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some premises, whether a building or not, named by him within the jurisdiction of such court, the court may, although such officer does not specify any particular reasons for his belief, or specify which of the articles are in such premises as aforesaid, grant to the officer a special search warrant under this section."

The special search warrant authorizes any officer authorized thereby to enter in the daytime, search, and seize all articles found which appear to the officer to have been stolen.

These provisions differ materially from those of the Metropolitan Police Act (2 & 3 Vict. c. 71), s. 25, for which they are to be substituted. That section allows any person to give information, and permits the magistrate to authorize a search in the night-time. We think that in making the law of search of universal application it is very wise to limit the power of information to superior officers of police, and to limit the power of search. The words "states on oath" admit of an oral information. In order that this may not be too loosely given, it might be prudent to require that the information should be read over to and signed by the informant (upon a form which might be scheduled to the Act) before the search warrant is granted. And in connection with search warrants it seems desirable either to repeal or to preserve, in the same manner as section 480 of the Merchant Shipping Act, 1854 (as to dealers in marine stores), section 8 of 6 & 7 Vict. c. 40, which empowers justices to grant search warrants on suspicion of thefts by "persons employed in the woollen, linen, cotton, flax, mohair, and silk hosiery manufactures."

The second paragraph of clause 4 is a very severe one. The opening paragraph of the clause is as follows:

:

"Where any articles are found in any premises either upon a search in pursuance of a warrant under this, or in pursuance of any other warrant, or without such search, or are otherwise found in the possession of any person, and are brought before a court of summary jurisdiction

The next paragraph provides that:

"If the court is satisfied that the person in whose possession the said articles [any articles ?], whether found in any premises or otherwise, are found, had reasonable cause to suspect that they were stolen, and failed to give information to the police of the fact that he had such articles in his possession, that person on summary conviction shall be liable to a fine, &c., or in case of a second or third offence, &c., &c." Surely this is going too far. Is not the effect of it this, that if anything is found anywhere which anybody thinks another person ought to have thought to have been stolen, such other person, if he should fail to put the law in motion against an imaginary thief, is to have the law put in motion against himself? We cannot but think that it would be reasonably sufficient if the liability should be confined to cases of the search warrant only.

Clause 6, which is taken from the Old Metal Dealers Act, provides that persons buying gold, silver, &c., shall not melt the same until the expiration of not less than seventy-two hours [increased from the forty-eight hours of the Old Metal Dealers Act] after he bought the same, and shall also keep a register of all sales, and allow a constable at any time to examine such register, &c. We are here treading on the very hotbed of thieves and receivers, and every precaution should be taken to make this clause as severe as possible. We think that the common law right of re-sale must necessarily be suspended; the time of suspension might fairly be extended from seventy-two hours to one clear week. And might it not be provided that, in case of a second sale by the same person within a limited period, up to a certain amount, notice of the purchase should be sent to the police? This would, of course, lead to thieves dealing with two or more receivers, and so double, or proportionately increase, the chance of detection.

It is next provided (clause 7) that if any person offers any article for sale, or in pawn," and is unable, or

refuses to give a satisfactory account of the means by which he became possessed of the article," he shall be liable to be fined £20,"or if, after due inquiry, the court considers that there is sufficient primâ facie evidence that the article was stolen, to imprisonment with or without hard labour for a term not exceeding one month." We think that this is a little too hard upon the general public. It includes, be it observed, all articles whatever, and would, we think, press unduly upon such unfortunate persons who, happening to be in reduced circumstances, might wish to be sellers for the most innocent of reasons, and yet be unable to answer "satisfactorily "questions of a searching character.

We now come to the regulations specially affecting pawnbrokers and" second-hand dealers," but before con sidering them, it is necessary to extract from the interpretation clause the definition of "second-hand dealer," which is as follows:

"The expression 'second-hand dealer' means a person who carries on the business of dealing in, or buying or selling by retail, second-hand ar ticles manufactured wholly or partly of gold, silver, or ot her precious metal, or any old scrap, broken or defaced gold, silver, or other precious metals, or second-hand jewellery, second-hand watches, second-hand clothing or tools, old iron, rags, or marine stores. whether such person deals in, buys, or sells such articles and goods only, or other stores and goods; provided that a person who bona fide carries on the business of manufacturing and selling new articles of gold, silver, or other precious metal, or new jewellery, or new watches, shall not be deemed to be a second-hand dealer within the meaning of this Act."

