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offer rewords for the conviction of offenders. In opening the motion, the plaintiffs' counsel stated that the plaintiffs did not wish to ask for a committal, the only object being to stop the publication of the advertisement, and to obtain an -apology. Cotton, L.J., said that he entirely disapproved of the making of motions to commit, when there was no intention of asking for a committal, bnt the only object was -to obtain costs and an apology. In snch cases he thought no costs of the motion ought to be given. Jesbel, M.R., and James, L.J., expressed their concurrence in this.— "solicitors, W. Foster; S. Whitehead.

BankruptcyAppropriation To Creditors Of "salary Or Income" Op Bankrupt Voluntary Allowance Bankruptcy Act, 18G9, s. 90.—In a case of Ex parte Wicki, before the Court of Appeal on the 24th ult., the question arose whether, when a bankrupt is in the receipt of a purely voluntary allowance, the court can, under section i>0 of the Bankruptcy Act, 1869, order it or any part of it to be appropriated for the benefit of the creditors. Section 88 enables the trustee of a bankrupt beneficed clergyman to obtain a sequestration of the profits of the benefice. And settir>p-^9 provides for the receipt by the trustee of a bankrupt who is or has been an officer of the army or navy, or a civil servant of the Crown, of so much of the bankrupt's pay, half-pay, salary, emolument, or pension as the court thinks Ijust or rea«onable, for the purpose of distribution amongst the creditors. And section 90 provides that, "where a bankrupt is in the receipt of a salary or income other than as aforesaid, the oourt, upon the application of the trustee, shall from time to time make such order as it thinks just for the payment of such salary or income, or of any part thereof, to the trustee during the bankruptcy, and to the registrar, if necessary, at the close of the bankruptcy, to he applied by him in such manner as the 1 court may direct." In Ex parte Wiclie the debtor was at the commencement of his liquidation in receipt of a purely voluntary allowance of £L'00 a.year, but had no claim, legal or equitable, for it upon the person from whom he received it. The trustee applied to the county court for an order attaching the allowance, hut the judge held that section 90 did not apply. Bacon, C.J., held {29 W. R. 400), that the allowance, so long as it was paid, was an income of which the debtor was in tbe receipt within the meaning of seotion 90, and he ordered the debtor to pay to the trustee one-fourth part of what he Bhoald receive from the donor. The Court of Appeal (james, Brett, and Cotton, L.JJ.), reversed this decision, and restored the order of the county court judge. James, L.J., said that the section did not apply to a purely voluntary allowance ; it could only apply when the bankrupt was in the receipt of something to which he had a legal or equitable right. Cotton, L.J., said that section 90 . followed other sections which applied to salary or income received by a bankrupt in respect of services rendered by him in various ways, salary or income to which he had a claim. Section 90 applied to something of a similar character which was not within the previous sections, and it meant an income of which the bankrupt was in the receipt, not by the bounty of another person, but which he had a right to receive. A merely voluntary payment made to the bankrupt for his maintenance after the bankruptcy wonld clearly not be within section 90, and in bis lordship's opinion it made no difference that the voluntary pay ment was made before the bankruptcy and was continued after'wards.—Solicitors, Wills $ Watte; T. D. Dutlon.

BankruptcyResolution Op Creditors To Accept Composition Under Section 28 or The Bankruptcy Act, 1869—Locus Standi Op Bankrupt To Apply To rREDucE A Creditor's Proof.—In a case of Ex parte Bacon, before the Court of Appeal on the 24th ult., tbe question arose whether, after the creditors of a bankrupt have Tesolved, under section 28 of the Bankruptcy Aot, 1869, to accept a composition, the bankrupt hes a locus standi to apply to the court to reduce tbe amount of the proof of a creditor, the proof having been for a long time without objection on the file of the proceedings in the bankruptcy, though not formally admitted by the trustee. Bacon, C.J., held (29 W. R. 292) that the bankrupt was entitled to have the proof investigated, and this decision was upheld by the Court of Appeal (james, Brett, and Cotton, L.JJ.). It

