Page images

would have hod no difficulty in proving a minimnm cost, and then, if the defendant did not ohoose to show his books, the jndge would have been well warranted in assuming that the defendant's cost of manufacture did cot exceed that minimum, and in charging him accordingly. But to disallow the defendant the whole coat of manufacture was, in fact, to change the judgment from a judgment for profits into a judgment for gross proceeds of sale. James, L.J., said that, assuming that the defendant had acted improperly in throwing obstacles in the way of the plaintiffs, still the court would not be justified in saying judicially that which it knew not to be the fact—viz., that the article cost nothing to manufacture, and in punishing the defendant by depriving him of the whale cost of manufacture. If there was absolutely no evidence of the coat, the court would have to fix a nominal sum for the cost, but that was not ao in the present case.—Solicitors, E. Weodard; J. <fc M. Gole.

Railway Company—Statutory Agreement As To InTerchange Of TrafpicAgreement To Refer DifFerences To Single ArbitratorJurisdiction Of RailVat Commissioners To InterveneRegulation Of RailWays Act, 1873, s. 8.—In a case of Great Western Railway Company v. Waterford and Limerick Railway Company, noted ante, p. 297, cause was shown against the rnle nisi then stated to have been granted in prohibition, before the Master of the Rolls on the 18th icst. The defendants had applied to the Railway Commissioners to deoide upon certain disputes that bad arisen between them and the plaintiff under an agreement entered into for the interchange of traffio in pursuance of a power in a special Aot. By the agreement all disputes were to be referred to a single arbitrator, to be appointed as therein mentioned. Tbe Muter of the Rolls granted, on the 14th inst., a rule •us returnable on tbe 18th, prohibiting the Railway CooimiBsioners from bearing the application. By section 8 of the Regulation of Railways Act, 1873, ''where any difference between railway companies is under the provisions of any general or special Act, passed either before or after tbe passing of this Act, required or authorized to be referred to arbitration, suoh difference shall, at the instance of any company party to tbe difference, and with the consent of the commissioners, he referred to the commissioners for their deoisiou in lieu of being referred to arbitration: Provided that the power of compelling a reference to the commissioners in this section contained shall cot apply to any case in which any arbitrator has, in any general or special Act, been designated by hia name or by the name of his office, or in which a standing arbitrator having been appointed under any general or special Act the commissioners are of opinion that the difference in question may more conveniently be referred to him." Tbe Railway Commissioners had in the meantime been made parties to the action, and cause was Bhown in their behalf, and on the part of tbe defendants, the Waterford Company, against the rule. It was stated that the Railway Commissioners had, since 1875, exercised jurisdiction in similar cases, and two cases before them are reported in which they have held they had jurisdiction. The main contention in favour of the jurisdiction was that no general or special Act could be found where an arbitrator was appointed by name or by the name of his office, and it was therefore argued that tbe words of the proviso were mere surplusage, and that the commissioners had jurisdiction in all cases of disputes between two railway companies. For the plaintiffs it wag contended that they came within the words of the proviso, and that the jurisdiction of the commifsionera was excluded. Jessel, M.R., was of opinion that tbe section was by no means easy to construe, but he must not forget that he was asked, sitting as a single judge, to overrule the opinions of three judges. He should not do so unless he felt very clearly that their construction was wrong, and this he was by no means prepared to say. Although, nn doubt, the proviso created great difficulty, still, in his opinion, tbe meaning of the section was that all disputes between two railway companies could bs adjudicated upon by the commissioners. No one had been able to discover any general or special Act in which specific differences between two railway companies had been referred to a named arbitrator, or 10 an arbitrator by the name of hia office, and he

could not help thinking that the legislature must have inserted the words in tbe proviso ex abundanti eaulcla in case there might possibly be some such provision in a geueral or special Act, and not with a view of limiting ths generality of the section. On the whole, therefore, although not feeling very confident, he was of opinion that the Railway Commissioners had jurisdiction to decide the matters in difference between the two companies, and be should therefore discharge the rule nisi with costs.—Solicitors, Nelson; Terrell $ Atkinson; Solicitor to the Board of Trade.

