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Crocker, Alfred, Sherborne, Dorset, Grocer. May 7 at 11.30 offices ta of Davies, Newland. Sherborne

Curdling, Alexander Foster, Stowmarket, Suffolk, Draper. May 13
at 11 at the Fox Hotel, Stowmarket. Gudgeon, Stowmarket
Davis, Joseph, Lambeth walk, Chir a Dealer. May 6 at 3 at offices
of Reynolds, Furnival's-inn
May 7 at 10 at offices of

Dore, Peter, New Swindon, Wilts, Farmer.
Boodle, Albion buildings, New Swindon
Downing, Frederick, Worcester, Maltster, May 13 at 3 at offices of
Forrest, Church st, Oldbury

Elliott, George Henry Crosspool, York, Builder. May 9 at 2 at offices of Taylor, Norfolk row, Sheffield

Errington, George, and Louis Joseph Errington, Mansford st, Corset Manufacturers. May 11 at 2 at offices of Tatham and Co, Queen Victoria st

Evans, John, Rev, Llanwrst, Denbigh. May 9 at 2 at the Grosvenor Hotel, Chester. James, Llanrwst

May 11 at 3 May 10 at 12

Evans, Morgan, Gilfach Goch, Glamorgan, Grocer. May 10 at 3 at Queen's Hotel, Cardiff. Morgan, Pontypridd Fletcher, Charles Robert, Nottingham, Boot Factor. at offices of Hincks, Bowling Green st, Leicester Foulds, Thomas, Kegworth, Leicester, Haberdasher. at offices of Clifford, Churchgate, Loughborough Goldsmith, James, Crowborough. Rotherfield, Sussex, Builder. May 5 at 4 at Church rd, Tunbridge. Stone and Simpson Goodhew, Walter, Faversham, Kent, Chimney Sweeper. May 13 at 11 at offices of Gibson. High st, Sittingbourne

Gray, Elijah James, Hollingworth Lake, nr Rochdale, Refreshment Room Keeper. May 6 at 3 at offices of Molesworth, Central chms The Walk, Rochdale

Green, Richard, Ashby-de-la-Zouch, Leicester, Greengrocer. May 12 at 11 at offices of Fisher and Co, Ashby-de-la-Zouch Greenwood, Joseph, Kingston upon Hull, Horehound Beer Manufacturer. May 9 at 11 at George Hotel, Whitefriar gate, Hull. Spurr, Hull

Grime, Thomas, Flint. Boot and Shoe Manufacturer. May 10 at 2 at Midland Hotel, New st, Birmingham. Sargent and Son, Birmingham

Hancock, Frederick Richard, Exmouth, Devon, Hairdresser. May 9 at 11 at offices of Mr. Richard Southcot, Post Office st, Bedford circus, Exeter

Hidden, George, Hungerford, Berks, Music Seller. May 9 at 12.30 at Three Swan Hotel, Hungerford, Lucas, Newbury

Hill, Alexander Charles, Lancaster, a captain in her Majesty's Navy. May 9 at 3 at offices of Forrester Addie, Albert street, Fleetwood

Hill, Hudson, New Brighton, Morley, York, Stone Mason. May 6 at 3 at Victoria Hotel, Great George st, Leeds. Watson, Leeds Hogben, Charles, Chatham, out of business. May 9 at 11 at offices of Reynolds Norman, High st, Chatham

Holland, James, Castle Northwich, Chester, Stone Merchant. May 17 at 3 at offices of Cheshire and Son, Applemarket street, Northwich

Hooke, Matthew, Peterborough, Northampton, Cabinet Maker. May 10 at 12 at offices of Vergette and Buckle, Market st, Peterborough

Houghton, Samuel, Runcorn, Grocer. May 5 at 2 at offices of Hitchen, Bank chambers, Runcorn

Humphreys, James Rone, Lamborne, Berks, Trainer. May 10 at 1 at offices of Sykes, Old Broad st

Hurley, Morris, Nailton st, Caledonian rd, Cab Proprietor. May 16 at 3 at offices of Wenn, Newgate st

Johnson, Richard, Dudley, Worcester, Licensed Victualler. May 6 at 12 at offices of Warmington, Castle st, Dudley

Johnson, Samuel Welton, Yardley, Worcester, Hatter's Assistant. May 9 at 3 at offices of Horton, Imperial chmbrs B, Colmore row, Birmingham. Horton, Birmingham

Jopling, Henry, Leeds. Leather Merchant.