Second-hand dealers are placed on the same footing as pawnbrokers in all respects by the Bill, although none of the provisions of the Pawnbrokers Act are applied to them. These traders are required to give every assistance to the police in the recovery of stolen goods, by giving speedy information, by allowing inspection of their wares by "a constable specially authorized as provided by this Act," and by answering all inquiries made by such constable. It is also provided that second-hand dealers must take out excise licences (the licences of pawnbrokers are provided for by sections 37-44 of the Pawnbrokers Act, 1872, which sections are left undisturbed), which licences are to be forfeited upon convictions, as also are pawnbrokers' licences (the Pawnbrokers Act contains no provisions for forfeiture of licences, but only restrictions upon the grant of them). Next we come to a series of clauses (16-19) providing for the registration of convicted pawn

brokers and second-hand dealers. To these clauses, which are to some extent modelled upon the well-known ones in pari materia which the Licensing Act of 1872 first brought into vogue, there can be no reasonable objection, nor is there any reasonable objection to extending to second-hand dealers that provision of the Pawnbrokers Act which prohibits dealing with children or drunkards, and the employment of persons under sixteen as servants or apprentices.

Passing to the general clauses of the Bill, we observe the appeal clause (clause 22) to be as follows:

"Where a person convicted under this Act is sentenced to be imprisoned, or to pay a fine exceeding five pounds, or to have his licence or certificate indorsed or forfeited, or to be registered, such person may appeal against the conviction to a court of general or quarter sessions."

It is important to compare this clause with the appeal clauses of the Summary Jurisdiction Act, 1879, as this is the first Bill of importance which has succeeded that Act, the appeal clauses of which it will be remembered apply to future as well as to past acts. All persons conversant with modern statutes will gladly miss the lengthy "conditions of appeal" which, in various forms, puzzled the reader before the passing of the Act of 1879. For these conditions, reference is to be had to the Act of 1879, and when they once become familiar, much trouble will have been saved. But it may be

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asked why there should be an appeal clause at all? The answer is that the Act of 1879 does not give an appeal against fines, and therefore the appeal must be given by the Bill.

The clauses that "this Act shall be, in addition to, and not in derogation of, any other powers or enactments in relation to stolen goods," and that "this Act shall not exempt any person from any proceeding by indictment or otherwise for an offence which is punishable at common law, or under any Act other than this Act, so that no person be punished twice for the same offence," do not please us much. The 480th section of the Merchant Shipping Act, 1854, is expressly preserved, and we suppose that it could ill be torn out from its parent Act. But we think it would have been no very hard matter to pick out, repeat, and incorporate the "other enactments," and this brings us, in conclusion, to pass from what the Bill does to what it does not do.

The Metropolitan Police Act (2 & 3 Vict. c. 71), will be found to contain a series of provisions (sections 2630) for the restoration to the owner of stolen goods. These provisions may be administered by a magistrate summarily but are, of course, confined to the metropolis. The Larceny Act, 1861, s. 100, provides for the issue of a "writ of restitution" to an owner after a conviction for felony or misdemeanor. Sections 101 and 102 of the same Act, amended by the Larceny Act, 1870, as to the insertion of advertisements in newspapers, prohibit the taking reward for helping to the recovery of stolen property without bringing the offender to trial, and the advertising a reward for the recovery of stolen property; with an indication that "no questions will be asked." These matters are so closely allied to the subject-matters of the Bill, that it would perhaps be worth while to consolidate and incorporate them with the necessary amendments. It will be found that the Metropolitan Police Act contains many provisions which may aptly be brought into force in the whole kingdom, especially when it is considered that the two sections which deal with the power of search are already incorporated in the Bill.

REVIEWS.

PRACTICE OF SUPREME COURT. THE PRACTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE. ALPHABETICALLY ARRANGED. Designed by F. 0. CRUMP, Esq., Barrister-at-Law. PART I. THE PRACTICE OF THE CHANCERY DIVISION OF THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE (INCLUDING THE WINDING UP OF COMPANIES), AND ON APPEAL TO THE COURT OF APPEAL AND HOUSE OF LORDS. BY FRANK EVANS, Esq., Barrister-at-Law. Horace Cox.

