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a formal defendant as his wife was suing. The property the subject-matter of the action had been given to the wife for life for her separate use, with remainder to the infants moving. JESSEL, M.R., in overruling the objection said that, as a rule, no doubt, a next friend should not be a defendant, but where, as in the present case, he might be said to be a formal or what had been called an ornamental defendant, there was no real objection to his acting as next friend. The real objection to a person acting as next friend was where he had an adverse interest and could not serve two masters. Therefore, without laying down any absolute rule, but relying upon what Lord Cranworth said in Elliot v. Ince (7 D. M. & G. 475), and upon Lewis v. Nobbs (L. R. 8 Ch. D. 591), he should, in the present case, hold that the defendant might act as next friend. On the merits his lordship gave the conduct to the infants, and made costs costs in the action.

Weatheralls.

RIETY-HIRING FURNITURE.-In a case of Crawcour v. Salter, before the Court of Appeal on the 9th inst., a question arose as to the effect of the custom of letting furniture on hire in excluding the operation of the doctrine of reputed ownership. Furniture had been sold to a hotel-keeper upon an agreement that it should be paid for by monthly instalments, and that, until all the instalments had been paid-SOLICITORS, J. Burn; H. G. Gedney; Johnson & in full, it should remain the property of the vendor. The purchaser became bankrupt before all the instalments had been paid, and the trustee in the bankruptcy claimed the furniture under the reputed ownership clause. The Court of Appeal (JAMES, BAGGALLAY, and Lʊsн, L.JJ.), affirming the decision of Malins, V.C., held that the custom of letting furniture on hire is now so notorious that the court is bound to take judicial notice of it, and that no one, especially an hotel-keeper, can now gain false credit from the fact that he is in possession of furniture. In coming to this conclusion the court went further in favour of the existence of the custom than they did in Ex parte Powell (24 W. R. 378, L. R. 1 Ch. D. 501, 20 SOLICITORS' JOURNAL, 137), and they were to a great extent influenced by the fact that in that case the trustee in the bankruptcy declined to have an issue tried as to the existence and notoriety of the the custom.-SOLICITORS, Dixon, Ward, & Co.; C. F. Yorke ; Kynaston & Gasquet.

ANCIENT LIGHTS ALTERATION ERECTION OF NEW BUILDING OBSTRUCTION-EVIDENCE.-In a case of Fowlers v. Walkers, before the Court of Appeal on the 6th inst., a question arose as to the evidence of obstruction to ancient lights. The plaintiffs had erected some warehouses on the site of some old cottages which they had pulled down. The defendants were erecting new buildings so as to obstruct the access of light to the plaintiffs' warehouses, and the action was brought to restrain the interference. Bacon, V. C., held that, as the plaintiffs had not proved in what part of the old cottages the windows, which were the foundation of their claim to ancient lights, were situated, they were not entitled to any relief. He said that, when ancient lights had been altered, it was essential for the person who claimed in respect of them to prove exactly the position and extent of the ancient lights. The Court of Appeal (JAMES, BAGGALLAY, and LUSH, L.JJ.) affirmed the decision, on the ground that the plaintiffs were bound to show that some part at least of their new windows was coincident with some part of the old ones, and that they had failed to do this.SOLICITORS, J. H. Lydall; Field, Roscoe, & Co.

APPEAL-LOCUS STANDI-APPEAL BY ONE OF TWO COPLAINTIFFS.-In a case of Beckett v. Attwood, before the Court of Appeal on the 10th inst., an appeal was brought by one of two trustees who were co-plaintiffs. The other co-plaintiff had not appealed. It was objected that one coplaintiff could not appeal without the other. The court (JAMES, BAGGALLAY, and LUSH, L.JJ.) overruled the objection. JAMES, L.J., said it was no answer to a person who complained that he was injured by a judgment to say that there was someone else who was also injured by it who did not choose to appeal. The defendants were in no worse position than if one of the co-plaintiffs had died.--SOLICITORS, E. Letchworth; Lamb; E. H. Barlee; Dixon, Ward, & Co.