WillGeneral Power Of Appointment Exercised Bt General Devi9eSubsequent Will Revoking DeviseWills Act, S. 27.—In a case of Sothcran v. Denittf, before the Master of the Rolls on the 21st inst., a qneation arose whether a power to appoint by will had been well exercised under the following circumstances :—By a settlement mads in 1870, certain real estate was directed to be held on trust for such persons as A., whether covert or sole, should by will appoint, with remainder in default of appointment to B. in fee. A. made a will in 1871, and thereby, in exercise of the power, appointed the real estate to the plaintiff in fee. In 1877 A. made another will, commencing "I revoke all former wills," which contained a general devise of all her real estate in favour of the defendant, but not in terms referring to the power. In 1878 A. made a third will, dealing with her personal estate only, but concluding with the words, '' Hereby revoking all former or other wills, I declare this to be my last will and testament." The real estate Bubjeot to A.'* power was claimed (1) by the plaintiff, on tbe ground that the appointment by the will of 1871 was not affected by the later wills; (2) by the defendant, on the ground that the appointment in tbe first will was revoked by the general devise operating as an exercise of the power in the will of 1877, and that this will was not affected by the will of 1878; aud (3) by the representative of B., on the ground that the appointments contained in the prior wills had been revoked by the revocatory clause iu the will of 1878, and consequeutly that the property went as iu default of appointment. Jessel, M.R, was of opinion that the third will had revoked both the former wills, and that the property remained uuappointed. — Solicitors, Gunnel $ Son; J. W. Smith,

Practice—Ord. 16, R. 17—Cross-claim Against CoDefendant.—A summons iu an action of Benecke y. Craddock, adjourned into court and heard before Vicechancellor Hall on the \S\h inst., raised a point of practice) as to the determination of questions between co-defendants. The action was brought by a mortgagee for foreclosure and sale of the interest of Messrs. Craddock and Smith in the plant, machinery, and agreements for leases of a colliery, under an agreement made between themselves and one Senior. Senior had been made a co-defendant in the action with Craddock and Smith, and claimed sums due to himself under the agreement, and the right to retain possession of the property until he was paid. Craddock and Smith set up in their statement of defence a cross-claim in respect of certain money balances against Senior. The present application was by Craddock and Smith that they might have the leave of the) court that service of their statement of defence upon Senior might be notice of their cross-claim. The rule (ord. 16, r. 17) under which the application was made provides that "where a defendant is, or claims to be, entitled to contribution or indemnity, or any other remedy or relief over against any other person, or where from any other cause it appears to the court or a judge that a question in the action should be determined, not only as between the plaintiff and defendant, but as between the plaintiff, defendant, and any other person, or between any or either of them, the court or a judge may, on notice being given to such last-mentioned person, make such order as may be proper for having the question so determined." His lordship, in the present case, considered that it would be highly inconvenient that the question between the co-defendants should be tried iu the action, and doubted, moreover, whether the application was right in farm. The summons was therefore dismsised, with costs.—Solicitors, Bradford f Farish; Torr j- Co.

Solicitor And Client—Ccstodt Op Title DBeds—Luna For CostsAbsconding Solicitor.—On tbe 21th inst, a motion was heard before Vice-Chancellor Hall in an action 1 of Molloy v. KiHy, whereby the plaintiff sought to obtain

An order against Messrs. Smiles & Co., solicitors, to direct them to deliver over certain title deeds relating to real estate belonging to the plaintiffs. The circumstances nnder which the deeds came into the possession of Messrs. Smiles & Co. were as follows :—The former solicitor of the plaintiffs in the action, O'Neill by name, baring been committed for trial upon a criminal charge, had absconded from his bail and not since been heard of, bnt, upon his disappearance, the deeds were handed to Messrs. Smiles & Co. by a third party acting nnder a power of attorney from O'Neill, and Messrs. Smiles & Co. were instructed to hold and use them for the purposes of tlie action, but subject to a lien on the part of O'Neill for heavy costs incurred in the action. No offer was made by the plaintiffs to indemnify Messrs. Smiles & Co. against any claim on O'Neill's part in respect of his lien, although they offered to hand over the deeds if that were done, but an unconditional order was asked. His lordship, however, said that he could not do what was in effect to confiscate the property of a man committed for trial, s.c. O'Neill's lien for unpaid costs, and made an order for the delivery up of the deeds on the plaintiff's undertaking to submit to O'Neill's claim, if, and when, established. He referred to give any costs of the motion.—Solicitors, T. D. Petlivsr ; Smiles $ Co.