May 6 at 1 at offices of Rooke and Midgley, White Horse st, Boar lane, Leeds Joyce, Richard, Burton-on-Trent, Joiner. Bright, High st, Burton-on-Trent

May 6 at 3 at offices of

Joynes, Simeon, Leafield, Oxford, Grocer. May 11 at 11 at Crown Hotel, Chipping Norton. Wilkins, Chipping Norton

Lamb, James William, Lonsight, nr Manchestr, Builder. May 11 at 3 at offices of Rylance, Essex st, Manchester

Leeming, William, Barrow-in-Furness. Farmer. May 7 at 11 at the King's Arms, Dalton road, Barrow-in-Furness. Sims, Barrow-inFurness

Lewis, Frederick, Falcon Market, Clapham Junction, Stationer. May 10 at 2 at offices of Nicholls and Leatherdale, Old Jewry chbrs. Nicholls, Gresham st

Lewis, Giles, Upper Kennington lane, Cattle Medicine Vendor May 4 at 3 at offices of Sheppard, Upper Kennington lane

Meech, Frederick, Weymouth, Dorset, Seedsman. May 12 at 11.45 at offices of Howard, East st, Melcombe Regis

Mcseley, Edwin John, Boylestone, Derby, Farmer. May 5 at 12.30
at offices of Robotham, St Alkmund's chchyd, Derby
Moseley, John, Boylestone, Derby, Farmer. May 5 at 12 at offices of
Robotham, St Alkmund's chchyd, Derby

Mulligan, Thomas, Batley, York, Grocer. May 9 at 2.30 at offices of Booth and Sons, Hanover street, Batley. Watts and Son, Batley

Norton, John Postle, Enfield, Grocer. May 6 at 3 at offices of Pedley and Bartlett, Bush lane, Cannon st

Owen, John, Bodaled, Fourcrosses, Merioneth, Dairyman. May 5 at 1 at Commercial Hotel, Portmadoc. Jones and Jones, Portmadoc Pardon, George, Scarborough, Fisherman. May 9 at 2 at offices of Kick, Newborough st, Scarborough

Parsons, Mary Jane, and Fanny Parsons, Dawlish, Dorset, Grocers. May 9 at 3 at offices of Brennand, Blandford

Philip, Richard, and Miles Hall, Morley, York, Cloth Manufac turers. May 6 at 12 at offices of Hewson, Albion st, Leeds. Malcolm

Polley, Frederick John, Ipswich, General Grocer. May 18 at 11 at offices of Pollard, St Lawrence st, Inswich

Powell, George Benjamin, Nottingham, Surgeon. May 13 at 3 at
offices of Whittingham, Middle pavement, Nottingham
Price. Eliza Ann, Stockwell rd, Stockwell, Grocer. May 11 at 2 at
Guildhall Tavern, Gresham st. Collins

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Riley, William, Leeds, Licensed Victualler. May 7 at 11 at offices of Dunn and French, East parade, Leeds

Roberts, Samuel, Stoke upon Trent, Beerhouse Keeper. May 6 at 11.30 at offices of Tennant and Co, Cheapside, Hanley Robinson, Edward, Bristol, Lodging-house Keeper. May 9, at 2, at offices of Tricks and Co, City Chambers, Nicholas st, Bristel. Osborne and Co, Bristol

Robinson, Henry, Great James st, Bedford row, Builder. May 12, at 3, at offices of J. Ronald Shearer, Basinghall st. Bagot Harte, Moorgate st

Royston, Mary, Hoyland Nether, York, Innkeeper. May 10, at 11,
at offices of Parker and Hickmott, Regent st, Barnsley
Savage, James, Bennington, nr Stevenage, Hertford, Baker.
May 11, at 4.30, at Dimsdale Arms, Fore st, Hertford. Cooper,
Lincoln's inn fields

Shaw, William, Swinton, York, Innkeeper. May 9, at 12, at offices of Gray, Eastgate, Barnsley

