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which the registration of titles could be made compulsory "; and the committee, "without expressing any final opinion on this latter question," thought it "sufficient to observe that it will be very difficult to force upon every purchaser or mortgagee in this country a mode of dealing with his property which not one purchaser or mortgagee in 20,000 at present adopts of his own accord. Your committee feel that in arriving at the above conclusion, they are only acting upon the axiom Which is laid down by the Royal Commission of 1868 in their report, and which th6y believe to be perfectly sound, that, 'for an institution to flourish in a free country, it must offer to people the thing that they want.'" Surely, in face of this opinion, we shall not have another attempt next session to galvanize the lifeless scheme of registering titles. We cannot help expressing our regret that the Government have again set aside, on the ground of their intention to deal with the general question of land transfer, Mr. Hopwood's useful little measure, which would only have affected a small area, and would have been of infinitely more practical service than any great land transfer scheme which has hitherto been launched.

"we Publish in another column a letter from a correspondent with reference to a general reform of the law and practice relating to defamation. His suggestions appear well worthy of consideration. In one or two points, however, we feel doubtful as to the advisability of the reforms he suggests. He proposes to abolish the legal distinction between libel and slander, which renders slander only actionable in the case of special damage, unless it be of a man in the way of his business, or unless it imputes an indictable offence. We fully agree that this distinction is very difficult to justify in principle, but for this, as for some other doctrines of the common law which are difficult to justify from a philosophical point of view, we are disposed to think there is a good deal to be said from a practical point of view. The judges of old thought that life would be almost unbearable if for every unfavourable opinion of his fellow-creature that a man expressed he was liable to be sued, although such fellow-creature could not show that he had sustained one halfpenny worth of damage. Our correspondent points out that spoken words delivered in a public place or on a public occasion may be far more injurious to a person than a private letter. This is true, and in these particular cases the distinction may work badly, but the question is, whether the rule in the main is a wise one; whether, on account of these caees, it would be well to make every defamatory statement made orally actionable. We are disposed to doubt whether the change suggested by our correspondent in this respect is desirable, though we are by no means prepared to express a decided opinion, and we feel the force of what he says. Again, our correspondent proposes to abolish the existing proceedings by indictment and criminal information, and substitute one proceeding by action, to include (if we do not misunderstand his proposal) damages for the civil injury and also the question of punishment. The main object appears to be to make the evidence of both parties admissible. We see no logical objection to this, but we doubt whether it would not involve too great an interference with the established lines of demarcation between criminal and civil matters to be practically possible.

Some Misapprehension appears to exist as to the disqualifications and other Inconveniences which attach to persons who have been reported to have been guilty of corrupt practices at elections. The Attorney-General, in answering Mr. Rtlands' question in the House of Commons, pointed out some of the distinctions between the report of an election judge and the report of an eleotion commission. The former case is regulated by the Parliamentary Elections Act, 1868 (31 & 32 Vict c. 125), section

43 of which provides that if a candidate has been found by the report of a judge upon an election petition to have been personally guilty of bribery, he is to be incapable of being elected to, or sitting in, the Honse of Commons for seven years, of being registered as an elector, or voting at any election, of holding any judicial or municipal office, and of being appointed or actiug as a justice of the peace. Section 45 contains a similar provision in the case of a person "other than a candidate, found guilty of bribery in any proceding in which, after notice of the charge, he has had an opportunity of being heard." These words were considered by Mr. Justice Blackburn in the second Btwdley Petition (1 O'M. & H. 174). A previous election had been declared void, and a question arose as to whether two persons who had been reported as guilty of having been bribed, by the judges who tried the first petition, were disqualified from voting at the second election. It was argued that, since they had been examined as witnesses on the trial of the previous petition, they had had "an opportunity of being heard " within the section; but Mr. Justice Blackburn ruled that the witnesses were not disqualified; first, because a report of a judge as to an offence committed by a person other than the candidate was not a finding of guilty; and, secondly, because the voters had not had " an opportunity of being heard," since those words must mean "an opportunity of being heard when he has had fair warning of the charge, and is asked to meet it, and be heard by himself or his counsel." There appears to be no special penalty or disqualification attached to persons reported by commissioners to have been guilty of bribery, except the liability to a criminal prosecution, which (as the Attorney-General pointed out) is, in many coses, precluded by the granting of a certificate of indemnity. It appears that in the case of several magistrates reported as guilty of corrupt practices, the Lord Chancellor has, in the exercise of his discretion, called upon them to show cause why they should not be removed from the Commission of the Feace, aud we observe that a contemporary has hazarded an opinion that solicitors who have been similarly reported upon ought to be called upon to answer such matters, although we do not gather what sort of jurisdiction would be thus enforced. In the case of aldermen and other municipal dignitaries found guilty of bribery, the Attorney-General hinted at further legislation, with a view to disqualification.