PRACTICE-CONDUCT OF ACTION-INFANT NEXT FRIEND A DEFENDANT-FORMAL PARTY.-In a case of Re Taylor, Taylor v. 1aylor, before the Master of the Rolls on the 6th inst., a motion was made on behalf of certain infants who had liberty to attend the proceedings that they might have the conduct of the action. An objection was taken on behalf of the defendants that the next friend of the infants was a defendant, and was, on that ground, an improper person to be so appointed. The next friend had been made

COMPANIES ACTS-RECTIFICATION OF REGISTER-CANCELLING AND RE-ISSUE OF ALL SHARES-FORM OF Order.In a motion before Vice-Chancellor Hall on the 12th inst., in Re The Nassau Tea Company (Limited), a short point of practice arose to the form of order for the rectification of the register of shareholders. The application was made under the Companies Act, 1862, s. 35, on behalf of all the shareholders, for an order to direct the rectification of the register by striking out the names of all of them, and the re-issue of the shares after due registration of a contract under the Companies Act, 1867, s. 25. The facts were briefly as follows:-Eight persons, formerly trading as partners in India, had formed themselves into a limited company under the above name, to carry on their former business, and they were the signatories of the memorandum of association to the full extent of all the shares in the company, which were expressed to be issued as fully paid up. No contract, however, had been registered, as required by section 25 of the Act of 1867, and, the omission having now been discovered, it was, with the consent of the company, sought to set the matter right. As, however, by the order asked there would be created an interval during which there would remain no members of the company on the register, his lordship ordered that the register should now be altered by striking out the shares of every shareholder except one share in each case, and that the shares should then be reissued to the same members after registration of a proper contract. The order would be expressed to be without prejudice to a subsequent application to strike out and re-issue the one share remaining against the name of each shareholder.-SOLICITORS, Wade & Lyall.

PRACTICE-MOTION FOR JUDGMENT-CONSENT BRIEF3RECTIFICATION OF SETTLEMENT.- A short point of formal practice was raised by the registrar of the day on the 7th inst. in an action of Fitzgerald v. Fitzgerald before Hall, V.C. The action was for the rectification of a marriage settlement, and was brought on as a short cause upon motion for judg ment. The husband, who was made a defendant to the action, appeared to give consent, being represented by separate solicitors, who, however, had briefed the plaintiff's counsel to give formal consent. The registrar drew the attention of the court to this, saying that the judgment could not be drawn up upon the briefs so held, and HALL, V.C., accordingly directed that the brief for the husband should be withdrawn, and judgment should go against him as in default of pleading. His lordship also directedth at the judgment should be taken in the form of the declaration given in Seton on Decrees, p. 1232 (Brown v. Hull, Dec. 16, 1876).-SOLICITORS, Freshfields & Williams; Humphreys & Son; Bowlings, Foyer, & Co.

ADMINISTRATION ACTION-INSOLVENT ESTATE-RULES IN BANKRUPTCY-JUDICATURE ACT, 1875, s. 10.-In a case of Hipkins v. Hildick, before Fry, J., on the 6th inst., the action was brought by a creditor for the administration of the real and personal estates of a testator, whose personal estate was insufficient for the payment of his debts. FRY, J., said that, having regard to the possibility that the whole estate might prove insufficient to pay the debts, it would be advisable to insert in the judgment for administration a direction that, in case the estate should prove insufficient for

the payment in full of the testator's debts and liabilities, the bankruptcy rules, with regard to the administration of the estates of persons adjudicated bankrupt, should be applied. This would call attention to the provisions of the Act, and might save trouble in working out the judgment.-SOLICITORS, Indermaur & Co.; Emmet, Son, & Stubbs; S. Whitehead.

CASES BEFORE THE BANKRUPTCY

REGISTRARS.

(Before Mr. REGISTRAR MURRAY, acting as Chief Judge.) May 7.-Ex parte Spain, re Barclay, Gray, & Co. The Court of Bankruptcy has no jurisdiction to try the question of the trustee's right to money deposited by debtors in liquidation with their solicitor previously to the presentation of the liquidation petition, the money being also claimed by a third person who objects to the jurisdiction.

This was an application on behalf of Henry Spain, the trustee of the estate of Barclay, Gray, & Co., debtors in liquidation, for an order that Mr. W. B. Styer, solicitor, should, within four days after the hearing of the application, pay to the applicant the sum of £917 Os. 7d., cash in his hands.

In the month of February, 1880, the Eastern Agency (Limited) commenced an action against the debtors to recover damages for the non-acceptance of a cargo of rice, purchased by them under a contract in writing. The action was referred to arbitration pursuant to the terms of the contract, and on the 22nd of December, 1880, the arbitrator made his award, whereby he awarded the sum of £919 0s. 7d., to be paid by the debtors to the Eastern Agency (Limited).