May 12, at 3, at offices

Sheldon, James George, Brighton, Builder. of John Vernon and Co, Moorgate st Skeavington, Robert, Cotmanhay, Derby, Farmer. May 9 at 11 at offices of Stevenson, 11, Week-day Cross, Nottingham Smith, John, Market Rasen, Lincoln, Corn Dealer. May 9 at 11 at offices of Page and Padley, Mill st, Market Rasen Soulsby, Edward, Waterloo, Northumberland, Baker. May 10 at 2 at offices of Lynn, 10, Waterloo pl, Blyth

Stark, George, Truro, Cornwall, Travelling Draper. May 5 at 11 at offices of Paull, Quay st, Truro

Steel, William, St Leonards-on-Sea, Builder. May 3 at 12 at offices of Phillips, 60, Cambridge rd, Hastings Swears, William Arthur, Chicksand-st, Whitechapel, Blind Manufacturer. May 11 at 3 at 58, Chancery lane. Smith, Savoy st Taplin, Walter William, Lincoln, Boot and Shoe Manufacturer, May 10, at 11, at offices of Page the Younger, Flaxengate, Lincoln Thomas, James, Aberavon, Glamorgan, Boot and Shoe Manufacturer. May 16, at 3, at office of Tennant and Jones, Aberavon Thompson, William, Ettingshall, Sedgley, Maltster. May 9, at 3, at offices of Whitehouse, Queen st, Wolverhampton Thornes, John, Cottingham, York, Saw Miller. May 6, at 11, at George Hotel, Whitefriargate, Hull. Spurr, Hull Tibbett, Thomas Adams, Rowley Regis, Stafford, Licensed Victualler. May 10, at 2, at offices of Addison, High st, Brierley hill Turr, Gervas, Attercliff, York, out of business. May 9, at 12, at Elephant Hotel, Doncaster. Parkin and Co, Epworth, near

Rotherham

Wallwork, Thomas, Liverpool, Auctioneer. May 7 at 1 at 1, Lyceum chmbrs, Hanover st, Liverpool

Webb, Henry Arthur, and Richard Smith, Brierley Hill, Stafford, Ironmasters. May 6 at 11.30 at Great Western Hotel, Monmouthstreet, Birmingham. Homfray and Holberton, Brierley hill Weight, Robert, Stroud, Gloucester, Grocer. May 11 at 12 at Swan Hotel, Stroud. Smith and Stafford, Stroud

Westmoreland, Charles, Market Rasen, Lincoln, Miller. May 7 at 11 at offices of Chambers, King st, Market Rasen Whitford, Richard, jun, Worcester, Provision Merchant. April 29 (and not the 27th as erroneously printed in the Gazette of 15th inst), at offices of Halford, Avenue House, the Cross, Worcester Williams, David, Furnace. Llanelly, Carmarthen, Builder. May 9 at 11 at offices of Howell, Stepney st, Llanelly

Williams, Henry Mansel, Pembroke, Draper. May 12 at 11 at offfices of Brown, Assembly Rooms, Pembroke

Wills, Edward, jun, Worcester, Fruiterer. May 6 at 11 at offices of Allen and Beauchamp, Sansom pl, Worcester

Wilton, Joseph, Cardiff, Licensed Victualler. May 9 at 3 at offices of Hudson and Co, Albert chmbrs, High st, Cardiff. Stephens, Cardiff Woodhouse, John, Banningham, Norfolk, Cattle Dealer. May 5 at 12 at offices of Daly, Guildhall chambers, Upper Market, Nor wich

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CASES OF THE WEEK

Nobel's Explosives Company v. Jones

Walter v. Howe..................................................................... Ellis v. Robbins .......

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THE HOUSE OF LORDS recommenced its sittings (which last for barely a month), on Thursday last with a list of fourteen appeals, which are equally divided between England and Scotland. The only appeal standing for judgment is Commissioners of Works and Public Buildings v. Angus, the voluminous opinions of the judges in which are still under the consideration of the law

lords.

