mainly to the Emperor of Russia, is alleged to have incited to the assassination of the Emperor of Germany, the Government are only fulfilling the obligations of international law. Although a State has a right to harbour political refugees, it cannot, consistently with the obligations of friendship with other States, allow them to plot against the person of the Sovereign, or the institutions, of their native country. Crimes of this kind do not call for extradition, but should be punished by the laws of the country to which the refugees have fled (Woolsey, 79). The rule is clearly laid down by Bluntschli (Droit International Codifié, § 396) :—“ The State should protect the refugees against pursuit; but it ought not to afford them a basis of operations for continuing their political offences."

WITH REGARD to the form of the charge against the publisher of the Freiheit―viz., that of publishing a libel on a foreign Sovereign-there appears to be no doubt that libels tending to disturb the amicable relations between this country and other nations, by malicious reflections on those who are possessed of high rank and influence in foreign States, are punishable at common law. Thus, Lord ELLENBOROUGH laid it down in Peltier's case (28 Howell's State Trials, 617), that "any publication which tends to degrade, revile, and defame persons in considerable positions of power and dignity in foreign countries, may be taken to be, and treated as, a libel; and particularly when it has a tendency to interrupt the pacific relations between the two countries." Moreover, a precedent curiously applicable to the present circumstances exists in R. v. Vint (27 Howell's State Trials, 627). In that case JOHN VINT was found guilty upon an information charging him with having published the following libel :—“ The Emperor of Russia is rendering himself obnoxious to his subjects by various acts of tyranny, and ridiculous in the eyes of Europe by his inconsistency; he has lately framed an edict to prohibit the exportation of deals and other naval stores. In consequence of this ill-judged law, a hundred sail of vessels are likely to return to this country without their freight."

THE ILL-DRAFTED BILL to amend the Bills of Sale Act 1878, on which we commented last year, has again made its appearance in the House of Commons. So far as we have observed, none of the errors on which we remarked have been remedied. We do not propose to go over them again, but attention should be drawn to clause 7, which proposes to provide that "from and after the commencement of this Act a solicitor of the Supreme Court attesting a bill of sale shall, before the execution thereof, explain its full meaning and effect to the grantor." This attempt to carry into effect the doctrine laid down by Vice-Chancellor MALINS in Hill v. Kirkwood (24 SOLICITORS' JOURNAL, 304) should be strenuously resisted by the profession. How will it be possible to make sure that the "full meaning and effect" of a bill of sale have been explained so as to satisfy a judge? In Hill v. Kirkwood the Vice-Chancellor said that a solicitor who explained the meaning of a bill of sale "in general terms" did not do his duty. "Did you," he asked," explain that the plaintiffs could not take a sheep or lamb off the farm and sell it at Doncaster Market in the ordinary course of farming business, and that the defendants could, at any moment, enter into possession and self up the plaintiffs ?" So far as we can gather from the Bill, it does not seem to be intended that the bill of sale shall be void if the solicitor fails to explain its "full meaning and effect" to the grantor; but the solicitor would, doubtless, be liable in such a case to be punished under the summary jurisdiction of the court.

By

SINCE THE NIGHT of Sunday next is the time fixed for taking the census of the United Kingdom, we may remind our readers of some of the leading provisions of the Census Act of last year (43 & 44 Vict. c. 37). section 1 the forms and instructions issued by the Registrar-General are to be such as the Local Government Board "shall deem necessary." By section 4, the registrars in England are to "leave or cause to be left at every dwelling-house within their respective subdistricts" schedules "for the purpose of being filled up by or on behalf of the several occupiers of dwelling-houses" with particulars of the name, sex, age, rank, profession, or occupation, condition as to marriage,. relation to head of family, and birthplace of every living person who abode in every house on the night of Sunday the 3rd of April, 1881, and also whether any were blind,. or deaf and dumb, or imbecile, or lunatic." Where a dwelling-house is let or sub-let in different stories or apartments, and occupied distinctly by different persons or families, a schedule is to be filled up by the occupier of each distinct story or apartment. Every occupier is to fill up the schedule "to the best of his or her knowledge or belief so far as relates to all persons dwelling in the house, story, or apartment," and to sign his or her name thereunto. A penalty of not more than £5, nor less than £1 (recoverable before two justices), is imposed upon every occupier "who shall wilfully refuse or without lawful cause neglect to fill up the said schedule to the best of his or her knowledge or belief, or to sign and deliver the same, . or who shall wilfully make, sign, or deliver, or cause to be made, signed, or delivered, any false return of all or any of the matters specified in. the said schedule." Section 5 gives the enumerators extensive powers of revision, for they are to "complete them shall appear to be defective, and correct such as such of the said schedules as upon delivery thereof to they shall find to be erroneous." Section 17 also confers some inquisitorial powers, for the enumerators and other persons employed in the execution of the Act are authorized to ask all questions directed in the instructions of the Local Government Board which are necessary for obtaining the returns required, and every person "refusing to answer or wilfully give a false answer to " any such question, is subjected to a penalty of from £1 to £5.

