will cause any injury to the persons interested in the lands, and whether such injury will admit of compensation in money. The defendant Bates had given a former notice to the plaintiff in August, 1879, of certain intended alterations to a stream running through the plaintiff's land, but such notice was held to be invalid, and an injunction was granted to restrain the defendant from proceeding under it before the justices (see Healey v. Bates, L. R. 13 Ch. D. 498). The defendant had recently served another notice under the Act, as to alterations to the same stream, upon the plaintiff, and his notice showed that considerable improvements were intended. The plaintiff now moved for an injunction to restain the defendant from proceeding under his notice, on the ground that the stream was not a "drain" within the meaning of the Act, but was a natural watercourse, and therefore outside section 72 altogether. JESSEL, M.R., although not desiring to express a final opinion as to the meaning of the Act, which was by no means clear, said that his present impression, after hearing the arguments, was term "drain," as used in the Act, referred to an artificial, and not a natural, watercourse. In the 72nd sec tion, a new drain must clearly be artificial, and the words for reference to existing drains-namely, that they might be "cleansed, widened, straightened, or otherwise improved" -showed that an artificial drain was referred to. other sections, some of them, pointed to the conclusion that artificial drains were the only ones that would be interfered with without the consent of the owner, and that if a natural stream was desired to be diverted, the owner's consent must be obtained. The plaintiffs had shown a prima facie case that the stream was a natural one,

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and therefore he should grant an injunction to restrain the defendant from proceeding with his notice, the plaintiff giving the usual undertaking in damages.-SOLICITORS, Nash Field; Robins, Burges, & Co.

PARTNERSHIP-RECEIPT BY ONE PARTNER-ACCOUNTSLIABILITY-MOTION TO VARY REFEREE'S REPORT-NOTES OF EVIDENCE BEFORE REFEREE-USE OF NOTES FOR JUDGE AND PARTIES-PRACTICE.—In a case of Fowler v. Murray, before the Master of the Rolls on the 23rd inst., the defend. ant had taken out a summons to vary the report of the official referee under the following circumstances:-It was referred to the official referee to take the accounts of an old partnership commencing in 1863, and continued subsequently in 1878, by taking the cashier of the firm into partnership. It appeared that in the year 1865 the banking account was not properly posted up in the cash-book of the firm, the entries being all in the cashier's handwriting, so that a sum of £442 more was received from the bank than had been entered up in the cash-book. A sum was entered in the cashbook at the end of the half-year to make it balance, and a sum was also shown as due at the end of the half-year to the defendant. The defendant submitted before the referee that the £442 ought to be treated as a defalcation by the cashier, but the referee in his report treated it as due from the defendant. The defendant was the active partner and signed the cheques during 1865, but in the name of the firm. Before the referee the defendant was examined viva voce, but did not positively swear that he did not receive the money-in fact, he stated he could rot explain the matter. He said he had, however, duly accounted for all sums received by him. Sums received for the firm were received by the defendant or the cashier. On the summons to vary the report as to the £442, JESSEL, M.R., said that as the defendant had not positively sworn he had not received the money, he could not treat the £442 payable by the cashier as a partnership loss, and he saw no reason for differing from the finding of the referee. In reference to the mode in which the summons was heard, considerable difficulty was experienced by all the parties in knowing what the evidence had been before the official referee, as the referee had refused to furnish a copy of his notes of the evidence, and none of the parties had an effective note. The referee bad, however, sent his book with the evidence and arguments to the judge, who read out the evidence as given. JESSEL, M.R., stated it was not the practice of the referee to furnish his notes to the parties, and that it was the duty of the counsel or solicitors before the referee to take notes of the evidence themselves for future use.- - SOLICITORS, Ullithorne, Currey, & Villiers; O. B. Wooler.

