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the Queen's Bench Division would sit on the Queen's birthday. Up to Thursday we understand that no decision had been arrived at on the subject among the judges of the Chancery Division, but we believe it is probable that most of them will sit on Saturday.

IN THE YEAR 1879, the Council of the Incorporated Law Society, after communicating with the Probate Registrars, sent a circular to the leading firms of law stationers in London with reference to the transaction by them of non-contentious probate business as agents for solicitors. The council expressed their opinion that a law stationer who could be proved to have acted as the agent of a solicitor in a proceeding in the Probate Court under rule 2 of the Rules of 1862 was liable, under the Stamp Act, 1870 (section 59 and schedule) to a penalty of £50; and was further (under the Solicitors Act, 1860) guilty of a contempt of court, and liable to a further penalty of £50. The council in their circular asked the law stationers, in case they were not disposed to concur in this opinion, to agree with the council on some mode of obtaining a judicial determination of the question. In answer to this circular several law stationers expressed their intention of abandoning the practice, but some refused to do so, and declined to concur with the council in obtaining any decision as to its legality. The council subsequently commenced proceedings to recover penalties against some leading firms of law stationers, and there will be found in another part of our issue this week reports of the trial of two of these cases, in which it was arranged that formal judgment should be given for the plaintiffs for £50, so as to enable the defendants to go to the Court of Appeal. There can, we think, be little doubt that it is an infringement of the letter, as well as of the spirit, of the law that a law stationer should transact business in the Probate Registry as agent for a solicitor, and the practice has been condemned both by the Incorporated Law Society and by the Associated Provincial Law Societies. But so long as the profession countenance it, whatever may be the result of the present proceedings, means will doubtless be found by the law stationers of continuing the practice.

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THE COPYRIGHT in the Revised Version of the New Testament, so far as there is a copyright, has a very different position from that of the copyright in the Authorized Version. The copyright in the Authorized Version was originallyin the Crown, the right being considered either as depending upon the circumstance of that translation having been made at the Crown's expense, or arising out of the duty of the Crown to provide the people with a correct version. The right was denied in Ireland by Lord Chancellor CLARE (Grierson v. Jackson, Ir. T. R. 304); but has never been disputed in England since the case of Universities of Oxford and Cambridge v. Nicholson (6 Ves. 278). The Crown, by letters patent, has, from time to time, vested its exclusive right of printing and selling the Scriptures in the Universities of Oxford and Cambridge, concurrently with the Queen's Printer. The authors of the Revised Version have, as the public are informed in the preface, assigned the copyright to the Universities. But how long does such copyright last? A private translator cannot, of course, invest his work with that perpetuity of copyright which the law forbids, merely by an assignment to an undying corporation. Although there has been such an assignment, the life of the assignor (or in the

case of a joint translation the life of the longest liver of the translators) and seven years afterwards, or not less than forty-two years in all-not the life of the corporationregulates the term of the copyright. There is, however, a statute passed in 1775 which, at first sight, seems to vest a perpetual copyright in the Universities. The Act 16 Geo. 3, c. 53, after reciting that "authors may give the copies of books composed by them to or in trust for one of the two Universities, &c., and may direct that the profits arising from the printing and reprinting such books shall be applied. ...as a fund for the advancement of learning and other beneficial purposes of education within the said Universities; and that whereas such useful purposes will frequently be frustrated unless the sole printing and reprinting of such books be preserved and secured to the said Universities in perpetuity"; provides that the said Universities shall have for ever the sole liberty of printing and reprinting "all such books as shall be bequeathed or otherwise given by the author or authors of the same respectively to or in trust for the said Universities." But this statute can hardly avail to extend the copyright in the Revised Version, for in the first place it appears from the preface to that work that there was an arrangement providing for the necessary expenses of the undertaking," and in the next place the statute in terms applies to originals and not to translations.