We Are Informed that Mr. Glasse, Q.C., will, after his present cases have been disposed of, attach himself to the court of Mr. Justice Fry.

The Solicitors' Remuneration Bill was in the orders of the day of the House of Commons for second reading on Monday last, but it was not reached.

The Liverpool Town Council on Wednesday agreed to increase the salary of the Town Clerk (Mr. Rayner), from £2,500 to £3,000 a year.

In the course of the hearing of a case in the Lancashire Chancery Court, on Tuesday last, the Vice-Chancellor (Mr. Bristowe, Q.C.) referred to the manner in which affidavits in that court were framed. He said the practice appeared to be to set out at length any correspondence which might occur in the case, the result being to throw upon suitors considerable expense which might be avoided. He would suggest that in future letters should be mentioned as exhibits in ordinary cases, parties being of course at liberty to insert in the affidavits any particular passage in a letter upon which reliance was placed. He hoped that solicitors practising in the court would make a note of what he had said, and he should take care to instruct the registrar in future to disallow costs which had been unnecessarily incurred in this direction.


■when Mr. Justice Mathew took his seat on the bench for the first time, he found himself called upon to deal 'With more than one matter of more than common difficulty. Few judges have, in the same day, disposed of two more important cases than Clarke v. Bradlaugh and Smalley v. Hardinge. In the latter case the plaintiff was the reversioner upon a lease, which had been disclaimed, with leave of the court, upon the lessee's bankruptcy, by his trustee. The defendant was in possession, as sub-lessee, of a part of the premises comprised in the lease, under a sub-lease granted, and Tegularly executed, by the lessee before the adjudication. Mr. Justice Mathew held that by the disclaimer the sub-lease was destroyed; that the only remedy of the sub-lessee, if he wished to preserve his interest from destruction, was to have applied, under section 23 of the Bankruptcy Act, to oppose the disclaimer, and to ask for a transfer of the lease to himself; and that, as the sublessee had neglected to avail himself of this remedy, the sub-lease had been destroyed by the disclaimer, and the plaintiff was entitled to recover the premises by action of ejectment. This decision of Mr. Justice Mathew was, last week, reversed by the Court of Appeal.

It is evident that the practical consequences involved in the question at issue are of great gravity. For it is the common practice to draw mortgages of leaseholds by way of demise; and if the sub-terms thus created were held to be destroyed upon a disclaimer by the trustee in bankruptcy of the mortgagor, the mortgagee would be exposed to the risk, in the event of the mortgagor's bankruptcy, of being obliged to accept an assignment of the original lease; thus making himself liable for its rent and covenants—a liability which he had expressly bargained to avoid. On the other hand, the result of holding, as the Court of Appeal has held, that the sub-lease remains valid, notwithstanding the disclaimer of the lease, is of no less serious consequence to every reversioner. For any lessee might make a sublease at a premium with a peppercorn rent, and then, on his becoming bankrupt, and the trustee disclaiming, the reversioner would find himself in possession of nothing but a peppercorn rent during the sub-term, which might be the original term minus one day.

The defendant in the recent case relied solely, and in the Court of Appeal successfully, upon his position under the words of the Bankruptcy Act. By section 23, it is enacted that, "when any property of the bankrupt acquired by the trustee under this Act consists of land of any tenure burdened with onerous covenants, . . . the trustee may . . . disclaim such property, and upon the execution of such disclaimer the property shall, . . . . if the same is a lease, be deemed to have been surrendered" on the date of the order of adjudication. The effect of the surrender of a lease upon a sub-lease previously granted by the lessee admits of no dispute, and was not disputed. The sub-lessee at common law was so far from being ousted from his rights by the lessee's surrender, that he retained them without any obligation to pay rent or perform covenants; for this obligation was incident to the immediate reversion upon the sub-term, which reversion was destroyed by the merger of the term in the superior reversion. The wellknown statutes which gave the superior reversioner a remedy in respect of the rent and covenants of the sublease do not afford him any help towards ejecting the sub-lessee. In short, if the word " surrender" is in the Bankruptcy Act to be taken to have its ordinary sense, it means that the rights of the sub-lessee are left intact; and this is the view which prevailed with the Court of Appeal.