THE CONTEST for the coronership of Central Middlesex will be watched with great interest on account of the principle involved. A thoroughly competent and experienced lawyer candidate is in the field, and the question of whether coroners should be chosen from the legal or the medical profession is, therefore, raised in its proper form. We should hardly be disposed to go so far as the resolution passed at the meeting held at the Law Institution on Monday, and affirm that the office of coroner ought, under all conceivable circumstances, to be held by a lawyer; it is enough to say that, cæteris paribus, a lawyer ought always to have the preference. Put in this way, the case for the legal profession appears to be unassailable. Let us take it from the medical standpoint, and admit, for the moment, that the object of a coroner's inquest is only to ascertain the cause of death, and that the evidence on which the jury have to proceed is mainly medical evidence. Does it follow that such evidence must be unintelligible to anyone but a doctor? How then do lawyer judges in criminal cases, depending mainly on medical evidence, contrive to understand the evidence of doctors and to lay it before juries? If lawyer judges, possessed of no special scientific knowledge, make a jury understand the purport of doctors' testimony (and no pretend that they do not), how can it be alleged that because a coroner possesses no special scientific knowledge he will therefore be unable to comprehend or explain the medical evidence? If he is a man of general intelligence and ready apprehension, will he not be likely to put it before the jury in a far more intelligible form than a medical coroner accustomed to talk only in medical jargon ? But it cannot be admitted that the object of coroners' inquests is only to ascertain the cause of death. The inquisition of the coroner finding a man guilty of murder sarily into the guilt or innocence of the suspected person, operates as an indictment; hence the inquiry is neces

one

can

and is therefore on the same footing as other preliminary criminal inquiries. Will anyone say that in the case of an ordinary criminal inquiry scientific knowledge is more essential to the judge or magistrate than knowledge of the rules of evidence and skill in the practical conduct of a legal inquiry?

THE FORMAL NOTIFICATION to the Speaker by the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland of the arrest of Mr. DILLON was Protection of Person and Property Act, which provides rendered necessary by section 3, sub-section 3, of the that "if any member of either House of Parliament be arrested under this Act, the fact shall be immediately communicated to the House of which he is a member, if Parliament be sitting at the time." Mr. O'CONNOR appears to have raised a question of privilege, on the ground that Mr. DILLON was on his way to London to

perform his parliamentary duties at the time when he was taken into custody; but it is clear that parliamentary privilege has never been allowed to interfere with criminal justice, for, on the 20th of May, 1675, the House of Commons passed a resolution "that by the laws and usages of Parliament, privilege of Parliament belongs to every member of the House of Commons in all cases except treason, felony, and breach of the peace." On the 29th of November, 1763, a similar resolution was arrived at in the case of WILKES, and in 1831 a Committee of Privileges reported that since that time [i.e., 1763] "it has been considered as established generally that privilege is not claimable for any indictable offence." In 1815 Lord COCHRANE, who was then a member of the House, and who had escaped from the King's Bench Prison, where he had been imprisoned on a conviction for conspiracy, was actually arrested in the House of Commons, although before the business of the House had commenced; and a Committee of Privileges reported that "the privileges of Parliament do not appear to have been violated." The provision for communicating to the House the arrest of one of its members has been generally introduced in the Acts which have suspended the Habeas Corpus Act, but Sir ERSKINE MAY states that in cases not falling under such statutes the cause of arrest is usually stated to the House, as was done upon the arrest of Lord GEORGE GORDON in 1780, and that of

Mr. SMITH O'BRIEN in 1848. In the present Act it will be observed that nothing is said about stating the grounds of the arrest, although these will, of course, appear in the next monthly list of prisoners laid before Parliament under section 1, sub-section 4, of the Act.

