Ward, John, Dawley, Salop, Chartermaster. March 31 at 3 at offices of Young, Market st, Wellington. Phillips and Co, Shifnal Wear, John Bolton, Bradford, York, Painter. March 25 at 3 at offices of Greaves and Taylor, Cheapside, Bradford

Welch, Henry, Nantwich, Chester, Coach Builder. March 29 at 2 at offices of Lisle, Nantwich

White, John, Everton, Loncaster, Estate Agent. March 28 at 2 at offices of Forshaw and Hawkins, Harrington st, Liverpool Whitethread, John, East Keal, Lincoln, Blacksmith. March 28 at 3 at offices of Hammond, Spilsby

Wright, William, Rothwell, York, Wheelwright. March 28 at 3 at offices of Tennant and Barret, Albion st, Leeds

Yates, James, Eaton, nr Congleton, Farmer. March 28 at 11 at offices of Cooper, Park st, Congleton

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Valuations for Probate and Transfer. Surveys.

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Estate and Auction Offices, 8, Pall Mall East, S.W. AW.-METROPOLITAN BOARD of WORKS.The services of a thoroughly experienced Solicitor are required for the assistance of the chief Legal Officer of the Metropolitan Board of Works.

The applicant must be qualified to conduct without supervision the general practice of a Solicitor, and especially heavy business in the Chancery and Common Law Divisions of the High Court of Justice, and he must have been practically engaged in such business in London for the last six years. It would be a further qualification if the candidate has some experience as a Solicitor in the conduct of Private Bill business in the Committee Rooms of the Houses of Parliament. The candidate should be not less than 28 and not more than 42 years of age. Salary not exceeding £600 per annum. Letters, stating age, experience, and qualifications, to be addressed to the undersigned on or before the 31st day of March instant. J. E. WAKEFIELD, Clerk of the Board. Metropolitan Board of Works, Spring-gardens, Charing-cross, S. W., March 17, 1881. AW.-Wanted, Partnership or Managing Clerk

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MR. JUSTICE FRY having succeeded to the whole of the causes and matters marked for Vice-Chancellor MALINS, in addition to those previously transferred to him, for hearing only, from other judges of the Chancery Division, some difficulty is understood to have arisen in arranging the business so as to reconcile the interests of the leaders hitherto attached to the courts of the ViceChancellor and the Justice. It is anticipated that the difficulty will be solved by the issue of a new order, when Mr. Justice FRY's successor has been appointed, transferring all causes and matters previously transferred to Mr. Justice FRY for hearing only, and not already heard, to his successor.

IT IS IN CONTEMPLATION to place either in the Royal Courts of Justice or in some other appropriate building, a memorial to the late Sir WILLIAM ERLE, for many years Lord Chief Justice of the Common Pleas. The movement, we believe, had its origin in the desire of personal friends of the late judge to testify their regard for his memory; but it was found that very many members of the legal profession desired to take part in this expression of esteem for one of the noblest characters that ever lent dignity to the administration of justice. A committee, composed of the Lord Chancellor, several late and present occupants of the bench, and some distinguished members of the bar, was accordingly formed to receive and apply subscriptions. The form of the memorial will depend on the sum which may be subscribed, but we believe that the present intention is to provide a marble bust of the late Chief Justice.

THE HISTORY Of recent attempts at bankruptcy legis lation is somewhat monotonous. Early in the session a big drum is beaten, and the commercial world wake up to hear the announcement that the bankruptcy stable is now going to be thoroughly cleansed. The Bill is introdnced; there is a little excitement among the Chambers of Commerce; perhaps a few

"

deputations wait upon the Minister in charge of the Bill, and then every one goes to sleep again till near the end of the session, when the "state of public business inevitably calls for the sacrifice of the measure. If any one doubts the truth of this description, let him look at the volumes of HANSARD for the last five years. Since Lord CAIRNS introduced his Bankruptcy Bill in the House of Lords in 1876 (which expired before it reached the stage of Committee) we have had a Government Bankruptcy Bill each year. In 1877 the Bill was introduced in the Lords; in 1878 it was introduced in the Commons, and in 1879 again in the Lords; but notwithstanding that in the course of the session everything was thrown overboard which could be dispensed with, and the Bill was reduced to a mere amendment of the existing Act, it failed to pass into law. In 1880 the Bill was cast on the troubled waters of the House of Commons; it struck on the rocks of a Select Committee, and sank with the Parliament. In the short session which followed the dissolution, the Government, as the Attorney-General said, "had not had sufficient time to bring in a Bill on this subject." The customary announcement, however, was made at the commencement of the present session, and the public were informed that a new department had taken charge of the Bankruptcy Bill. Here we are, however, nearly at Easter, with an Irish Land Bill hovering before us, and there is no indication as yet of the appearance of Mr. CHAMBERLAIN's measure.