(Before Mr. Registrar Brougham, acting as Chief Judge.)
Feb. 10.—Re Jacobs.

Creditors who have proved their debt under resolutions for composition, and opposed such resolutions, but who hive received the composition, restrained from proceeding at law, notwithstanding tbe faot that their debt is not sufficiently set forth in the debtor's statement of affairs.

This was an application on behalf of Daniel Jacobs for an order that Messrs. Goodman and the sheriff of Middlesex should be absolutely restrained from taking any further proceedings under an execution levied upon the goods of the applicant in an action in which Messrs. Goodman were plaintiffs, and Uyman Lipson and the applicants were defendants.

On the 30th of July, 1880, Daniel Jacobs filed a petition for liquidation by arrangement or composition. At the first meeting, held on the 17th of August, the creditors passed a resolution to adjourn, and at the adjourned meeting resolutions were carried that a composition should be accepted of one shilling in the pound, to be paid within fourteen days of registration at the office of the debtor's solicitor, and that tbe security of Solomon Barnett should be accepted for the composition. The solicitor for MeBsrs. Goodman attended the first meeting, and objected to the adjournment, but Messrs. Goodman did not attend, nor were they in any way represented at tbe adjourned meeting.

At the second meeting, held on the 15th of September, the ■creditors oonfirmed the resolutions for composition. Messrs. Goodman then attended by proxy, and put in their proof for £151 3s. Id., but did not assent to the resolutions. They subsequently opposed registration, on the ground that the resolution for the adjournment had not been duly passed, but the registrar overruled the objection.

The debtor returned Messrs. Goodman in his statement of affairs as creditors for £76 5s. 8J. only, which was admittedly an insufficient amount.

On the 5th of October, Messrs. Goodman received a letter from the debtor's solicitor in the following terms :—

"17, Gracechurch-street, E.C.—Sept., 1880. "I beg to inform you that you may receive the composition of one shilling in the pound on £151 3s. Id., the amount of your claim in this matter, upon applying at my offices as above, between the hours of eleven and four.

"Any bills or other securities you may hold must be produced.

"The amount of the composition will be transmitted by post at your risk upon the return of this notice with the receipt attached, duly signed, or it will be paid upon the production of this notice and the receipt duly signed.— Tours obediently, "Henry Albert Patience,

"Solicitor in the matter."

Messrs. Goodman thereupon signed a receipt in the following form, and forwarded it to Mr. Patience :— "The Bankruptcy Act, 1869.

* In the matter of proceedings for or towards the liqui

dation by arrangement or composition with creditors instituted by Daniel Jacobs (describing him).

"Received the sum of £7 lis. 3d., being the amount of the composition of one shilling in the pound on our claim in this matter. "J. & J. Goodman."

On the 7th of October they received a orossed cheque for the amount, and they did not send any further acknowledgment to the debtor or his solicitor. Subsequently, Messrs. Goodman, believing that they were not bound by the resolution, instructed their solicitor to issue a fi. fa. on a judgment which they obtained against the debtor on the 1st of June, 1880, for a portion of their debt of £151 3). Id, and to commence an action for the balance. The sheriff entered into possession under the fi. fa. on the 21st of January, and on the same day the debtor was served with a writ at the suit of Messrs. Goodman.

On the 25th of January the debtor obtained an order from this court restraining the plaintiffs from prooeeding under the judgment and the Ji. fa. issued thereon, and on the 2Sth the plaintiffs were served with a notice of the present application.