The plaintiff in the recent case had thus evidently little to rely upon so far as the language of the Bankruptcy Act is concerned. He endeavoured to make up

for this deficiency by appealing to the authority of decided cases. The cases which he is said to have cited were three: Taylor v. Qillott (L. R. 20 Eq. 682), Ex parte Ditton (44 W. R. 1008, L. R. 3 Ch. D. 459), and Ex parte Buxton (29 W. R. 28, L. R. 15 Ch. D. 289). How far these cases support such a contention we leave the reader to judge. In the first of them, upon whioh Mr. Justice Mathew is reported to have relied, a lessee, who had agreed to grant a sub-lease, had let the intended sub-lessee into possession without having otherwise performed the agreement. The lessee became bankrupt and his trustee disclaimed the lease. Thereupon the intended sub-lessee filed a bill in chancery against the superior reversioner, claiming to have a lease granted according to the lessee's agreement, and to restrain the reversioner from proceeding against him in ejectment. In plain language, he asked that the reversioner might be ordered specifically to perform something which neither he, nor anybody under whom he claimed, had agreed to perform at all. It was never the practice in equity to make such orders, and there is no need to wonder that the bill was dismissed. Vice-Chancellor flail, in giving judgment, declined to say what would have been the result if the sub-lease had been actually granted, though he expressed in strong language his sense of the hardship which would be inflicted upon the reversioner if he was forced to content himself with any rent and any covenants, however inadequate, which his lessee had chosen to insert in the sub-lease. As to the last point, there cannot be two opinions; aud it happened that the circumstances in Taylor v. Qillott lent a peculiar emphasis to the Vice-Chancellor's remarks. We suppose the argument founded on this case in Smalley v. Hardinge was somewhat as follows :— That an agreement for a lease is in equity the same thing as a lease; and that, as the agreement was not enforced, so the sub-lease, if actually granted, would, have been held to have been destroyed. But it is not correct to say that, in contemplation of equity, a thing agreed to be done is the same as a thing done: at the most, this is true only as between the parties to the agreement. And in Taylor v. Qillott, the defendant was no party to the alleged agreement. There was no equity against him, whatever there might be against somebody else. The fact that equity would not step out of its way to make him grant to the plaintiff a legal right which the plaintiff had not got, by no means shows that it would have deprived the plaintiff of the legal right if he had got it.

The bearing of the other two cases cited upon Smalley v. Hardinge is less obvious. In Ex parte Ditton, a lessee had deposited his lease with a person by way of equitable mortgage. The lessee became bankrupt, his trustee disclaimed, and the equitable mortgagee, who had been present when leave was given to disclaim, sought to appeal from the order giving the leave. It was held that he ought to have asked the Bankruptcy Court to stay execution of the order to disclaim pending the appeal; and that, as he had failed to do so, and bad suffered the act of disclaimer to be perfected, this disclaimer could not be undone. What do we find here to give any new or peculiar meaning to the word "surrender " P In Ex parte Buxton, it was decided that the equitable mortgagee of a lease, willing to accept an assignment of the lease, had a right to prevent tho trustee from disclaiming, upon the terms of indemnifying him against liability under the lease. We once more find nothing here bearing upon the meaning of the word "surrender "; and nothing to justify us in reconstructing an Act of Parliament which has said one thing pretty clearly in such a way as to make it say another.

The clumsiness of modern legislation has made it quite inevitable that a hardship shall be inflicted upon one party er the other; and by the use of the word "surrender," it is plainly indicated that the reversioner is the one to suffer hardship. We think that the Court of Appeal, in refusing to take it upon them to shift the burden of inconvenience to the shoulders of somebody else because they might think him better able to bear it, or because the burden would be smaller in his case, or because the circumstances of the first case ■which happened to turn up cast an unfavourable light upon his claim, have only refused to substitute a public evil for a private evil of much less consequence.