THE PRESENT AGITATION for the election of ladies as

able divergence of opinion upon several of the points.. The ceremony was not quite so imposing as might have been wished. Mr. Justice FRY's plain black gown looked rather sombre beside his colleagues from the Queen's Bench Division, who appear to have followed the "solemn decree and rule" dated the 4th of June, 1635, which provided (inter alia) that “when the judges go to the council-table, or to any assembly of the Lords in the afternoon in term time, they ought to go in their robes of violet or black, faced with taffeta, and with tippets and scarlet hoods pinned near the left shoulder." Lord COLERIDGE, who temporarily occupied the Lord Chancellor's place on the woolsack, attended as a peer, and not as a judge, and therefore appeared in the frock-coat of domestic life.

THE SECOND CLAUSE of Mr. DAVEY's Leases Bill provides that "where there is a proviso for re-entry or other stipulation by way of forfeiture for breach of any covenant or engagement that any assignment or underlease shall be prepared or made by or under the direction of the lessor's solicitor, or any particular solicitor or person, no effect shall be allowed or given to the proviso or stipulation. Provided that, in case of an assignment, notice in writing is given to the lessor within three months after the making of the assignment, specifying the name, residence, and occupation of the assignee, and the date of the assignment." The necessity for some such provision as this to put an end to the charges levied on the public for the benefit of clerks of city com

DODSON upon that subject, have drawn attention to the question as to what public offices may be filled by women. As regards the office of guardians of unions, there appears to be no express provision to exclude them, since the 4 & 5 Will. 4, c. 76, s. 38, simply provides that the guardians shall all be elected by the ratepayers, and that the Poor Law Commissioners shall fix a qualification, without which no 66 person shall be eligible, while by section 109, " person includes "any body politic, corporate, or collegiate, aggregate or sole, as well as any individual.” In Rex v. Stubbs (2 T. R.) the Court of King's Bench held that a woman could be appointed an overseer of the poor if she was a "substantial householder" within the 43 Eliz. c. 2. Again, Olive v. Ingram (2 Strange, 1114) decided that a woman is capable of holding the office of sexton, "there having been many cases where offices of greater consequence have been held by women, and there being many women sextons now in London." Among instances of these "offices of greater consequence" it appears that Lady PACKINGTON was returning officer for the borough of Aylesbury, while the Countess of PEMBROKE, as hereditary Sheriff of Westmoreland, sat on the bench beside the judges of assize. Again, in an Anonymous case (2 Lord Raym. 1014), the Court of Queen's Bench held that the appointment of a woman as governor of Chelmsford Gaol was good; and it is stated in "Callis on Sewers" (4th ed.), 253, that women are eligible to serve as Commissioners of Sewers.

A DREARY STAGE of the lengthened litigation in Commissioners of Works and Public Buildings v. Angus was reached on Thursday last week, when six out of the seven learned judges who had heard the re-argu. ment of the case attended for the purpose of delivering their answers to the five questions propounded to them. Unfortunately, the case was not fixed till two p.m., and the opinions were so long that those read last had to be delivered with extreme rapidity in order to prevent the meeting of the House for ordinary business from being delayed. Some of the learned judges were scarcely audible, and it is impossible to give the result of their deliberations until their opinions Lave been printed, but there was 8 consider

necessary) from some facts furnished by a correspondent as having lately come under his notice. "In one case," he says, "the lease contained the usual covenant that all

were

to do SO

on re

assignments and underleases should be prepared by the these persons were applied to to waive their right to Upon an underlease taking place persons specified. prepare the underlease, and as the circumstances special they consented ceiving £8 8s. for looking through the draft underlease-a fine on the lessee from which, of course, the lessors derived no benefit. Another case was that of a lease by one of the city companies, which provided "that all deeds and other writings and agreements, to be made at any time during the term thereby granted, for or concerning the underletting, settling, mortgaging, assigning, or disposing of the said demised premises, or any part thereof, by the lessee, his executors, administrators, and assigns, or their, or any of their, estate, interest, or term of years therein, should either be made, drawn, or written by the clerk of the said -for the time being at the expense of the parties requiring the same, or if any such settlement, mortgage, lease, or assignment of the said premises, or any part thereof, should be made by any other person than such clerk for the time being, then, and in such case, the lessee, his executors, administrators, and assigns should, from time to time, as the case should require.

