bank, but stopped payment on the 1st of March, 1880, and went into voluntary liquidation. Claims were made upon the purchasing bank for the balance of the purchase-money, and upon the vending bank for a rescission of the agreement for sale, and damages, and eventually an agreement for the compromise of such claims upon the terms of a call being made on the shareholders in the vending bank, and of certain mutual payments, and for the carrying out of the selling agreement, was come to between the two companies, subject to its sanction by special resolutions of the two companies and by the court. A call was proposed to be made accordingly upon Jameson, and he required the liquidators making such call to place his payment and that of the other dissenting shareholders to a special account, so as to be applied secondarily to that of the assenting members in satisfaction of the debts and liabilities of the vending company. On the refusal of the liquidators of the vending bank to place Jameson's name, and that of the other dissenting members, in a separate list, he now moved against the liquidators of the vending bank that it might be declared that, a between the assenting and dissenting members, the assenting members were primarily liable to the extent of the amounts unpaid on their shares for the payment of the debts and liabilities of the company, and that no call should be made upon the dissenting members until the liability of the assenting members had been exhausted, and that it might be declared that the dissenting members were not liable for the costs of the winding up or for any costs or liabilities incurred by reason of the transfer to the purchasing company. Petitions are pending to approve the agreements of compromise, and it was asked that the motion and petitions might come on together, but on the Master of the Rolls declining to accede to this course two points were argued; first, whether the selling agreement was within the powers of the vending company independently of the Companies Act; and, secondly, whether it was within the 161st section of the Act. By article 93, sub-section 9, of the articles of association of the Union Bank, the board might, subject to the assent of the company by special resolution, "amalgamate with, sell, and transfer all or any part of its business," and might enter into the necessary deeds, agreements, and contracts, and the board was empowered to do all such acts as might be necessary or expedient to carry out such purchases and transfers. JESSEL, M.R., was of opinion that the selling agreement was not authorized by article 93. The word "business" he thought might be left to be interpreted by the company, and without straining the word arrears of calls might very well be included. The word "sell" primâ jacie meant a sale for cash, and the company could not sell for such consideration as might be agreed upon. The sale was in effect in consideration of shares in the purchasing company, and no majority could bind a minority under the articles to carry out a sale in that manner. It was plain to his mind that the sale could only be carried out by a winding up under the Act, and in fact this was the opinion of the board, as they passed a resolution for a voluntary winding up, and the appointment of liquidators. As to the question whether the agreement was within the 161st section of the Companies Act, he thought the case was within that of In re City and County Investment Company (L. R. 13 Ch. D. 475), where the Appeal Court (including himself) had decided that the section did authorize such an arrangement as the present. Another point had been mentioned, as to whether the agreement was within the power of the purchasing company, and he should not now express an opinion upon that question until that company had been heard upon the point, but would merely direct the rest of the motion to be disposed of after the petitions had been heard.-SOLICITORS, Parkers; Cunliffe, Beaumont, & Davenport.

APPOINTMENT OF NEW TRUSTEE-VESTING ORDERTRUSTEE OUT OF JURISDICTION-TRUSTEE ACT, 1850, s. 32. -In a case of In re Carter, before Fry, J., on the 11th inst., a question arose as to the appointment of a new trustee of a settlement in the place of a trustee who was residing out of the jurisdiction. The settlement was of real estate in England. It was executed upon a marriage in Australia, the husband and wife and the other beneficiaries, who were the children of the husband by a former marriage, being then resident in Australia. The trustees were the husband and a rother of his, who was also resident in Australia. Afterwards all the beneficiaries came to reside permanently in

England, and a petition was presented asking for the appointment of a new trustee in the place of the brother, who was still permanently resident in Australia. FRY, J., held, upon the authority of In re Bignold (20 W. R. 345, L. R. 7 Ch. 223), that he could appoint a new trustee and make a vesting order without service of the petition on the trusteewho was out of jurisdiction. This appears to go somewhat further than In re Bignold, inasmuch as there the trustee, when appointed, was residing in England, but had afterwards gone to reside abroad, whereas in In re Carter the trustee was still residing in the place in which he was residing at the time of his appointment. SOLICITORS, Robinson, Son, & Edmonds.