A QUESTION has already arisen whether the Revised Version of the New Testament may be used in churches when the second lesson comes to be read. It has been said that the Church of England has never tied herself down to a particular translation, although where the Bible forms a part of the Book of Common Prayer-as is the case with the Epistles and Gospelsta old version must, by the very terms of the Act of Uniformity, be used to the letter. There is, however, direct authority for the proposition that even in the lessons the authorized version must be used. In Newbery v. Goodwin (1 Phil. 282), a suit was brought against a clergyman for (inter alia), “irregularities in reading the Holy Scriptures," and a monition was decreed against the defendant to refrain for the future from offending in the manner charged in the articles. Sir JOHN NICHOLLS said: "The law directs that a clergyman is not to diminish, in any respect, or to add to, the prescribed form of worship. Uniformity in this respect is one of the leading characteristics of the Church of England. Nothing is left to the discretion or fancy of the individual. If any minister were to alter, omit, or add according to his own taste, this uniformity would soon be destroyed, and though the alteration might begin with small things, yet it would soon extend itself to more important changes in the public worship of the Established Church, and even in the Scriptures themselves the most important passages might be materially altered under the notion of giving a more correct version, or omitted altogether as unauthorized interpolations." The principle of this case will, of course. hold good as regards any version not authorized, although produced under the authority of Convocation. The case appears to proceed upon the authority of the Canons. The 14th Canon prescribes that "all ministers shall observe the orders prescribed in the Book of Common Prayer, as well in reading the Holy Scriptures, and saying of prayers, as in administration of the Sacraments, without either diminishing, in regard of preaching or in any other respect, or adding anything in the matter or form thereof." Canon 80 also directs that "if any parishes be yet unfurnished with the Bible of the largest volume, the churchwardens shall, within convenient time, provide the same at the like charge of the parish." Both these Canons clearly proceed on the assumption that, whether altered or not by authority from time to time, one uniform text shall be used at the same time in all churches.

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CONSOLS HAVING REACHED a price considerably above par, after allowing for accrued interest, it becomes a matter of some importance to understand exactly the terms upon which these and other Government debts may be "paid off." The very numerous statutes authorizing the National Debt, mostly repealed by the Statute Law Revision Act, 1870 (33 & 34 Vict. c. 69), were recast and, as far as material re-enacted, by The National Debt Act, 1870 (33 & 34 Vict. c. 71), (passed during Mr. Gladstone's tenure of office), which is very precise. The 5th section provides that the annuities described in the first schedule to the Act shall form part of the National Debt, and "shall respectively continue redeemable by Parliament at the periods and in the manner in the same schedule mentioned, at the rate of one hundred pounds for every one hundred pounds of the capital sums in respect whereof they are payable." The annuities described in the schedule are 3 per Cent. Consols, 3 per Cent. Reduced, New 3 per Cents. New 3 per Cents., and New 24 per Cents. Of these the New 3 per Cents. are redeemable at any time without previous notice, and the 3 and 24 per Cents. (also without notice) at any time after the 5th of January, 1894. In speaking of redemption of the "New Threes" without notice, we merely mean that no notice is provided for by the Act of 1870, which follows faithfully in this respect the Act, 7 Vict.c. 4, by which these annuities were created. Probably however, the precedent of that Act, which allowed the holders of certain 34 per Cents. about six months to declare their option to be paid off or to accept the lower rate of interest, would be followed in a greater or less degree; but an Act of Parliament would be neces scarcely appears to sary to provide for notice, to which the creditor be entitled in strict law Those who buy 2 per Cents. at their present discount, therefore, may be paid off in fourteen years at a handsome premium. Consols and Reduced are redeemable at any time, subject to a peculiar "regulation" scheduled to the Act. By this regulation (which follows, almost in terms, section 24 of the Act 25 Geo. 2, c. 28, which created the" Consolidated Fund" in 1751) they are redeemable "at any time on one year's notice, printed in the London Gazette, and affixed on the Royal Exchange in London, and on repayment by Parliament, according to such notice, of the several sums, or any part thereof, for which the said several annuities, or either of them, are or is payable, by payments not less than £500,000 at one time, in manner directed by any Act to be passed, and also on full payment of all arrears of the same annuities. Then, and not till then," proceeds the regulation with solemnity, 66 so much of the annuities as are attending on the principal sums so paid off shall cease, and be understood to be redeemed." It is not very easy to speculate upon the manner which would be directed "by an Act to be passed" for the redemption of part of a loan. All public borrowers hitherto have, in redeeming, dealt with all the holders of a particular loan at once, giving them the option of taking their principal, or receiving a lower rate of interest. We imagine, however, that the holders of any £500,000, or larger amount which Parliament might be pleased to pay off, could be selected at the absolute pleasure of Parliament, if it should not be deemed more convenient and equitable to proceed by a "drawing mentioned that the holders of Consols amounted in 1885 for redemption. It may be to about 126,000 persons, and that the holders of " New Threes" amounted in the same year to about 85,000. (See McCulloch's Commercial Dictionary, tit. “Funds.")