On the 26th of January, 1881, the award was made a rule of the Queen's Bench Division of the High Court, and, on the 16th of February, an order was obtained for payment of the amount to the Eastern Agency (Limited).

The debtors, on the 1st of March, obtained an order to stay execution under the order pending an appeal by Tamvaco & Co. (who had been brought in as third parties pursuant to the provisions of the Judicature Act) on payment of the sum of £919 0s. 7d. into court to abide the result of the appeal.

On the 2nd of March the debtors handed the sum of £919 0s. 7d. in cash to Mr. Styer, their solicitor, and on the 3rd, and before the money could be paid into court, they presented a petition for liquidation.

On the same day (the plaintiffs' solicitors being unaware that the debtors had paid the money) Mr. Styer was served with a summons to set aside the order of the 1st of March, and, on the 4th of March, an order was made setting it aside.

The trustee claimed to have the £919 in the hands of Mr. Styer paid to him as part of the estate of the debtors, and the Eastern Agency (Limited) also claimed the money.

Finlay Knight, in support of the application.

K. T. Reid, and J. Linklater, for the Eastern Agency Company. The court has no jurisdiction to try this question. It has no jurisdiction against a third party unless by consent: Ex parte Dicken, Re Pollard (27 W. R. 731, L. R. 8 Ch. D. 884); Ex parte Brown, Re Yates (L. R. 11 Ch. D. 148). The trustee can have no higher right to the money than the debtor has, and he ought to be left to his action.

C. Hall, for Styer.-I am a stakeholder merely, and desire to get rid of the money.

Knight, in reply.-The company is a creditor claiming to hold security, and is not a stranger to the proceedings. This is not a mere money demand by the trustee, it is a question whether the fund claimed by the company has been specifically appropriated to the payment of the company's debt.

Mr. REGISTRAR MURRAY said that, having regard to the case of Ex parte Dicken, Re Pollard, and the principles there laid down by the Master of the Rolls, he did not consider that he had jurisdiction to deal with this matter under the 72nd section. The remarks made by Lord Justice James in that case applied here, and he did not think it expedient that he should exercise jurisdiction. He did not see that the trustee had any higher right than the debtors had, and if they had brought an action against the solicitor to recover the money paid to him, it would have been his duty to inter

plead. It was impossible for him to assume jurisdiction in such a case, and he must refuse the motion, with costs. Solicitors for the trustee, Marson & Dadley. Solicitors for the Eastern Agency (Limited), Murray, Hutchins, & Stirling. Styer.

SOLICITORS' CASES. QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION.

(Sittings at Nisi Prius, before DENMAN, J., and a special jury.)

May 9-11.-Mason v. Aird.

Melsheimer, with whom was M'Intyre, Q.C., appeared for the plaintiff.

Sir H. S. Giffard, Q.C., C. H. Anderson, and Frankau, were counsel for the defendant.

This action was brought by a late articled clerk to a solicitor against his master to recover damages for a breach of covenant that the defendant would use all his endeavours to promote the admission of the plaintiff as a solicitor of the Supreme Court. The plaintiff had been some years in the defendant's employ before the articles were signed, on May 24, 1876, for three years, and under these the plaintiff duly served the defendant. But when the plaintiff presented himself to the Law Institution for examination certain questions were put to the defendant as to whether the plaintiff had faithfully, honestly, and diligently served him, and the defendant refused to certify to that effect, whereby the plaintiff alleges he has been debarred and delayed from being admitted and practising in his profession. The defence set up is that the defendant honestly and bona fide believed certain statements as to the character and honesty of the plaintiff made to him by a Mrs. Stanley, since dead, with whom the plaintiff was at one time living. These related to a fee of £2 4s. 6d. for professional work due to Mr. D. Straight (now a judge in India), which the plaintiff alleges that barrister's clerk returned to him as a present for extra trouble taken in the case. Mr. Straight, however, denied ever having given this authority, and has written saying he would come over from India, if necessary, to prove it, and this denial is now admitted. This transaction, bowever, took place some fourteen months before the articles were signed, in March, 1875. Further, there was a charge of tampering with the stamps on certain bankruptcy proceedings, and with making away with the papers connected therewith in 1874-5. These papers were put in the plaintiff's room in the defendant's office in January, 1875, and Mrs. Stanley's story was that the plaintiff had taken the papers home and removed the stamps over the steam of a kettle. She further said the plaintiff admitted to her having taken £1 from his employer, on suspicion of which another clerk had been dismissed. The defendant, in January, 1879, addressed a long memorandum to the Law Institution at their request, setting out all these misdoings, and Mrs. Stanley's letters as his reason for refusing to certify, and on this the plaintiff has commenced a further action of libel against the defendant. In the present action, the plaintiff also claimed damages for a slander for the defendant's having said of the plaintiff to a Mr. Crump, about March, 1874, when he was investigating the plaintiff's accounts, "I have some suspicion he is robbing me; I may want you to overhaul his accounts."