The idea

The design of this work, the credit of which belongs to Mr. Crump, seems to us a very good one. is to bring together, under headings arranged alphabetically, not only the provisions of the Judicature Acts and Rules and the decisions upon them, but also all the statutes and orders now in force, with the decisions upon them, relating to the practice of the Supreme Court. There is an obvious convenience to the practitioner in being able to refer to a section which contains, in a short compass, everything relating to the matter in hand. The present volume comprises the practice of the Chancery Division, and, judging from the titles we have examined, we are disposed to consider it a good piece of workmanship. Taking, for instance, the title "Solicitors," we find the subject arranged under nine heads General Provisions, Proceedings affecting Status, Retainer and Authority, Changing Solicitor, Costs, Payment of Money and Delivery of Papers, Enforcing Undertaking, Disclosure as to Writ, and Default in Proceeding. This last head, which does not appear in the table prefixed to the title, does not seem Strictly to fall within the subject, and the only provision

cited might, perhaps, have been inserted under the subhead "Jurisdiction over Solicitors as Officers." Under these general headings the matter is arranged under sub-heads, to which reference is rendered easy by the tables prefixed to the titles. The cases seem to be industriously collected; their effect is concisely stated, and references are given to all the reports. We have pleasure in commending the work to our readers.

JUDICATURE ACTS.

THE JUDICATURE ACTS, 1873 AND 1875, THE APPELLATE JURISDICTION ACT, 1876, AND OTHER STATUTES, THE RULES OF COURT AND ORDERS IN COUNCIL, WITH NOTES, FORMING A PRACTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT. By J. M. LELY AND W. D. J. FOULKES, Barristers-at-Law. THIRD EDITION. H. Sweet.

There has been some increase of size in this edition, but it still remains a very handy book, and there is plenty of room in the margins for annotating new decisions. As regards mechanical arrangements and devices for facilitating ready reference, this work on the Judicature Acts is excellent, and we may add, as the result of frequent reference to former editions, that the effect of the cases is given with accuracy and terseness in the notes. We have not missed any recent case in the proper places. The Judicature (Officers) Act, in this edition, and the new orders and rules are inserted conveyancing counsel to the Court of Chancery can (as 1879, is carefully annotated, but we doubt whether the the authors suggest on p. 109) be said to be intended to be included among such "other officers of the Supreme Court as are, from time to time, transferred to the Central Office astonished to hear of any such proposed transfer. This by rules of court." Those gentlemen would be greatly edition of Messrs. Lely and Foulkes' book will be found a very complete and practical compendium of the present practice.

CRIMINAL LAW.

PRINCIPLES OF THE CRIMINAL LAW.
By SEYMOUR F.
HARRIS, Barrister-at-Law. SECOND EDITION. Revised
by the AUTHOR and F. P. TOMLINSON, Barrister-at-
Law. Stevens & Haynes.

The favourable opinion we expressed of the first edition of this work appears to have been justified by the reception it has met with. Looking through this new edition we see no reason to modify the praise we bestowed on the former edition. The recent cases have been added and the provisions of the Summary Jurisdiction Act are noticed in the chapter relating to Sumof criminal law for the student. mary Convictions. The book is one of the best manuals

Mr. Woodforde, the judge of the Derby County Court, is said on Saturday to have stated that "the county court registrars (who at present tax bankruptcy costs), being paid by fees and not by salary as he would have them paid, knew that it was important for them to treat in a friendly manner the accountants and trustees who mainly brought business to the courts. He furnished an instance in support

of his statements wherein a bankrupt's estate realized £249,

but as the costs amounted to £245, there was but £4 for

the creditors." [Some explanation of this statement appears to be required.]

In the House of Commons on the 15th inst., in answer to Mr. Hicks, Sir W. Harcourt said that he was quite aware of the inconvenience which is caused in some cases

both to the judges and to others who have to attend the

autumn and winter assizes, and he had been in communication with the Lord Chancellor and the Attorney-General on the subject, and hoped that some more convenient system might be devised by which all prisoners might be brought to trial speedily and the gaol system consolidated.

CASES OF THE WEEK.