ACTION OF DECEIT ALLEGATIONS OF FRAUD-Judicature ACT.-In a case of Redgrave v. Hurd, before Fry, J., on the 14th inst., the question was raised whether, since the Judicature Act, it is necessary that, when an action is based upon fraud or misrepresentation, the specific misrepresenta tions intended to be relied upon should be distinctly alleged in the pleadings. Reference was made to the case of Arkwright v. Newbold, recently before the Court of Appeal (ante, p. 333), in which the same point was raised, though it became unnecessary to decide it. It was stated that in that case James, L.J., in answer to an observation made by counsel, that some persons thought that pleadings should be abolished, said that no one, he believed, had proposed that pleadings should be abolished in an action of this kind, and intimated his opinion, as did also Cotton, L.J., that in such an action the allegations of fraud should be specific. It became, in the result, equally unnecessary in Redgrave v. Hurd to decide the point, and indeed counsel on both sides admitted that the Judicature Act had made no difference. But FRY, J., said that it had always beenhis opinion that the Judicature Act could not affect the question. He thought it was only fair play between man and man that when charges of fraud were made the person charged should know what were the specific charges made against him.SOLICITORS, John Holder; R. Biale.

FORCIBLE ENTRY-EJECTMENT OF TENANT-INJURY TO FURNITURE-5 Rich. 2, stat. 1, c. 8.—In a case of Beddall v. Maitland, before Fry, J., on the 8th inst., the question arose whether damages could be recovered for the forcible entry upon, and ejectment of, a tenant from a house, and injury done to his furniture. The defendant had occupied a house as tenant at will to the plaintiff, and the plaintiff had given him notice to quit. The defendant, by his counter-claim, alleged that the plaintiff had unlawfully, and by force, broken into, and ejected the defendant from, the house, and violently put him and his family out of the house, and also violently and recklessly thrown thereout, and damaged his goods and effects. And the defendant claimed damages in respect of these alleged injuries. The evidence showed that an agent of the plaintiff, and some men employed by him, had broken in the door of the house, and had turned out the defendant's furniture. FRY, J., said that the result of the statute of Richard 2 was that a man who was in possession of property might use force to keep out a trespasser; but, if a trespasser had got into possession, the rightful owner could not use force to turn him out, but must appeal to the law. The result appeared to his lordship to be this, that as the defendant's possession was unlawful, he could recover no damages for the forcible entry. He could recover no damages for the entry, because he was not in rightful possession, and he could recover no damages for the forcible entry, because the statute of Richard 2 made forcible entry a crime, but did not give any civil remedy for it. But, in respect of other independent acts done in the course of, or after the forcible entry, an action would lie, because the possession which was acquired by force was made unlawful by the statute, and the person who had thus acquired possession could not, in answer to the claim for damages, plead a lawful possession. This his lordship thought was the result of the authorities. Thus in Newton v. Harland (1 Scott N. S. 474), the plaintiff recovered damages for injuries done to his wife by the defend. ant in turning her out of a house after a forcible entry by the defendant, while in Pollen v. Brewer (7 C. B. N. S. 371), it was held that no damages could be recovered for a forcible eviction itself.-SOLICITORS, F. C. Tudor; E. Johnson.

DIVORCE-AFFIDAVIT VERIFYING PETITION-ABSENCE OF PETITIONER AFFIDAVIT BY SOLICITOR.-In the Probate, Divorce, and Admiralty Division on the 15th inst., in Bruce v. Bruce and Laing, a novel point of practice was raised. The petitioner in a suit for dissolution of marriage, is an officer in the army, and is at present stationed at Candahar. An application was now made on his behalf to dispense with bis affidavit verifying the petition under rule 2, on the ground that there is at Candahar no British consul or other person having authority to take affidavits, and no notary public. HANNEN, P., said that he would, under the circumstances, allow the petition to be verified by the petitioner's solicitor, and would dispense with an affidavit from the petitioner himself until he was in a position to be sworn.-SOLICITORS, Hollams, Son, & Coward.

CASES BEFORE THE BANKRUPTCY
REGISTRARS.

(Before Mr. REGISTRAR PEPYS, acting as Chief Judge). Feb. 15, 22; March 1.-Ex parte Barker and another, Re Rogers.

R., s solicitor, being pressed by Stock Exchange creditors, sold his bousehold furniture, after valuation by an independent valuer, to B., a barrister, for the sum of £432, upon the condition that R. should, out of the purchase-money, repay B. an old debt of £118, and £100 on account of professional fees. This

transaction occurred more than three months before R. became a bankrupt.

Held, that the trustees under R.'s adjudication could not recover the furniture or the two sums paid to B., on the ground that the transaction constituted either an act of bankruptcy or a fraudulent preference.

This was an application on behalf of C. M. Barker and another, the trustees under the bankruptcy of Mr. William Rogers, solicitor, Essex-street, Strand, for a declaration that an alleged purchase of the bankrupt's furniture by Mr. Augustus Beddall, and two payments made to him by the bankrupt, were fraudulent and void.

The bankrupt had employed Mr. Evans, a stock-broker, to buy and sell stocks and shares for him, and he became indebted to Mr. Evans in £3,544. On the 19th of March,

1880, Messrs. Travers-Smith & Braithwaite, the solicitors for Mr. Evans, wrote to the bankrupt for payment of the amount, and on the 1st of April, a demand to ground a debtor's summons was signed and posted.