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At the conclusion of the evidence the learned JUDGE summed up and pointed out that this was not an action of libel, but, in accordance with the ruling of the Court of Appeal, the question was whether the defendant used his honest endeavours to promote the plaintiff's admission. They were not to try the guilt or innocence of the plaintiff, or the truth or falsehood of the accusations, but (1) whether the defendant honestly and bond fide believed them. It was to be observed that the defendant in June, 1879, after the expiration of the articles, entered into some negotiations with the plaintiff as to re-engaging him. This the defendant explained as owing to a desire that the plaintiff should finish up two or three cases of which he was cognizant and the defendant ignorant, and to save a journey to the Maidstone Assizes. As to the slander, did the defendant (2) mean to impute a felony to the plaintiff in what he said to Crump? Thirdly, was he actuated therein by actual malice? If they found a verdict for the plaintiff, they would award him damages on both heads.

Sir H. Giffard said he had not touched on the question. of slander, as the Lord Chief Justice, on a former trial,

had ruled the occasion as privileged, and, even if not, he should submit that the claim as to that was barred by the Statute of Limitations.

DENMAN, J., said he should not consider that point tonight (as to entering judgment) in case the jury should find or the plaintiff on that part of the case. It was not the main part of the case.

The jury retired, and, after an absence of an hour, returned into court, saying they were unable to agree unanimously on the third question, but found "Yes" to the first, and "No" to the second question. After some discussion with his lordship they retired again, to consider the question of actual malice, though his lordship intimated that he thought it was immaterial, being disposed of in the former answer. After a brief absence the jury again returned, and said "No" in answer to the third.

DENMAN, J.-That is a verdict for the defendant, and I give judgment for him.

Melsheimer asked for a stay of execution to move, and DENMAN, J., granted it, observing that his verdict would have been the same as that now given.-Times.

SOCIETIES.

INCORPORATED LAW SOCIETY.

A special meeting of the Incorporated Law Society, for the purpose of taking into consideration the present position of legal procedure, the impending changes in the profession, and other incidental matters, was held at the society's hall on Friday, the 16th inst. The meeting had been convened on the requisition of a large number of the members of the society. About 250 gentlemen attended, and Mr. J. M. CLABON, President, occupied the chair.

The PRESIDENT stated the object of the meeting.

Mr. C. FORD asked whether he might be permitted to put some questions to the president?

The PRESIDENT replied that he was in entire ignorance as to what would be done. Until he came into the room he had not seen the resolutions that were to be submitted to the meeting. He wished to give every possible information in answer to any questions that might be put to him.

Mr. FORD then put the following questions:-(1) Whether the circumstances under which the council sent to and received back from the Legal Procedure Committee certain recommendations, as announced at the time in the Times newspaper, are open to any satisfactory explanation. or whether this society must regard the action of the Legal Procedure Committee in the light of an affront on this society? (2) Whether any arrangement has been come to between the conncil and the benchers with regard to the regulations of the Inns of Court affecting the call of solicitors to the bar? (3) Whether, with reference to the communication of the Attorney-General to the council in regard to certain solicitors, whose names had been scheduled by the Parlia mentary Commissioners, the council are aware of any steps in contemplation by the first law officer of the Crown to put a stop to the reckless expenditure of money by barristers and other candidates for parliamentary honours at election times? (4) Whether the council have taken any steps to safeguard the right of solicitors to audience in the Bankruptcy Court when, as provided in the present Government Bankruptcy Bill, such court becomes a branch of the High Court of Justice?