THE CUSTOMS AND INLAND REVENUE BILL, recently introduced in the House of Commons, proposes to effect several important changes in the probate and legacy duties. It is provided, by clause 28, that after the 1st of June next the duties imposed by the Act of last year on probates and letters of administration shall cease to be payable, and instead thereof there is to be paid on the affidavit by the person applying for probate or letters of administration, stamp duty at the rate of £1 for every full sum of £50, and any further fractional part of £50, where the estate is between £100 and £300, and at £1 5s. for each similar sum where the estate is between £300 and £1,000, and at £3 for every full sum of £100 and any further fractional part of £100 where the estate is £1,000 and upwards. Comparing this scale with that in last year's Act, it will be seen that it is a good deal higher. At present £2 is paid on £150: under the new Bill £3 will be payable; now £15 is payable on £750 under the new Bill £18 15s. will be payable; now £40 is payable on £1,900: under the new Bill £57 will be payable. Of course, however, the scale is much more simple than the scale in the Act of last year. Legacies below £20 are no longer to be exempt from duty (unless, under section 13 of the Act of last year, the whole personal estate is less than £100); but, on the other hand, clause 42 provides that legacy or succession duty, if at the rate of one per cent. only, shall not be payable where the duty imposed by the Bill shall have been paid on the affidavit. As a correspondent pointed out last week, where the whole personal estate, without any deduction for debts or funeral expenses, does not exceed £300 in value, probate or letters of administration may be obtained by delivering to the proper officer of Inland Revenue a notice setting forth the particulars of the estate, and such others as may be required, and depositing with him the sum of fifteen shillings for fees of court and expenses, and also, in case the estate exceed £100,❘ the further sum of thirty shillings for legacy and succession duty. By clause 29 a very valuable reform is proposed to be effected. Instead of the application for a return of probate duty on the ground of debts, it is provided that, in the case of a person dying domiciled in the United Kingdom, the person who applies for probate

or letters of administration may deduct from the value of the estate, for the purpose of estimating the amount of duty payable, the debts due to persons resident in the United Kingdom and the funeral expenses; but voluntary debts expressed to be payable on the death of the deceased, or payable under any instrument not delivered to the donee three months before the death, or debts in respect of which real estate is primarily liable, or a reimbursement may be claimed from real estate or from any other estate or person, are not to be deducted, and the funeral expenses to be deducted are to include "only such expenses as are allowable as reasonable funeral expenses according to law." The affidavit is to extend to the verification of the account and schedule of debts and funeral expenses. Probates are in future to bear a certificate setting forth that the affidavit has been delivered duly stamped, and stating the amount of the gross value of the estate as shown by the account.

VOLUNTARY SETTLEMENTS of personalty in order to escape duties will be considerably checked if clause 39 of the Bill passes into law. That clause provides that the personal property to be included in an account shall include any property which the deceased, having been absolutely entitled thereto, has voluntarily caused to be transferred to himself and any other person jointly, so that the beneficial interest therein passes by survivorship on his death to such other person; also property passing under any past or future voluntary settlement by deed or other instrument not taking effect as a will, whereby an interest for life, or any other period determinable by reference to death, is reserved, either expressly or by implication, to the settlor; or whereby the settlor reserves to himself the right, by the exercise of any power, to restore to himself, or to reclaim, the absolute interest in such property. But where an account comprises property passing under a voluntary settlement, and upon production of the settlement it appears that stamp duty has been paid thereon, the amount of such duty is to be returned to the person delivering the account. Property taken as a donatio mortis causâ, or under a voluntary disposition by the deceased, operating as an immediate gift inter vivos, not bonâ fide made within three months before the death, is also to be included in the account. beneficiary or trustee acquiring possession of any personal property thus required to be included in the account is, within six months after the death of the deceased, to deliver an account, verified by oath, of such property,. duly stamped under the Act, on penalty of double duty.

The

A meeting of the Incorporated Law Society, convened on the requisition recently published in our columns, "for the purpose of considering the present position of legal procedure, the impending changes in our professiour, and other incidental matters which to the meeting may appear urgent and important," was fixed to be held yesterday (Friday) afternoon at the Law Institution.

At a meeting of solicitors residing and practising in the central Middlesex district, held on the 2nd of May at the Law Institution, J. M. Clabon, Esq., President of the Incorporated Law Society, in the chair, it was unanimously resolved: "That this meeting is of opinion that the office of coroner is one which ought to be held by a lawyer, as being eminently of a judicial character, and requiring the holders to be well acquainted with the law of evidence and the mode of legal procedure, and that this meeting approves of the candidature of Mr. Thomas Henry Bolton for the office of Coroner of Central Middlesex, and pledges itself to use all possible exertion and influence to secure his return."

OUGHT PLEADINGS TO BE
ABOLISHED?