About the middle of March, the bankrupt informed Mr. Beddall, a barrister with whom he had been upon terms of intimate friendship for many years, that he had been speculating heavily on the Stock Exchange, and had lost several thousands of pounds, which he was wholly unable to pay. He further stated that he had, by meeting previous losses, so exhausted all his ready money, that it was imperatively necessary for him to raise funds to meet his current expenses. The bankrupt was then in debt to the extent of about £15,000, with assets £60 or £70, besides book debts amounting to £1,200, and his furniture. Mr. Beddall stated, however, that the bankrupt did not inform him of the extent of bis indebtedness, and, apart from his Stock Exchange losses, he had no idea, until after the adjudication, that he owed more than a few hundred pounds.

Mr. Beddall advised the bankrupt, as his friend, to sell bis furniture, and go into lodgings, which he at once acceded to, and the bankrupt's wife inspected some apartments accordingly. It was found, however, that the rent of such lodgings as the bankrupt required would amount to so large a sum as to render it impossible to adopt that course. Mr. Beddall then advised him to obtain an advance upon a bill of sale of his furniture, and at once take a smaller house. The bankrupt agreed to do this, and subsequently showed Mr. Beddal: the prospectuses of a number of loan societies, from which it appeared that the interest charged was large as to render that course also impracticable. As money was, however, urgently required by the bankrupt, Mr. Beddall eventually made this proposition to him: that he would purchase his furniture out and out, at a price to be fixed by a competent valuer, and would hire a house, which he would let to the bankrupt's wife at a fair rent, but upon the condition that, out of the purchase-money, he should repay the balance of a debt he owed Mr. Beddall, and give him a cheque for at least £100 on account of professional fees then due, amounting to between £300 and £400.

SO

The bankrupt having accepted the proposal, it was agreed

that independent valuers (Messrs. Phillips & Son) should be appointed, and, about the third week in pril, a valuation was made by them, and, by arrangement, farniture was delivered at a house Mr. Beddall had taken on lease for the purpose. Some little delay occurred, in consequence of the illness of the bankrupt's son, and on the 26th of April, before any of the furniture was removed, Mr. Beddall paid him the sum of £100 on account of the valuation, and the balance of £332 on the 1st of May. The furniture was finally delivered on the 5th of May, and Mr. Beddall thereupon signed an agreement to let the house furnished to the bankrupt's wife, and possession was subsequently given to her thereunder.

On the 3rd of May, the bankrupt, in accordance with the arrangement, paid Mr. Beddall the sum of £118 14s., the balance of a debt due to him, and, on the 6th of May, £100 further, on account of fees.

On the 13th of April, 1880, a debtor's summons was issued against the bankrupt at the suit of Evans, and on the 18th of June the adjudication took place. On the 8th of July, the order of adjudication was discharged by the Court of Appeal, and, on the 2nd of August, Rogers was finally adjudicated bankrupt.

J. Linklater, in support of the application.-The transaction is void either as an act of bankruptcy or as a fraudulent preference. It is a sale by a hopeless insolvent for the purpose of defeating his Stock Exchange creditors, and the evidence shows this to be the avowed object of the transaction. A sale of part of a debtor's property may come within the provisions of the statute as a 575, and cases there cited. In Lee v. Hart (10 Ex. 479), fraudulent transfer: Smith's Mercantile Law, 8th ed., Wightman, J., said, "The statute does not mention sales ruptcy may be committed, but a sale of goods at a low as one of the fraudulent modes by which an act of bankrate may be a fraudulent transfer if the seller did not intend to sell the goods bona fide for the purpose of carrying laying creditors, and the purchaser has reason to know that on his business, but for the purpose of defeating and debad. Young v. Waud (22 L. J. Ex. 27) shows that an such is the object of the seller." The sale is therefore assignment may be fraudulent if creditors are necessarily delayed, and that result has been contemplated: Harwood v. Bartlett (6 Bing. N. C. 61); Fraser v. Levy (6 H. & N. 16). In the latter case Channell, B., held that if a trader turned his goods into money with intent to take them out of the reach of his creditors, and the buyer knew it, the sale was invalid. The transaction is a scheme to prefer the respondent, as well as a fraudulent sale: Ex parte Pearson (21 W. R. 688, L. R. 8 Ch. App. 667); Ex parte Halliday (21 W. R. 348, L. R. 8 Ch. App. 283). He also cited Singleton v. Butler (2 Bos. & P. 283); Re Wright (L. R. 3 Ch. D. 70); Tomkins v. Saffrey (L. R. 3 H. L. App. Cas. 213).

