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LONDON. MAY 21, i88r.
<?raiE*T Tones 637
Cbimixal Proceduek 538
The Stolen Goods Bill 639
Casis or Tm Week—
In re Brown's Trusts 642
Whitmore v. Farley • 642
The Duke of Roxburghe v. Cox., 642
Ex parte Lister 642
Ex parte Young 643
Patmnn v. Harland and Bennett ■ 543
In ro Spicer, Spicer v. Spicer.... 544
Grange v. "White - 644
Partriilsre v. Baylis 544
Walters v. Walters - 541
Cases Before The Bankruptcy Registbahs:—
Ex parte The Trustee, Re Clarke 545
Solicitors' Cases 646
Societies . • ••• 646
Law Stcdbxis' .touexaj, 546
Legal Appointments 647
CoXFAjTrxs .« 647
Creditors' Claims 548
Legislation Of The "week . — 519
CoraT Papers 550
Losdox Gazettes, &c, &c • 651
The AsrECT of the rooms in the Iloyal Courts of Justice which are now being prepared for the chief clerks of the four judges of first instance in the Chancry Division is very different from that presented even so short a time since as Easter of this year. No doubt appears to exist that these rooms will be actually entered upon during the month of June, and that each chief clerk and his staff, numbering in all about seventy officials, will before the end of next month, be installed in the new building.
It Is Worth Noticing that the recent applications with reference to the Canterbury aud Oxford election petitions have brought to light the circumstance that the Masters consider 200 guineas as the highest amount which can be allowed as between party and party for getting up a case, instructions, and drawing up briefs for counsel. The charge made in the Canterbury case was 500 guineas, and in the Oxford case (in which the brief contained between 400 and 500 folios) 400 guineas. In each case the sum of 200 guineas was allowed.
A Suggestion has been made by the Treasury to the Lord Chancellor for adjusting the salaries of some of the clerks in the legal offices, so as to assimilate them to the salaries of the corresponding classes in the Civil Service. Under the proposed regulations the salary of a first-class clerk will be £500, rising by annual increments of £20 to £600; that of the second class will be £250, rising by annual increments of £15 to £-100, and that of the third class will be £100, rising by annual increments of £10 to £200. This suggestion, if carried out, will affect between sixty and seventy of the clerks in the chancery offices.
It Is To Be Hoped that, as regards the "well" for solicitors in the new courts, the urrangementa of the Court of Appeal at Lincoln's-inn, which were approved of by Lord Cairns, will not be taken a3 a model. It is essential that solicitors should be placed face to face with the counsel they may have occasion at any moment to communicate with. It is not convenient that counsel should be compelled to attract his client's attention by patting him on the head with his brief. The solicitors' seats should be opposite to, and facing, those of the counsel of the inner bar, and immediately below the latter seats thcro should be provided a table or desk for [the papers of the solicitors, with provision for writing. As regards the solicitors' "well," the arrangements of the court now occupied by Mr. Justice Kay nre a very fair model. It should not be forgotten that the shorthand writers should be placed as nearly as possiblo halfway between the counsel and the judge, and facing the witness-box.
Poor Mr. Rea, the Belfast solicitor whose tragic end has this week been recorded in the papers, carried the virtueof pertinacious presentation of his coses to unheardof lengths. Some of our readers may, perhaps, recall the Bcenes in the Parliamentary Committee on the Belfast Town Improvement Bill in 1864. On the eleventh day of the sitting of the Committee, Mr. Rea, who conducted his opposition to the Bill in person, had not concluded bis cross-examination of the fourth witness, bavingtaken amuchlougertimeoverthecross-examination I of each witness than had been occupied by tho promoters and all the other opponents of the Bill put together in the examination and cross-examination of all four witnesses. On the eleventh day, the patience of the Committee being completely worn out, they declined to hear Mr. Eea any further. He refused to withdraw, and, after a fearful struggle, in which one of the policemen was injured, he was dragged out of the room by three policemen, after threatening to bring an action against every member of the Committee.
that if the finder were to say, "* Even if the owner doesclaim it, I mean to keep it,' that might be larceny."