FATHER AND CHILD-UNDUE INFLUENCE-ACTION TO SET ASIDE DEED-ONUS OF PROOF-PURCHASER FOR VALUE WITHOUT NOTICE. In a case of Bainbringe v. Browne, before Fry, J., on the 18th inst., a question arose as to the onus of proof in an action brought by a child to set aside a deed executed by him under the influence of his father, and for the father's benefit. The action was brought by a daughter and two sons to set aside a deed which they had executed, at the request of their father, when they were respectively of the ages of twenty-five, twenty-four, and twenty-two, charging their reversionary shares ander the marriage settlement of their father and mother with the payment of the interest on some previously existing mortgage debts of the father (the interest on which had been allowed to fall into arrear), and covenanting personally for the payment of the interest. The deed also empowered the mortgagees to sell the reversionary shares in the event of the interest not being punctually paid. The consideration for the deed was an agreement by the mortgagees to reduce the rate of interest on the mortgage debts in the event of punctual payment. At the date of the execution of the deed the daughter was usually resident in her father's house, though she was then actually on a temporary visit to an aunt. One of the sons was a medical student at Edinburgh; the other was an undergraduate at Oxford. They were staying at home for a vacation, and executed the deed in the presence of their father and mother and of a clerk of their father's solicitor, the clerk attesting their execution. The daughter's execution was attested by the aunt. The deed was ap

proved on behalf of the father and the children by the father's solicitor, who represented to the solicitors of the mortgagees that he was acting for the father and the children. The defendants to the action were the mortgagees and the father. The father put in no pleading, and did not appear at the trial. The plaintiffs at the trial deposed that they executed the deed at their father's request, in ignorance of its contents; that they had given no instructions to the solicitor; and that they had no independent advice. The mortgagees adduced no evidence, relying by their pleading simply on the fact that the deed had been approved by a solicitor who professed to be acting for the father and the children; that the defendants were ignorant of the exercise of any improper influence by the father; and that they were purchasers in good faith and for value. FRY, J., said it was plain that the plaintiffs had not, when they executed the deed, been fully emancipated from their father's control, and, though there was no distinct evidence of pressure by him, yet the plaintiffs had proved the existence of a state of things from which the court would infer pressure and undue influence. The burden was therefore cast on the father of showing that the deed was executed by the children after independent advice, with full knowledge of its contents, and with a free intention of giving him the benefits conferred by it. He had not attempted to discharge this duty, and therefore, as far as he was concerned, the deed must be set aside. But this inference of undue influence, though it operated as against the person who could exercise the influence, and as against any volunteer who claimed through him, and any person who took the property with notice of the circumstances which raised the equity, did not operate as against a purchaser for value without notice of those circumstances. In the present case there was no evidence that the mortgagees knew that any undue influ. ence or pressure had been exercised by the father, or that the plaintiffs were not emancipated from his control. A solicitor professed to be acting for them, and his letters showed that he realized the nature of the duty which was imposed upon him. It was impossible to conclude that he did not discharge his duty properly. Unless it was to be held that in such a case it was absolutely necessary that the child should be advised by a different solicitor from the father, it could not be said that the mortgagees had notice of any of the circumstances necessary to raise an equity to set aside the deed. Therefore, as against the mortgagees, the action must be dismissed.-SOLICITORS, J. H. Lydall; Roberts & Barlow.

CASES BEFORE THE BANKRUPTCY
REGISTRARS.

(Before Mr. Registrar MurraY, acting as Chief Judge.) May 4, 11.-Ex parte Vale, Re Bannister.

Seizure by the sheriff under an elegit before notice to the elegit creditor of an act of bankruptcy committed by the defendant is sufficient to confer upon the elegit creditor a good title to the chattels seized, notwithstanding that the delivery by the sheriff takes place after such notice.

This was an application on behalf of the trustee under the bankruptcy of G. Bannister, sen., for an order that the Retford and Bassetlaw Loan and Investment Company (Limited) and the sheriff of Middlesex, or one of them, should be ordered forthwith to pay to the trustee the value of the furniture, goods, chattels, and effects seized by the sheriff under a writ of elegit.

On the 15th of December, 1880, Bannister (a trader) committed an act of bankruptcy by non-compliance with the terms of a debtor's summons issued at the instance of Mr. Boord, one of his creditors.

On the 24th of January, 1881, the sheriff of Middlesex seized the furniture and goods of Bannister under an elegit issued by the Retford and Bassetlaw Loan and Investment Company (Limited), in respect of a judgment for about £300. At that time the company had no notice of the act of bankruptcy committed by the debtor on the 15th of December.