E. C. Willis, for the respondent.-The transaction complained of occurred more than three months before the adjudication, and cannot therefore be a fraudulent preference: section 92. To ask for the furniture and the money too is to ask the court to commit a fraud upon the respondent. There was no invitation by the bankrupt to the respondent to take possession of the furniture; the bankrupt did not go to him with a view to the particular arrangement which was carried out. Harwood v. Bartlett and Frazer v. Levy are distinguishable. In Young v. Waud the debtor had absconded, and in Lee v. Hart circumstances occurred which really amounted to a conspiracy to defraud creditors who had supplied goods. There is no authority to show that a person in difficulties may not dispose of goods for their full value; and a wide difference exists between a sale of part of the debtor's property and the whole. There is no evidence that the information as to the bankrupt's position was given from any fraudulent motive. Suppose the goods had been sold to a stranger, could the transaction have been impeached? In Robson on Bankruptcy, 3rd ed., at p. 132, it is said, "The true principle applicable to cases of this kind seems to be that if the transaction is bona fide, and does not involve consequences injurious to the debtor's solvency, it will not be an act of bankruptcy; but that, on the other hand, if the circumstances of the debtor and the nature of the security are such that the necessary result of the latter, if carried into effect, must be to render him hopelessly insolvent, or, in the case of a trader, to disable him from carrying on his business, it will be an act of

bankruptcy." In the present case the sale was of the bankrupt's household furniture only, and the transaction in no way interfered with the carrying on of his business. He also cited Ex parte Topham (21 W. R. 655, L. R. 8 Ch. App. 614); Ex parte Tempest (19 W. R. 137, L. R. 6 Ch. App. 70).

Mr. REGISTRAR PEPYS, after stating the nature of the application, said: The bankrupt, who it appears was hopelessly involved in transactions on the Stock Exchange, in the month of March last, goes to his friend Mr. Beddall, who is an old friend of his, they having been clerks together in a solicitor's office, to ask his advice as to what to do under the circumstances. He was then hopelessly pressed by Stock Exchange creditors, and he had incurred other debts, especially one to Mr. Sims, from whom he had borrowed money for former transactions. He had very little assets at his bank, consisting merely of a sum of £60 or £70, book debts amounting to £1,200, and also his furniture. The first advice Mr. Beddall

seems to have given to him was that he should raise money on his furniture on a bill of sale, and in that way stave off the evil day. But this, on consideration, appeared impracticable on account of the exorbitant terms exacted by loan companies dealing with persons in difficulties; and another reason was that the transaction appeared on the whole to be too risky. However that may be, for some reason or other that idea was given up, and then Mr. Beddall said to Mr. Rogers, "If you cannot do it any other way, I am willing, in consideration of our old friendship, to buy the furniture of you at a valuation, to be determined by an independent person, and, having so bought the furniture, I will lease a house into which I will place it in which you and your family can reside, no extra rent being charged for the use of the furniture. For this, you shall pay me the old debt you owe me of £118, and you shall also pay me on account of certain professional fees I have earned in your service £100 more, which you can pay out of the proceeds of the furniture." This agreement is ratified, and the transaction goes on. Some little time elapses before it is carried out, in consequence of the illness of one of the bankrupt's children, but in April the furniture is valued by an independent valuer at £432. Of this, £100 is paid to Mr. Beddall, reducing the amount to £332, and ultimately the furniture is sold, and the whole arrangement carried out, a house being taken for the wife, and £118 paid to Mr. Beddall in consideration of his part of the transaction. Up to this time no act of bankruptcy had been committed, but on the 7th of May a debtor's summons is issued, an act of bankruptcy established, and ultimately adjudication takes place. The first observation which I have to make upon this transaction is that it must be taken entirely as one transaction. I was asked to look upon it as if originally a sale of the furniture took place by Rogers to Beddall, and that the money was simply considered lost by Rogers, and that subsequently he made a voluntary payment to Beddall, but that view cannot be sustained. I think the whole must be considered one transaction, and a regular bargain between them that "You shall do so and so, and I will do so and so," the whole thing being arranged between these two gentlemen, who are both clever lawyers, and who knew very well that they must be careful. The whole arrangement must be looked upon as one, and, although the actual payment to Mr. Beddall was not made until after the act of bankruptcy, still I feel bound to hold that altogether the transaction took place in March, more than three months before the bankruptcy, and therefore the 92nd section does not apply.