An Application made this week to the City of London Court, which we report elsewhere, opens up a gloomy prospect to solicitors. A solicitor, of course, is not personally liable to witnesses whom he subpoenas for their expenses unless he thinks fit to bind himself to pay them. And we have always understood that the evidence which is necessary to render a solicitor liable in respect of a promise to pay the expenses of a witness must be clear and unambiguous. If the evidence is ambiguous or doubtful, or the acts or statements of the solicitor relied on are consistent with his acting as agent or solicitor only, then the court will hold that there is no evidence at all of any promise to be personally liable (see the observations of Pollock, C.B., in ice v. Everett, 26 L. J. Ex. 334, 338). In Gilbert v. Terry it appears from the judgment of Mr. Commissioner Keep. that the evidence of the plaintiff was that Mr. Terry, a solicitor, went to the plaintiff, a surveyor, and "told him he (Mr. Tebry) wanted him to give evidence on behalf of his client." Upon the evidence the jury found a verdict of three guineas for the plaintiff, and on an application for anew trial the judge held that "the jury believed that the defendant was unwise enough to say a word on his own responsibility, and so found against him ; " and he refused to order a new trial. If the whole evidence against Mr. Terry is correctly stated in the judgment of the commissioner, there would seem to have been no evidence whatever to fix the solicitor with personal liability.
A Charoe of appropriating a £5 note picked up in the street, which came before the magistrate at the Thames Police Court last week, illustrates the anomalous 6tate of the law as to larceny by the finder of a chattel. Mr. Lushington dismissed the charge, on the ground that the finder had no means, at the moment when he picked up the note, of knowing who the owner was. Reg. v. Thurborn (1 Dear. 387) is the leading case upon this point. There the prisoner picked up a bank note, there being no circumstances which would facilitate his finding the owner, but the jury found that he had, when he picked it up, intended to appropriate it to his own use. Parke, B., delivered an elaborate judgment, and arrived at the conclusion that there had been no larceny, because there was no evidence of taking invito domino. He cited the followiug passage from 1 Hale's Pleas of the Crown, 506:—" If A. find the purse of B. in the highway, and take and carry it away, and hath all the circumstances that may prove it to be done animo furandi, as deuying or secreting it, yet it is not felony;" but he stated that the taking would be larceny if the finder , reasonably believed that the owner could be found. The correctness of this judgment was doubted by Martin, B., in Reg. v. Olyde (16 W. K. 1174, L. R. 1 0. C. B. 139), although Reg. v. Thurlcrn was followed. The prisoner had picked up a sovereign. He met the owner of the money very soon afterwards, and denied having found it. The jury found that he had, with a knowledge that he was doing wrong, det.-rmined to keep the sovereign, even if the owner should become known to him. The conviction was quashed, on the ground that there was no evidence of his belief, when he picked up the money, that he could fiud the owner. Cockburx, C.J., however, observed,
The Philanthropic Gentlemen who recently met at the Mansion House to inaugurate a licensed home for drunkards, under the Habitual Drunkards Act of 1879, said a good deal about the self-supporting character of the institution to be established in order to prevent the Act from becoming a dead letter, but they omitted to draw attention to the circumstance that under the Act every " retreat" must "from time to time, and at least twice in each year, be inspected by the inspector or assistant inspector of retreats." Hence, on the establishment of the proposed "model licensed home," an inspector of retreats will have to be appointed by the Home Secretary, and the "salary and allowances" of such inspector, as well as hia expenses in carrying out the provisions of the Act, will have to be " paid out of moneys provided by Parliament." It is questionable whether, even if the Act were put in force by the local authorities, the publio should be burdened with any costs attending the "retreat" of the drnnkard, but it is still more doubtful whether for the sake of a mere amateur experiment the British taxpayer ought to be saddled with the salary and expenses of an inspector.