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WILL CONSTRUCTION CONDITIONAL LEGACY-MARRIAGE WITH CONSENT OF GUARDIAN OR GUARDIANSDEATH OF SOLE GUARDIAN APPOINTED BY WILL.-In a case of In re Brown's Trusts, before the Court of Appeal on the 13th inst., a question arose as to the non-fulfilment of the condition upon which a legacy had been given. A testator, by his will, appointed his wife sole guardian of his children during their respective minorities. And he bequeathed the sum of £5,000 to each of his daughters," upon her attaining the age of twenty-one years, or on her marriage with the consent of her guardian or guardians, which should first happen." The widow died before one of the daughters attained twenty-one, and this daughter married under twenty-one without the consent of any guardian, none having been appointed after the death of the widow. The daughter died under twenty-one. The question then arose whether the daughter's representative was entitled to the legacy. FRY, J., held that, as a guardian might have been appointed, the performance of the condition had not become impossible, and that, as it had not been complied with, the legacy bad lapsed. This decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeal (JAMES, BAGGALLAY, and LUSH, L.JJ.). It was contended that the case was governed by Dawson v. Oliver-Massey (24 W. R. 993, L. R. 2 Ch. D. 753), in which a legacy was given to an infant, "upon her attaining twenty-one or marrying with the consent of her parents," and, after the death of one parent, the infant married with the consent of the surviving parent, and the Court of Appeal held that this was a sufficient compliance with the condition, it having become impossible, by the act of God, and without any default on the part of the legatee, to obtain the consent of both parents. So in In re Brown's Trusts it was urged that, there being no guardian in existence at the time of marriage, and the will not having pointed out any mode of appointing guardians, a strict compliance with the condition had become impossible. JAMES, L.J., said that the real question was whether the principle of the decision in Dawson v. Oliver-Massey applied. When parents were dead it was impossible to supply their place, but there was no such impossibility of supplying the place of guardians, and the testator, in using the words "with the consent of her guardian or guardians," evidently contemplated that guardians of the infants would be appointed in the event of the death of the mother. It would have been the easiest thing possible to obtain the appointment of guardians by the court. A guardian appointed by the infant herself to consent to her marriage would not be a guardian within the meaning of the condition. It would be an unwarrantable extension of Dawson v. Oliver- Massey to hold that the temporary non-existence of a guardian was equivalent to the non-existence of parents. BAGGALLAY, L.J., said that, having been a party to the decision in Dawson v. Oliver-Massey, he entirely agreed with the distinction which had been drawn between that case and the present. LUSH, L.J., said that if, after appointing the mother sole guardian of the children, the testator had said that the daughter's marriage must be with the consent "of her said guardian," it would have been impossible after the death of the mother to comply with that condition. But the testator had not done this; on the contrary, he had clearly contemplated the existence of a guardian or guardians other than the mother.-SOLICITORS, Emmet, Son, & Stubbs; Simpson, Hammond, & Co.

ILLEGAL CONSIDERATION-COMPOUNDING A FELONY

STIFLING A PROSECUTION-DEPOSIT OF TITLE DEEDS.-In

a case of Whitmore v. Farley, before the Court of Appeal on the 14th inst., a question arose with regard to the validity of an agreement upon the terms of which a criminal prosecution had been withdrawn. The plaintiff had deposited some securities with a broker, and she afterwards brought a charge against him before a magistrate of wrong. fully converting the securities to his own use. charge had been partly beard, the wife of the broker endeavoured to induce the plaintiff to withdraw from the prosecution, and ultimately, on the morning of the day fixed for the further hearing of the charge, an agreement was come to that the prosecution should be withdrawn if the consent of the magistrate could be obtained, and that the

After the

broker's wife should charge her separate estate with the amount of the loss which the plaintiff had sustained through the broker's misconduct. When the case was called on the magistrate was informed of the terms of the agreement, and he gave his sanction to the withdrawal of the prosecution, and the defendant was discharged. In pursuance of the agreement some title deeds of separate estate of the wife were deposited with some bankers. The wife afterwards declined to carry out her agreement, and the action was brought claiming a charge on her separate estate. No objection to the legality of the agreement was raised by the pleadings, but Fry, J., held (28 W. R. 908, 24 SOLICI TORS' JOURNAL, 691) that the agreement, being for the compounding of a felony or the stifling of a criminal prosecution, was contrary to public policy and illegal, and that it could not be enforced. And he held that the wife was entitled, as between herself and the plaintiff, to the return of the deeds, for which she had delivered a counter-claim, though he could only make a declaration of the right, and could not make an order for the return of the deeds, because there was a prior mortgage of the property, and the holder of that mortgage was not a party to the action. This decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeal (JAMES, BAG-GALLAY, and LUSH, L.JJ.), who said that it was immaterial that the agreement had been made in court with the sanc tion of the presiding magistrate. Such a sanction could not give any legality to that which was in itself an illegal act. It was objected that by making a declaration as to the title deeds, the court was affording active relief to one of the parties to the illegal agreement. But the court said that the declaration was the logical result of the dismissal of the plaintiff's claim. If the plaintiff had not acquired a valid charge on the property, it followed that the wife, being entitled to the property, free from any charge in favour of the plaintiff, was entitled to the deeds. LUSH, L.J., said that compounding a felony was not only an illegal, but a criminal act, rendering the person who attempted it liable to punishment, and it followed that every agreement by which a person in consideration of a private benefit to himself consented to withdraw from a charge of felony was illegal and could not be enforced. There was no legal obligation on a man who had been wronged to prosecute the wrongdoer, but, if he did institute a prosecu tion, then he acted on behalf of the public, and would not be allowed to enter into any bargain not to continue the pro-secution. SOLICITORS, F. Bradley; Remnant, Penley, & Grubbe.