WE ARE GLAD to observe that Mr. Justice HAWKINS has remitted the fine of £10 which he recently imposed on the plaintiff who, on the learned judge depriving him of his costs, inasmuch as he ought to have brought thing, too"-whether reflecting upon counsel's applicahis action in the county court, remarked, "That's a rum 5th section of the County Courts Act, 1867; upon the tion; upon the policy of the Legislature in passing the conflicting judicial interpretations of that section; or upon the application of the section by the judge, does not appear. There is little doubt that a technical contempt of court had been committed, but it seems clear that no disrespect to the court was intended, and that the remark was only that of a man who had been so carried away by his interest in the case as to express his thoughts aloud. It may be observed that the lesser and less usual punishment for contempt, by fine only, is not so easily exacted from the offender as the greater and ment, which frequently takes the form of imprisonment more usual punishment by fine coupled with imprisononly until the fine is paid. In this latter case the officer by apology or payment of the fine, or both, "purges of the court may immediately arrest the offender, who, his contempt. Where a fine only is inflicted, we presume that it becomes a debt to the Crown, recoverable by the tedious process of "English Information" under the Crown Suits Act, 1865.

A CORRESPONDENT sends us the following advertisement which appeared in a recent issue of a daily paper,

LIBEL.

per

AS WE POINTED OUT when the question was first raised, and for the reasons which we pointed out, the Court of Appeal has affirmed the judgment of Mr. Justice MATHEW to the effect that Mr. BRADLAUGH was not entitled to affirm under the Parliamentary Oaths Act. Shortly put, the ratio decidendi is that Mr. BRADLAUGH is not 66 another son" ejusdem generis with a Quaker, Separatist, Moravian, or like persons who from time to time have been allowed to substitute an affirmation for an oath, not on the ground of having no religious belief at all, but having a religious belief very actively developed. Mr. BRADLAUGH appeals to the House of Lords, but it can hardly be expected that on the main point-upon which every argument was urged the House will reverse the decision of the Court of Appeal. Upon the technical question, howeverscarcely raised before Mr. Justice MATHEW-whether a common informer or only the Crown can sue for the penalty, there is a little room for doubt; and, indeed, Lord Justice BRAMWELL expressed some hesitation upon it. The words of the Parliamentary Oaths Act are to the effect that the member not properly affirming "shall for every such offence be subject to a penalty of five hundred pounds, to be recovered by action in one of her Majesty's superior courts of Westminster." It appears to be undoubted law that, where a penalty is not expressly or impliedly given to a subject, only the Crown can sue for it (see Com. Dig. tit. Forfeiture C). But it is also said that such a penalty must be sued for in the Exchequer (R. v. Malland, Str. 828); and inasmuch as the statute gives three courts wherein to sue, and as the Crown usually proceeds by information, not action, the court held that the words "by any person who shall sue for the same" are to be read into the statute, and that the right of the subject to the penalty is impliedly given. It is with much diffidence that we throw a doubt upon reasoning which has convinced so strong a Court of Appeal; but it may be worth while to point out that there has been a slight departure from the rule that a penal statute is to be construed strictly in favour of defendants, not of plaintiffs, and to suggest that the words "by a party grieved" might be read into the statute after the word "recoverable," with perhaps a little less violence than the words "by any person who shall sue for the same." It is in conformity with the practice under the Parliamentary Elections Act, 1868, and we think also, with general principles of law, that the legal interest in procuring a member to be unseated is not vested in all the world, but in his constituents, or in his opponents at a particular election.