The Second Monthly List of persons detained in> prison in Ireland under the Protection of Person and Property Act, shows that the number of prisoners has risen from thirty-five to fifty-four. Most of the additional prisoners are incarcerated upon grounds similar to those upon which those included in the first list were detained, but it appears that John Ruane and Patrick Ruane are detained at Galway on reasonable suspicion of having committed murder, while William. Doorley is imprisoned on suspicion of arson. The cause assigned for the arrest of Mr. Dillon, M.P., is that he is reasonably suspected of having been guilty"as principal, of a crime punishable by law — that isto say, inciting persons to forcibly oppose and resist the execution of process of the law for giving possession of lands, and to riot and assault" within a. prescribed district.
The case of The Queen v. Wiltshire (29 W. R. 473,. L. R. 6 Q. B. D. 366) is one of those provokiug cases in which a prisoner gets off by a technicality without there being any moral doubt of his guilt, and yet the circumstances were such that it is impossible to deny that the court was bound to give effect to the technicality. Such unfortunate occurrences give great occasion to the unlearned to blaspheme.
The facts were these. A man was convicted of bigamy under the following circumstances :—The prisoner had. in 1864, married a woman whom we will call A. Iu 186S he went through the ceremony of marriage with B., A. being Btill alive, and he was charged with, and convicted of, bigamy. In 1879 he married C, and in 1880, C. beiug still alive, he married D. He was then charged with bigamy in marrying D., C. being still alive, and he was convicted. The question was whether this conviction, could be sustained. The point upon which the case turned was as to the presumption with regard to the continued existence of A., and the court held that, it not having been left to the jury to say whether A. was alive or not when the prisoner married C, the conviction could not be sustained.
It Beems quite clear that this most unsatisfactory conclusion was inevitable. At first sight the result might seem more absurd than it is, because it looks as if the prisoner escaped the conviction for bigamy iu respect of one former marriage, on the ground that he was guilty of bigamy in respect of another former marriage, but this is not the case: the woman A. might possibly have been alive when the marriage with C. took place, and dead when the marriage with D. took place, In which case, though the marriage with C. would be a bigamy, the marriage with D. would be no bigamy. The case was one of a slip in the way the matter was left to the jury, which must sometimes occur; but, apart from the poiut upon which the decision actually went, the case illustrates very forcibly the possible absurdities that may arise from the cumbrous rigidity which still characterizes our criminal procedure. If the case had been correctly left to the jury, in what position would it have stood? The evidence on which the jury would have had to decide whether the woman A. was alive in 1879 when the marriage with C. took place was not very satisfactory. There is, it is said, a presumption that the marriage with C. was valid; that it could not be presumed to have been a bigamy, and that the presumption in its favour rebutted the presumption of the continued existence of A. It was held that it was for the jury to decide between these conflicting presumption?, whereas the Common Serjeant, who tried the case, told the jury that there being a prima facie case of bigamy, the onus was thrown on the prisoner of proving that the woman A. was nlive when he married C. But assuming that the jury on the facts had come to the conclusion that A. was alive in 1879, when the marriage with C. took place—it will be observed that the marriage with D. took place in 1880—what ground iu reason, without more, would they have for presuming that A. was dead in 1880? It seems to us that in reason and justice the prisoner certainly ought to have been convicted. If A. was dead in 1879 he was guilty of bigamy in marrying D., C. being alive. If A. was to be presumed to be alive iu
1879, she ought surely to be presumed to be alive in
1880. But the difficulty would then have arisen that the prisoner was indicted for bigamy in marrying D., C. bt iug alive, not for bigamy in marrying D., A. being alive. It seems doubtful whether an indictment could be allowed containing counts charging the felony alternatively. An amendment, assuming it possible, does not meet the case, because the truth is that the jury might not really be able to come to a conclusion whether A. was alive in 1879 or not, but they might well think that if she was alive in 1879, she was alive in 1880, and so that quacunque via the prisoner was guilty of bigamy. For the same reason a fresh indictment far bigamy in marrying D., A. being alive, might prove unavailing.