The PRESIDENT replied that (1), with reference to the suggestions made by the council to the Legal Procedure or Costs of Litigation Committee, the matter had been referred by them to the particular committee which they had appointed for the purpose of considering the suggestions, and the result of their deliberations had been forwarded to the Costs of Litigation Committee. This resulted in communications between himself and the Attorney-General, the council, he believed, coming well out of the matter. The suggestions were not accepted by the committee at first, but were sent back to the council, and having been reconsidered, and some of them to which objection had been taken having been struck out, they were returned to and reconsidered by the committee. In his opinion, nothing in the nature of an affront had been intended to the council or the society. The second question concerned a subject which had occupied

the attention of the council very largely. They prepared a Bill with regard to it, and had an interview with the Lord Chancellor early in January, when certain suggestions were made by them, but up to then his lordship had not received any communication from the benchers, and the matter was postponed. They afterwards saw several of the members of the bar, more particularly the treasurers of the four Inns of Court, who, at the suggestion of the council, considered the subject separately and together, and eventually passed a resolution that the period of probation might be reduced from three years to one year-in other words, that solicitors might become barristers on only one instead of three years' terms. This was not considered to be all that was wanted, because there was still the preliminary examination for the bar, and the council requested that the society's preliminary examination should be held to be an equivalent for it. Answers had been received from Lincoln's-inn and the Middle Temple, stating that the matter should receive consideration, and they expected that a similar reply would be received from Gray'sinn. He believed the council would consider this a satisfactory solution of the difficulty. The council knew nothing whatever with respect to the subject of the third question. As regarded the fourth, the council had taken immense trouble with reference to the Bankruptcy Bill, and had appointed a strong committee previous to the commencement of the session. They drew up observations which were sent to the Bankers' Institute, the wholesale dealers, and the provincial law societies, and when their replies were received they were forwarded in a tabular form to the AttorneyGeneral and the Board of Trade. The council also saw Mr. Chamberlain, and had received communications from him. They afterwards considered the Bill, and communicated with the provincial societies. As soon as answers had been received from the societies, the council intended to again communicate with Mr. Chamberlain, and, in the meantime, Mr. Ford's questions would be referred to a committee of the council in order that the subject of the audience of solicitors in the Bankruptcy Court might be carefully considered.

Mr. E. KIMBER remarked that it was not his intention to make an attack upon the council, or to say whether what they had done was right or wrong. The meeting had to consider what was to be done at the present time, and he felt that it was incumbent upon every member of the solicitors' branch of the profession to make a strong stand against a matter which was, in his opinion, unconstitutional and illegal. He thought that when he attacked the Judicature Act every one present would be in accord with him. Great authorities disagreed with respect to it, so it was, at least, not surprising if solicitors did so, and that the public took an erroneous view of their conduct. He drew the attention of the meeting more particularly to the 75th section of the Act, which related to the Council of Judges who were to consider the procedure and administration of justice. The section laid it down that they should assemble once a year to consider the operation of the Act and the Rules of Court, together with the working of the offices and the arrangements relative to the duties of the officers of the courts, and to inquire into any defects which existed in the system of procedure or the administration of the law in the High Court of Justice and the Court of Appeal. They were also to report annually to one of the Secretaries of State as so what amendments it was desirable should be made for the better administration of justice. What was there in existence at the present moment? A Legal Procedure Committee had been appointed, of the object of which the president himself was in doubt, but thought it to be a committee to consider the costs of litigation. This was the first instance in the country's history of the appointment of a committee upon the mere authority of one Minister of State-a departmental committee to govern Legislation and prescribe what should be done with regard to the great profession of the law. Personally, he admired the Lord Chancellor greatly, but in the present instance he had acted, not as a Minister, but as a creature. It was most extraordinary that the judges had never met in council, in accordance with the requirements of the Act, until after the death of the Lord Chief Justice. If those who were appointed to administer the law had not upheld one of the principal sections of the Judicature Act, was it surprising that the general public looked unfavourably on the whole practice and profession of the law? They had done so, as was proved by the calumnies that had been uttered in the Times, and