Mb. Bbadlacgh'b appeal to the House of Lords is likely to raise questions of some little interest as to the practice and procedure under the Appellate Jurisdiction Act, 1876, and the Standing Orders of the House of Lords which derive their force therefrom. The 11th section of the Appellate Jurisdiction Act, 1876, enacts that an appeal shall be "subject to such conditions as to the value of the subject-matter in dispute, and as to giving security for costs, and as to the time within which the appeal shall be brought, and generally as to all matters of practice and procedure, or otherwise, as may be imposed by orders of the House of Lords." The Standing Orders of the House, therefore, have all the force of a statute, and so wide are the terms of the section authorizing them, that it would be almost impossible for any particular order to be ultra vires.

Turning to the Standing Orders, we find that they deal with their subject-matter with great particularity. Order 1 fixes the time within which an appeal may be lodged at one year, not five years, as Mr. Gladstone and the Attorney-General stated, the period of five years being confined to cases where the person entitled to appeal is non compos mentis, or under other disabilities in the order mentioned. The saving words in this order, "except where otherwise provided by statute," have, we should imagine, reference to the provisions of the "Divorce Amendment Act, 1868," 31 & 32 Vict., c. 77, which limits to one month the period within which must be brought the appeal to the House of Lords, fh-Bt given by that act, against a decree for dissolution of marriage. We know of no statute extending the period of appeal. Order 2 prescribes that all petitions of appeal be signed, and the reasonableness thereof certified by two counsel, who shall have attended as counsel in the court below, or shall purpose attending as counsel at the hearing in the House. It will be remembered that Mr. Bradlaugh appeared in person in the court below, so that a new Standing Order would seem to be required, the present order not being quite applicable. "With regard to security for costs, Standing Order 4 requires that the appellant shall become bound to the Queen in a penalty of five hundred pounds, and also procure two sufficient sureties in the sum of two hundred pounds apiece, and a very recent amendment of this order {ante, p. 389) provides that the appellant must lodge in the Parliament Office " an affidavit by the proposed sureties setting forth specifically the nature of the property in consideration of which they claim to be accepted as sureties," failing which affidavit the appellant himself, so it is ordered, must pay £200 into the account of the fee fund of the House of Lords. It may perhaps be doubted whether this amendment would be held applicable to an appeal in an action commenced before it was made, but the amendment itself contains no saving words, and no objection could be taken in ordinary cases to its having a retrospective application.

Another question which may arise is whether the appeal may be partial only—i.e., whether it may be only against so much of the judgment as decides the right of the particular plaintiff to sue for the penalty. "The Form of Petition" provides for a partial appeal, but we greatly doubt whether an appeal against part of the reasons of a judgment may be said to be partial where there is no attempt to split the judgment

itself, and it may be noticed that the provision is

by accident we suppose—made for appealing against part of a decree, which is of course more frequently severable than a judgment. It so happens that the part of the judgment against which Mr. Bradlaugh does not propose to appeal affects very materially —though indirectly —the constitution of the very court to which he appeals. Assuming that the House, or a single member of it, should be prepared to give judgment on the question of the oath, but not on the question of the right to sue, what is there to prevent this being done? Again, it is. possible that an objection might be taken to the jurisdiction of the House, looking to the fact that the right ot a particular individual to sit in the House of Commons was being questioned in the court below. If the House itself should take a stand upon such an objection, the appeal could not be heard. In conclusion, it may be worth while to point out that neither the Appellate Jurisdiction Act, nor any standing order, has taken ana; the right always existing, but never exercised eince 1783, of every lord, temporal and spiritual, to hear the appeal, although there must be a quorum of three qualified peers.


VI.—Miscellaneous Matters. In concluding our notice of this Bill we shall follow, with some exceptions, the arrangement of subjects adopted by the draftsman.