The truth is that it is quite possible, under our present system (especially in cases of felony, where the indictment can only charge one felony)-^although it does not, of course, often happen in practice—that a man may escape who is clearly guilty of one of two alternative charges, because it is difficult to say which he is guilty of. Of couree, there might be substantial difficulty, as ■when the punishment or nature of the offences differed; but when, as in the case we are suggesting, the offence is substantially the same, only with slight difference of circumstance, it is really absurd that there should be any difficulty in convicting and punishing a miscreant ■who, quacunque via, thoroughly deserves it. We believe we have seen it gravely argued in some book of high authority on criminal law that when the evidence is so balanced that it is impossible to say whether a man is guilty of stealing or receiving, though he must have been guilty of one or the other, he ought to be aoquitted. If this be good law, it seems to us very bad sense. Tho difficulty we are discussing depends very much on our system of indictments. So far as the true allegation and proof of circumstance may be properly materia), it may be necessary that such allegation and proof «hould be strictly required in the interests of the prisoner. But in such a case as this the result appears to us to be absurd. The very ground of defence really shows the offence, with slight chauge of circumstance, to have been committed.
Some time ago we took occasion to point out the useless and even mischievous character of the oldfashioned system of indictments. It is a survival from a period of our law when, perhaps, it had its uses, an obsolete application of that almost superstitious consideration for legal instruments and documents which once so largely prevailed in the law, and was, no doubt, a valuable priuciple in earlier times. The indictment is, in form, a presentment, and in early days, we suppose, when the function of the jury was to present, as being neighbours already cognizant of the facts, rather than to to try, it might be necessary that the charge should be set out with rigid accuracy, and it seems obvious that such accuracy would be a safeguard. But now the indictment answers ether purposes. Its really essential function is to inform the prisoner what the charge against him is. We have pointed out how badly and cumbrously it performs this function. The depositions really give the prisoner the requisite information. What, in fairness, the prisoner ought to be informed of are the facts upon which the prosecution mean to rely, and, perhaps, in addition to this, he ought to have some notice or particulars of the crime or crimes, whether statutory or common law, of which it is alleged the facts show him to be guilty. Ot course, if there were a code, that would be done by referring to the section of the code. The question whether more than one charge should be tried at the same trial ought to be one for the discretion of the court; the distinction between felonies and misdemeanors in this respect seems quite illogical and groundless. The case upon which we have founded the above remarks affords another illustration of the vices of the present system to which we before drew attention.
THE STOLEN GOODS BILL.
The Bill which it is proposed to call the Stolen Goods Act, 1881, which was recently read a second time in the House of Lords, is not likely to meet with much opposition. Thieves and receivers are, of course, not represented in Parliament, and we should hardly imagine that " second-hand dealers " and pawnbrokers are represented sufficiently to be able to interfere. It is all the more necessary, therefore, that the various clauses of the measure should be carefully scrutinized in the interest of the general convenience of the public.
Shortly put, the objects of the Bill are the prevention of " receiving " and the speedy detection of thieves, aud these objects are proposed to be effected by vesting in the police an extensive power of search, and by putting traders under a sharp supervision aud control. The power of search is not quite new, no doubt, for the germ of it may be found in the little-known " Old Metal Dealers Act, 1861" (24 & 25 Vict. c. 110),. and in sections 24 and 25 of the Metropolitan Police Act (2 & 3 Vict. c. 71). And ever since the "Act against Brokers" (1 Jac. 1, c. 21) pawnbrokers have been (very properly) subjected to divers harassing regulations. But it is now sought greatly to extend the power of search, and to subject second-hand dealers in a large variety of articles (including wearing apparel) to the same control and supervision as pawnbrokers. We propose to consider the thirty-seven clauses by which this is proposed to be done, premising that the Old Metal Dealers Act, 1861, aud the two sections in the Metropolitan Police Act to which we have referred, are, with one or two other less important enactments, repealed and replaced by the provisions oi the Bill.
The first paragraph of clause 3 is as follows :—
"Where an officer of polioe, being an inspeotor, or of equal or superior rank, ft i tea on oath to a court of summary jurisdiction that he has received information that certain articles specified by bim hnve been stolen, and ih.it he has reason to believe and doeB believe that the said information is true, and that those articles or some of them are in
some premise?, whether a building or not, named by him within the jurisdiction of Bnoh court, the oourt may, although such officer does not speoify any particular reasons for his belief, or specify which of the articles are in such premises as aforesaid, grant to the officer a special search warrant nnder this section."