The Newcastle-upon-Tyne Incorporated Law Society have petitioned the House of Commons in favour of the Solicitors' Remuneration Bill.

It seems to us a very doubtful question, to judge from recent experience, whether, in all cases of libel, it should be open to the party libelled to proceed by way of criminal prosecution. The theory of the law on the subject is that a libel is a criminal offence, not on account of the wrong done to the individual's reputation, but because of its tendency to lead to a breach of the peace. Accordingly, as the law originally stood, in criminal prosecutions the truth of the libel was no defence. The severity of the ancient law in this respect has been modified by the statutory provision which enables the defendant to plead that the libel was true, and that it was for the public good that it should be published. It appears to us that the ancient theory which made the criminality of a libel depend on its tendency to produce a breach of the peace cannot, in its integrity, be supported as a reasonable theory of the law. If this be the theory of the thing, the fact that the publication of the libel was for the public good is immaterial. That fact does not at all diminish or affect the tendency of the libel to lead to a breach of the peace. Again, what would otherwise be libellous may not be so, on the ground that it is a fair comment or criticism on a matter of public interest; but the irritable author, whose production has been condemned, is none the more likely on that account to abstain from horsewhipping the editor or the critic, if he would otherwise be disposed so to do. It seems to us that the protection of the public from attacks upon the reputation is the real ground of the criminality of libel. It is an analogous case to that of an assault, which may be the foundation of an action or of an indictment at the election of the party assaulted. The attack on the person and on the reputation are similar in this respect. In an action the object is mainly to compensate the individual; in the case of an indictment the object is the protection of the public from similar attacks. There can be no doubt that it is essential to the protection of the public that libel should be a crime. Private malice and the appetite for scandal, which makes defamation a profitable pursuit, would otherwise, in many cases, be subject to no counteracting influence. An action can only be effectual where the party sued is a substantial person. The ostensible conductors of scurrilous newspapers are frequently men of straw. Again, if pecuniary damages were the only remedy, a man of wealth might be willing to buy, however dearly, the gratification of defaming his enemy. It is, therefore, inevitable that libel should be ranked among crimes.

But very often it must occur to any impartial person that cases which form the subject of a prosecution for libel would much more appropriately have formed the subject of a civil action. We do not wish to be regarded as speaking with respect to any particular case, but generally. We cannot help thinking that it is desirable in the interests of the public that there should be some limitation upon the power of a person who has been libelled to proceed by way of public prosecution. There are cases in which the libel is so malicious and outrageous; the conduct of the libeller shows such an obvious defiance of law, and contempt for the rights of the individual, that in the interests of the public the libel is obviously a proper subject of criminal prosecution, or no one's repution would be safe; on the other hand, there are cases in which the libel is so much more excusable, or even almost justifiable, that it would be obviously inappropriate to place it within the category of crimes; for instance, a man in the course of some private difference may have made unguarded statements which he cannot prove in correspondence with some third party, under circumstances which do not amount to privilege, but which palliate and almost justify his conduct in a court of conscience if not of law; a man as a public critic may have been misled into making comments, the severity of

which he cannot altogether justify; or again, the conduct of the party libelled may have been so provocative of the libel that it is obvious that he has no locus standi to appear in the name of her Majesty as the vindicator of the public against defamation. Then, of course, as is the case with other similar matters, there are cases nearer the line, in which it is more difficult to discriminate and to say whether the particular libel ranges itself under the head of crime or mere civil injury. But we cannot help thinking that the province of discriminating ought not to be left entirely to private and personal judgment.

The need of some judicial mode of discrimination has been intensified by the course of recent decisions. In the case of The Queen v. Carden (28 W. R. 133, L. R. 5 Q. B. D. 1), it was held that the province of a magistrate upon a preliminary inquiry upon an information for publishing a libel was merely to ascertain whether there were prima facie grounds for believing that a libel had been published, and that he could not receive evidence of the truth of the libel under Lord Campbell's Act. We do not find fault with this decision, though it appeared to us that the point was a very doubtful one. We do not think a magistrate ought to be compelled to sit and have the question of the truth of the libel tried out before him when he is quite clear that the matter ought to go before another tribunal. But it does seem to us that the effect of the decision is to leave the application of the criminal law for the purposes of private vengeance still more unfettered than it was before.