forfeit for the use of such clerk the full sum of £5 5s. of lawful British money." The lease further required in this latter event a full abstract of any of the beforementioned documents to be left with the clerk within ten days of their execution; and, in order that the architect should share in the profit, it provided that unless the company's architect was employed, he should be entitled to a sum of several hundreds of pounds. Your readers will notice that in this latter case the pretence that the company will derive any benefit from the covenant is dropped, and it is frankly stated that the penalty is to be for the use of the clerk. In the third and last instance I shall mention a lease granted by a city company contained a covenant worthy of the great Pecksniff himself in its disinterested tone. It ran as follows:-' And to the intent that the said--might from time to time better know the tenants or occupiers of the premises thereby

demised, that all and every underlease, or underleases, assignment, or assignments, mortgage, or other transfer of the said premises, or any part thereof (except only by will), should be made or prepared and engrossed by the clerk of the said company for the time being, or by his procurement, at the reasonable cost and expense of the lessee, his executors, administrators, and assigns.'

THE DECISION in the case of Guebert v. Moir, of which a note will be found in another column, will be received with some relief by solicitors. Vice-Chancellor MALINS had held that a managing clerk had a general authority to give a personal undertaking by his principal to pay a sum of money as security for costs in an action. The result of the affirmance by the Court of Appeal of this doctrine-which would in point of fact enable a managing clerk to pledge his principal's credit to any extent in matters collateral to the conduct of actions-would have been very serious, but happily the court have decisively rejected it, and have laid it down that, unless a managing clerk has a special authority from his principal, he cannot bind his principal by a personal undertaking to pay a sum as security for costs.

THE FOLLOWING is a list of the new Queen's Counsel, with their respective years of call to the bar :-Two members of the Probate and Admiralty Bar-Mr. E. C. CLARKSON, 1854, and Dr. T. H. TRISTRAM, 1855; two members of the Parliamentary. Bar-the Hon. E. CHANDOS LEIGH, Hilary, 1859, and Mr. H. C. SAUNDERS, Easter, 1859; and one member of the North-Eastern Circuit-Mr. JOHN FORBES, 1862.

the barrel rolling, and it rolls out of the upper floor into the street and damages somebody. Clearly there is prima facie evidence of negligence here. My action in leaving the barrel so placed that it could roll out was one of the causes of the motion of the barrel. In the case of the horse, the animal's motion when it bolts, as in the case supposed, is entirely the result of its own volition; it is motion which is started by an entirely new and incalculable factor.

Of course, there are cases where the question of negligence may arise, though the damage is the result of the volition of animals. If the known character of the animal is such that mischief that arises may be expected and foreseen, of course the duty of using a greater amount of precaution to prevent it may arise. A man driving a vicious bull along a street, or letting a dog of known bad character be at large, cannot rely on the fact that the damage was done by the animal sua sponte. So in the old case of Mitchil v. Alestree (1 Vent. 295), where the defendant took an unbroken horse into Lincoln's-inn-fields for the purpose of breaking the horse, and the horse was so unruly that he broke from the defendant and ran over the plaintiff, the defendant was held liable. The question will always arise in cases with regard to animals, whether there is any negligence in the use of the animal for the purposes for, and under the circumstances in, which it was used, having regard to the character of the animal. This must be a matter of degree. As to the use of an unbroken horse in a crowded public thoroughfare, there could be little doubt. If a horse which, though broken, could be proved to be of a very restive character, were taken into a similar place, a more doubtful question might arise. But with regard to horses of ordinary temperament, constant experience shows that there is little danger from the use of them, and it is, therefore, a reasonable use of the highway to employ them for traffic. In the case of Manzoni v. Douglas there was nothing to show that there was

ANIMALS.

THE case of Manzoni v. Douglas (29 W. R. 425, L. R. 6 Q. B. D. 145) raised a point which we have sometimes heard discussed, but as to which there never, as it seemed to us, could be much doubt. In that case a horse, drawing a brougham in a public street, suddenly bolted without any apparent cause, and, notwithstanding the utmost efforts of the driver to control him, swerved on to the pavement and injured the plaintiff. It was held that on these facts an action would not lie against the owner of the horse. It seems to have been contended by the counsel for the plaintiff that there was sufficient evidence of negligence to go to the jury, and to call for rebuttal on the part of the defendant. And he relied on the cases of Byrne v. Boadle (2 H. & C. 722) and Scott v. London Dock Company (3 H. & C. 596.)