many other newspapers, with regard to the costs of the the House of Commons and outside of it, and it became legal profession, their practice, and their social position. necessary to throw cold water on all that they did. The The judges had never met, except for the purpose of Legal Procedure Committee itself originated from an abolishing two ancient offices. Why were not the defects article which appeared in the Times, followed by letters of the Act discussed by the judges themselves? It could signed "Lex" and one from a member of the Judicature not be from the want of knowledge as to its requirements, Commission. It was not at all difficult to define who that for he had heard one of the judges in the Court of Appeal gentleman was, from the views to which he had given remark that he knew what a particular rule meant, as he expression when on the bench. Articles and correspondence had drawn it himself. Again, a Queen's Counsel, who was followed, the whole press took the matter up, and eventu a member of Parliament, had told the court that he knew ally the Government, after consulting the Lord Chancellor, the meaning of the Act, for he was the author of it. Sir appointed a departmental committee. The Times never William Charley had said in a work he had written that after made any allusion to the cost of litigation, but advised the judges were accustomed to meet together for the pur- the committee to get rid of the many steps necessary to pose of consultation, but such a meeting was unknown in be taken in some of the courts before a case could be the present day. These meetings were, however, calcu- decided. The Times, at any rate, had at length taken the lated to break down the barrier of prejudice which burden from the shoulders of the solicitors, and he hoped existed, but which, he was glad to be able to say, was the action of the meeting would result in its being slowly disappearing. That the Lord Chancellor entirely put on the right ones. He would move, "That no Comsympathized with the Act a letter which he held in his mittee on Legal Procedure can have the confidence of hand would prove. It was addressed to a solicitor by the the public, or of this branch of the profession, unless secretary to the Lord Chancellor, and stated that his lordship was glad he had no complaint to make against the society recommends to her Majesty's Government the both be properly and adequately represented; and this officers of the Court of Chancery, and that the subject of appointment of a Royal Commission to inquire into expense in the Chancery Division of the Supreme Court the whole question of economizing, simplifying, and had for a considerable time occupied his earnest attention, with a view that such changes might be made as would If they passed this resolution, the public and the press could accelerating the process and practice of the law." no longer say the solicitors were opposed to simplification, economy, and swiftness in the practice of the law, or to say put money in their pockets. The statistics of the High Court that solicitors desired to protract litigation that they might of Justice proved that the applications for immediate judg ments were extremely numerous, and that this had been the case to a much greater extent than had ever been contemplated by the Judicature Commissioners themselves, which, vising their clients at the earliest possible moment so as to of itself, would prove that solicitors were in the habit of adput an end to litigation. It would be said, in opposition to the appointment of the Royal Commission, that one had already been appointed-the Judicature Commission-which had sat several times and had been the cause of the passsng of two Acts of Parliament. In reply to that it could be said that grievances were still complained of by the public and that the costs of litigation had not been reduced. Emphatic action must be taken, pending the report of the Legal Procedure Committee, in order to influence the House of Commons and with a view to getting rid of the opprobrium which at present attached to them in the exercise of their profession. Many members of the House of Commons on both sides, to his personal knowledge, were in favour of the solicitor branch framing Acts of Parliament, of the interpretation of eighty as against the bar, and felt the want of the solicitor in per cent. of which they would have the responsibility. The members of the society who occupied seats in the House had made their mark upon the Statute Book on many occasions. He urged the society to put aside antiquated notions of dignity. The reforms of the law must come from the humble, working members of the profession. The members who signed the requisition upon which the meeting had been convened were of the rank and file, and experienced the respon. sibility of interpreting laws which were not to be adminis tered in London only, but in the provinces, where the flower If the of the profession practised in the minor courts. solicitors were properly represented the public would soon understand that, although the costs of litigation were heavy, they were desirous of diminishing them and also of diminishing litigation, notwithstanding that their costs would neces sarily be reduced at the outset. The law could be m de more costly, more expeditious, and yet more profitable to the lawyer. Government that they were not in the rear in public opinion, Let them carry the motion and prove to the faction of the nation. but were prepared to lead it, and to do so to the entire satis

meet the difficulties which arose out of a defective system. It was sad that the profession, who were the instruments by which the Act was to be carried out, should be liable to be attacked because of its defects, whilst the judges, and not they, were liable for them. He was of opinion that it might safely be concluded that the Lord Chancellor thought that, although the Council of Judges had not been annually called, yet that it ought to have been, and that there was some difficulty in calling it; also, that when it was called it would be a machine awkward and difficult to set in motion-too heavy and cumbrous for its objects. Therefore it had been thought best to appoint a Committee of Legal Procedure, or a Costs of Litigation Committee. It was, however, a departmental committee, consisting of judges, barristers, and only two solicitors. Neither the solicitor branch of the profession nor the public were properly represented upon it. How was the committee composed? Lord Coleridge was the chairman, Lord Justice James, Mr. Justice Bowen, Mr. J. C. Mathew, Mr. R. T. Reid, all of them either barristers or past-barristers; Mr. Hollams and Mr. C. Harrison, solicitors. Lord Shand, Sir James Hannen, and the Attorney-General, all from the