E. C. Willis, for the applicant.—The plaintiffs are bound by the terms of the composition, and they had no right to levy an execution. They accepted the sum of £7 lis. 3d. in satisfaction of the composition on their debt.

fi. V. Williams, for the plaintiffs.—This is a mere question between the debtor and the plaintiffs whether they agreed to receive the money in satisfaction, and a common law court is in a position to deal with the whole matter. The provisions of a composition are binding upon those creditors only whose names and the amount of whose debts appear in the debtor's statement. Ex parte Lacty (29 W. R. 299, L. R. 16 Ch. D. 131) shows that where a creditor is not bound by the resolution at the time of registration, he cannot come in afterwards and obtain the benefit of the resolution. The debt dne to tbe plaintiffs not being correctly stated, the resolutions are not binding npon them.

Mr. Registrar Brougham.—They are bound to the extent of the amount which appears in the statement of affairs—£76.

Williams.—The principle upon which the court should act is laid down in Ex parte The Paper Staininy Company*, fiisltop (L. R. 8 Cb. 595), and if a creditor objects to be bound by a resolution on grounds peculiar to himself, he ought not to be restrained' He also cited Breslauer v. Brown (26 W. R. 536, L. R. 3 H. L. Cas. 672); Lewis v. Leonari (L. R. 5 Ex. D. 165).

Willis, in reply.—The plaintiffs had no right to come ia and take the composition, and then turn round and say they were not bound by the resolutions. A creditor whose claim has not been omitted from the debtor's statement may, nevertheless, come in under the resolutions.

Mr. Registrar Brougham, after referring to the fact), which he said were not in dispute, said that in Breslauer v. Brown, Lord Blackburn made these observations : "I take it that if a man came in dnring the proceedings and said, I claim to prove for £1,000 which has been left out of the list, and if his proof was admitted, and then he nsed his power to vote against the composition, being an absolutely dissenting creditor, waiving the condition for his benefit for the very purpose of opposing the resolution, nevertheless, if the resolution was carried by the statutory majority, he would be bound by it." Those remarks seemed to apply here. In that case the creditor was not put down in the statement of affairs ; here the creditors were put down, but not for the whole amount. If, however, they had come in for the larger amount, they could not have prevented registration of the resolution. But having proved for the amount of their claim, and opposed the resolutien, they must be considered as bound to the full amount; and, even if it had been a matter of discretion, whether this court would allow the matter to go on or not, he thought .the creditors ought to be restrained.

Application granted.
Solicitor for the debtor, John Cotton.
Solicitor for the plaintiffs, O. G. Harmon.

(Before Mr. Registrar Hazlitt, acting as Chief Judge.)

Feb. 12.—Be Bouldm, the Younger.
Leave given to debtor to file a second petition for liquida-
tion when proceedings under the first have fallen throue-n.
The debtor recently presented a petition for liquidation,

and, at the adjourned first meeting, held ou the 26th of January, the creditors passed a resolution to accept a composition of two shillings in the pound, one-half payable forthwith, and the other naif by instalments. The resolution was -duly filed, and the second general meeting appointed to be held on the 8th of February, when four creditors whose debts amounted to £157 voted for the confirmation of the resolution, and four creditors to the amount of £106 dissented from it. The resolution was not, therefore, carried by the statutory majority.

Thomas Noton (solicitor), for the debtor, applied for leave to convene a new first meeting of creditors, He stated that one creditor had taken proceedings against the debtor and was in a position to sign judgment, and two others had obtained orders of committal against him, and it was desirable they should be restrained.

Mr. Registrar Hazlitt.—I do not see any special circumstances to justify the application. The creditors have met, sod the creditor has not carried the resolution. I cannot allow anew first meeting to be convened, but leave may be given to file afresh petition for liquidation.

Feb. 18.—Re Nobbe. New first meeting of creditors allowed in a case where, partly owing to the confusion and noise whioh prevailed at tile first meeting, no resolution was put, and creditors to a large amount desired to acoept a composition.