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THE COMPLAINT of Mr. LEWIS LEWISOHN against the Russian Government involves some important questions of international law. Mr. LEWISOHN is a native of Hamburg, of Jewish extraction, but he is a naturalized Englishman, and carries on business in London. In August last he went to Russia on mercantile business, bearing a passport with the signature of Lord GRANVILLE

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and the visa of the Russian Consul in London. He visited the fair at Nijni Novgorod, but upon reaching St. Petersburg and presenting his passport, he was summoned to the bureau des étrangers, and was asked whether he was a Jew, and on his answering in the affirmative, he was ordered to leave for the frontier within twenty-four hours. Inquiries addressed by Lord GRANVILLE to Lord DUFFERIN elicited a reply that Mr. LEWISOHN'S "notice to quit" was in accordance with Russian law, and that he could not be allowed to go again to St. Petersburg. The 1st article of the Commercial Treaty made between Great Britain and Russia in 1859 provides that "the subjects of each of the two contracting parties respectively shall have liberty freely and securely to come to all places, ports, and rivers in the dominions and possessions of the other, to which other foreigners are or may be permitted to come," but the article concludes with the following words: "It is understood, however, that the preceding stipulations in no wise affect the laws, decrees, and special regulations regarding commerce, industry, and police, in force in each of the two countries, and generally applicable to foreigners." It appears that in the following year the Russian Government issued an ukase which declared that foreigners might enter all the merchants' guilds, and enjoy all the rights of natives, but that in the case of Israelites, only those who were 'connus par leur position sociale et par la vaste étendue de leurs revirements commerciaux," might enter into commerce, and then only as bankers, manufacturers, or holders of leasehold property, and upon the special authorization of the Ministers of Finance and Foreign Affairs. Lord GRAN. VILLE'S application to the Russian Government for redress to Mr. LEWISOHN for the pecuniary loss sustained by his expulsion and continued exclusion from Russia appears to have been entirely unsuccessful. Assuming that the provisions of the 1st article of the Treaty of 1859 can be affected by subsequent legislation on the part of either of the contracting States, it may be questioned whether the ukase of 1860 can relate to a Jewish foreigner who merely visits Russia for the purpose of trading.

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THE MOVEMENT in favour of electing ladies to offices of responsibility appears to be making progress, since it is stated that in the parish of Beeford, Yorkshire, a female churchwarden has recently been elected. There appears to be no doubt that women are eligible for this office. In Morgan v. The Archdeacon of Cardigan (1 Salk. 166), the Court of King's Bench granted a mandamus to the archdeacon to swear in a churchwarden duly elected, for" as it is in the peril of the parishioners, so they may choose and trust whom they think fit." The grounds of disqualification are apparently not very numerous, but a churchwarden must reside or carry on business within the parish at the time of his election; and in Anthony v. Seger (1 Hagg. Cons. 9), an alien was held to be disqualified. In that case Lord STOWELL observed: "If a parish had returned a Papist, or a Jew, or a child of ten years of age, or a person convicted of felony, I conceive the Ordinary would be bound to reject." The authority of Rex v. Stubbs (1 T. R. 395), which decided that a woman may be elected overseer of a parish, would doubtless extend to the case of a female churchwarden; but Mr. PRIDEAUX ("Churchwarden's Guide," 14th ed., p. 5) states that "there can be little doubt that the courts would relieve her from the burden of serving, unless the necessity of the case required that she should do so."