was argued on behalf of the creditor that the amount of the composition which the creditors had agreed to accept was based upon the amounts of tbe proofs as they existed on the file of proceedings, and that the bankrupt could not afterwards be allowed to have a proof reduced for his own benefit. And, moreover, it was said that the trustee was the only person entitled to object to the proofs of the creditors, and that he ought to have done so within a reasonable time. James, L.JT, said that in an ordinary case of bankruptcy questions as to tbe amounts of the creditor's proofs ought to be 1 left to the trustee. But there was a broad distinction between the present case and an ordinary bankruptcy, in that an arrangement had been made that the bankrupt should pay a composition, and he was intorested in reducing the amounts of the proofs on which he would have to pay. If he did not perform his agreement the court had power to enforce it against him, and, therefore, be had a great interest in seeing how much ought to go to a particular creditor. The trustee in a bankruptcy represented all tbe creditors. It would be a violation of justice to say that the bankrupt had no interest in a question which arose only between him and the particular creditor, and in which the other creditors had no interest. The question whether the composition had been accepted on the footing of the proofs as they stood was one of merits, not of locus standi, and it might possibly be shown that the amount of this particular proof had always been in dispute. The present question was whether the bankrupt was entitled to have the matter investigated, and his lordship thought that he was. He was of opinion also that there was no estoppel by the file of proceedings in the bankruptcy. Brett, L.J., said that the file of proceedings was not in the nature of a record, and that the bankrupt was entitled to go behind it Cotton, L.J., said that under the special circumstances, the question not being as to an estate vested in a trustee in a bankruptcy, but as to the amcunt which the bankrupt was to provide to pay the composition, he had, notwithstanding that he was a bankrupt, a right to have the amounts of the proofs ascertained.—Solicitors, Western & Son; Morley <fc Shirreff.

Married Woman Separate Estate General Engagements— After-Acqci Red PropekttRestraint On Anticipation.—On the 28th ult., the Court of Appeal (james, Brett, and Cotton, L.JJ.), reversed the decision of Malins, V.C., in Pike v. Fitzgibbon (28 W. R. 667, L. R. 14 Ch. D. 837). The question was whether, when a general engagement bas been entered into with a married woman who has separate estate, on the credit of that estate, the creditor with whom the engagement was entered into is entitled to have it enforced against whatever separate estate the married woman has at the time when the judgment is recovered, or only against that separate estate which she had at the time when the engagement was contracted, or so much of it as remains unalienated at the date of the judgment. Malins, V.C., held that the judgment must extend to separate estate acquired after the engagement was contracted, and tbat even a life estate as to which the married woman was restrained from anticipation, but as to which that restraint had become inoperative by the death of the husband before the date of the judgment, must be included. James, L.J., said that as to the property upon which there had been a restraint on anticipation the result of the Vice-Chancellor's judgment was, in plain English, that a person who was restrained from anticipation could anticipate. Whether it was done by a deed or by contracting a debt, or in any other way, the result would be that the married woman would be contracting a debt in anticipation of her future income. The contention was that a married woman who had separate estate had acquired a sort of equitable status or capacity to contract debts, not only in respect of that estate, but in respect of any separate estite, and indeed, if the argument were pushed to its logical conclusion, any estate which she might acquire; that, in fact, she was relieved altogether from tbe incapacity of coverture, and was entitled to contract debts to be paid out of any estate which she might subsequently acquire. His lordship was of opinion that there was no authority for that proposition. It was founded on a misapprehension of Picard v. // (18 W. R. 178, L. R. 5 Ch. 274). The point did not arise there. The inquiry directed in that case was of what the separate property consisted at the date of the judgment, but the object of that inquiry was to prevent any interference with alienations which the married woman might hare made —to ascertain what there remained of that separate estate which she had at the time when she entered into the engagement with the plaintiff. The misapprehension had arisen from not attending to the facts of that case. His lordship desired it to be understood, as the judgment of the Court of Appeal, that in any future case of the kind the proper inquiry would be what separate estate chargeable in equity the married woman had at the date of making the engagement, and what remained of it at the date of the judgment, and that alone was lbound by the engagement. That was really the effect of the decision in Johnson v. Gallagher (9 ~W. R. 506, 3 De G. F. ft J. 494). Brett, L.J., said that he understood the effect of the authorities to be, not that equity had created a status of a married woman to make contracts, hut that it bad recognized or created what was called separate estate, and had attached certain liabilities, not to the married woman, hut to the separate estate. Courts of eqnity bad held that certain promises made, and nets done, by a married woman during coverture, in consequence of the fact that she was possessed of separate estate being known to the person who was dealing with her, would be enforced against the separate estate of which she was possessed at the time when the dealing took place, or so much of it as remained at the time when the judgment was recovered, whether at the time of the judgment the separate estate had or bad not ceased to exist as such by reason of the determination of the coverture. But that did not apply to separate estate which came into existence at the date of the engagement The court was really asked to make new law, bnt the days wore at an end in which any court in this country ought to make new law by judicial decision. And the effect of holding that separate property as to which thf re was a restraint from anticipation would be affected "would be to strike out that restraint. Corroir, L.J., said that a disposition by way of anticipation, which was not to take effect till after the denth of the husband, would be as much an anticipation as a disposition which was to take effect a year after it was made, and it would ke a reductio in aisurdam if the same thing could be done by contracting a_ debt in respect of which the creditor could obtain execution after the death of the husband. The argument was that a married woman who had separate property was treated hy a court of equity as if she was a feme sole. But that was not so. A man could not be restrained from anticipating bis income—a married woman could. She was only treated as a feme sole in respect of property with which she was entitled to deal as a feme sole, and she was not entitled so to deal with property as to which she was restrained from anticipation, though, as between herself and her husband, she has a feme sole in respect of that property too. The nature of the doctrine was explained in the judgment of Lord Justice Turner in Johnson v. Gallagher (3 De G. F. ft J. 509). If separate property acquired after the date of the engagement was to be held liable to satisfy it, his lordship did not see how any property to which the married woman was entitled when discovert, and which was held in trust for her, could be excluded. It was said that an equitable execution ought to apply to everything which a court of equity could reach at the time of the judgment. But the answer was that the only property which a court of equity allowed a married woman to affect by ber engagement was property which she had to her separate use at the time of the engagement, and which she was not restrained from anticipating. As to any other property, there was no contract.—Solicitors, Dujjield $ Bruty ; Beaumont $ Warren; Bray $ Warren.