STATEMENTS are very generally current to the effect that
the new rules which may shortly be expected will, in pur-
suance of the resolution of the Procedure Committee,
abolish pleadings except in cases where leave is given by
the court to plead on account of special circumstances
rendering it desirable, in the particular case, that there
should be pleadings. We doubt whether the proposed
step is altogether desirable. There is at present a
great clamour to the effect that law is too expensive;
that, especially in actions for small amounts, the costs
bear so large a proportion to the amount at stake as to
make the game not worth the candle. It is alleged
that this, to a great extent, arises from a number of pre-
liminary steps and interlocutory matters which are not
essential, and which seldom produce any real benefit
proportionate to the costs incurred by reason of them.
There is therefore just now a great feeling in favour of
abolishing, as far as possible, these preliminary matters,
and proceeding as promptly and directly as possible to
trial. We feel a certain amount of melancholy scepti-
cism with regard to these perpetually-propounded
panaceas for the production of a sort of millennium of
cheap law which sanguine reformers constantly herald
in the newspapers. Something, no doubt, may be
done, but we doubt whether such measures as these
really hit the blot-assuming that the blot can be hit.
The truth is that there is a difficulty, not altogether
artificially produced, but, to a large extent, inherent in
the nature of the thing, with regard to law costs. An
action for a small amount may be as troublesome and
anxious a matter in its way as one involving a large
amount. If the costs are cut down too unsparingly,
though the game may be more worth the candle to the
client, it may not be worth the candle to the higher
class of solicitor. The question how a solicitor's costs
in litigation are to be regulated is one of great difficulty.
The apothecary's bill kind of system which at present
prevails is a most miserable and unsatisfactory system,
but it is difficult to suggest any wholly satisfactory
principle.

But to return to the question of pleadings. We took occasion some time ago, when the new rules first came out, to discuss the new system of pleadings. We then pointed out that the old system of pleadings involved two separable ideas and objects. Perhaps the primary purpose in logical and chronological order is the purpose of informing the court of the facts, and determining the issues upon which its judgment is requested. Pleadings, as every student of the law knows, were at first oral. At the same time as the court was informed of the facts and issues upon which its judgment was requested, of course the collateral purpose was served of informing the other party of the case which he had to meet. When pleadings became documentary, they formed the premisses upon which the judgment was founded as a conclusion, as well as also continuing to serve the purpose of giving information to the other side. The principle of an almost superstitious veneration for records and written instruments, of which our law affords so many instances, is, we think, exemplified in the history of pleading. The notion of the absolute necessity of a written record of the allegations or statements upon which the judgment was founded, as a conclusion on premisses, undoubtedly largely entered into the view of pleadings taken in former days. It seems to us, however, that the usefulness of pleadings for that purpose, and for the purpose of determining the issues (if they ever had any) has continuously dwindled, and, under the Judicature Act, has become reduced to the lowest possible ebb. The true function of pleadings now is that which was originally perhaps a secondary and incidental result of them-viz., giving information previously to the trial to the other side as to the case which will be set up.

Now, it seems to us that the present system is objectionable because it does not sufficiently recognize the substantial nature of the case. A great deal of waste is thus Let us occasioned, both of time, labour, and money. take an illustration. An action is being brought on a charter-party or a building contract. The provisions of the contract are perfectly well known to both parties, or if there is no copy, it can be made the subject of inspection, yet because it is necessary to make a statement of the case giving rise to a logical legal conclusion on the record, long extracts from the contract have to be made that may be of no advantage to anybody. Why, for all practical purposes, would it not be sufficient to say that the plaintiff, or defendant, as the case may be, will rely on such and such a clause of the charter-party, or specification, of such a date, made between, &c. [describing it], and will say that the terms of such clause have not been complied with; or to make some short general statement of that sort? If further particulars are necessary, detailed particulars of a concrete sort can then be given; but the present system frequently involves the setting out of long provisions of the contract, and the denial, in identical terms, of the performance of them, while very little is gained thereby. The ancient bugbear of a variance still troubles the dreams of a

pleader.