It remains now to consider whether it is a fraudulent transfer of part of the bankrupt's estate under the 6th section (2nd sub-section), and, therefore, an act of bankruptcy. Many cases were cited to me in the course of the argument for the trustees, and great stress was laid upon the case of Tomkins v. Saffery. I have looked very carefully through that case, and have read the judgment of their lordships, but it does not appear to me that the case is at all upon all fours with the present. There were two grounds in that case for setting aside the transaction as a fraud against the trustee. One was that there had been a cessio bonorum, a giving up of the whole of the property of the bankrupt, and a fraud under the Bankruptcy Act. Now, in this case, there has been no cessio bonorum, no giving up of the whole of the property of the bankrupt. The bankrupt parts with the furniture, but the book debts which would be worth some hundreds of pounds, although they might not be immediately realizable, were

not included in the consideration. Then it is said it, the transaction, is fraudulent because no pressure was put upon the debtor. But in Tomkins v. Saffery the debtor went voluntarily to the Stock Exchange creditors, and made a voluntary cession on his part, and, therefore, it was fraudulent under the Act. But there does not appear to be any voluntary preference in this case on the part of the debtor, such as existed in Tomkins v. Saffery. It is not as if he had gone to Mr. Beddall and said, "How much will you take?" and had paid what he demanded of him in the first instance. On the contrary, he simply went and consulted him as to whether he could assist him or not, and the actual transaction was to make a distinct arrangement that something should be done, and it resulted in a bargain upon one side and the other. It therefore appears to me that the case of Tomkins v. Saffery does not apply. Then, apart from general considerations as to whether this was a fraudulent preference of one creditor over the others which is void against the trustees, I have to consider whether it was an act of bankruptcy. It was very ably put to me, and no doubt it seems at first sight, that these two astute lawyers laid their heads together to defeat the Stock Exchange creditors, who are left out in the cold, and, therefore, that the transfer was a fraud. But, when I come to look at the transactions, step by step, which I have done very carefully, I must consider in what particular point it can be held to be void against the trustee. Now, as Mr. Willis put it in the course of the argument, "Suppose there had been a sale, and a stranger had bought the furniture, could it have been impeached?" I think clearly not. Supposing I go one step further, and suppose there had been a sale of the furniture to a friend of the bankrupt; does that alter the case? Does the fact of making himself a party to the transaction, so far as regards hiring a house for his friend, alter it if the transaction be in itself bond fide? Surely he could do as he liked in this respect. If he chose to let a house to the bankrupt he could do so, or if, out of consideration for his friend, he took lodgings in order that he might have payment of the debt, would that shake the case? It appears to me that it would not, and this being altogether out of the purview of the Act, it was quite competent to him to make the arrangement, because so long as the bankruptcy did not take place within three months, he might have given any preference he liked, and I It appears to me, therefore, after looking very carefully into do not think anything could have been done to prevent him. the matter, that there is no one ground upon which the transaction can be impeached. It appears to be of the nature of a transfer of property in consideration partly of a present advance, and partly of a past debt, and, as such, cannot be impeached. I think, therefore, that the present application fails, and it must be dismissed, with costs.

Solicitors for the trustees, Travers-Smith & Braithwaite. Solicitors for the respondent, Harris & Powell.

The annual generel meeting of this society was held on Tuesday last at the offices, No. 18, Lincoln's-inn-fields, W.C.; Mr. John M. Clabon, the chairman, presiding. Mr. G. W. BERRIDGE (the actuary and secretary) having read the notice convening the meeting, the report was taken as read.

The CHAIRMAN said: It is a great many years since I became a director of this society-I think more than twentyfive years ago-and I am certain, if my memory serves me, that there has not been one year in which we have not had a good account to give you-in which we have not had a plentiful accession of business and made the most careful selection of our lives, as shown by the fact that the actual deaths are so much less than the expectation; and in which we have not dealt carefully in investing the money of the society. The report will have given you many figures which you used not to have; but still I think I may with advantage recall to your memory a few figures which may show you what I have said as to our uninterrupted prosperity. I shall begin with the figure of the funds in hand, because I think entries hardly give us that idea of the large amount of our funds, and particularly as a recent valuation of our liabili