Atteal — Locus Standi — " Person Aggrieved " — Okm.ii Tor Prosecution For Offences Under Debtors Act, 1869—Debtors Act, 1869, ss. 11, 16—Bankruptcy Act, 1869, s. 71.—In a case of Ex parte Evans, before the Court of Appeal on the 24th ult., the question was raised whether a person against whom a prosecution has been directed by the Court of Bankruptcy, as an accomplice of a bankrupt in the commission of offences under the Debtors Act, 1869, is entitled to appeal from tbo order, or to apply to the court to have it rescinded after he has been acquitted of the alleged offence. On tbe representation of a creditor the judge of a county court directed the creditor to prosecute the bankrupt, the trustee in the bankruptcy, a solicitor, and for alleged offences under the Debtors Act. t by whom the charge was heard in the first

instance, dismissed it as against the trustee and the solicitor. The solicitor then applied to tbe court to expunge from the file of proceedings so much of the order directing the prosecution as related to himself, alleging that he was a "person aggrieved " by tbe order within the meaning of section 71 of the Bankruptcy Act, 1869. The judge of the county court refused the application, and his decision was affirmed by Bacon, C.J. (29 W. R. 200), whose decision was again affirmed by the Court of Appeal (james, Brett, and Cotton,. L.JJ-). It was urged that the case was distinguishable from Ex parte Brown (24 W. R. 750, L. B. 2 Ch. D. 799), in which the Court of Appeal held that a person, against whom a prosecution had been directed by the Court of Bankruptcy as an accomplice of a fraudulent debtor, could not appeal from the order, because, in the present case, the order was ex facie without jurisdiction, inasmuch as it directed a creditor to prosecute, whereas section 16 of the Debtors Act, 1869, enacts that the court shall order the trustee to prosecute. James, L. J., Said that it was settled by Ex parte Brown that a person who was ordered to be prosecuted in this way was not a "person aggrieved " by the order. He might be aggrieved like anyone else by being prosecuted, but the only object of the order of the Court of Bankruptcy was te obtain tbe payment of the costs of the proseoution by the country. Brett, L.J., thought Ex parte Brown was conclusive, and that tbat decision was perfectly right. Cotton, L. J., said it would be most unfortunate for persons against whom such a prosecutioa was directed if they could appeal from the order. If they could appeal at all, they could appeal on the ground that a prima facie case was not shown against them, and, if they did not appeal, when the trial took place, it would be said tbat they had admitted that there was a primd facie case against them. His lordship was of opinion that such a person could neither appeal from the order, nor apply after he had been acquitted to have the order rescinded.—Solicitors, John Evans; Harper, Broad, § Battcock.