With regard to married women, the Bill contains some rather revolutionary provisions. Clause 42 proposes to abolish acknowledgment of deeds and examination of married women (under the Settled Estates Act, 1877, or on a surrender by husband and wife of copyholds), and the next clause enables a married woman, by deed made with the concurrence of her husband, to dispose of reversionary interests in personalty, to release powers, or release or extinguish her equity to a settlement, and to dispose of, release, or disclaim any personal property in possession, or any debt or chose tn action to which she or her husband in her right is entitled under any instrument made before or after the commencement of the Act As a necessary consequence it is proposed to repeal Malins' Act (20 & 21 Vict. c. 57). The section is not to authorize a married woman to make any disposition, release, extinguishment, or disclaimer of any property which she is restrained from alienating or anticipating, or of any property settled by marriage settlement. Clause 44 enables the court in cases where a married woman is restrained from anticipation, by judgment or order, to bind her interest in any property. Clause 46 provides that a covenant, or other contract in writing made by a married woman, "shall operate to bind her separate estate, if any, real and personal, and to create a debt recoverable thereout, as against her, her heirs, executors, and administrators, taking her separate estate, but to the extent only of that separate estate." This provision, which it will be seen proposes to make a married woman's charge effectual against all her separate property, whether acquired before or after the charge (so far reversing the rule laid down by the Court of Appeal in Pike v. Fitzgibbon) is, in accordance with that decision, to apply only if and so far as the married woman is not restrained from anticipation, and is, moreover, applicable only if and so far as a contrary intention is not expressed in the covenant or contract.

With regard to infants, clause 47 provides that where a person in his own right seised of or entitled to land for an estate in fee, or for any leasehold interest at a rent, is an infant, the land shall be deemed to be settled land, and the infant to be tenant for life thereof, within the proposed Settled Land Act, and the land shall be deemed to be a settled estate within the Settled Estates Act, 1877. Clause 48 proposes to imply (subject to the expression of a contrary intention) extensive powers of management of land during minority in trustees either appointed for the purpose by the settlement, or, if none are so appointed, then in the trustees of the settlement within the proposed Settled Land Act, or, if there are none, then in trustees to be appointed for this purpose by the court. Clause 49 proposes to amend the provisions of 23 & 24 Vict. c. 145, s. 26, as to maintenance, mainly by omitting the words "income to which such infant may be entitled in respect of such property," which in In re George (L. R. 5 Ch. D. 837) were held to render the provision applicable only to cases where the infant was either absolutely entitled to the the principal and income or was entitled to the principal contingently in such a manner as that he would, on coming of age, become entitled to the income also. It Is now proposed to be provided that "where any property is held by trustees on trust for an infant, either for life or for any further interest, . . . the trustees may, at their sole discretion, pay to the infant's parent or guardian, if any, or otherwise apply, &c, . . . the income of that property."

Passing over clauses 50 and 51, relating to rent-charges and other annual sums, we come to the provisions as to powers of attorney. Clause 52 enables the donee of a power of attorney to execute any instrument in his own name. Clause 53 makes irrevocable, except with the consent of the donee, a power of attorney, whether given for a valuable consideration or not, which is expressed to be irrevocable for a fixed time specified in the instrument creating the power, not exceeding a year from the date of the instrument, and clause 54 makes irrevocable, except with the consent of the donee, a power of attorney given for valuable consideration and expressed to be absolutely irrevocable. Clause 55 protects payments made, and acts done in good faith, without notice of the revocation of a power, and clause 56 provides that instruments creating powers of attorney may be deposited in the Central Office of the Supreme Court, and that a separate file shall be kept of the instruments so deposited, which may be searched by any person, and office copies obtained, which are to be sufficient evidence of the contents of the instruments. Clause 45 enables a married woman to appoint an attorney to execute any deed, or do any other act, which she might herself execute or do.

Clauses 57—73 contain various small provisions intended to shorten deeds, among which may be mentioned the abolition of the feoffee to uses in the conveyance of freeholds by a man to himself jointly with another; the abolition of the indorsed receipt (clause 63), and of the authority for payment to the vendor's solicitor (clause 65); and the implication of the joint account clause (clause 70), and of the estate clause (clause 72).

Clause 75 provides for the protection of solicitors and trustees adopting, or allowing the adoption of, the Act.

Mr. Justice Kay will join Mr. Justice Stephen at Leeds, the latter judge going alone to Newcastle and Durham, where prisoners only will be tried.

The recent recognition by her Majesty of a Canadian Barony, says Debrett's Peerage for 1831, is an exceptional circumstance, and the gentleman (Baron de Longueiiil) whose title has been acknowledged, holds the remarkable position of being the only subject of the Queen who is a colonial Peer, and who, at the same time, has not any precedence. The Fendal Barony is entirely exceptional, and is the only Canadian hereditary title existing. The patent of nobility signed by King Louis XIV. granting this title to Charles Le Moyne for distinguished servioes, is remarkable as creating, not only a territorial barony, but also conferring a title of honour upon himself and his descendants, whether male or female. The cession of Canada to England by the Treaty of Paris in 1763 made no change ia the legal right to hold honours; since this period each successive head of the family has, by assumption of right, used the title; but it was not officially recognized by the British Government until December 4, 1880.