ties shows the very prosperous condition of our society; and I begin with that for another reason, for I remember that when I first became a director the funds in hand were £130,000. In abstracting these figures from old papers, I find that at the end of 1869 the £130,000 had increased to £736,000; at the end of 1874 they had increased to £1,104,000; at the end of 1879 they had increased to £1,610,000; and at the end of last year, only one year more, they were £1,670,000. I may remind you that during the last year the bonus was declared, and we have in point of fact paid to those persons who desired to bave their bonus in cash £35,000. We should have therefore had that sum in hand at the end of last year had it not been for this payment. The number of policies at the end of 1864 was 1.756; at the end of 1869, 2,190; at the end of 1874, 2,536; at the end of 1879, 2,847. You will observe the progressive and regular increase-I am giving the total, and not the net business, and I will now give the same figures as to the amount assured. At the end of 1864 we had £2,178,000 insured; at the end of 1869, £3,217,000; at the end of 1874, £4,015,000, and at the end of 1879, £4,928,000, so we have advanced in fifteen years considerably more than double. The next set of figures I will give you are the total annual premiums at the end of each period. In 1869 they were £95,000 odd; in 1874, £120,000 odd, and in 1879, £148,000 odd. I did not begin with the figures of 1864, because they are not convenient, but of course they are double, as well as the amount assured. The next favourable point I may mention is the large average amount we have on each life, because it is a well-established fact that the lives of the higher are better than those of the lower orders, for as you go up in the scale of society people are better fed and better clothed. Now, in the quinquennium ending December, 1864, the average was £1,440; and in the quinquennium ending 1869 the average was £1,777. I have not the figures for the two next quinquenniums, but in the last year the average was £1,980, so that we have been progressively getting a class of lives which, according to admitted facts, are of a better class. Then I have another set of figures-the average annual amount insured during the periods of five years. The average annual amount during the quinquennium ending 1869 was £347,000; in the next quinquennium ending 1874 it was nearly the same-viz., £348,000; and in the quin.quennium ending 1879, £398,000. Now it is one of the strongest evidences of prosperity that we have tided over this certain period, which is always the difficulty of an office. Our new business continues to increase largely, and when an office tides over the period of difficulty, which is generally from twenty-five to thirty years from its commencement, and the new business continues to increase, it is, as it were, on a basis of certain prosperity. The next set of figures I will give you, which I have already referred to generally, relate to the carefulness with which lives are selected. Mr. Berridge tells me that on the average during the quinquennium ending in 1869, the excess of the expected claim over the actual claim was £16,000; in the next quinquennium it was £16,000 again, and in the last quinquennium it was £22,000; and he tells me that during the last year it is about £18,000; and whereas the expectation as to life would have been that thirty-six would have died, in respect of which deaths we should have paid £93,000, only twenty-four died, in respect of which we have paid £74,600; so that in every single particular which I have given you there has been a regular increase of prosperity. Now I will give you the last two years, and comparing them only I find that the amount insured in 1879 was £303,181, the premiums being £9,605. In 1880 it was £299,000-a few pounds less-the premiums being £10,175, the sam insured being something less and the premiums being a little more. The next head I will give you is that of assets, and I hope you will agree with me, when you look down the list of assets that we give you in the balance-sheet, that we stand in a good and sound position. There is no one asset to which any objection can be made. I may tell you that during the last year there is an actual increase in the assets of £56,000. It would have been about £100,000, but we have paid £35,000 for our cash bonus, and this is the way in which we have dealt with that £56,000. We have put out on mortgages £3,000; loans on policies, £1,500; on preference stocks, £30,000; on reversions, £16,000; on deposit, £20,000. I think our deputy

chairman will have something to say to you presently on the subject of our investments. I consider that we are very fortunate in being able to make the investments we have made, because you know what increasing difficulty there is in getting good investments paying a good rate of interest. To show you how much we have to put out, I will tell you there has been paid off during the year £176,000, and that is all being invested again in the same class of securities which you see in the balance-sheet. After some further observations the Chairman concluded by saying:-Having made these general observations, I think I am justified in saying that I have proved to you the three things I said in the beginning-We have an annual accession of good business; we make a most careful selection of our lives; and we put out the money we have at the best and safest profit. I move the adoption of the report.

Mr. H. Fox BRISTOWE, Q.C., seconded the adoption of the report, and referred to several items in the accounts. With respect to the reversions, the average profit realized from these in the three last quinquenniums was 9 per cent., showing that this business paid nearly double the average rate of interest of the general investments. The other assets were exactly such as a society like this should possess.

Mr. EILOART called attention to several items. He wished to know whether there was any idea of making the reserve fund or insurance fund proportional to the amount insured. The amount insured in 1874 was £4,000,000; in 1879, £4,900,000, with an increase at the end of the five years of £913,000. The funds in 1874 were £1,104,000, and in 1879 £1,610,000, so that they had an increase of £506,000 of funds to set against an increased amount insured of £913,000, being more than 50 per cent. Now were they to go on adding to the reserve to meet the sum insured, something like 50 per cent. of the amount?

The CHAIRMAN said that the funds went on increasing year by year, there being more received in premiums than was paid. Mr. Berridge made a valuation of the liabilities, and when he found they had a sum in excess of what they were liable for, he advised the board that it might be fairly divided. The female lives had lived longer than they anticipated, but the males lived a shorter time, but the two about balanced. Any office which during the last few years had kept up its business-and this office had actually increased theirs-must be considered to have done well.

unanimously. The resolution was then put to the meeting and carried

Mr. BOODLE next proposed the re-election of the retiring directors, Messrs. Kay, Kensit, Russell, and Powell. Mr. WALMIESLEY seconded the resolution, which was agreed to.