PracticeCostsParty And Party CostsTaxation Bt Third PartyUndertaking To Pay—Solicitors Act, 1848 (6 & 7 Vict. C. 73), 8. 38.—In a case of Re Grundy, Kershaw, <fc Co., before the Master of the Rolls on the 25th ult., a motion was made to discharge an order of course for taxation, obtained under section 38 of the Solicitors Act, 1843, under the following circumstances :—A petition was presented for the winding up of a limited company, and before tbe petition came on to be beard, Messrs. Hulton & Lister, the solicitors of the company, wrote a letter to Messrs. Grundy, Kershaw, ft Co., the solicitors of the petitioner, by wbiob, in consideration of their withdrawing the petition, they undertook to pay "all proper oosts and charges incident to, and recoverable under, such petition, such costs, in case of difference, to be taxed." The petition was withdrawn, and Messrs. Grundy, Kershaw, ft Co. sent to Messrs. Hulton ft Lister an account of their coats. These costs could not be agreed between tbe parties, and Messrs. Grundy & Co. were served with an order made on the petition of the company, referring it to tbe taxing master to tax and settle the bill, and that in case a sixth should be taxed off, Messrs. Grundy ft Co. should pay the costs of taxation. Messrs. Grundy & Co. moved to discbarge the order of course, on tbe ground that it was irregular and inapplicable to a taxation as between party and party, on which footing it ought to be taken, and that they ought not, in any event, to be rendered liable to pay tbe costs of taxation. For the company on the motion, it was contended that the case was within the words of the 38th section, and that the company were in the position of third parties giui the taxation, and that the order of course bad been properly made under the section. Reliance was placed upon the case of Be Hartley (30 Beav. 620), as showing that the company were in such position, and that the costs—which were there party and party costs—were properly taxable under ihe section. Jessel, M.R., said that the letter written by the solicitors was clearly a personal nndertaking on their part to pay tbe taxed costs of the petition. There was an excellent reason why such an undertaking should be given, as otherwise the petition would not have been withdrawn. If Messrs. Hulton ft Lister had wanted to tax the petitioner's costs, their course was simple—namely, to tike out a summons under the agreement; bnt the thirdparty section was only applicable to solicitor and client costs, and the mode of procedure under that section was ertirely different to a party and party taxation, as in such case tbe> person requiring the taxation would have to bear the costs of taxation. There Whs, no doubt, a hardship that, however large a bill was on a part; and party taxation, there was no means of makiDg the solicitor pay the costs of taxation; but there was this to be said, that if a solicitor brought in an exorbitant bill the taxing master could report specially the circumstances, and the court would certainly be able to pnnish, in some war, such a proceeding. There was also the objection to the order, that it was not obtained by Messrs. Helton & Lister on the usnal terms of being ordered to pay the amount found due. In his opinion the petition was wrong and the order was wrong, and must be discharged with costs, to be paid by the company. In reference to the case of Jte Hartley, which had been relied upon, he was bound to say the order was right, but the report might well deceive anyone into thinking that the order had been made in reference to party and party costs. According to his ▼iew of the report, and it also appeared inferantially from the argument and the judgment, which treated Vincent v. Venntr (1 M. & K. 212), as a conclusive authority, which decision related to solicitor and client costs, the order to tax really related to solicitor and client costs, and that, of course, made tbe decision perfectly intelligible. As Messrs. Hnlton & Lister desired him to make the proper order, he should now, on their application, make an order to tax Messrs. Grundy's bill as between party and party.—SoliciTor*, Pritehard, Enghficld, <fc Co., for Grundy, Kershaw, <fc Co., Manchester; Milne, Riddle, $ ilellor, for Hnlton % Litter, Manchester.

SOLICITORS' CASES. Court or Appeal. (Sittings at "Westminster, before Bramwell, Baqgallay, and Lush, L.JJ.)

March 25 —In re James Edward Shearman, A Solicitor.

This was an appeal by one W. Edwards from an order of a divisional court, dated July 8, 1880, refusing to strike Mr. ShetrmaD, who is a solicitor, off the rolls.

Edward Pollock, for the solicitor, called their lordships' attention to an old case (3 N. & M. 566), from which it appeared that the eourt would not listen to an application to sirike a solicitor off the rolls unless it were made by a tarriater. The plaintiff was represented by counsel in the Divisional Court, where bis application was dismissed with coa^s, but in this court he was not represented by counsel. This wa« one cf those cases the subject-matter of which was interlocutory, and the appellant, therefore, was out of time.

The appellant, who appeared in person, attempted to ahow that tbe cause of his being out of time was the fault of his solicitor.

Biiamweix, L.J., however, refused to hear him, on the ground that he waa too late, and that the cause of his being too late was immaterial.

Baggallay, L.J., concurred.

Lush, L. J., expressed bis concurrence with the principle of the case cited.

The appellant subsequently endeavoured to renew his application, bat their lordships refuged to listen to him.— Tints.