SET-OFF-ARMY AGENT-SALE OF OFFICER'S COMMISSION. In a case of The Duke of Roxburghe v. Cox, before the Court of Appeal on the 13th inst., a question arose as to setoff. An officer, who desired to retire from the army, applied to the Army Purchase Commissioners to purchase his commission. The purchase-money was deposited by the Commissioners with the bankers, who acted as their agents, to be paid by them to the officer on his retirement being gazetted. The bankers had also acted as the bankers of the officer, and there was a balance due from him to them on his current account. The bankers claimed a right to retain this debt out of the purchase-money, and Bacon, V.C., held that they were entitled to do so by virtue of their banker's lien. On the appeal it was contended that no banker's lien could exist, inasmuch as the bankers did not hold the purchase-money as the officer's bankers, but as trustees for him. The Court of Appeal (JAMES, BAGGALLAY, and LUSH, L.JJ.) held that both the demands that of the officer against the bankers, and that of the bankers against him-were legal demands, and that the one could be set off against the other, and on this ground they supported the decision of the Vice-Chancellor.-SOLICITORS, W. & A. Ranken Ford; Fladgate, Smith, & Fladgate.

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BANKRUPTCY - LETTERS ADDRESSED TO BANKRUPT — APPLICATION FOR RE-DIRECTION-LOCUS STANDI-BANKRUPTCY ACT, 1869, s. 85.-In a case of Ex parte Lister, before the Court of Appeal on the 12th inst., a question arose as to the locus standi to apply for an order for the redirection of letters addressed to a bankrupt. Section 85 of the Bankruptcy Act, 1869, provides that "the court, upon the application of the trustee, may, from time to time, order that, for such time as the court thinks fit, not exceeding three months from the date of the order of adjudication, post letters

addressed to the bankrupt at any place or any of the places mentioned in the order, shall be re-directed, sent, or delivered by the Postmaster-General, or the officers acting under him, to the trustee, or otherwise as the court directs, and the same shall be done accordingly." An adjudication had been made against two of three partners who had traded in England. The third partner was resident abroad, and had never been within the jurisdiction of the English Bankruptcy Court. A receiver had been appointed, but no trustee had been chosen, and one of the registrars was acting as trustee. Upon the application of the registrar trustee and of the petitioning creditor, another of the registrars, acting as Chief Judge, ordered that all post letters addressed to the bankrupts at their place of business should be re-directed, sent, or delivered to the receiver. The petitioning creditor applied to the registrar to vary this order, on the ground that it ought to have dealt with all letters addressed to the bankrupts in the name of the firm under which they had traded. The registrar trustee declined to join in the application, being of opinion that the variation asked for would not be authorized by section 85. The registrar refused the application. The petitioning creditor appealed, and the registrar trustee declined to join in the appeal. The Court of Appeal (JAMES, BAGGALLAY, and LUSH, L.JJ.) dismissed the appeal, on the ground that such an order can, by section 85, be made only on the application of the trustee. They said that possibly the petitioning creditor might obtain authority to use the name of the trustee.-SOLICITORS, S. S. Seal; Aldridge.