The auditors, Messrs. Boodle and Valpy, were also reappointed.

The remuneration to the directors and auditors was fixed, and cordial votes of thanks passed to the chairman and directors and to Mr. Berridge and the staff. The meeting then separated.

LEGAL APPOINTMENTS.

Mr. LEWIS WILLIAM CAVE, Q.C., who has been appointed a Judge of the Queen's Bench Division, in succession to Sir Henry Mather Jackson, deceased, is the eldest son of the late Mr. William Cave, of Deborough, Northamptonshire, and was born in 1833. He was educated at Rugby, and was formerly scholar of Lincoln College, Oxford, where he graduated second class in classics in 1856. He was called to the bar at the Inner Temple in Trinity Term, 1859, having in the previous month obtained a first-class certificate of honour. He was for several years a revising barrister, and became a Queen's Counsel in 1875. He formerly practised on the Midland Circuit, but since the last arrangement of the assizes he had become a member of the North-Eastern Circuit. Mr. Justice Cave published (in conjunction with the Hon. Edward Chandos Leigh) a volume of Criminal Reports, and he has also edited "Addison on Torts,” and “Addison on Contracts.' He has been recorder of the city of Lincoln since 1873,

and is a bencher of the Inner Temple. He recently presided over the Commission to inquire into the existence of Corrupt Practices in the City of Oxford.

Mr. EDWARD HARRY ADCOCK, solicitor (of the firm of Starkey & Adcock), of 19, Palmerston-buildings, Old Broadstreet, and Penge, has been appointed a Perpetual Com. missioner for taking the Acknowledgments of Deeds by Married Women for the Counties of Middlesex and Surrey, and the Cities of London and Westminster.

Mr. WILLIAM OSBORN BOYES, solicitor, of Barnet, has been appointed Registrar of the Barnet County Court (Circuit No. 37) jointly with Mr. Stanley Harris. Mr. Boyes was admitted a solicitor in 1870. He is an LL.B. of St. John's College, Cambridge, where he graduated in the Law Tripos in 1866. Mr. Boyes has also been appointed Clerk to the County Magistrates at Barnet, on the resignation of Mr. Harris.

Mr. WILLIAM BRICE, late a solicitor, of Bristol, has been appointed a Magistrate for Gloucestershire. Mr. Brice was admitted a solicitor in 1833. He was for many years clerk to the city magistrates at Bristol, and was town clerk of that city from 1874 till 1880. He retired from the legal profession on resigning the office of town clerk.

Mr. GEORGE DICKINSON BYFIELD, solicitor (of the firm of Houghtons & Byfield), of 85, Gracechurch-street and Barnet, has been elected Clerk to the Barnet Board of Guardians, Assessment Committee, School Attendance Committee, and Rural Sanitary Authority, in succession to Mr. Stanley Harris, resigned. Mr. Byfield is also clerk to the East Barnet Valley Local Board, and was admitted a solicitor in 1873.

Mr. BENJAMIN SCOTT CURREY, solicitors (of the firm of Barber, Currey, & Boroughs), of Derby, has been appointed by the high sheriff of Derbyshire (Mr. Francis James Sumner) to be Under-Sheriff of that county for the ensuing year. Mr. Currey was admitted a solicitor in 1852.

Mr. G. R. DODD, solicitor, of 54, New Broad-street, London, E.C., has been appointed a Commissioner in England for taking Affidavits in the Supreme Court of the Province of South Australia.

Mr. THOMAS FORSTER, solicitor (of the firm of Keenlyside, Forster, & Forster), of Newcastle-upon-Tyne, has been elected an Alderman for that borough. Mr. Forster was admitted a solicitor in 1860.

Mr.

Mr. JOHN PICTON MEREDITH GEORGE, solicitor, of Cardigan, has been appointed by the high sheriff of Cardiganshire (Sir Marteine Owen Mowbray Lloyd, Bart.) to be Under-Sheriff of that county for the ensuing year. George is the son of Mr. William Griffith George, solicitor, town clerk of Newport, Pembrokeshire. Не was admitted a solicitor in 1877, and he is in partnership with his father.