We feel that there is considerable difficulty in devising a remedy, but we do think that it would be well if some preliminary authorization were necessary to a prosecution for libel, and that it should be open to the tribunal, charged with the duty of granting or withholding such authorization, to decide whether a prima facie case was made out for the application of the criminal law, having regard to the general aspect of the

case.

In the case of criminal informations for libel, a rule for the criminal information has to be obtained, against which the proposed defendant can show cause. This might or might not be thought a suitable safeguard in the case of ordinary indictments for libel. We do not pledge ourselves to the recommendation of any particular mode of effecting the desired object. Possibly it would be desirable to give the magistrate a general jurisdiction to consider the point whether, even assuming that there had been a libel, on the whole, the case was a fit subject for indictment. Some machinery of this nature, however, we really think there ought to be.

TRUST SECURITIES PAYABLE TO BEARER.

MOST foreign and colonial Government securities are made payable to bearer, and cannot be inscribed in any books or registers in the names of the holders. The comparatively high rate of interest which may be obtained on many of these investments leads to applications to trustees by their cestuis que trust to invest the trust funds upon them, and the question not unfrequently arises whether trustees are justified in complying with these requests. The answer to the question is, in many cases, not free from difficulty.

Before, however, we consider the question of investments made by trustees in bonds payable to bearer and passing by delivery, it may be well to clear the ground by dealing, first, with the question of whether trustees are justified in retaining such investments made by the testator or creator of the trust. They can, of course, only do so by virtue of an authority contained in the will or trust deed. Of course, where a testator expressly directs certain specified securities payable to bearer to be retained by his trustees, they will be justified in retaining

them. Thus, in Mendes v. Guedalla (2 J. & H. 259), a testator directed that, unless his trustees should see any very pressing reason to the contrary, so much of the testator's personal estate as should consist of Spanish bonds should be retained by his trustees for the time being, and should not be sold or converted under the general direction therein before contained in that behalf, until £50 at the least could be obtained for each bond of £100. The Spanish bonds belonging to the testator were payable to bearer and passed by delivery. It was assumed by the court that the trustees were justified in retaining the bonds. So also where the testator, although not specifying the particular bonds, clearly shows an intention that all his Government bonds shall be retained, the court will hold that the direction includes bonds payable to bearer and passing by delivery. Thus in Arnould v. Grinstead (Weekly Notes, 1872, 216), a testator directed that all his personal property "invested in Government or other securities, in bonds or shares, of whatever nature or kind, be held in the same or the like investments." The personal property of the testator was invested in securities most of which were payable to bearer, and it was contended, for persons interested in remainder, that these investments were unauthorized and unsafe. Vice-Chancellor Bacon, however, said that the securities on which the trust fund were invested could not be altered without violating the plain and positive directions of the will, and accordingly held that the investments were proper investments. We are not aware of any other reported case on this subject, but in an unreported case of Re the Trusts of Lord Broughton's Will, heard before ViceChancellor Hall, on 25th of July, 1879,* trustees were authorized to retain these investments upon much less plain and positive directions. The testator authorized his trustees to appropriate and set apart towards payment of a certain trust legacy bequeathed by his will" any mortgages or other securities" of which he might be possessed at the time of his death. The trustees having set apart, among other investments, some Canada bonds payable to bearer held by the testator, Vice-Chancellor Hall held that the trustees were justified in retaining these bonds. On the other hand, in another unreported case of Re Skinner, before the Master of the Rolls on the 14th of June, 1879,† the question arose with reference to the usual direction as to investment in a marriage settlement of personalty, that the trustees "should be possessed of the said stocks so transferred as aforesaid upon trust that they should either permit the whole or any part of the same to remain in their then respective actual state of investment," or with the consent in writing of the husband and wife, or the survivor, and after the decease of the survivor, at the discretion of the trustees, should sell the same. Some of the settled funds were invested in Turkish, English, and Austrian bonds, payable to bearer, and upon a petition by the trustees for the advice of the court as to whether they were justified in retaining these investments, the Master of the Rolls answered the question in the negative. The trustees, he said, would not be justified in retaining the investments already made in bonds payable to bearer, and transferable by delivery. Probably in this state of the authorities, the only safe advice that can be given to trustees is that, in order to justify trustees in retaining investments of this description made by the testator or creator of the trust, there must be some reference in the will or trust deed, either to the particular investments to be retained, or to the general class of investments of which they form part.