barrister branch, had, in consequence of representations

which had been made to the Government, been added to

the committee. What could these gentlemen know about the matters which most affected solicitors in their practice? He held in his hand a number of letters of complaints which he had received, and one of them showed that the particular work which could be effected by two attendances when the matter was in the Common Law Division required no less than thirteen attendances if it was in the Chancery Division. The construction of the Rules of Court was in most cases determined from the draftsman's point of view, and from the reading of some of them opposite conclusions might be arrived at from

those which would be derived from others. Some of them had required the decision of the Court of Appeal, and of the very judges who had drawn them, which would not have been the case if the practical men of the solicitor branch had been taken into the confidence of the gentlemen who drew them. He could not understand how it was that law and legislation were concluded without consulting the very men who were best able to define the practice affected by the rules to be made. The Council of the Incorporated Law Society were consulted now and then, it was true, and it really was a fact that quite recently they had got no less than thirteen of her Majesty's judges to dine with them, when, no doubt, they had ample opportunities of consultation. But the benchers also dined together on the very same night, and they invited several influential members of Parliament. How were the two entertainments spoken of in the newspapers? That of the benchers was referred to in much higher terms than that of the society. The members of the bar were an important element in the background in the management of the influential newspapers. Their intentions were evident Mr. FORD moved an amendment, "That this society, by the articles which appeared in the Times. The whilst appreciating the courtesy of the Lord Chancellor in solicitors were gaining in the esteem of the public, both in appointing a Legal Procedure Committee, regrets that so few

Mr. J. MOTE seconded the motion, and objected to the committee as he had a dislike to anything of a secret character, and to being bound to trust implicity in any persons, however high their station. He thought that neither the solicitors nor the public were sufficiently represented upon it, and thought it would give great confidence to the general public if the name of such a person as Samuel Morley had been placed upon it.

solicitors were appointed to serve thereon, and especially that neither the president nor vice-president of this society were so appointed." He thought the meeting was much indebted to Mr. Kimber. He was opposed, however, to the resolution, as they had not the report of the committes before them and they could not say whether it would be satisfactory or otherwise. The position of the president for the time being had been duly recognized in the recent Bill for altering the remuneration of solicitors in conveyancing matters. He suggested that Mr. Kimber should withdraw his proposition for the appointment of a Royal Commission, at any rate, for the moment. If they adopted the motion, they might be told that they were acting prematurely and unwisely.

Mr. J. INDERMAUR seconded the amendment. He asserted that far too much attention was paid to the bar and far too little to the solicitors in these matters. There was no need for the public to be represented on a committee of this character. The bar knew very little upon these inatters as a rule. It was really the solicitors who were acquainted with the practical working of the law who were best fitted to give an opinion. The motion was far too extensive in its character, but the amendment was a very reasonable one. What did the bar know as to the details of the profession? They knew literally nothing as far as the simplification of the practice was concerned. In ordinary matters, in his opinion, the costs allowed to solicitors were quite inadequate, and the whole system of the conduct of an action might be very much amended. The solicitor branch ought to be so represented that the public might be made to know that they did not desire the increase of expense or the continuation of litigation, because the continuation of litigation was not to their interest. They trusted that they were honest men, and would not continue litigation to the detriment of their clients, but that would work more to the interest of the barrister than of the solicitor, to whose interest it was to simplify litigation and make it as cheap and expeditious as possible. The amendment would prove that the council were not always so active as they might be. Mr. F. K. MUNTON thought that the amendment would more adequately meet the circumstances of the case than the motion. He quite agreed that it was very undesirable that the members of the society should do or say anything that was likely to affect the conduct of the society as a whole, and although it might be said that the council had not so actively looked into the matter as some members might have liked, yet having appointed their representatives, if they complained of them, it should be done rather by way of a recom. mendation to them to consider it. He was strongly opposed to a motion being passed that looked anything like an attack upon the council. Mr. Justice Bowen had complained, according to a report in the Times of that morning, that his time was taken up for several hours in trying a case of tort respecting a very small matter, and the report seemed to allude to the folly of the solicitor in bringing such an action in a superior court. But it was next to impossible after the writ had been issued to take an action for tort which had been commenced in the superior court into a county court. He mentioned a case where the verdict was for £20, and the costs amounted to £96, but it was the Judicature Act that was in fault and not the solicitor.