Id the Hones of Common?, on the 21th nit., in reply to Mr. Mellor, tbe Attorney-General stated that there would be no practical difficulty in the way of placing lists for the oonrta in Banc aa well aa those of appeal and Nisi Prhis on the notice board of Westminster-hall, and also on a notioeboard at the Royal Courts of Justice after the close of each day's sitting, and that arrangement should ba carried iDto effect.

In a case cf Willis v. Willis, before the Divorce Court, on the 24th ult., a petition for restitution of conjugal rights, the President said :—" It is not any pari of the duty of a judge to comment on the law, but I cannot forbear from saying that the law in this matter calls for consideration. I am not aware of any other country in which a judge can force an unwilling wife to return to her husband. I never exercise this jurisdiction without the greatest pain, and, notwithstanding the statement of this gentleman, I have never known a case in which it was not a question of terms."

THE SOLICITORS' REMUNERATION BILL.

The following report on (his Bill has been issued by the Incorporated Law Society of Liverpool :—The Incorporated Law Society of Liverpool, in common with many other legal societies, hag for some yearn past considered the mode of remuneration in respect of conveyancing business very unsatisfactory, and has advocated tho adoption of a scale for such remuneration. The present Bill is fr.imed with a view to meeting the difficulties arising under the system now in> vogue, but in some respects it requires amendment and additions. Tbe Bill does not contain a scale of remuneration, but gives power to the Lard Chancellor, the Lord Chief Justice of England, the Master of the Kolls and the President for the time being of the Incorporated Law Society of the United Kingdom, or any three of them, the Lord Chancellor being one, to regulate by general orders the remuneration of solicitors in conveyancing and other noncontentious business. Before any general order can be made it must be submitted to the Council of the Incorporated Law Society, and their observations and suggestions are to be taken into consideration in making the order. The mode of remuneration may be by scale of commission or percentage, or by a gross sum, or by a fixed sum for each document prepared or perused, without regard to length, and may be regulated with reference to the following considerations :— (1) Tbe position of the client—i.e., whether as vendor or purchaser, mortgagor or mortgagee, and the like. (2)The place and circumstances at or in which the business istransacted and the absence of the solicitor from his usual place of business. (3) The amount of money to which the business relates. (4) The labour and responsibility on the part of the solicitor. (5) Tbe number and importance of the documents prepared or perused. (6) The remuneration in like business at the passing of the Act. The general orders may authorize the taking of security for future costs and the allowance of interest on disbursements. Further, they are to be laid before Parliament, and are not to take effect if an address by either House be presented to tbe Queen seekine a disallowance of them within one month thereafter. The Bill also proposes to give a power to solicitors to make agreements with clients as to their remuneration for their work, which agreements must be in writing, and may or may not include disbursements in the amount of remuneration stipulated for. Theso agreements may be sued upon and set aside in the same manner as agreements not relating to the remuneraiion of solicitors. If, on taxation of costs, any such agreement is objected to by tbe client, tbe taxing master may inquire into the facts and certify to the court, who shall have power to order either a cancellation of the agreement or a reduction of the amount payable thereunder. It will be seen that in some respects tbe Bill is mote favourable to solicitors than the Bill of last year. Tbe introduction of tbe President of the Incorporated Law Society as one of the persons authorized to mak > general orders, and the provision that tbe proposed general orders shall be first submitted to the Council of the Incorporated Law Society, and their suggestions considered before sncb order is made, are concessions to the solicitors. The obnoxious provision that solicitors and their clients should not have power to make any agreement for a larger remuneration than that fixed by the general orders was omitted from the Bill re-introduced in the second session of 1S80, and has not been again inserted. That Bill was, however, in one particular mere favourable to the profession than the present one, inasmuch as, while it provided that an agreement for the remuneration of a solicitor might be set aside on the like grounds as any other agreement, it further stipulated that the remuneration under such contract should not be subject to any taxation, examination, or allowance. The committee are, however, of opinion that no objeotion should be taken to this part of the Bill, as only the less scrupulous practitioners would be likely to induce their clients to enter into arrangements which would be liable to ba Impeached, and tbe section wonld not, therefore, be likely to alfect tbe majority of the profession. On tho whole, therefore, the committee approve of the measure, but recommend that the following points should not be Inst sight of. They see no reason to change their opinion expressed in their report on this subject of last year, that a scale of fees which includes disbursements cannot be applied satisfactorily. It is obvious that at the commeucement of any