With regard to the power of trustees to invest in these securities, there has also been some conflict of opinion. In Lewis v. Nobbs (L. R. 8 Ch. D. 591), a testator gave the residue of his estate to trustees on trust to invest in Parliamentary stocks or funds, or upon real securities,

*Solicitors, Messrs. Phelps & Woodforde, + Solicitors, Messrs. Johnsons & Co.

The

and the will contained a proviso that as often as the trustees should think it expedient so to do, they might sell out, transfer, and otherwise vary any of the trust moneys, funds, and securities, and invest the same in or on any other funds or securities whatsoever. trustees sold out New Three per Cents., and invested the proceeds in Russian railway and Egyptian bonds. The Russian bonds were transferable by delivery. Vice-Chancellor Hall held that the trustees were authorized to invest the trust funds in the bonds. And in the above-mentioned case of Re the Trusts of Lord Broughton's Will, Vice-Chancellor Hall held that under a direction to invest the testator's residuary personal estate "in their or his names or name," in or upon (inter alia) "the loans, notes, debentures, stocks, or other securities of any British colony, or foreign Government or State," the trustees might properly invest trust moneys on bonds payable to bearer and transferable by delivery. On the other hand, in the above-mentioned case of Re Skinner, under a trust to invest in the "public funds of . . any colony or dependency of Great Britain, or in the public funds of any foreign Government," the Master of the Rolls held that the trustees would not be justified in making any investment in foreign Government bonds payable to bearer.

As to the duties of trustees where the trust funds comprise securities payable to bearer and passing by delivery, and the interest upon which is payable by coupons attached to the bonds, the judgment of ViceChancellor Wood in the above-mentioned case of Mendes ▾. Guedalla contains a clear statement of the doctrine of the court. The three trustees in that case deposited a box containing the bonds payable to bearer with their bankers in trust for all three trustees, and the learned judge said (p. 277), "I do not see what better course the trustees could have adopted for the protection of the property. . . . With regard to property of that description (whether it be a plate chest, or whatever it may be), I know of no better course to take for protecting it than to deposit it at your bankers. It must be deposited somewhere. It cannot be in three houses at once. The only other course which suggested itself to me was to deposit it in a box with three locks, opened by three different keys, one to be kept by each of the three trustees; so that the box could not be opened without the permission of all the trustees. But where the interest of property is payable upon coupons, and twice a year, and the box must be opened twice a year for the purpose of obtaining access to the coupons, it is too much to say that a man of ordinary prudence in the management of his affairs would think it necessary, for the protection of his property, to adopt a course of that kind-knowing, as he would, that it would be the banker's duty to see that the coupons only were taken out of the box on each occasion, and that neither the box itself nor the securities were removed." It also appears from this case that there will be no irregularity in one of the trustees being intrusted with the key; for someone must be so intrusted in order to get access half-yearly to the coupons, and there is no person to whom it can be intrusted for that purpose with greater propriety than one of the trustees.

On the 25th ult., Mr. Justice Fry, upon taking his seat, alluded to the order recently made by the Lord Chancellor referring to the resignation of Sir Richard Malins, and trans. ferring all causes and matters pending before him to his court (which we printed last week), and said he wished to have the assistance of the leaders of the bar in arranging the course of business in the court. After some discussion, his lordship decided upon taking motions, adjourned summonses, and non-witness causes on Thursdays; and short causes, petitions, adjourned summonses, and non-witness causes on Fridays and Saturdays. This would leave the first three days of the week for the regular cause list. quently his lordship stated for the information of the bar that after Easter he would move into the court recently occupied by Vice-Chancellor Malins.

Subse

REVIEWS.

MUNICIPAL CORPORATION ACTS. RAWLINSON'S MUNICIPAL CORPORATION ACTS. EDITION.

SEVENTH

By THOMAS GEARY, Esq., Barrister-at-Law. W. Maxwell & Son.