It is difficult to conceive of cases more entirely distinct in principle than those cases and the case under discussion. In one of those cases a barrel of flour, and in the other a bale of goods, while under the management of the defendant or his servant, fell upon the plaintiff and injured bim. The tumbling of an inanimate thing into the street is, as it seems to us, per se some evidence of negligence on the part of somebody which calls for explanation, because an inanimate thing cannot move of its own accord, and the person having charge of the thing is therefore prima facie responsible. The case is altogether different where an animal is concerned, which has volition and a power of independent action of its own. In the former case the action of the person in charge would be (except when the agency of any stranger came into play) one of the causes of the motion of the iranimate object. I leave a cask on its side on an upper floor of a warehouse, thinking it in a safe position and not likely to move. The vibration caused by a passing wagon, or a draught of wind, or some movement of its contents by force of gravitation, or some such cause, sets

for instance, that it had, within the knowledge of its owner, bolted on previous occasions without any, or with very slight, provocation. It seems to us clear that the law is as we state it, and that it recognizes the distinction between dangerous animals and animals that are not dangerous-i.e., animals whose nature is to do mischief, and harmless animals. Among dangerous animals are reckoned particular members of a species generally harmless which, by reason of their individual character known to their owner, are dangerous, as, for instance, a dog accustomed to bite men.

Again, the qualities "dangerous" and "harmless must necessarily be considered with relation to the ordinary circumstances under which the use of the animal takes place. A horse driven in harness, or led, or ridden, is ordinarily a harmless creature, but a person who lets a horse stray in the streets unattended would be responsible for mischief naturally arising from such an act, because a horse is not harmless under those circumstances. Again-to resort to a proverbial illustration-we doubt whether the law considers a bull a dangerous animal of necessity, but if a person introduced a bull into a china shop he would obviously be respon sible for the mischief occasioned, because a bull is not an appropriate animal inside a china shop.

This last illustration, however, may possibly be supposed to depend upon the law of trespass, and herein we may note a curious distinction of law. Indeed, we are not a little puzzled sometimes by the law of animals, and doubt whether it can be reduced to an altogether logical basis. A man, it would appear, is absolutely liable in trespass for the act of his beast, such as a bullock, in trespassing on a neighbour's land, apart from any question of negligence. In other words, he is bound to keep his animal in. Therefore I am liable for the spontaneous act of my animal if he trespass against my neighbour's land, but not if he trespass against my reighbour's person, unless I by negligence have con

duced to the latter mischief. This may seem at first anomalous. It might be urged that if the owner of an animal is bound suo periculo to prevent that animal from trespassing on another's land, he ought to be bound likewise-seeing that he keeps and uses the animal for his own advantage-to keep the animal from running up against a person in the street. The answer, as it seems to us, is that there is a radical difference between the case of trespass to a person's land, or to himself when upon his own land, and to himself when using the highway. It seems to us probable that if a man's animal trespassed on another's land, and when upon that land injured his person or property, it might be held that the owner would be liable for the trespass, both to the land and to the goods or person, if the case were based in argument on this distinction; but the highway is for the reasonable use of all persons according to the ordinary practice and usages of life and business, and a man using it takes a certain amount of risk of accident, whereas he is entitled to a more absolute security on his own land.

We have been dealing rather with acts done by animals not induced by any apparent external cause, , but the question may give rise to difficulty, how far and under what circumstances any liability rests upon the < owner of an animal which does an act, being impelled thereto by unusual circumstances of which the owner is not the cause. Take, for instance, the case of a horse frightened by a fire and running away. Perhaps a fire is to be considered as a reasonable cause for any animal's running away; but take some small cause such as would only make a very spirited or nervous horse run away, then a more difficult and complex question arises-viz., as to whether it was negligence to bring such an animal into the place where he was being used, in the sense that, if any mischief arises, the owner ought to pay for it. These are questions of much nicety, and largely questions of degree. We do not think that there has ever been much attempted by way of systematizing the law with regard to these subjects and others of a similar nature, and perhaps it is impossible to do so. The above ob. servations have, however, occurred to us on reading the report of the case that has formed our text.