On the 2nd of February, Bannister committed another act of bankruptcy by filing a liquidation petition, of which the company had notice on the 5th.

On the 10th of February, the furniture and goods of which

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the value was now claimed by the applicant were delivered (after inquisition) by the sheriff to the company.

On the 15th of February, an adjudication of bankruptcy was made against Bannister based upon the act of bankruptcy committed by him on the 15th of December, and, at the first meeting, the creditors appointed the applicant trustee of the

estate.

E. C. Willis, for the applicant.-The title of the appli cant relates back to the date of the act of bankruptcy, and the goods are therefore his. The seizure by the sheriff under the elegit occurred after the act of bankruptcy. The noncompliance with the debtor's summons is an act of bankruptcy available for adjudication: Ex parte Hankin, Re Buchan (23 W. R. 401, L. R. 10 Ch. 267); Ex parte Duignan, Re Bissell (19 W. R. 1127, L. R. 6 Ch. 605); Ex parte Gourlay, Re Ormandby (L. R. 15 Ch. D. 447). An elegit is not protected by the 94th section, and has no operation of any kind before inquisition.

Nicoll, for the company.-The goods are ours by virtue of the writ of elegit, and the transaction is protected by section 95, sub-section 3. At the date of the seizure the company had no notice of any act of bankruptcy, and the goods belong to us. He cited Ex parte Wright, Re Arnold (L. R. 3 Ch. D. 70).

Cur, adv. vult.

themselves from saying what their judgment would have been if the garnishor had actually received the debt. The application must, therefore, be refused.

Solicitor for the trustee, G. Bathurst Norman. Solicitors for the company, Allen & Son, for Newton, Jones, & Co., East Retford.

(Before Mr. REGISTRAR MURRAY, acting as Chief Judge.) May 18.-Re Warner.

Leave given to file resolutions after the expiration of the time allowed for that purpose by rule 284, the omission to file them in proper time having arisen from inadvertence.

This was an application for leave to file resolutions passed by creditors under a petition for liquidation, notwithstanding that the three days limited for the purpose by rule 284 had expired.

On the 12th of April, 1881, the debtor filed a petition for liquidation, and the first meeting of creditors was held on the 2nd of May, when resolutions were passed accepting, a composition of twelve shillings in the pound.

At the second meeting, held on the 13th of May, the resolutions passed at the former meeting were confirmed. There was no dissentient creditor at either meeting.

On the 17th of May, the solicitor's clerk attended at the office in Lincoln's-inn-fields to file the resolutions, when, in consequence of the three days allowed by rule 284 having expired, they were refused. The clerk stated in his affidavit that he was under the impression that Sunday did not count as one of the three days, and that until he attended at the office he was unaware the time had expired. Sunday, it appeared, was not the last of the three days.

F. C. Willis, for the debtor.

Mr. REGISTRAR MURRAY said that as the omission to file vertence, the order would be made. the resolutions within the proper time had arisen from inad But, at the same time, it was important the profession should be aware that Sunday, even in the middle of the three days allowed by rule 284, did count. In this case, the fact that the resolutions had been as sented to unanimously was important. Application granted. Solicitor, E. Parkes.

SOLICITORS' CASES.

BOWEN, J.)*

May 20, 21.-Re W. H. Pook, a Solicitor.

This was a rule calling upon the solicitor to answer certain affidavits, or, in default, to show cause why he should not be struck off the rolls. It appeared that the solicitor had received from a client a sum of nearly £400, for the purpose of paying a composition to creditors. Part of this sum he had, with his client's permission, appropriated to the payment of his own costs, a second rortion he had paid to creditors, and a third portion he had employed for his own purposes, thereby rendering it incumbent upon the client to borrow money from his relations in order to pay his creditors.