There is one habit of judges which we believe to be a fruitful source of long-windedness and expense. We do wish, as earnestly as that corporate entity the "we" of journalism can wish anything, that any humble remarks of ours could induce them to reconsider their ways in this respect. A judge makes up his mind—sometimes in fact wrongly, but we will assume for our present purpose rightly-that a litigant's case is not meritorious, and that all truth and justice are on the other side; thereupon, on the principle that any stick does to beat a dog with, he sets himself to refuse to the party whom he considers unmeritorious all the facilities and opportunities which, if his cause were meritorious, he ought to The object is good, but we believe receive as of course. this to be short-sighted policy and an unsound mode of procedure. The right to amendments and such like matters ought to be considered wholly irrespective of what one may call the ultimate merits of the cause. The result of this habit of the judge of taking advantage of slips to further the justice of particular cases is responsible for a great deal of cumbrous complication. A pleader alleges a great many alternatives and sets out a great deal verbatim to make himself safe against the possibility of a judge's conceiving an unfavourable opinion of his case and construing his allegations with anything but benevolent neutrality. We are convinced that additional expense and other mischiefs are, in the long run, occasioned by this, to our mind, bad judicial habit. Judges are, after all, men, and must be affected by the moral aspect of the particular case they are trying, but it seems to us to be the duty of a judge to consider the general as well as the particular application of everything he does.

To return to our subject. It seems to us that the substantial use of pleadings is by way of being short and that in most cases some particulars, and concise particulars of the case that will be set up ought to be quite sufficient, but we cannot help thinking that these ought to be given by both sides. The complicated series of allegations leading up to formal issues may be, on the whole, unnecessary and mischievous. We are disposed to think that in many cases it is so, but all that there is of advantage in it might be retained (and, as it seems to us, without its demerits) by a less formal substitute more directly pointed to the substance of the thing. It hardly seems to us to be desirable that the parties should go to trial without any definite information as to the case which the other side mean to set up, except so far the indorsement on the writ may inform the defend

ant.

as

ACTIONS FOR DECEIT.

It was decided by Pasley v. Freeman (2 Sm. L. C., 8th ed., p. 66) that there must be fraud, by which was meant an intention to deceive, in order to support the action in tort for a misrepresentation of another's credit which has induced the plaintiff to act upon the defendant's recommendation and receive damage. This was further insisted upon in Haycraft v. Creasy (2 East, 92). There the plaintiff had supplied goods on credit to an impostor, a certain Miss Robertson, who had been representing herself as having come into a fortune. Before delivering the goods, the plaintiff had applied to the defendant to know whether it would be safe to give credit to the lady, and had received an answer to the effect that the defendant knew Miss Robertson to be a lady of fortune, and one who might safely be trusted to any amount. It appeared that the defendant had himself been deceived by Miss Robertson, and had lent her £2,000 without security. Miss Robertson had absconded without paying for the goods. At the trial, a verdict for the plaintiff for £475 was given. On the argument on a rule for a new trial, it was held that the action would not lie, because the foundation for such an action was fraud or deceit in the defendant, and damage to the plaintiff by means thereof, and in this case the defendant's representation was bond fide with a belief in the truth of it. Grose, Lawrence, and Le Blanc, JJ., concurred in this view of the case, but Lord Kenyon was inclined to go beyond what had been established by Pasley v. Freeman twelve years before. His opinion has now received the approval of the Court of Appeal in the case of Leddell v. McDougal (29 W. R. 403).

The Court of Chancery had applied a different rule in cases of misrepresentation. It had not in early times made any use of this head of equity, but, as Lord Eldon was fond of asserting, the equity had always existed and was not rendered novel by the fact that the circumstances which called for its application had not previously arisen. In equity the defendant was liable for damage sustained by the plaintiff in consequence of the plaintiff having acted on a false statement made by the defendant innocently with intent that it should be acted upon. Suits in equity analogous to the action at law for deceit, therefore, became by no means uncommon, while the action at law was brought less frequently. The equitable principle gave plaintiffs a better chance of success, as it did not require an intention to deceive. There was less difficulty in pleading, and no trouble about the presumption or proof of legal fraud. The cases in equity dealing with misrepresentation became very common as soon as joint stock companies began to 'flourish. Most of those cases, however, are complicated 'by questions of agency, which are beyond the present purpose. The law as it now exists is clearly stated by the learned editors of Smith's Leading Cases. "It is not necessary that [the representation] should be false to the knowledge of the party making it; if it be untrue in fact, and not believed to be true by the party making it, or made recklessly without any knowledge on the subject, and for the purpose of inducing another person to act upon it, an action may be maintained thereon by the person who has been induced to act upon it." Even the case of Pasley v. Freeman was one which, in Lord Eldon's opinion (Evans v. Bicknall, 6 Ves. 174), was more fit for a court of equity than a court of law; and it is clear that the observation would apply still more forcibly to Haycraft v. Creasy.