[To the Editor of the Solicitors' Journal.]

Sir,—The observations in your last week's number as to proceedings for libel, taken in connection with soma recent cases which have attracted public attention, suggest the consideration whether the time has not arrived for an entire reform of the law of libel and slander, which, as it now stands, is admittedly unsatisfactory. Probably the reason why a reform has not been hitherto attempted has been because the intricacies of the existing law are known to but few, and those few beiug mea of large practice in the common law courts, have rarely had the time or the inclination to undertake legal reforms. What I propose to do in this letter is to sketch out a general outline of the reform which it appears to me would meet the wants of the age, leaving the details to be filled in by more experienced hands.

First, I would abolish the existing technical distinction between libel and slander—a distinction known to lawyers, but very little understood by the general public, and which is well illustrated by the old case, where an action was brought by a parson against his parishionet for

calling him " a d d fool"; and it was held, per totam

curiam, that the action would not lie, being for spoken words, and no special damage proved—"parceque on

poet estre bon parson et d d fool; aliter si il avaist

este attorney-at-law, parceque d d fool ne poet estra

bon attorney-at-law." It is obvious that spoken words, if delivered from a pulpit or platform, may be far more injurious to the person attacked than a private letter, and the principles on which the remedy is to be based should be the same in both cases.

Next, I would abolish all the existing proceedings by indictment and criminal information, which are based on fictions of the law, and would substitute as the sola remedy an action, to be called an action for defamation, to be brought by the person injured, or, in the case of defamation of public persons, by the Attorney-General. The statement of claim should state shortly the act of defamation, the innuendo (if any), and the special damage (if any); and should pray (1) for damages, (2) for an injunction, (3) for costs, and (4) for such punishment as the court may think proper. The defence would then either deny or justify the act, and the court at the trial would adapt the relief to the circumstances. In many cases,where the sole object of the action was to clear the plaintiffs character, an injunction with payment of costs would be a sufficient remedy, and a jury would be unnecessary; in other more serious cases the court might award fine or imprisonment. In every case, however, the evidence of both parties ought to be freely admitted, and the trial should be either by a judge alone, or a judge and jury, at the option of the parties.

Having provided for a simple plan of procedure, it would be necessary to classify in a codified form the various acts of defamation for which an action would lie —such as defamation of public persons, imputation of criminal offences, cases of special damage, defamation of title, &c, and the various defences which would bo an answer to the action, as privilege, public interest, &c, and provisions would be introduced to secure the absolute immunity of witnesses, legal and parliamentary proceedings, reports in newspapers, &c. It would also be reasonable to provide that a person in the position of the printer of a newspaper should be free from liability on hie giving up the name of the editor.

The above is a mere outline, but if the principles of the reform are once agreed upon, the details can be easily filled in, and advantage taken of the experience of those who are familiar with the subject. It is, of course, too much to hope that any reform of this nature can be so framed as to meet every possible case, but if the basis of the law be sound it will not be difficult to introduce amendments, and a satisfactory code of law on this subject may be ultimately obtained.

It would be an advantage if such of your readers as have given special attention to this subject would give the public the benefit of their views. R. J. C.

Lincoln's-inn, April 5.

[To the Editor of the Solicitors' Journal.]

Sir,—Attention being called to this subject by the two or three Bills now before Parliament for an amendment of the law affecting these instruments, a few statistical remarks respecting them may not be without interest.

In the year 1878, being the last one under the old Act, there were 20,059 bills of sale filed; but in the year 1880, viz., within two years after the new (the present) Act came into operation, the number filed rose to the large number of 56,625, being an avernge of 1,089 weekly; or, allowing for Sundays and holidays, nearly 200 each day of the year past.

During the fortnight ending the 23rd ult. there were 2,141 bills of sale filed, of which 310 were for sums not exceeding £10 each, and 460 for between £10 and not exceeding £20 each, being more than one in every three for £20 and under.

This is owing entirely to the operation of the 2Qth section of the present Act, which enacts that " chattels comprised in a bill of sale which has been, and continues to be, duly registered under this Act, shall not be deemed to be in the possession, order, or disposition of the grantor of tho bill of sale within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Act, 1869."