The special search warrant authorizes any officer authorized thereby to enter in the daytime, search, aud seize all articles found which appear to the officer to have been stolen.
These provisions differ materially from those of the Metropolitan Police Act (2 & 3 Vict. c. 71), s. 25, for which they are to be substituted. That section allows any person to give information, and permits the magistrate to authorize a search in the night-time. We think that in making the law of Bearch of universal application it is very wise to limit the power of information to superior officers of police, and to limit the pcwer of search. The words "states on oath" admit of an oral information. In order that this may not be too loosely given, it might be prudent to require that the information should be read over to and signed by the informnnt (upon a form which might be scheduled to the Act) before the search warrant is granted. And in connection with search warrants it seems desirable either to repeal or to preserve, in the same manner as section 480 of the Merchant Shipping Act, 1854 (as to dealers in marine stores), section 8 of 6 & 7 Vict. c. 40, which empowers justices to grant search warrants on suspicion of thefts by " persons employed in the woollen, linen, cotton, flax, mohair, and silk hosiery manufactures."
The second paragraph of clause 4 is a very severe one. The opening paragraph of the clause is as follows :—
"Where any articles are found in any premises either upon a search in pursuance of a warrant under this, or in pursuance of any other warrant, or without such search, or are otherwise found in the possession of any person, and are brought before a court of summary jurisdiction "—
The next paragraph provides that:—
"If the court is satisfied that the person in whose possession the said articles [any articles ?], whether found in any premises or otherwise, are found, had reasonable cause to suspect that they were stolen, and failed to give information to the police of the faot that he had such articles in his possession, that person on summary conviction shall he liable to a fine, &c, or in case of a second or third offence, &c, &c."
Surely this is going too far. Is not the effect of it this, that if anything is found anywhere which anybody thinks another person ought to have thought to have been stolen, such other person, if he should fail to put the law in motion against an imaginary thief, is to have the law put in motion against himself? We cannot but think that it would be reasonably sufficient if the liability should be confined to cases of the search warrant only.
Clause 6, which is taken from the Old Metal Dealers Act, provides that persons buying gold, silver, &c, shall not melt the same until the expiration of not less than seventy-two hours [increased from the forty-eight hours of the Old Metal Dealers Act] after he bought the same, and shall also keep a register of all sales, aud allow a constable at any time to examine such register, &c. We are here treading on the very hotbed of thieves and receivers, and every precaution should be taken to make this clause as severe as possible. We think that the common law right of re-salo must necessarily be suspended ; the time of suspension might fairly be extended from seventy-two hours to one clear week. And might it not be provided that, in case of a second sale by the same person within a limited period, up to a oertain amount, notice of the purchase should be sent to the police? This would, of course, lead to thieves dealing with two or more receivers, and so double, or proportionately increase, the chance of detection.
It is next provided (clause 7) that if any person offers any article for sale, or in pawn, "and is unable, or
refuses to give a satisfactory account of the means by which he became possessed of the article," be shall be liable to be fined £20, "or if, after due inquiry, the court considers that there is sufficient prima facie evidence that the article was stolen, to imprisonment with or without hard labour for a term not exceeding one month." We think that this is a little too hard upon the general public. It includes, be it observed, all articles whatever, and would, we think, pre3s uuduly upon such unfortunate persons who, happening to be iu reduced circumstances, might wish to be sellers for the most innocent of reasons, and yet be unable to answer "satisfactorily " questions of a searching character.
We now come to the regulations specially affecting pawnbrokers and" second-hand dealers," but before considering them, it is necessary to extract from the interpretation clause the definition of " second-hand dealer," which is as follows :—
'The expression 'second-hand dealer' means a person who carries on the business of dealing in, or buying or selling by retail, second-hand ar tides manufactured wholly or partly of gold, silver, or ot her precious metal, or any old scrap, broken or defaced gold, silver, or other precious metals, or Becond-hand jewellery, second-hand watchfs, tecond-hand clothing or look, old iron, raes, or marine stores, whether such person deals in, buys, or sells such articles and goods only, or other stores and goods; provided that a person who bond fide carries on the business of manufacturing and selling new articles of gold, silver, or other precious metal, or new jewellery, or new watches, shall not be deemed to be a second-hand dealer within the meaning of this Act."