The passage from Lord Kenyon's judgment in that case, which the Master of the Rolls adopted in Leddell v. McDougal, was as follows:-"The case rested on this, that the defendant affirmed that to be true within his own knowledge which he did not know to be true. This is fraudulent, not, perhaps, in that sense

which affixes the stain of moral turpitude on the mind of the party, but falling within the notion of legal fraud such as is presumed in all cases within the Statute of Frauds. The fraud consists, not in the defendant saying that he believed the matter to be true, or that he had reason so to believe it, but in asserting positively his knowledge of that which he did not know." It seems that at the time when Lord Kenyon delivered this judg ment he was going a little beyond the common law as it existed. It is perhaps to be regretted that the Master of the Rolls should have selected this passage for adoption, raising, as it does, the much-vexed question of legal as opposed to moral fraud. Everybody will recollect the vigorous attack made by Lord Justice Bramwell in Weir v. Barnett (26 W. R. 746, s.c. sub nom. Weir v. Bell, 3 L. R. Ex. D. 238) upon the expression "legal fraud." It was, he said, to him as if one were to talk of legal heat and legal cold, or legal light and legal shade. Like most very acrimonious contentions it turns out in reality to be a contest about a word. The expression "legal fraud" is one which undoubtedly is more or less an insult to ordinary language. But it has become a useful technical phrase, and it is characteristic of our legal phraseology to be unscientific. Oddly enough one need go no further than the same number of the WEEKLY REPORTER in which Leddell v. McDougal appears for an instance in point. In McCollin v. Gilpin (29 W. R. 408) we find Lord Justice Bramwell himself using the word " agreement in one sentence both for an agreement and the document wherein its terms are expressed.

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In saying that he adopted the words of Lord Kenyon the Master of the Rolls did not, it seems, mean that he followed Lord Kenyon's judgment as an authority. Lord Kenyon happened to express what subsequently became the equitable principle, and what is now undoubtedly the law. Leddell v. McDougal is an unusual case, though the principle upon which the Court of Chancery had acted in dealing with misrepresentation was well established. In that case the plaintiff being about to let a house and shop to one Thornton, of whom he knew nothing, applied to the defendant, at Thornton's suggestion, for information as to Thornton's position to meet the responsibility of a lease at a rent of £100 a year, and asking if the defendant could recommend Thornton as a safe and advisable tenant. The defendant wrote in answer that he had "much pleasure in replying affirmatively." The lease was granted; Thornton did not succeed with his business, and left without paying any rent, taking his furniture and fixtures with him. The lessor then brought an action for deceit against McDougal, and the Court of Appeal, reversing the decision of Vice-Chancellor Bacon, held that the plaintiff ought to succeed.

Here was an excellent opportunity for a clear enunciation by the Court of Appeal of the law upon the question of misrepresentation in the nature of deceit. Unfortunately, not only did the court decline to go into the cases upon the subject, but the judgments, though agreeing in the result, were not quite consistent. The Master of the Rolls said it appeared that McDougal did not really know whether Thornton was a man of substance or what his means were. He had no particular knowledge of his means. Then the learned judge adopted the language of Lord Kenyon which has already been quoted; and, summing up the matter, said that the defendant must be taken to have known that Thornton was not in a responsible position to meet the responsibility of the undertaking. Lord Justice James, however, thought that there would have been a good deal of force in the argument for the defendant if he had represented that Thornton was in a good and responsible position, without having had the precise knowledge of his circumstances which, in fact, he had. Knowing as he did what the state of Thornton's affairs really was, it was impossible that he could have truthfully said that he was in a good and responsible position. And Lord

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