conveyancing business the solicitor is usually in the dark as to the amount of the necessary disbursements. An application to the Chancery Division may he requisite, or questions of pedigree may arise, involving heavy payments; or titledeeds may he wrongly stamped, involving payment of further duties and penalties. The committee consider that the principle of charging by scale is inapplicable to settlements, many of the most complicated of which relate to landed property, which it would be inconvenient to value for the purpose of ascertaining a percentage remuneration. Others, too, involving in their preparation considerable care and labour, are mainly concerned with property to be subsequently brought into settlement, and the inability to assess a remuneration by ecile applies to them in a still greater degree. It is submitted that in the case of settlements the remuneration must almost necessarily be fixed by a consideration both of the labour involved and the length of the document. The committee are also of opinion that interest ought to be allowed upon the solicitor's profit charges as welt ns upon his disbursements, commencing after a reasonable time. It is notorious that solicitors have to wait for lona periods of time from causes beyond their control for pawnent of their costs, and it is difficult to see why comp'n'ation, in the form of interest, should not be given to th ni for the loss they thus sustain. The most important obje tion to the Bill, however, is that the scale to be adopted is not set out in it. The committee think that it is essential that the general body of solicitors should know what fees will in future be allowed to them, and have the opportunity of being heard on the matter before the Bill become? law. The committee recommend that a petition be presented to the Houso of Commons praying that the Bill do not pass into Uw in its present form on the following grounds :—

1. No scale which includes disbursements will he satisfactory or just, either to the profession or the public, as it mu>t be impossible to estimate the disbursements at the outset of the business.

2. The principle of charging by scale cannot fairly or properly be applied to cases other than sales, conveyances, mortgages, and leases.

3. Any scale which may be adopted should be set out in the Act.

4. Provision should be made fcr allowance of interest to solicitors on all their charges, and not on disbursements only, in proper cases.

The committee will, probably, consider it necessary to put amendments on the notice paper of the House of Commons embodying the above recommendations in case the Bill should be read a second time. To prevent this ocsurrence the committee suggest that members of Parliament be requested to vote against the Bill in its present form, and that to this end the aid of the other law societies of the kingdom be invited.

March 19, 1881.

The society baa presented the following petition to the House of Commonsj :—

To the Honourable the Commons of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland in Parliament assembled. The hnmble Petition of the Incorporated Law Society of Liverpool nnder the common seal.

Sheweth that a bill, ehortly called the Solicitors' Remuneration Bill, is now proceeding in yonr Honourable House providing for the remuneration of solicitors in conveyancing matters by a soale of commission and peroentage without regard to the length of the document prepared, and having referenoe to the following considerations :—(1) Theposi tion of the client—i.e., whether as vendor or purchaser, mortgagor or mortgagee, and the like. (2) The place and circumstances at or in which the business iB transacted, and the absence of the solicitor from big nsual place of businesp. (3) The amount of money to which the bosiness relates. (4) The labour and responsibility Oi the part of the solioitor. (5) The number and importance of the doouments prepared or perused. (6) The remuneration in like business at the passing of the Act. Yoor petitioners will view the adoption of the principle of charging by commission or percentage with the greatest satisfaction. Your petitioners, however, respectfully submit to your Honourable House that any scale which may he adopted should be set out in the Act. The Bill is silent as to what remuneration will be sanctioned, and your petitioners consider it essential that the general body of solicitors should

know what fees will in future b» allowed to them, and should have the opportunity of being heard on the matter.

For the above and various other reasons of minor importance your petitioners pray that the Bill, in its present form, may not pass into law.

And your petitioners will ever pray, &c.

SOCIETIES.

BARRISTERS' BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION. The eighth annual general meetinz of this society was held on Wednesday afternoon in the Middle Temple Hall. The Lord Chancellor presided, and among those present were the Lord Chief Justice, Lord Justice Brett, Mr. Justice Manisty, Mr. Jucticn Watkin Williams, Mr. Justice Mathew, Mr. Justice Kay, Mr. Baron Pollock, Vice-Chancellor Hall, Sir R. Collier, the Attorney and Solicitor-General, and many members of the bar.

The annual report, which was eubmitto I to the meeting, stated that during the year sixteen new members had joined the association as subscribers or donors. The contributions amounted to £365 15a. 4d. The annual income now amounted to £1,604 lis. Id., of which, during the past year, £312 13'. Id. had been derived from interest on investments. Many applications for relief had been made during the year to the committee, and in twenty cases relief bad been granted, although many applications had been refused solely on account of want of funds. In several instances the committee felt painfully that the sum voted to applicants was wholly insufficient. Several of the grants it was noted were madeto the widows and families of men who had attained a high and honourable position at the bar.