PRINCIPAL AND SURETY-JUDGMENT AGAINST PRINCIPAL DEBTOR-RIGHTS OF CREDITOR AGAINST SURETY.-In a case of Ex parte Young, before the Court of Appeal on the 12th inst., the question was raised whether a judgment or award against a principal debtor is binding on or is evidence against the surety in an action against him by the creditor. It was stated by counsel that no English authority was to be found on the point, but that it had been decided by the Amerian courts that the surety is not bound, reference being made to a decision of the Supreme Court of New York in the case of ef Douglas v. Howland, 24 Wendall, 35. The question arose thus:--An agreement had been entered into between a firm of English wine merchants, consisting of K. and M., with a firm of wine growers in Germany, for the supply of wines by the latter to the former, the English firm binding themselves to take a certain quantity of wine yearly. Afterwards K. retired from the English firm, and was succeeded by W. The German firm objected to continue the arrangement with the new English firm, unless K. would guarantee the due performance of it by them. K. then wrote a letter to the German firm, by which he requested them to treat the original agreement as made between the new English firm and themselves, and in consideration thereof he undertook and guaranteed that all wines supplied by them to the new firm should be duly paid for, and that the agreement should, in other respects, be duly performed by the new firm. Upon this guarantee being given, the German firm continued the supply of wine to the new English firm. The German firm afterwards complained that the new English firm had not taken the quantity of wine which they were bound to take under the agreement, and they claimed a reference to arbitration under an arbitration clause contained in the original agreement. The arbitration took place and the arbitrator awarded £1,250 damages, to be paid by the new English firm to the German firm, for breach of contract. The amount awarded was not paid, and the German firm claimed to prove for the amount against the estate of K., who had meanwhile filed a liquidation petition. The court (JAMES, BAGGALLAY, and LUSH, L.JJ.) held that the proof could not be admitted for that amount. JAMES, L.J., said that the meaning of the guarantee was that, if the new firm did not perform the agreement, the guarantor would be liable in an action against him for any damages which the German firm could show that they had sustained by the default. If he was to be liable for any amount which an arbitrator between the parties to the agreement might fix as the amount of the damages, this ought to have been expressed in the clearest language in the guarantee. It was clear that in an action against a surety no admission of liability made by the principal debtor to the creditor would be evidence against the surety. And, if the surety was not bound by any such admission, it would be monstrous if he were to be bound by the mode in which the creditor and the princi

pal debtor chose to ascertain the amount of the liability. LUSH, L.J., said that the guarantor had not undertaken to be liable for such an amount as an arbitrator might find to be due by the principal debtor to the creditor. If there had been a verdict by a jury for the amount due from the principal debtor to the creditor, it would have been no evidence as against the surety of the amount due. The creditor must have proved the amount due over again as against the surety. He was only liable to pay what should be found due as against him. There must be specific words in the guarantee in order to make the guarantor liable to pay whatever might be awarded by a third person, whether an arbitrator, a jury, or a judge. If the surety insisted on it, the amount due must be proved against him just as against the principal debtor. The proof against the principal debtor was res inter alios acta, and did not bind the surety.SOLICITORS, Hindson, Miller, & Vernon; Stibbard, Gibson, & Co.

VENDOR AND PURCHASER-RESTRICTIVE COVENANTLEASE-NOTICE OF LESSOR'S TITLE-VENDOR AND PURCHASER ACT, 1874, s. 2, SUB-SECTION 1.-In a case of Patman v. Harland and Bennett, before the Master of the Rolls on the 13th inst., a motion was made to restrain the defendants from erecting a building to be used as an art studio in breach of a covenant contained in a former conveyance of the property. The property in question was sold and conveyed by the plaintiff to the predecessor in title of the defendant Harland, subject to the covenants and conditions contained in an indenture of the 25th of October, 1876, and, amongst others, to a covenant not to erect any building upon the said property other than a private dwelling-house. A private dwelling-house had been duly erected upon the property in question, but the defendant Bennett had recently commenced to erect at the side of the house a corrugated iron structure not attached to the house, intended to be used as an art studio in connection with an art college for ladies carried on in the house. The defendant Harland had leased the premises to the defendant Bennett, and had expressly covenanted with the latter that she should make the erection in question. The conveyance to Harland was made expressly subject to the indenture of the 25th of October, 1876. The plaintiff now moved for an injunction to restrain the erection of the proposed studio. For the defendant Harland it was contended that he was not a necessary party to the motion, and that the erection would not be a breach of the covenant. For the defendant Bennett it was contended that she had not constructive notice of the covenant, as she was expressly told she had liberty to make the erection in question, and reliance was placed upon the dicta of Turner, L.J., in Wilson v. Hart (L. R. 1 Ch. 463). JESSEL, M.R., was of opinion that a lessee who took a lease had constructive notice of his lessor's title, and Lord Eldon had treated such a doctrine as settled law in his time, and it had not been disturbed since, and in fact there was no difference as to notice whether a man took by purchase or under a lease. A man who purchased or leased was bound to investigate his vendor's or lessor's title, and he was held to take with notice of that title, and was bound to inquire what that title was. Of course that meant reasonable inquiry, and a purchaser or lessee was not simply limited to the conveyance to his vendor or lessor, but must go back during the usual length of title. In the present case if only the conveyance to Harland had been seen, the lessee would have seen that the property was subject to the restrictive covenants. It had, however, been argued that if a lessee having constructive notice were told by his lessor that there was no restrictive covenant, that would do away with the effect of constructive notice, but he entirely dissented with that doctrine. If a person had notice of a deed relating to the title, he had notice of the contents, and it was no excuse for not asking to look at the deed that he was told it contained nothing necessary to be seen. There might, no doubt, be cases where a deed could not be seen, and where there might be no constructive notice, but that was another question, and when a person had constructive notice it was no answer to say he had been told a certain deed did not prejudicially affect the title. If a person knew a deed affected the title, he was bound by its contents. There was a class of cases, of which Jones v. Smith (1 Hare, 43) was the most notorious, in which it was held that if a man was told of a deed which might or might affect the title, and was told at