POLICE WITNESSES have on various occasions been called to order by magistrates and judges for exhibiting partizanship. In a case which was tried before Mr. Justice FRY on Tuesday last there were several police

constables examined, and the learned judge had occasion to lecture one of these witnesses for showing bias. In the course of his examination one of the policemen was asked whether he had made a report on the matter in hand, and in reply stated that he had made a report, and that it was under his own control at the present time. The remark of the learned judge may be commended to the consideration of the heads of the police. He said, "It is part of the regular duty of police constables to make reports of every matter in which they are engaged, and these reports are always in existence, but in my experience police constables who are witnesses never bring them into court."

STATEMENT OF THE CONSIDERATION IN BILLS OF SALE.

1.

No section of the Bills of Sale Act, 1878 (41 & 42 Vict. c. 31) has given rise to more difficulty than that which provides for the statement in the deed of the consideration for which it was given. By section 8 it is enacted that “every bill of sale to which the Act applies shall set forth the consideration for which such bill of sale was given," otherwise such bill of sale shall be deemed fraudulent and void as against trustees in bankruptcy and execution creditors.

The decisions upon this section are already rather numerous, and at first sight somewhat conflicting, but we think that, with two or three exceptions, they are capable of being reconciled. We propose to consider the most recent cases on the subject, and to endeavour to deduce from them principles which may be useful for future guidance; but before doing so it may be well briefly to advert to some of the earlier decisions.

In Ex parte Carter, Re Threappleton (27 W. R. 943, L. R. 12 Ch. D. 908), the Chief Judge in Bankruptcy held that the consideration of a bill of sale was not sufficiently set forth to satisfy the requirements of section 8 under the following circumstances:-The bill of sale recited that in June the mortgagor had applied to the mortgagee for 4 loan of £340. In fact it appeared that £240 had been advanced in different sums in the months of March and April by the mortgagee to a firm consisting of the mortgagor and another person, and that the remaining £100 was advanced in June, after dissolution of the partnership, to the mortgagor alone. The Chief Judge appears to have thought that the stringent language of the section left him no alternative but to hold the bill of sale void. For reasons, however, which will be presently given, it may be doubted whether this decision would now be followed. The question came before the Court of Appeal soon afterwards in Ex parte National Mercantile Bank, Re Haynes (28 W. R. 848, L. R. 15 Ch. D. 42), where the consideration was stated to be £2,050 paid by the bank to the grantor at or before the execution of the bill of sale. It appeared that the grantor had agreed to apply £550 in taking up certain acceptances on which he was liable to the bank, but which were not due at the time the deed was executed. When the £2,050 was paid to him he at once handed back £550 to the bank for that purpose. The Chief Judge again held that the consideration was insufficiently set forth, and that the deed was therefore void, but the Cours of Appeal reversed this decision, on the ground that, although the consideration must be truly stated, it is not necessary that a collateral agreement as to the application of the consideration should be set forth; and with respect to Ex parte Carter, Baggallay, L.J., observed that he was by no means satisfied that he should have agreed with the decision in that case. A similar point was raised in the case of Hamlyn v. Betteley (28 W. R.

956, L. R. 5 C. P. D. 327), where the court held that the consideration for a bill of sale was sufficiently stated as "the sum of £182 3s. now paid by the grantee to the grantor," though in fact, at the request and with the assent of the latter, the money was paid as follows:£8 3s. 3d., and £103 178. 5d., to discharge two executions against the grantor's goods; £25 Os. 9d. to the attesting solicitor for money lent to the grantor, and for costs as his solicitor, and the balance only of £45 1s. 7d. to the grantor.