Lord Selbokne, in moving the adoption of the report, said : I have to apologize for the fact that down to the present time I have not entitled myself to any enoh hononr as presiding at this meeting by contributing to its funds. I hope, however, yon will believe that that has not been due to want of sympathy with the work of the association. The fact is, that the sooiety came into existence about the time I left the bar, and during the time I was at the bar I waa accustomed to take part from time to time in other methods of providing for similar wants. With respect to the objects of the association, I need not say that until the time this association was formed, the profession of the bar was the only one of the great learned professions which had not large provision made by public institutions or otherwise for the wants of suoh of its members as might fall into misfortune. If there is any learned profession whioh has peonliar claims upon its members for this kind of assistance the bar may be said to have as strong as any of them. I was thirty.five years in praotice at the bar, and few men had better opportunities of thoroughly knowing and understanding the profession ; and I must say, byway of testimony to that profession, that I cannot call to mind the time at which I was not led to think more and more highly of the qualities which generally distinguish its members, not only of honour and integrity, but of kindliness, generosity, and mutual regard and respect, even in those circumstances of necessary rivalry and different success in fortune which might, in many minds, provoke a very different kind of feeling. If that is so, then the feelings which such mutual bearing and conduct must engender lead naturally to sympathy with those members of the profession who fall into misfortune. All of ns probably must have had only too frequent occasion to observe the effect of those causes which produce unmerited misfortune. In the first place, there are young men full of hope and promise, who come to the bar, and do all that is in their power to distinguish themselves in that walk of life, but who, from year to year, find that the business which they hoped for does not come, and on that account fall into difficulties through no fault of their own. Then there are others who, as time goes on, find other men treading on their heels, and their bosiness growing less and less till at last it leaves them. In tae meantime, they may have contracted those relations to which all of us look forward, in the hope that matters would look brighter, but which nevertheless go backward. Then, again, there is another class of men who are generous, possibly even more than prudence would justify, or who may invest their savings in securities which torn oat the reverse of safe or profitable, and so become embarrassed by debt. There are also men with an acknowledged reputation for learning wbo have seemed to have within their grasp these honours they hoped for, but which have slipped away and left them but ill-rewarded for tbeir talents. I have known such men, who have lived to a great age, and before the close of their lives have not had the means of living except through the kindness and sympathy of their brethren at the bar. We may see, too, men whose bodily or mental health breaks down, or who are cut off, it may be in the prime of life, leaving behind them widows and families, the objects of their dearest affections, who have to struggle on as best they can. Now, there is not one of us to whom such things might not possibly have happened, and no more need be said as to the special call thus made npon the prosperous among the profession. Help ought tobeuiven, not in a careless way, not in a way which may wound the feelings of its recipients, but aft«r careful inquiry, and with much considtration of the feelings of those wbo receive it. From what I have heard and read, I am satisfied that that is the way in which this association acts. Iu fact, 1 think that all the conditions of a thoroughly good association are fulfilled in respect to this society. The need is great •, it is commended to the feelings of the bar by sympathies of the strongest kind, and help is given under the management of men entitled to the thorough confidence of the profession, and who prove their interest in the work by the personal attention they give to it. I heartily wish the association success, and that eaoh year may witness a great addition to its funds.

The report was adopted, and other resolutions were also agTetd to upon the motion of the Lord Chief Justice, Lord Justice Brett, Mr. Justice Manisty, Mr. Justice Kay, the Attorney-General, the Solicitor-General, and others.

LAW UNION FIRE AND LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY.

The annual general meeting was held on the 2ith nit. at •the offices, 126, Chancery-lane, James Cuddon, Esq., the chairman of the board, presiding.

Mr. F. Mcgedt (the actuary and secretary) read the notice convening the meeting and the minutes of the previous meeting. The report and accounts were taken as read.