the same time it did not affect the title, he would not in such a case bave constructive notice of its contents. The instance he alluded to was where a purchase was made of a married man, and the purchaser was told the vendor had made a settlement on his marriage, which, however, did not affect the property sold. No doubt some difficulty had arisen from some observations of Turner, L. J., in Wilson v. Hart, but those observations could not alter the settled law on the subject. He was also of opinion that the Vendor and Purchaser Act, 1874, s. 2, sub-section 1, did not alter the law, it only did away with that necessity for a stipulation on the point which had previously been the practice, and, in his opinion, the effect was the same as if a lessee had expressly bargained not to look at his lessor's title. On the merits he was of opinion that a breach of the restrictive covenant had occurred, and therefore he granted an injunction until the trial to restrain the completion of the building. He would not new grant a mandatory injunction to pull down the building (although it was stated it could be done in a few hours), as it might be the building would be so altered before the time as to be used as an adjunct to the dwelling-house. There would be no injunction against the defendant Harland, and the costs would be costs in the action.-SOLICITORS, W. H. Bennett; John Mackrell & Co; Edward Newman.

PRACTICE-ATTACHMENT-DEBTORS ACT, 1869, s. 4, SUPSECTION 3-DEFAULT BY PERSON IN FIDUCIARY CAPACITY. -An application to enforce an order for leave to issue an attachment was made to Hall, V.C., on the 14th inst., iu an administration action of In re Spicer, Spicer v. Spicer. An order had been obtained in the action requiring the defendant, who was the executrix of the estate being administered. to pay into court certain moneys belonging to the testator's estate, the amount to be verified by her upon affidavit. The order had not been complied with, and an order for leave to issue attachment against her had been obtained. The registrar, however, had refused to draw up the order, on the ground that no sum was specified in the order, and the case was not within the exception of section 4, subsection 3, of the Debtors Act, 1869, whereby arrest and imprisonment for default have been retained in the case of a person acting in a fiduciary capacity, "and ordered to pay by a court of equity any sum in his possession or under his control." The present application was that the order might be drawn up, notwithstanding the objection, but HALL, V.C., held that the exception in the Debtors Act must be construed strictly, and that, as the real contempt consisted in not making the requisite affidavit, the order ought not to go, and the application must, therefore, be refused.-SOLICITORS, Sole, Turner, & Knight.

PRACTICE-PARTITION ACT, 1876-REQUEST FOR SALE-MARRIED WOMAN-FORM OF REQUEST.-In a partition action of Grange v. White, before Hall, V.C., on the 14th inst., in which an order for sale instead of partition was desired by the parties, one of the parties interested was a married woman, who had been made a co-plaintiff with her husband. The direction of the court was asked as to the form in which her request should be made. Section 6 of the Partition Act, 1876 (39 & 40 Vict. c. 17), provides that the request may be made on the part of a married woman by the next friend, "or other person authorized" to act on her behalf, and in Crookes v. Whitworth (27 W. R. 149) a married woman's request was made by her counsel authorized to act on her behalf. However, in Wallace v. Greenwood (43 L. T. N. S. 720), Jessel, M.R., said that the request of counsel was not sufficient under the Act, and that it must be made by some person specially authorized to act on her behalf in the action. HALL, V.C., held that, to put the matter in proper form, the married woman should "authorize and request A. B. (her solicitor) to instruct counsel to request a sale."-SOLICITORS, Burton, Yeates, & Hart.