Mr. W. ROBERTS (Debenham, Suffolk) was quite sure that everybody wished to pass a resolution that would be satisfactory to the general body of the profession, but could not help thinking that the amendment in its present form would be construed by many of them and of the public as a mere wail. Many of the opinions expressed by Mr. Kimber had long been felt by country practitioners. He suggested that Mr. Kimber and Mr. Ford should combine to produce a resolution, and the meeting which had been called for a specific purpose would be productive of great good.

Mr. N. HANHART could see nothing in the resolution attacking the council, and thought they should express an opinion as to the constitution of the committee before the report came out, because, if the committee happened to make some good suggestions, their opportunity would be lost. It was time that the public should be made to understand that their interests were the interests of the solicitors. He held that litigation must always be expensive, as it was the application of expensively trained intellects to the dissection of very small affairs. There ought to be more -opportunity by a summary process of getting security for costs. Fewer false claims would then be advanced, and

fewer false defences made, and enormous expense in litigation would be saved. He thought that the simplification of the procedure of the Mayor's Court should engage the attention of any committee now sitting. The time had arrived for energetic action on the part of the solicitor branch, in order that the public might generally know that they had their interests at heart as well as their own.

Mr. A. BEYFUs hoped the motion would be carried for a Royal Commission. He regretted to have to say that it was to the interest of the barristers that solicitors should not be permitted to do the work that they ought to do. The scale of fees for drafts of length and difficulty was so low that they were obliged to send them to counsel to settle, and whilst they were not properly represented on the legal committees, this must continue to be the case. The public had no idea where the costs went to. The costs of an ordinary appeal would amount to £70 or £80, and only some £15, perhaps, would go to the solicitor; but the public did not know this, and would not until the solicitors were more largely represented, and a commission appointed to consider the whole position of solicitors and barristers. The public would get substantial justice when the solicitors had it, but not before.

Mr. EDWIN HUGHES moved the adjournment of the meeting in order that the council might have an opportunity of considering the amendment.

Mr. Low seconded the motion.

Mr. C. A. BETTS thought the appointment of a Royal Commission would only shelve the matter for two or three years, and the motion for the adjournment would delay a question which solicitors had at their very hearts-the opprobrium which had been cast upon them for years pastwhilst the amendment expressed regret and did nothing more. The question had been burked again and again, and this meeting proved the interest taken in it by solicitors. The council had not protected them in this or any other matter. (Question.) The taxing masters treated their costs as something to be reduced under any circumstances, and the delays in payment were infinite, whilst no consideration whatever was paid to the interests of the working branch of the profession.

Mr. L. EMANUEL spoke in the highest terms of the wisdom, sagacity, and high-mindedness of the council, but there must be something in the traditions of the place which had the unfortunate effect of enervating them, and these gentlemen for whom individually they had the highest respect, did not do collectively what they would do individually in conducting their own affairs. He felt sure the obnoxious certificate tax would be repealed if Parliament were properly approached, and the question of their relation with the other branch of the profession certainly required amendment. He wished they could meet as they were doing more frequently, and that the council would do more to advance the interests of the solicitors, and with the object of removing the mediæval prejudice which was felt against them.

Mr. MORGAN suggested that the first half of the motion should be combined with the amendment, and that the second half of the motion, on which there would be probably some difference of opinion, should be moved separately. He did not concur in the observations which had been made which were detrimental to the council.

Mr. MELVILLE GREEN (Worthing) thought the mode and time of proceeding was just one of those questions which had better be left to the council. Mr. Chamberlain had brought in a Bill dealing with bankruptcy reform, upon which he prided himself that he did not care for the advice of solicitors. At the present time the opinion of solicitors was at a lower point than usual with those in power; there was, therefore, no use in carrying the proposition which was before the meeting. But it would come to pass that any legal reforms which had not the assistance of their knowledge and experience must fail, and it was not for them to take an inopportune moment for protesting when they would be simply supposed to be grumbling.

Mr. T. H. DEVONSHIRE was desirous the meeting should not make a serious mistake. If the council would tell them that they really would give the subject their earnest and prompt consideration, and call them together again, without unreasonable delay, it was their duty and to their interest to adjourn. He was quite sure no one in the room desired to make any serious complaint against the council.

Mr. KIMBER entirely agreed with the amendment; but after what had been said, thought it better to adjourn. He

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