It will be seen, therefore, that with the exception of Ex parte Carter, the cases, so far, are perfectly consistent with the principle laid down by James, L.J., in Ex parte National Mercantile Bank, that "the Act requires the real consideration to be set forth, but does not require that any bargain between the parties relating to it should be stated." The Lord Justice was, indeed, careful to except from this rule cases where it appears that the transaction is a sham one, but, subject to this qualification, we believe the principle has ever since been acted upon. The effect of the qualification received an instructive illustration from the case of Ex parte Charing Cross Advance and Deposit Bank, In re Parker (29 W. R. 204, L. R. 16 Ch. D. 35), the facts of which were shortly as follows:-A bill of sale stated that it was given in consideration of the sum of £120 paid by the mortgagee to the mortgagor at or before its execution. In fact only £90 was paid to the mortgagor, £30 being retained by the mortgagee for interest and experses. Under these circumstances the Court of Appeal held that the consideration was not truly set forth, and that a receipt after the attestation clause, signed by the mortgagor, being no part of the deed, could not be looked at for the purpose of showing how the £120 was made up. "It is clear," observed James, L.J., " that the true consideration is not set forth in the bill of sale. The very object of the Act was to prevent the setting forth as part of the consideration that which was retained by the grantor in the shape of interest and expenses. In the present case there was really an evasion of the provisions of the Act, and it is not at all like Ex parte National Mercantile Bank." It appears, therefore, that the Lord Justice considered that the retention of a sum for interest and expenses was an evasion of the Act, or, in other words, a sham transaction; and both his lordship and Cotton, L.J., seem to have drawn a distinction between the retention of a debt arising out of the loan and one existing independently of it. By the light of subsequent cases, however, it would appear that the real ground of the decision was the retention by the grantee of the interest in advance, and that the retention of a debt bona fide arising out of the loan will not avoid the bill of sale.

In Carrard v. Meek (29 W. R. 244) the bill of sale was expressed to be made "in consideration of the payment of £81 18s. by the said C. Carrard to the said W. Blin, and in further consideration of the payment of £16 38. by the said C. Carrard to the sheriff of Surrey, for and at the request of the said W. Blin," and it was held by Lindley and Lopes, JJ., that this was a sufficient statement of the consideration, although all that was paid by the grantee was the £16 3s., the £81 18s. being a debt incurred two months previously. This decision, it is submitted, is quite in accordance with the authorities already referred to, but the case of Ex parte Berwick, In re Young (29 W. R. 292), seems incapable of being reconciled with them. The consideration was there stated to be "the sum of £65 now paid " to the grantor by the grantee. This sum had really been advanced in instalments some time before the execution of the deed, and, for that reason, the Chief Judge held that the consideration was not truly set forth.

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THE IRISH LAND BILL.

IV.

THOSE of our readers who have followed our previous articles will not, we think, be at any loss to discover the causes of the "failure" of the Land Act of 1870. At first sight this Act would seem to have conferred upon the tenantry throughout Ireland an inestimable boon to have raised them from a position of entire dependence upon the will, even the caprice, of the landowners to one of complete independence, an independ. ence secured, in the case even of tenants having no pecuniary claim of an appreciable nature-a not uncommon case in the south and west-by the imposition of an arbitrary fine (called compensation for disturbance) upon the exercise by the owner of his undoubted right of resuming, at will, the possession of his land. To the northern tenant the Act offered complete, though tardy, justice; and in assuring him that the implied term which lay at the foundation of his tenure would henceforth be observed inviolably, it would appear to have given him all he could desire, and did, in fact, give him all that he had ever demanded. But he was not long in discovering that the independence thus gained was of little practical importance to him the sufferers from any disregard of the customs had never been numerous, and it was only here and there-principally upon estates which had lately changed hands-that the new legal right was of any greater practical value than the old moral one, while, on the other hand, the immediate result of the Act was to put an end to all those indulgences which had grown up in the manner already described, and the want of which was a serious loss to the smaller tenants. That the Act should put a stop to these indulgences was inevitable. In the first place, as the tenant could not, by any arrangement, forego the privileges given him by the Act, there was always the danger of an increase to the "tenant-right" arising from any such benefit: secondly, the joint operation of this Act and the Ballot Act of 1872 was to deprive the landowner of that political inducement which had operated in this respect so largely in favour of the tenants, who henceforth could not, even if they would, assure the landlord of that return which had been one of his principal incentives to stand well with his tenantry: and, thirdly, the Act was passed in a manner provocative of resistance, and so as to excite a large number of the landlords to set themselves, and set themselves successfully, to minimize its effects.