Second-hand dealers are placed on the same footing as pawnbrokers in all respects by the Bill, although none of the provisions of the Pawnbrokers Act are applied to them. These traders are required to give every assistance to the police iu the recovery of stolen goods, by giving speedy information, by allowing iuspection of their wares by "a constable specially authorized as provided by this Act," and by answering all inquiries made by such constable. It is also provided that second-hand dealers must take out excise licences (the licences of pawnbrokers are provided for by sections 37—44 of the Pawnbrokers Act, li'i, which sections are left undisturbed), which licences are to be forfeited upon convictions, as also are pawnbrokers' licences (the Pawnbrokers Act contains no provisions for forfeiture of licences, but only restrictions upon the grant of them). Next wc come to a series of clauses (16—19) providing for the registration of convicted pawnbrokers and second-hand dealers. To these clauses, which are to some extent modelled upon the well-known ones in pari materia which the Licensing Act of 1872 first brought into vogue, there can be no reasonable objection, nor is there any reasonable objection to extending to second-hand dealers that provision of the Pawnbrokers Act which prohibits dealing with children or drunkards, aud the employment of persons under sixteen as servants or apprentices.
Passing to the general clauses of the Bill, we observe the appeal clause (clause 22) to be as follows :—
"Where a person convicted under this Act is sentenced to be imprisoned, or to pay a fine exceeding five pounds, or to have his licence or certificate indorsed or forfeited, or to bo registered, such person nny appeal aeainst the conviction to a court of general or quarter sessions."
It is important to compare this clause with the appeal clauses of the Summary Jurisdiction Act, 1879,as this is the first Bill of importance which has succeeded that Act, the appeal clauses of which it will be remembered apply to future as well as to past acts. All persons conversant with modern statutes will gladly miss the lengthy " conditions of appeal" which, in various forms, puzzled the reader before the passing of the Act of 1879. For these conditions, reference is to be bad to the Act of 1879, and when they once become familiar, much trouble will have been saved. But it may be asked why there should be an appeal clause at all? The answer is that the Act of 1879 does not give an appeal against fines, and therefore the appeal must be given by 'the Bill.
The clauses that "this Act shall be, in addition to, and not in derogation of, any other powers or enactments in relation to stolen goods," and that "this Act shall not exempt any person from any proceeding by indictment or otherwise for an offence which is punishable at common law, or under any Act other than this Act, so that no person be punished twice for the same offence," do not please us much. The 480th section of the Merchant Shipping Act, 1854, is expressly preserved, and we suppose that it could ill be torn out from its parent Act. But we think it would have been no very hard matter to pick out, repeat, and incorporate the "other enactments," and this brings us, in conclusion, to pass from what the Bill does to what it does not do.
The Metropolitan Police Act (2 & 3 Vict. c. 71), will be found to contain a series of provisions (sections 26— 30) for the restoration to the owner of stolen goods. These provisions may be administered by a magistrate summarily but are, of course, confiued to the metropolis. The Larceny Act, 1861, s. 100, provides for the issue of a "writ of restitution " to an owner after a conviction for felony or misdemeanor. Sections 101 and 102 of the same Act, amended by the Larceny Act, 1870, as to the insertion of advertisements in newspapers, prohibit the taking reward for helping to the recovery of stolen property without bringing the offender to trial, and the advertising a reward for the recovery of stolen property, with an indication that "no questions will be asked." These matter" are so closely allied to the subject-matters of the Bill, that it would perhaps be worth while to consolidate and incorporate them with the necessary amendments. It will be found that the Metropolitan Police Act contains many provisions which may aptly be brought into force in the whole kingdom, especially when it is considered that the two sections which deal with the power of search are already incorporated in the Bill.
PRACTICE OF SUPREME COURT. The Practice Op The Supreme Couet Op Judicature. Alphabetically Arrangbd. Designed by F. O. Crump, Esq., Barrister-at-Law. Part I.—The PracTice or The Chancery Division Op The High Court Op Justice (including The Winding Up Of Companies), And On Appeal To The Court Of Appeal And House 0? Lords. By Frank Evans, Esq., Barrister-at-Law. Horace Cox.