May 11.-MR. REGISTRAR MURRAY said a question arose in this case as to the right of an elegit creditor to hold, as against the trustee, certain goods and chattels seized by the sheriff under the writ, and delivered by him to the creditor before the order of adjudication. The question was fully discussed in the recent case of Ex parte Abbott, Re Gourlay, and, as he understood that case, it placed an elegit creditor, upon seizure by the sheriff, in precisely the same position as a creditor who had seized under the ordinary writ of fi. fa. in the case of a trader for a debt under £50. The difficulty in this case was that by the doctrine of relation back of the trustee's title to the act of bankruptcy on which the adjudication was made, the goods so seized were, in law and fact, the goods of the trustee and not of the debtor. The creditor was obliged to resort to the protective clauses of the Act, and the burden of proof was upon him to show that at the time of the delivery of the goods to him by the sheriff (such delivery being, in his opinion, tantamount to a sale within the meaning of section 95, sub-section 3), he had no notice of "any act of bankruptcy available for adjudica tion." The delivery in the present case was on the 10th of (Sittings in Banc, before Lord COLERIDGE, C.J., and February. That the creditor had no notice of the act of bankruptcy on which the adjudication was madeviz., the non-compliance with the debtor's summonswas clearly proved by the affidavit which was uncontradicted, and upon which the deponent had not been cross-examined. But it was said that the creditor had notice of the act of bankruptcy committed by the debtor on the 2nd of February, by filing the liquidation petition, and the evidence certainly did not show that he had not. In fact, upon the affidavits which had been read, and having regard to the fact that notice of the petition was sent by post to the creditor in the ordinary way by the officer of the court on the 3rd of February, it must be inferred that at the date of the delivery he had notice of an act of bankruptcy, and according to the decision in Ex parte Duignan, Re Bissell, an act of bankruptcy "available for adjudication." What was the meaning of the words "act of bankruptcy in this section? The case was argued before him as if the date of delivery was the crucial test, and that notice of any act of bankruptcy committed before that date would be sufficient to deprive the creditor of that protection, and, curiously enough, his attention was not drawn to the case of Ex parte Schulte, Re Mataule (22 W. R. 462, L. R. 9 Ch. App. 409), which, he confessed, had escaped his memory at the time, but which expressly decided that the act of bankruptcy referred to in this section must be construed as meaning an act of bankruptcy committed before seizure. That being so, it followed, in this case, that the creditor was not affected in any way by the liquidation petition. So far from being prior to the seizure, it was not filed till the 2nd of February, whereas the seizure was proved beyond all doubt to have been made on the 24th of January, some ten days previously. With reference to the recent case of Curtoys v. Pillers, as he understood it, the Court of Appeal decided in favour of the trustee because there was nothing in the process of attachment which would take it out of the words of the statute, but their lordships expressly guarded

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A second charge against the solicitor was that he had appropriated two sums of money paid to him by another client for the purpose of paying certain landlord's claims in respect of a house of which the client was tenant. As the money was not sent to the landlord the client's goods were seized.

Prior to the hearing of the case the solicitor had refunded the money due to both his clients.

Sir H. James, A.G., and A. L. Smith, for the solicitor, were unable to deny the charges, but pointed cut that in the liquidation proceedings some of the creditors did not prove, and that so much of the money as necessarily remained in the solicitor's hands was allowed to get mixed up with his own. The money having been refunded the clients were now in statu quo. Under these circumstances they appealed to the court not to pronounce the severest penalty.

A. Wills, Q.C., and Hollams, for the Incorporated Law Society.

Lord COLERIDGE, C.J.-This is such an important case that we will take time to consider.

Lord COLERIDGE, C.J.-In the case of Mr. Pook, a solicitor, which was before us yesterday, my brother Bowen

* Reported by W. BLEW, Esq., Barrister-at-Law.