THE CONVEYANCING BILL.

V.-AS TO LEASES.

We now return to the clauses relating to leases. The object of clauses 13 and 14 appears to be to amend and enlarge the provisions of 32 Hen. 8, c. 34. That statute, which gives grantees of the reversion the same remedies against lessees as the lessors had, and lessees the same remedy against grantees of the reversion as they might have had against lessors, relates only to grants by deed of the reversion, and to covenants and agreements running with the land.

Clause 13 of the Bill proposes to remove these restrictions as to the remedy of reversioners, by providing that "rent reserved by a lease [should not ་་ lease be defined in the definition clause ?], and the benefit of every covenant or provision therein contained, having reference to the subject-matter thereof, and on the lessee's part to be observed or performed, and every condition of reentry and other condition therein contained, shall be annexed and incident to and shall go with the reversionary estate in the land, or in any part thereof, immediately expectant on the term granted by the lease, notwithstanding severance of that reversionary estate, and shall be capable of being recovered, received, enforced, and taken advantage of by the person from time to time entitled, subject to the term, to the income of the whole or any part, as the case may require, of the land leased."

Clause 14 proposes, in like manner, to make the obligations of all lessor's covenants run with the reversion.

Clause 15 extends the provisions of 22 & 23 Vict. c. 35, s. 3. Under that section, where the reversion upon a lease is severed, and the rent legally apportioned, the assignee of each part of the reversion is, in respect of the apportioned rent, to be entitled to the benefit of all conditions or powers of re-entry for non-payment of the original rent, as if such conditions or powers had been reserved to him as incident to his part of the reversion, in respect of the apportioned rent allotted or belonging to him. Clause 15 of the Bill provides that, "notwithstanding the severance by conveyance, surrender, or otherwise, of the reversionary estate in any land comprised in a lease, and, notwithstanding the avoidance or cesser in any other manner of the term granted by a lease as to part only of the land comprised therein, every condition or right of re-entry, and every other condition contained in the lease, shall be apportioned, and shall remain annexed to the severed parts of the reversionary estate as severed, and shall be in force with respect to the term whereon each severed part is reversionary, or the term in any land which has not been surrendered, or as to which the term has not been avoided, or has not otherwise ceased, in like manner as if the land comprised in each severed part, or the land as to which the term remains subsisting, as the case may be, had alone originally been comprised in the lease." The operation of the sections to which we have referred above is restricted to leases made after the commencement of the Act.

The next clause provides that in the case of a lease made under a power contained in a settlement, or conferred by Act of Parliament or otherwise, any preliminary contract for or relating to the lease shall not form part of the title, or evidence of the title, of any person to the lease, and clause 17 (as we have before mentioned) supplies the omission from the Vendor and Purchases Act, 1874, of any provision with reference to the non-requirement of the title to a leasehold reversion on a contract to grant a lease for a term of years.

We now come to the clause relating to forfeiture. The general nature of this provision we have often explained. The lessor is not to enforce a forfeiture until he has served on the lessee a notice specifying the breach complained of, and if the breach is capable of remedy, requiring the lessee to remedy the breach, and in any case requiring the lessee to make compensation in money for the breach, and the lessee has failed within a reasonable time thereafter to remedy the breach if it is capable of remedy, and to make reasonable compensation in money, to the satisfaction of the lessor, for the breach. It has always appeared to us to be desirable to give to the parties the opportunity of settling the matter without resorting to the court, but we confess that there is force in the objection urged to this provision, that there are cases where summary enforcement of rights under the proviso for re-entry is extremely important to the lessor. This objection might easily be obviated, however, by the insertion of words providing that in such cases the lessor might, upon summary application to the court, obtain leave to enforce the forfeiture without giving any previous notice.

The next paragraph of the clause resembles that contained in Mr. Davey's Bill, to which we last week referred. It provides in effect for application by the lessee for relief in case the lessor is proceeding to enforce the forfeiture, aud enables the court to grant such relief on such terms as the court thinks fit. The clause expressly covers the case of an underlease, also that (to which a correspondent referred last week) of a grant at a feefarm rent, and also applies to cases where the proviso of re-entry is inserted in the lease in pursuance of the

directions of an Act of Parliament.

We have never been able to see any sufficient reason for exempting from the operation of this provision (as is done in the Bill) forfeitures for breaches of covenants against assigning, underletting, or parting with the possession of the premises. There can be no doubt that