WILL-CONSTRUCTION-LEGACY-VESTING-"PAYABLE." -In a case of Partridge v. Baylis, before Fry, J., on the 13th inst., a question arose as to the vesting of some legacies. A testator gave a fund to trustees, upon trust to pay the income thereof to his daughter for her life, aud after her death upon trust to pay and divide £2,000, part of the fund, unto and equally between all and every the child and children of the daughter as and when they

should attain twenty-one, and in case any or either of the children should die before his, her, or their share or shares thereof should become "payable as aforesaid," without leaving a child or children, the testator directed that the share or shares of him, her, or them so dying should go to the survivor or survivors, equally if more than one, and if but one, the whole to that one, with full power for the trustees during the respective minorities of the child or children, to pay and apply the interest of his, her, or their expectant share or shares for and towards his, her, or their maintenance, education, and support. And in case all such children should die under twenty-one, without leaving a child or children, upon trust as the mother should appoint, and in default of appointment on trust for the next of kin of the mother. The daughter had four children who attained twenty-one. Three of them died before the mother, two without issue, the third leaving issue. On the death of the mother the question arose whether the shares of the children had vested at twenty-one, or whether, as the first gift over was in the event of their dying without issue before their shares became "payable as aforesaid," and the shares could not become payable until after the death of the mother, who was the tenant for life, the shares of the two children who had died before their mother without issue had gone over to the other two. FRY, J., held that the shares had vested on the children attaining twenty-one. He said he should be inclined to give the word "payable" its natural meaning, but there were authorities for holding that it might be construed differently, and there were indications in the will which led to the inference that it was not to be read literally. The words were "payable as afore said," and in the direction to pay the words were, "as and when they shall attain twenty-one." Then the power of maintenance and advancement was confined to the minorities of the children. Again, the ultimate gift over was in the event of all the children dying under twenty-one. The inference was that the first gift over was intended to apply to a state of circumstances similar to that to which the second was to apply. On the whole, he thought the words payable as aforesaid" must be read as meaning "attaining twenty-one."-SOLICITORS, Pattison, Wigg, & Co.;. Tucker & Lake; Beale, Marigold, & Co.

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EXECUTOR RETAINER EQUITABLE ASSETS- 3 & 4 WILL. 4, c. 104.-In a case of Walters v. Walters, before Fry, J., on the 16th inst., a question arose as to an executor's right of retainer. The suit was brought for the administration of the real and personal estate of a testator, who died in the year 1865, and a decree for administration was made in 1866. His personal estate was insufficient for the payment of his debts, and his real estate was sold, and the proceeds of sale brought into court. The personal estate realized £43,000. The specialty debts amounted to £51,000. The simple contract debts amounted to £66,000. In August, 1876, there were in court a sum of £17,000, arising from personal estate, and a sum of £40,000 which had arisen from the sale of real estate, and an order was then made that the £17,000, and so much of the £40,000 as should be necessary, should be applied paying the specialty debts, and this was done. Further sums were afterwards realized, both from personal estate and from the sale of real estate, and were brought into court, and when the cause came on for further consideration there was a sum of over £20,000 in court, which was made up of those further sums, and of the residue of the £40,000 after the payment of the specialty debts had been made, but there was not enough to pay the simple contract debts in full. The executor of the testator claimed, by virtue of his right of retainer, to be paid, in priority to the other simple contract creditors, a simple contract debt which the testator owed him. FRY, J., held that this claim could not be sustained. He said that the specialty debts had been, in fact, paid out of two funds-personal estate, which was legal assets, and real estate, which were made assets by the Act 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 104. The execu tor's right of retainer applied only to legal assets, and it was a right inter pares-as against creditors in the same degreeand extended no further. If the personal estate had been applied in the first instance in payment of the specialty debts, the executor could never have succeeded in asserting his right of retainer. If he could assert it now, it must be by reason of the accident that the specialty debts had been

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