and myself have now had time to read through the affidavits, and to consider the facts, and, having done so, we have come to the conclusion that there is nothing in the case to mitigate the extreme penalty that can be inflicted in cases of this sort. The circumstances are shortly that Mr. Pook, in his capacity of solicitor, received a sum of nearly £400 from a client of his, a respectable and a respectably connected man. The money was substantially for paying a composition to the client's creditors, but it was not so applied. The consequence was that the client had to borrow money from his relations to pay the composition, for Mr. Pook retained the money with which the composition was to have been paid. Some substantial portion of the money was due to Mr. Pook for costs, and as the costs were incurred before the money was obtained, and as the client never objected to the application of so mach of the money for costs, I do not take that into consideration, but put it out of the question. Another portion of the money Mr. Pook did apply in payment of the debt due from his client, but another portion, nearly £150, he retained, until only two days ago, when he repaid it, and then under pressure of these proceedings, in the hope that it would be taken into account in mitigating his sentence. Such payment cannot, in my opinion, be taken to have any weight; it was money paid under pressure, and not because it was due, or from any desire to discharge a debt. What then is to be done? I have no desire to be hard upon anyone, for we are all exposed to temptation; but here is a person clothed with a character of extensive responsibility, and invested with trust, and the power of using that trust by this court. Mr. Pook was an officer of this court, and by virtue of that position was enabled to hold himself out to the world as a person fit to be trusted in transacting business. Honour and honesty are, above all things, necessary in a solicitor, and if a person shows by his conduct that he is unfit to exercise the privileges conferred upon him, I can come to no other conclusion than that this court must order him to be struck off the rolls.

Solicitor for the Incorporated Law Society, Williamsın. The Solicitor.

HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE.

QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION.

Sittings at Nisi Prius before GROVE, J., and a Special

Jury.)

May 20.-The Incorporated Law Society v. Waterlow, Brothers, & Layton.

This was an action by which the plaintiffs, sought to recover penalties from the defendants for acting as proctors and solicitors without being duly qualified.

Sir Hardinge Giffurd, Q.C., G. A. R. Fitzgerald, and R. T. Reid, appeared for the plaintiffs.

Sir H. James, A.G., Willis, Q.C., and Finlay, were for the defendants.

The substance of the plaintiffs' case was that the defendants, whose regular business was that of law stationers, had, in many instances, obtained probate of wills at Somerset House, going through all the necessary formalities, and answering any inquiries that might be made by the officials with respect to the different documents. It appeared that the practice was for country solicitors in many cases, instead of communicating with their London agents, to transact business connected with the probate of wills with the defendants, who would do it at a cheaper rate, although, as between solicitor and client, there would be no difference in the amount charged.

Sir Hardinge Giffard having briefly opened the nature of the case to the jury, and explained that the defendants, assuming they had acted illegally, were liable to a penalty of £50 for each offence.

GROVE, J., observed that substantially the matter seemed to be one of law, and there was no issue of fact for the jary to decide.

Sir H. James, A.G., said his contention would be that the defendants were merely messengers of the country solicitors, giving no advice themselves, and using no skill or discretion of their own.

A discussion thereupon took place between counsel, and in the result it was agreed that the jury should be discharged, and that his lordship should give a formal judg

ment, which would enable the defeated party at once to go to the Court of Appeal.

His LORDSHIP according gave judgment for the plaintiffs for £50.

May 20.-The Incorporated Law Society v. Shaw & Blake. This was a case almost precisely similar to the last, but desirous to obtain the opinion of the jury, formal proof was the learned counsel who appeared for the defendants being

entered on in the case.

The same counsel appeared for the plaintiffs.

Edward Clarke, Q.C., and Bremner, were for the defen dants.

It appeared that the claim against the defendants was in respect of nineteen different infringements of the Act, and in in the result, after proof had been given of one of these, the same arrangement was arrived at as in the preceding case, with this difference in the facts, that here the solicitors who employed the defendants carried on their profession in London, and not in the country, and that it was elicited in evidence that it was contrary to the practice at Somerset House to receive documents connected with probate of wills unless they were indorsed with the name of a solicitor.-Times.

SOCIETIES.

INCORPORATED LAW SOCIETY.

The meeting of the members of this society which had been specially convened "for the purpose of considering the present position of legal procedure, the impending changes in the legal profession, and other incidental matters which to the meeting might appear urgent and important," which was adjourned from the 6th, was continued on Friday, the 20th inst., at the hall of the society, Chancery-lane. The meeting was attended by about 170 gentlemen. The president, Mr. J. MOXON CLABON, presided.

The PRESIDENT said that the following motion and amendment, the former moved by Mr. EDWIN KIMBER and seconded by Mr. JOSEPH MOTE, and the latter moved by Mr. CHARLES FORD and seconded by Mr. JOHN INDERMAUR, were before the meeting:

"That no committee on legal procedure can have the confidence of the public, or of this branch of the profession, unless both be properly and adequately represented; and this society recommends to her Majesty's Government the appointment of a Royal Commission to inquire into the whole question of economising, simplifying, and accelerating the process and practice of the law."