The sixth edition of this work was published in 1874. The statutes affecting municipal corporations which have been passed since that date are so numerous (Mr. Geary prints seventeen) and important, that we are not surprised to learn that the present edition has long been required. The Local Loans Act, 1875, the Municipal Elections Act, 1875, the New Charters Act, 1877, the Parliamentary and Municipal Registration Act, 1878any of these four might have been thought to necessitate a new edition of itself. A very sensible reason, however, for the delay is given in the preface. It appears that the late Government brought in "a Bill for the consolidation of all the municipal corporation statutes, but took no steps whatever with regard to this Bill beyond bringing it in each session, and it seems now to be quietly dropped."

Passing to the mode in which the new statutes have dealt with, we cannot but think a better mode of arrangement would have been to print the Municipal Acts proper by themselves, and the supplementary Acts in the appendix, with which the book has always concluded. The Prison Act, 1877, the Justices' Clerks Act, 1877, and the Adulteration Act, 1879, come rather awkwardly in the principal part of the book. In connection with the New Charters Act, 1877, we should have looked for a little practical information as to the mode of procuring a charter, and a list of municipal boroughs incorporated since 1835 might surely have been given. We think that the schedule to the Municipal Elections Act, 1875, ought to have been provided with editorial marginal notes, and that both the 313th section of the Public Health Act, 1875, and the rules for meetings of ratepayers, contained in the third schedule of the Public Health Act, and substituted by section 313 for sections 12 and 13 of the Local Government Act, ought to have been printed at length in the note to 35 & 36 Vict. c. 91, s. 4, which incorporates the sections of the Local Government Act above named.

With regard to the cases, we have searched for many, and missed none, and the notes are always clearly and neatly expressed. The condensation which the editor speaks of in the preface might have been applied with greater vigour to the notes in the earlier part of the book, which are still sadly redundant, and occasionally (see, for instance, the note to 32 & 33 Vict. c. 55, s. 1) so choke the section annotated as to spread it over eight pages, and render it no easy matter to read. Similarly, the statutes might have been more abridged. The "Parliamentary "clauses of the Act of 1878 are, perhaps, properly printed, but a very slight extract from the Promissory Oaths Act, 1868, would have sufficed. The index is a remarkably good one, and the book, though rather clumsy in shape, is very well printed.

On Tuesday evening the members of the Midland and North-Eastern Circuits entertained Mr. Justice Cave at dinner in the Inner Temple-hall, in order to celebrate the learned judge's recent elevation to the bench. The chair was occupied by Mr. Alfred Wills, Q.C., and there was a large attendance of leaders and juniors of the circuits.

The following are the circuits chosen by the judges for the ensuing Spring Assizes:-Midland Circuit, Mr. Justice Lopes; Western Circuit, Mr. Justice Manisty; SouthEastern Circuit, Mr. Justice Hawkins; North-Eastern Circuit, Mr. Justice Stephen; Northern Circuit, Mr. Justice Watkin Williams and Mr. Justice Mathew; and North and South Wales Circuits, Mr. Justice Cave.

CORRESPONDENCE.

THE INCORPORATED LAW SOCIETY AND THE "LAW LIST."

[To the Editor of the Solicitors' Journal.] Sir,-Will you be so good as to insert in your columns the enclosed letter, which I have, by direction of the Council of the Incorporated Law Society, sent to Mr. John Nicholls in answer to his letter which appeared in your issue of the 26th inst., with reference to the omission from the Law List of the asterisk formerly affixed to the name of every solicitor who was a member of this society. March 30. E. W. WILLIAMSON, Secretary.

[The following is the letter referred to :

(Copy.)

Incorporated Law Society, Chancery-lane,
March 30, 1881.

Dear Sir, I am directed by the council to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 23rd inst.

The council desire me to state that, as far as the public is concerned, it has already by means of the issue of the Law List, a list of practising solicitors to refer to, but the official authority given to that work does not extend to any mark that may be affixed to the name of a solicitor who happens to be a member of this society.

In the instance given in your letter of an inaccuracy in the local list, you do not furnish me with such information as will enable me to discover how it arose, if it exists.

If, however, I am correct in assuming that it refers to the case of a member who practises at Merthyr Tydfil, I may mention that the information given by that gentleman is now before me, in which no reference is made to an address at Aberdare. After the proof was struck off a slip was sent to him, and returned marked "perfectly correct." The local list was framed from particulars supplied by the members themselves, after a special application made to each of them.