The design of this work, the credit of which belongs to Mr. Crump, seems to us a very good one. The idea is to bring together, under headings arranged alphabetically, not only the provisions of the Judicature Acts and Bules and the decisions upon them, but also all the statutes and orders now in force, with the decisions upon them, relating to the practice of the Supreme Court. There is an obvious convenience to the practitioner in being able to refer to a section which contains, in a short compass, everything relating to the matter in hand. The present volume comprises the practice of the Chancery Division, and, judging from the titles we have examined, we are disposed to consider it a good piece of workmanship. Taking, for instance, the title *' Solicitors," we find the subject arranged under nine keads — General Provisions, Proceedings affecting Statut, Retainer and Authority, Changing Solicitor, Costs, Payment of Money and Delivery of Papers, Enforcing Undertaking, Disclosure as to Writ, and Default in Proceeding. This last head, which does not appear in the table prefixed to the title, does not seem strictly to fall within the subject, and the only provision
cited might, perhaps, have been inserted under the subhead "Jurisdiction over Solicitors as Officers." Under these general headings the matter is arranged under sub-heads, to which reference is rendered easy by the tables prefixed to the titles. The cases seem to be industriously collected; their effect is concisely stated, and references are given to all the reports. We have pleasure in commending the work to our readers.
JUDICATURE ACTS. The Judicature Acts, 1873 And 1875, The Appellate Jurisdiction Act, 1876, And Other Statutes, The Rules Of Court And Orders In Council, With Notes, Forming A Practice Of The Supreme Court. By J. M. Lely And W. D. J. Foulkes, Barriaters-at-Law. Third Edition. H. Sweet.
There has beeu some increase of size in this edition, but it still remains a very handy book, and there is plenty of room in the margins for annotating new decisions. As regards mechanical arrangements and devices for facilitating ready reference, this work on the Judicature Acts is excellent, and we may add, as the result of frequent reference to former editions, that the effect of the cases is given with accuracy and terseness in the notes. We have not missed any recent case in this edition, and the new orders and rules are inserted in the proper places. The Judicature (Officers) Act, 1879, is carefully annotated, but we doubt whether the conveyancing counsel to the Court of Chancery can (as the authors suggest on p. 109) be said to be intended to be included among such " other officers of the Supreme Court as are, from time to time, transferred to the Central Office by rules of court." Those gentlemen would be greatly astonished to hear of any such proposed transfer. This edition of Messrs. Lely and Foulkes' book will be found a very complete and practical compendium of the present practice.
CRIMINAL LAW. Principles Op The Criminal Law. By Seymour F. Harris, Barrister-at-Law. Second Edition. Revised by the Author and F. P. Tomlinson, Barrister-atLaw. Stevens & Haynes.
The favourable opinion we expressed of the first edition of this work appears to have been justified by the reception it has met with. Looking through this new edition we see no reason to modify the praise we bestowed on the former edition. The recent cases have beeu added and the provisions of the Summary Jurisdiction Act are noticed in the chapter relating to Summary Convictions. The book is one of the best manuals of criminal law for the student.
Mr. Woodforde, the judge of the Derby County Court, is said on Saturday to have stated that "the county aourfc registrars (who at present tax bankruptcy costs), being paid by fees and not by salary as he would have them paid, knew that it was important for them to treat in a friendly manner the accountants and trustees who mainly brought business to the courts. He furnished an instance in support of his statements wherein a bankrupt's estate realized £219, but as the oosts amounted to £2 (5, there was but £4 for the creditors." [Some explanation of this statement appears to be required.]
In the House of Commons on the 15th inst., in answer to Mr. Hicks, Sir W. Harcourt said that he was quite aware of the inconvenience which is caused in some cases both to the judges and to others who have to attend the autumn and winter assizeB, and he had been in communication with the Lord Chancellor and the Attorney-General on the anbjeot, and hoped that some more oonvenienb system might be devised by which all prisoners might be brought to trial speedily and the gaol system consolidated.