"That this society, whilst appreciating the purposes of the Lord Chancellor in appointing the Legal Procedure Committee, regrets that so few solicitors were appointed to serve thereon, and, especially, that neither the president nor the vice-president of this society were so appointed."

Mr. FORD asked permission to withdraw the following motion of which he had given notice:-"That, in the opinion of this society, the practice which sanctions the payment of barristers' clerks by snitors for services rendered by such clerks to barristers is objectionable in its operation and should be discon. tinued." He also asked permission to withdraw his amendment, to which course Mr. Indermaur had agreed, and appealed to Mr. Kimber to substitute some other form of motion for the one before the meeting, which probably everybody present was not prepared to adopt. It varied from his motion only as far as the appointment of a Royal Commission was concerned, which he thought ought not to be pressed. If Mr. Kimber could agree to this the motion would be adopted and the meeting might almost immediately adjourn.

The question was put to the meeting, who gave per mission to Mr. Ford to withdraw his amendment, which having been done,

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Mr. EDWIN HUGHES, as the mover of the adjournment, thought was too late to express any regret with regard to the constitution of the Legal Procedure Committee. could not now be altered, therefore it was a waste of time to attempt to interfere with it. It was too soon to think of asking for a Royal Commission, because at present it was not known whether the report would not give them all for which they were seeking. At any rate, they could not get a Royal Commission appointed until after the report of the

committee had appeared. Therefore he must object entirely to the motion, because to regret anything which was past was futile, and to ask for a Royal Commission before the committee had reported was premature. The observations that had been made with reference to the inactivity of the council, in his opinion, had much better be postponed until the council was re-elected at the annual meeting. It was not fair to place these gentlemen in office and then find fault with them, which really amounted to finding fault with themselves as members for having elected them. He wished that a greater number of members would attend the annual meeting, which was the proper time and place for this new generation of solicitors which was springing up to bring forward their particular views and get them represented if they thought it wise to do so. They ought not to be brought forward at a special meeting like the present. He therefore felt rather precluded from making any observations on gereral questions, and thought that the suggestions which had been thrown out should be referred to the council for consideration and to report thereon to the members at the annual meeting. Nothing could be done in the present session, or until a report had been issued by the Legal Procedure Committee. He moved, as an amendment, "That the whole subject discussed at the previous meeting, and also at the present, be referred to the council for consideration and report at the next annual meeting."

The amendment was not seconded.

Mr. G. A. CROWDER moved as an amendment to Mr. Kimber's motion, "That this meeting, whilst recognizing that it is both the duty and interest of solicitors as a body to promote expedition and economy in litigation, affirms that it is to the interest of the public that solicitors should be fairly paid for honest work, and requests the council to support with energy all well-considered measures tending to further these objects, which are now alike frustrated by defects in procedure and practice." There were three defects in the motion. The first, which was apparent on the face of it, was the suggestion that there should be a Royal Commission to inquire into legal procedure. He was one of those who held that the solicitor branch of the profession were far better fitted to consider the question of legal procedure than any other body of men. The bench and the bar, without doubt, could bring to bear upon the subject a very considerable amount of competency, but solicitors were the better fitted to discuss it, because they bad to carry out the details of the procedure established by Act of Parliament in everyday practice. They experienced daily the difficulties and defects of legal procedure, and he maintained that all but those who were members of the legal profession were wholly and utterly incompetent to consider the question. Gentlemen outside the profession might be able to offer valuable suggestions, but it was a farce for anyone to attempt to improve legal procedure who was unacquainted with its fundamental elements. It would be worse than useless that a Royal Commission should be established, unless they had an assurance that the majority of its members would be of the legal profession, and it would only increase the delay in improvements. Another objection to the motion was not so apparent, which was that it was premature. The Legal Procedure Committee was appointed, as he understood it, without any reference whatever to the council of the society, and, therefore, neither the motion nor the amendment could reflect upon the council, who had nothing whatever to do with its formation. It was much to be regretted that the solicitor branch was not more fully represented upon it, but that it was not so was no fault of the council. But in view of the fact that the committee had been sitting for some time, and were about to issue their report, it would be worse than useless for the society to take any action. The report might very possibly contain suggestions or information of the utmost utility; at any rate it would, in all probability, form the basis of their future deliberations. The general meeting would take place in the course of a few weeks, and there would then be an opportunity of considering the report and considering how far they could adopt it, or, at any rate, it would afford materials for their discussion. At present it would be extremely unwise to take any action which would pledge the society to a course which might be altogether independent of the suggestions contained in the report. A further objection was, that if the motion were adopted, it would amount to forcing the council's hand as it were, and putting them in an attitude of hostility towards the Legal Procedure Committee and the Lord Chancellor, who was