That there may be an error here and there is not improbable on the first publication of a work of this character; but, subject to this, it may be fairly stated that an accurate list of the members of this society is given in the calendar.

The fact of previous Law Lists having contained very numerous inaccuracies has been so far established

as to enable the council to state that the previous system did not work satisfactorily.

In 1880 the complaints were very numerous as to the errors and omissions in the issue of that year.-I am, dear Sir, yours faithfully,

E. W. WILLIAMSON, Secretary. J. Nicholls, Esq., 73, Gresham-street, E.C.]

having kindred objects would probably reduce the expenses to a sum less disproportionate to the income. March 29. A SOLICITOR.

[It is right to point out that our correspondent appears to have looked only at the half-yearly balance sheet for the latter part of the year, which includes the annual dinner and the heavy cost of printing the rules and report, and sending a copy to every member of the profession. If he will refer to the balance-sheet for the previous half-year-i.e., to February 28, 1880, he will find that the expenses are only £204 19s. 6d.-Ed. S.J.]

CASES OF THE WEEK.

CONTEMPT OF COURT-MOTION TO COMMIT PUBLISHER OF NEWSPAPER-ADVERTISEMENT-REWARD OFFERED FOR EVIDENCE-COSTS.-In a case of The Plating Company v Farquharson, before the Court of Appeal on the 23rd ult., an application was made for the committal of the publishers of a newspaper for an alleged contempt of court in inserting in the newspaper an advertisement tending to prejudice the plaintiffs in the prosecution of the action, and of an appeal which had been brought by the defendants from the judgment of Bacon, V.C., at the trial. The action was brought to restrain the infringement by the defendants of the plaintiff's patent. The defendants denied the validity of the patent, and in particular they disputed the novelty of the invention. At the trial of the action Bacon, V.C., overruled the objections, and granted the plaintiffs an injunction. The defendants gave notice of appeal, and, after the notice had been given, an advertisement appeared in the newspaper in question offering a reward of £100 to anyone who could produce documentary evidence that the process to which the patent related had been performed before the year 1869. The plaintiffs alleged that the publication of this advertisement was a contempt of court, and applied to the Court of Appeal for an order to commit the publishers. It was urged that the advertisement would tend to induce the forging of documents, and reliance was placed on the case of Pool v. Sacheverel (1 P. W. 675), in which Lord Chancellor Macclesfield committed for contempt a person who had inserted in a newspaper an advertisement offering a reward to any person who should discover and legally prove that a marriage, the validity of which was in question in the suit, was invalid. The Lord Chancellor was of opinion that the advertisement was a direct inducement to subornation of perjury. The court (JESSEL, M.R., and JAMES and COTTON, L.JJ.) refused the application. JESSEL, M.R., said that the advertisement had been inserted by the publishers in the ordinary course of business, and it was clear that they had

no intention of interfering with the administration of justice. In order to justify an order for committal, it must be shown that the advertisement, on the face of it, would convey to the mind of a person of ordinary intelligence that it would tend to interfere with the administration of justice. In his lordship's opinion the advertisement was a very harmless one. £100 was not a very large sum, and documentary evidence was not easily forged. The notion that the advertisement wonld induce the forgery of documents was a wild one, and was not founded on any reasonable construction of it. It was a common practice to offer rewards for the discovery of a lost deed or a lost marriage certificate, and his lordship had never heard it suggested that this was illegal. He did not profess to understand the case of Pool v. Sacheverel, as it was reported. Of course, an attempt to suborn witnesses would be contempt of court, but on the facts, as they appeared in the report, his lordship should not have come to the same conclusion as Lord Macclesfield did. But that case had no application to the present case, for an advertisement for evidence of something which was not in the knowledge of the advertiser, but which he believed to be true, could not be treated as a subornation of perjury. But his lordship said that, if neces-sary, he should feel at liberty to disregard Pool v. Sacheverel, against editors or publishers of newspapers ought to be disHe added that the practice of making motions of this kind couraged; they caused great loss of time and great expense. JAMES, L.J., said that Pool v. Sacheverel appeared to him to be inconsistent with the practice of the Government to