As to the class of persons to whom these small bills of sale are given, the constant repetition of the names of Moses, Aaron, Solomon, Abraham, &c, sufficiently testifies.

"Whilst, doubtless, one-half or three-fourths of the bills of sale now given are to these professional moneylenders, yet the remainder may be, and perhaps are, legitimate enough, and the difficulty is, whilst trying to prohibit or check the one class, to insure that the other /lass is not unduly prevented or prejudiced. One or more of the Bills now before Parliament provides that every grantor of a bill of sale shall file therewith an affidavit that all the goods thereby charged are his own and have been paid for, and that under no circumstances shall a bill of sale be valid if the grantor becomes bankrupt within three months next after giving it. No doubt but that some such enactment would go a long way to stop many of the money-lenders' bills of sale; but I am not so sure whether it would work well as a general measure affecting every case.

The subject is a pressing one, and calls for a remedy; but, as we know, it is often easier to ask a question than to satisfactorily answer it. John Miller.

Bristol, April 2.

THE INCORPORATED LAW SOCIETY AND THE "LAW LIST." [To the Editor of the Solicitors' Journal.'] Sir,—May I a9k the favour of space for the enclosed copy of my reply to Mr. Williamson's letter of the 30th ult.

I propose at the annual meeting of the society to move a resolution on the subject referred to in the correspondence between Mr. Williamson and myself, and I shall hope to induce the council to revert to the former practice. John Nioholls.

73, Gresnam-street, London, E.C., April 6.

[The following is the letter referred to:—

73, Gresham-btreet, London, E.C., April 3, 1881.

Dear Sir,

The Incorporated Law Society and the Law List. I am obliged by your letter of the 30th ult.

The council do not meet the complaint that, without consulting the members, they decided to abandon an arrangement which there was no necessity to discontinue.

I submit that a new list of members, prepared in the society's own office, and, as now alleged, because of inaccuracies in the official Law List, ought not to need an apology for mistakes "here and there." I send yon a list of about 170 such omissions as the one to which I drew youT attention in my letter of the 23rd ult., and which I have compiled from the Law Lists of 1880 and 1881.

I have learnt from other members that there are numerous mistakes in the Calendar of the following kinds —viz., names mis-spelt, year of admission incorrect, and appointments omitted. In each instance named to me I have verified the statements, and on each of the first three pages of the list of London members I have found other errors. I have gone no further.—I am, dear Sir, yours faithfully, John Nicholas.

E. W. Williamson, Esq., Secretary, Incorporated Law Society.


Winding Tjp Of Newspaper CompanyRights or Contributor.—I should be glad if any of your readers could inform me as to the rights of a gentleman who for several years was on the per m an en t staff of a newspaper, and regularly contributed weekly articles, in the liquidation of the proprietors. Can he claim as a "clrrk or servant" to be paid in full? I am told there lias been a case in which it was held that he could do so, but I cannot find any authority on the subject. Templar.


HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE. Chancery Division. I, the Right Honourable Rouudell Baron Selborne, Lord High Chancellor of Great Britain, do hereby order and direct as follows:—

1. Each of the several causes which shall be transferred to Mr. Justice Kay shall, until farther order, be deemed to have been transferred to him for the purpose only of trial or of hearing.

2. No cause or matter shall, until further order, be assigned to the said Mr. Justice Kay by the snnie being marked by the plaintiff or petitioner with the name of the said Mr. Justice Kay.

Dated this 30th day of March, 1881.

Selborne, C.

REGISTRATION ]OF BRITISH TRADE-MARKS IN SWITZERLAND. A copy of a form of certificate of establishment or domicile, which is required by the Swiss Federal Bureau in addition to the ordinary forms constituting the application of a British subject for the registration or his trademark in Switzerland, may be inspected -.x the office of the Registrar of Trade-Marks, 25, Southampton-buildings, Chancery-lane, London, W.C.

The members of the South-Eastern Circuit have in»ited Mr. Justice Watkin Williams and Mr. Justice Mathew to a dinner to celebrate their recent elevation to the bench. Th« dinner will take place oa Tuesday, the 12th inst., in the Inner Temple-hall.

The Board of Legal Studies of the University of Csmbridge have received from the committee of the George Long Memorial Fond an offer of .£500 to provide a prize or medal for the candidate in the law tripos most distinguished in Roman law and jurisprudence. The board recommend that the memorial should take the form of a prize.

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