theoretically the fountain-head of legal knowledge, and he was practically the source from which alterations in the procedure which affected the profession would emanate. Anything, therefore, which would appear to be hostile to him would be productive of direct and positive harm. It was satisfactory to hear from one member of the council at the last meeting that their relations with the Legal Procedure Committee were of a most amiable kind. He urged the meeting, in the name of common sense, to allow them to remain so, and not do anything which would involve the solicitor branch in conflict with the Lord Chancellor, but let them give the council their confidence and avoid tying their hands in any manner. They had invested the council with the guardianship of the interests of the profession, and they could safely continue to have confidence in them in the present crisis, for crisis it was, and they ought, in discussing the motion, to take into consideration the circumstances under which it was proposed to pass it. The suaviter in modo would often carry a point where the fortiter in re would fail. As regarded the amendment, the first part was a truism, for no one would deny that it was both the duty and the interest of solicitors as a body to promote expedition and economy in litigation. The public would doubtless have their own opinion on this point, but there could be no question that the Judicature Act, with all its defects, had facilitated expedi tion in obtaining legal redress. The public could not object. to the promotion of their interests by the solicitors, whether it was to the interest of the solicitors to do so or not. The amendment also set out that it was to the interest of the public that solicitors should be fairly paid for honest work, and in this lay the difficulty of the whole subject. What was honest work, and what was fair pay? What the public thought of it was another question. The last part of the amendment was the practical part. It requested the council to support with energy all well-considered measures tending to further these objects. This was an expression of the confidence of the members in the council, and the request was made with a view of strengthening their hands in carrying out any measures they might think necessary.

Mr. F. K. MUNTON, in seconding the amendment, observed that Mr. Ford's amendment was an improvement upon the original motion, but the present amendment was an improvement upon both. The motion reflected upon the council, because it brought forward something which they had not thought proper to initiate, and which it suggested they ought to have done, and the statement of the president that it was undesirable to pass any resolution at all was an evidence of it. Any reflections the members might wish to cast upon the council should be left for the annual meetings. There had been the greatest apathy on the part of the members up till within the last four or five years as to what was being done at those annual meetings. Very few members were present, and little or no interest was taken in the proceedings, yet the members were always complaining of the council.

Mr. J. W. PROUDFOOT expressed his entire satisfaction with the council, but was of opinion that the speakers should confine themselves to a discussion of the subject for which the meeting was convened. He had hoped that the object of the speakers would have been to bring forward questions, the consideration of which would have for its object the enabling the members of the solicitor branch to conduct their business with more comfort and satisfaction to themselves and the public than was possible at present. He had heard that the mere attendance at judges' chambers for the purpose of taking out a summons occupied the greater part of a day's work, and in order to sign judgment or issue a writ it was necessary to stand in a long train, waiting for one's turn, and it was almost a matter of impossibility for the clerks to get through their business at all. It was next to impossible for a solicitor to ascertain when his client's case would go before a jury. On one day but one case would be set down; on the next there would be two; on the next none at all; and on the next, half a dozen. It would be set down for hearing in the Common Pleas to-day, in the Queen's Bench to-morrow, and up in a garret the day after, and it was a matter of perfect impossibility to know where to assemble the witnesses. It was said that counsel did not attend to their cases, but how was it possible for them to do so? Under the present mode of procedure they could not attach themselves to one particular court as was done formerly, when the case would be in the list for this court to-day, and, if not tried, in the list for that court

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