Mr. WILLIAM MORGAN GRIFFITHS, solicitor, of Carmarthen and Narberth, has been appointed by the high sheriff of Carmarthenshire (Mr. Charles William Mansel Lewis, of Stradey Castle) to be Under-Sheriff of that county for the ensuing year. Mr. Griffiths was admitted a solicitor in Michaelmas Term, 1868, and is a commissioner to administer oaths, and a perpetual commissioner for taking acknowledgments of deeds by married women, is clerk to the visiting justices of the Joint Counties Lunatic Asylum at Carmarthen, to the magistrates of the Llanboidy Division of the said county, and to the Board of Conservators of the Carmarthen Bay Fishery District; he is also assistant Conservative registration agent for the districts of Carmarthen and Kidwelly in the said county.

Mr. RICHARD STEPHENS JACKSON, solicitor (of the firm of Farlow & Jackson), of 5, St. Benet-place, Gracechurch-street, and of Gravesend and Sittingbourne, has been appointed a Commissioner to administer Oaths in the Supreme Court of Judicature.

Mr. WILLIAM DANIEL HENRY OEHME solicitor, (of the nrm of Oehme & Summerhays), of 167, Gresham House, Old Broad-street, London, and Brighton, has been appointed a Commissioner of the High Court of Judicature at Fort William in Bengal to take Affidavits and also the Acknowledgments of Married Women in respect of property in India.

Mr. WILLIAM PILCHER, solicitor, of Marlborough Chambers, 49, Pall Mall, S.W., has been appointed a Commissioner to

take Acknowledgments of Deeds and to administer Oaths for New York, United States.

Mr. WILLIAM SMITH, solicitor (of the firm of W. Smith & Son), of Sheffield, has been elected President of the Sheffield District Incorporated Law Society for the ensuing year. Mr. Smith was admitted a solicitor in 1844, and he is in partnership with his son, Mr. Charles Henry Smith. He is viceconsul at Sheffield for France and Italy, and clerk to the West Riding magistrates at Sheffield. His firm are solicitors to the Sheffield School Board. Mr. Smith is also one of the twelve town trustees of Sheffield, and a member of the town council of the borough.

Mr. CHARLES WILLIAM REES STOKES, solicitor, of Tenby, has been appointed by the high sheriff of Pembrokeshire (Sir Owen Henry Philipps Scourfield, Bart.) to be Under-Sheriff of that county for the ensuing year. Mr. Stokes was admitted a solicitor in 1864, and is town clerk of the borough of Tenby. Mr. FREDERICK CONDE WILLIAMS, a judge of the District Court of Jamaica, has been appointed a Puisne Judge of the Supreme Court of the Colony of Natal. Mr. Justice Williams was educated at Christ's College, Cambridge, where he graduated in Easter Term, 1873, and he formerly practised on the B.A. in 1868. He was called to the bar at the Inner Temple Midland Circuit and at the Warwickshire, Birmingham, and Coventry Sessions. He was appointed a district judge in Jamaica in 1876.

COMPANIES.

WINDING-UP NOTICES. JOINT STOCK COMPANIES.

LIMITED IN CHANCERY.

BROOKE, SWINDELLS, AND COMPANY, LIMITED.-Petition for wind-ing up, presented March 9, directed to be heard before the M.R. on March 26. Milne and Co, Harcourt bldgs, Temple, agents for Wood and Co, Manchester, solicitors for the petitioner ELECTRIC WRITING COMPANY, LIMITED.-Petition for winding up, presented March 8, directed to be heard before the M. R. on March 19. Shum and Co, Theobald's rd, Gray's inn, agents for Kidson and Co, Sunderland

HALIFAX BUILDING AND QUARRYING COMPANY, LIMITED.-Credi tors are required, on or before April 8, to send their names and addresses, and the particulars of their debts or claims to Joshua Armitage Riley, Cheapside, Halifax, the official liquidator. Apr 29 at 12 is appointed for hearing and adjudicating upon the debts and claims HUDDERSFIELED QUARRYING COMPANY, LIMITED.-The M.R. has by an order, dated Jan 18, appointed Fred Carter, Huddersfield, to be official liquidator

PELHAM PUBLISHING COMPANY, LIMITED.-Petition for winding up, presented March 9, directed to be heard before the M.R. on March 19. Munns and Longden, Old Jewry, solicitors for the petitioners

[Gazette, March 11.] CARRIAGE CO-OPERATIVE SUPPLY ASSOCIATION, LIMITED.-Petition for winding up, presented March 11, directed to be heard before the M.R. on March 26. Purser, Fenchurch st, solicitor for the petitioners HARTLEPOOLS NEWSPAPER AND PRINTING COMPANY, LIMITED.By an order made by V. C. Bacon, dated March 5, it was ordered that the voluntary winding up of the company be continued. Rowley and Co, Great Winchester st bldgs, solicitors for the peti tioner

MADRAS IRRIGATION AND CANAL COMPANY, LIMITED.-The M.R. has fixed March 23 at 12 at his chambers for the appointment of an official liquidator

[Gazette, Mar. 15.]