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In the south, the result was even more pernicious to the tenant for as he, as a rule, had paid nothing for goodwill on entering his farm, and had no tangible "improvements" to rely upon, the sole right given him by the Act was to receive his " compensation" if arbitrarily evicted. Such evictions were, however, of very rareoccurrence, even for political causes, before the Act, and practically unknown on any other ground. when a tenant was so hopelessly "broken" that it wasnecessary to get rid of him, it had been usual to give him 'assistance,' "to take him to America," or on some such pretext, the amount of which was ordinarily little, if at all, less than the maximum amount now recoverable as compensation for disturbance. On the other hand, very few indeed of the tenants were in a position to claim this compensation at all: not one in a thousand could ever have paid up all his arrears of rent on demand: and, except in some rare instance of personal animosity, no landowner in Ireland would ever have been so insane as to part with a tenant who paid his rent regularly as it became due if he could by any possibility keep him on. Moreover, in the few cases in which, from any cause whatever, a landlord was so determined to get rid of a particular tenant as to give him an enforceable right to compensation, he never had any difficulty in recouping the sum, if he desired it, in the shape either of increased rents

or a payment for possession, from the next incoming tenant. The practical outcome of the Act, therefore, so far as the south was concerned, was to embarrass the landlord in the management of his property, and to embitter the relationship of landlord and tenant, without conferring any tangible pecuniary benefit on the latter. Above all, it did not even pretend to give him the only thing he really wanted, a right to permanent occupation on equitable terms. But the defect in the Act, which which was perhaps of even greater practical importance than any other, was that it provided no measure of the tenant's interest-when he had any-other than an action at law, and no means of raising such an action until the parties were already in a position from which neither of them could recede. In effect, the Act found the Irish tenant a petted dependent, and left him a soured litigant.

If the new legislation, then, is to have any better fate than the old, these are the errors which it has to avoid :

(1) It must not interfere with future express contracts at all: the sole result of this interference in the Act of 1870 was to prevent landowners from giving a class of temporary accommodation very valuable to the tenants "for fear it might grow into a right."

(2) It must not attempt to secure the occupation of the tenant merely by fining the landlord for evicting him: apart from the gross injustice of such a proceeding it would be utterly futile; the working of the Act of 1870 has shown more than one easy method of shifting the burden of any such fine off the shoulders of the landlord on to those of the incoming tenant, the place where, of all others, it is most undesirable to put it.

(3) It must provide some machinery, other than an action at law, for determining, at any given time, the amount of the tenant's interest in a manner by which both parties shall be bound: the failure of the Act of 1870 in this respect is well illustrated by the widely known case of the farm lying in two counties, so as to necessitate actions before two different chairmen upon an eviction, when one chairman (the facts being necessarily identical) dismissed the tenant's claim with costs, and the other awarded him the maximum compensation.

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(4) It ought to provide, in some reasonable way, for future fluctuations in the value of the land. As the law stood prior to 1870 these practically inured for the benefit of the landlord, but not for his disadvantage. The rent might, and did, go up from time to time, but it never went down; and though in periods of temporary distress large remissions were made, and much assistance of different kinds habitually given, by almost all landlords, there does not seem to have been, even in the terrible crisis of 1846-7, anything like a permanent reduction of rent over any extensive area. This was the case even in Ulster, where, although it was always the rule that the rent could not be raised "so as to interfere with the tenant-right," the landlord could always obtain the benefit of any increase of general value, while, on the other hand, he was effectually protected against loss from any depreciation so long as the tenant-right remained of any value whatever. For it is obvious, that so long as the right of occupancy at a given rent retained a saleable value, there was nothing

to enable the tenant to effect a reduction of rent, which he could only do by throwing up his holding and so sacrificing whatever tenant-right he still possessed. And the Act of 1870 does not seem to have interfered with this right directly, though, as it is a right which can only be enforced by means of notices to quit, it has rendered the exercise of it somewhat more difficult.