The Chairman said—Gentlemen, it gives me great pleasore upon meeting you on this occasion to be able to congratulate you on the continued success of our company. It would have been no matter of surprise if the general depression had occasioned some falling off in the average of the new business. The new premiums iu the life department •for the past year were, as the accounts before you show, £10,383, while the average new premiums per year during -the past quinquennium were £8,864. Thus, the commencement of the current quinquennium as to new life business ehows a very handsome increase. There were during the past year fifty-nine claims, averaging, including bonuses, £691. The average amount per policy in force having been £839, the difference in our favour, in the expectation as to amount, has been no inconsiderable advantage. The average amount -of the new life policies issued during the past year was d£980, showing an excess of £141 over the average of policies in force at the end of the last quinquennium. This is a movement in the right direction. During the past year ainety-five policies have lapsed, the total amount insured whereby was £68,608, with yearly premiums thereon of -£1,145. The surrenders were sixty-six in number. The total amount insured by the policies so surrendered was £69,852, with yearly premiums thereon of £1,873. The total amount of new life business proposed during the past year was very large, as jou will observe. It was about £98,000 in excess of the amount actually completed. It is to be regretted that there was a necessity for declining many proposals, and that others went off from causes beyond our control. I may, however, state that in all the cases of declined policies—forty-three in number— the board simply exercised that caution which the circumstances appeared to demand—a caution wh'ch I doubt not you will appreciate. With regard to the fire department, the amount of the new yearly premiums, namely, £8,242, shows a substantial increase upon the average of the new yearly premiums during the past qninquenninm, such average having been £7,728. Although the fire losses were somewhat in excess of those •of the previons year, it must be remembered that the

losses iu such previons year were exceptionally small, and that losses must be looked at with reference to the increasing amount insured year by year. Certainly oor good fortune as to losses from fire has for several years been re markable, the claims having been much less than the computation. We have thus been enabled this year to increase the fire reserve fund to the extent of £6,000, raising that fund up to the amount of one year's net premium income. According to the opinions even of extremely cautious persons a fire reserve fund equal to one year's total premium income is amply sufficient, but this applies more especially to a business such as ours, which is a home business and that generally of a first-class nature. A considerable proportion of that reserve fund is set down in our books to an account called current risks, which now stands at very nearly £22,000; the remaining part of that fund, amounting to about £14,000, is made up of the one-fifth of declared profits yearly set aside under the terms of the deed of settlement, and which is, as you arc aware, in part divisible periodically as thereby provided. Now, as to the dividond proposed to b^ declared. It may be well to advert to tho line of policy we hnve. always —as I think, prudently and judiciously—pursued, of keeping in hand on the profit and loss account a sufficient sum to guard against the occurrence of one or two less prosperous year?, so as to enable us without regird to the diminished profit in any such year to maintain the dividend. After taking out of the fund to the profit and loss account what is required for the dividend now proposed to be paid, the large sum of £21,000 remains—it is probably more than is sufficient for the purpose I have mentioned, but this is indeed, to my mind, a comfortable and satisfactory position. So long as we can command the continuance of a new premium income in both departments combined of £18,000, or anything near it, we shall have every reason to be particularly well satisfied—£18,000 a year new premium income seemB large, but we must not lose eight of lapses and surrenders, and other circumstances by which old premium income is necessarily diminished. Indeed, all that we require to realize the great expectations which many of us have—I think with good reason— formed as to the future of the compmy is your earnest and combined support. In the name of the directors I beg to express our appreciation of the honour you have done us in giving us your confidence and aiding us by your influence, and to assure you that no exertions on our parts shall be wanting steadily to increase the magnitude and prosperity of the company. It really would be a much less arduous task to double the preseut income of £150,008 a year than it has been to create that income.

The Chairman moved the adoption of the report and accounts.

Mr. C. PEMBr.uTox (deputy-chairman).—I have great pleasure iu seconding that resolution, and all I can say is that I hope with the chairman you will favour us with your influence in sending new business to the office. If you will only do that you need have no fear as the continued prosperity of the office.

The resolution was at once cordially adopted.

Mr. John Root.—I have much pleasure in moviu? the following resolution: "That the recommendation of the directors in their report now rea l as to the payment of dividend be adopted, and that a dividend of 3s. per share, free of income tax, be paid to the shareholders on the paid-up capital for the financial year ending the 30th of November, 1881."

Mr. E. Ward seconded the motion, which was at once agreed to.

Mr. JosKrn Dodds, M.P., proposed, and Mr. Thomas G. Mills seconded, there-eleotion of the retiring direotors, and the names were put severally and separately to the meeting, eaoh beiog unauimoualy re-eleoted.

On the motion of Mr. G. U. Robins, seconded by Mr. George Thomas, Mr. Theodore Waterhouse, the shareholders' auditor, was re-elected.

The Chairman proposed the re-eleotion of Mr. James J. Darley, the direotors' auditor.

Mr. Pemijerton seconded the motion, whioh was at onoe carried.

Mr. Harcocrt Master proposed that the sum of fifty guineas be paid to each of the auditors for bis services during the past year.

Mr. W. Newton seconded the motion, whioh was carried unanimously.

The Chairman.—I beg to propose a vote of thanks to our

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