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But it is at least doubtful whether the right ought, an abstract proposition, to be maintained in its integrity even without adopting Mr. Mill's view of the "unearned increment," there is at least as much to be said in favour of adınitting the tenant to participate in any future increase of value, as for bestowing upon him a present interest in the land. We reject, as absurd, the

claim made by some of the advocates of the tenants to the whole of this prospective increase, a claim which would reduce the owner's interest to a fixed rent-charge, and would, by converting him from a quasi-partner into a mere creditor, inflict a very serious injury on all struggling tenants, that is, on nineteen-twentieths of the tenantry of Ireland.

The Act of 1870, as we have said, made no attempt to solve this problem, indeed, it is, at least, doubtful whether its importance was then recognized. Its exist. ence was, however, as we happen to know, brought at the time under the notice of the framers of that Act, and a scheme for its solution propounded, which had all the advantages of being fair in working, not unjust in principle, and completely self-adjusting: which has sinco been tried, upon a limited scale and by express contract, with the most satisfactory results, but which was then rejected, and is now ignored, for no reason that we can divine except that fatality which seems to attend all proposals for the benefit of Ireland, emanating from Irishmen unconnected with political life. It is true that, in the measure now before Parliament, a provision has been inserted, apparently alio intuitu, which might, if fairly worked, attain the desired end through the clumsy machinery of an action at law once in every fifteen years, but besides the other formidable objections to this proposal, nothing is more to be deprecated in the relationship of landlord and tenant than an atmosphere of litigation "perpetually renewable."

Bearing these four points in mind, it will be seen, without much difficulty, that the present Bill, complète a departure as it is in some respects from the Act of 1870, unfortunately adheres to the lines of that Act precisely in those very characteristics which have mainly caused its "failure"; that it, too, offers to the tenants large boons which are not what they want; that it, too, inflicts upon the landowners disadvantages out of all proportion to the benefits conferred on the tenantry: opening to both an endless vista of interminable litigation: litigation moreover to be conducted before tribunals of inferior standing and authority, with the aggravation in the present case (from which the Act of 1870 was free) of the very most objectionable Court of Appeal ever devised by the most perverse ingenuity. We propose, in our next article, to examine these allegations in detail.

CASES OF THE WEEK.

SET-OFF-EXECUTOR-LEGATEE-COSTS.-In a case of Knapman v. Wreford, before the Court of Appeal on the 19th inst., a question of set-off arose. The action was an administration one. Some of the legatees had brought an action in the Probate Division for the revocation of the probate of the testator's will. The executor resisted this action successfully, and the plaintiffs were ordered to pay his costs. The legatees assigned their legacies, and the assignees gave notice of the assignments to the executor. The executor claimed to set off his costs of defending the action in the Probate Division against the legacies. The court (JESSEL, M.R., and JAMES and LUSH, L.JJ.), affirming the decision legacies subject to the paramount right of the executor to of Hall, V.C., held that the assignees could only take the set off against them the costs which he had incurred on behalf of the testator's estate.-SOLICITORS, E. W. Reeves; Day & Cather; Fox & Co.

DISSOLUTION OF PARTNERSHIP-DIFFERENCES BETWEEN PARTNERS-DATE OF DISSOLUTION.-In a case of Lyon v.

Tweddell, before the Court of Appeal on the 19th inst., a question arose as to the date from which a partnership ought to be dissolved. The deed of partnership provided that the partnership should continue during the joint lives of the partners, or until it should be dissolved, but the deed contained no provisions for dissolution. The action sought a dissolution, on the ground of differences between the partners. Bacon, V.C., decreed a dissolution as from the

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