The debtor presented a petition for liquidation on the 27th of January, and the firstjmeeting of creditors was appointed to be held on the 15th of February. The debts amounted to about £5.500 in tbe aggregate, and creditors to the extent of £575 resiled in Germany. At ihe first meeting considerable confusion and noise prevailed. The proxies of some of the foreigu creditors did not appear to be aware of their rights or duties, and tbe proceedings terminated without any resolution being pot to tbe meeting.

S. Wyatt Hart applied for leave to convene a new first meeting of the creditors. He produced an affidavit which showed that creditors to the extent of £4,600 out of a total of .£5,500 desired to avoid the expenses of a bankruptcy by accepting a composition from the debtor; and be contended, upon the authority of Ex parte Terrell (25 W. R. 153, L. R. -4 Ch. D. 293), that the court might properly allow a new meeting to be held. The omission to pass a resolution was a mistake on the part of the creditors, consequent upon tbe confuiion and noise which prevailed at the meeting.

Mr. Registrar Hazlitt held that, as no resolution had been put to the creditors at the first meeting, and n large body of the creditors now desired to accept a composition, a new first meeting might be allowed.

Solicitor, Greening.


Common Pleas Division.
(Sittings in Banej, before Grove and Lindlet, JJ.)

Feb. 21.—Barker v. Stone. The facts of this case were as follow :—An action for damtg's had been brought in a county court by the plaintiff against a man named Wearn, the present defendant Stone being employed to conduct the action as the plaintiff s solicitor. The judge intimated at the conclusion of the case that his pigment would be for tbe plaintiff, in any event, for £25, but reserved formal judgment in order to consider whether the plaintiff was not entitled to £15 more. At the next sitting of the court judgment for the full amount was given; bat in the interim between the sittings of the two courts, one Harris, hearing tbat an action had been brought, consulted Stone with reference to a claim which he had on Weam's .furniture and effects. Stone, without consulting the plaintiff Ot telling Harris that he had been solicitor in the action, advised Harris to obtain a bill of sale with a view to perfect his title, and Harris, taking this counsel, procured and fegiitered a bill of sale to the prejudice of Barker, who thus lo<t the fruits of his judgment. Barker then sued Stone in «he county court for negligence, and the judge, though negativing negligence, held that there had been a distinct breach of faith on tbe part of the defendant, and gave judgment for the plaintiff. Against this judgment the defendant now

Cave, Q.C., and Stone appeared for the defendant; Kerans for the plaintiff. After considerable argument,

Grove, J., gave judgment in favour of the plaintiff. —There were three grounds of action against the defendant— viz., neglect, breach of duty, and misconduct. Those terms might or might not be applied to the same kind of action, but, in his judgment, whether the defendant's conduct was more properly described as breach of duty or as neglect, either was sufficient to support the aotion. It could only not be a breach of duty by the defendant alleging ignorance, in which case it would be negligence; but to his mind it seemed hardly credible that a solicitor should be ignorant of so manifest a duty as, having been actually retained for one client, to acoept duties for another in direct conflict with the interests ot the first. It was not necessary that there should be collusion between the solicitor and his second client. The judgment of Chief Justice Tindal in the case of Taylor v. Blacklow, which had been cited in the argument, sufficiently showed that a breach of duty miiht be actionable. That was a case where the defendant, an attorney, being employed to raise money on mortgage for the plaintiff, disclosed to the proposed lender certain defects in the plaintiff's title, in consequence of which the plaintiff was exposed to certain actions at the suit of the proposed lender and suffered certain damage. Chief Justice Tindal in discussing the oonduct of tbe defendant, said that, instead of faithfully discharging his duty of raising money upon his client's deeds, he disclosed defects of title to the very person who was about to lend. In consequence of this disclosure the plaintiff sustained certain injuries. There was, therefore, a breach of duty on the part of the defendant which there was no ground for saying, was not actionable. This judgment he (Grove, J.) adopted as strictly applicable to the present case. A pregnant instance of the hardship on the plaintiff had been afforded by the defendant's own conduct, for, according to tbe evidence, he admitted that he felt himself incapacitated from taking any part in impugning the bill of sale, which it might have been his imperative duty to do on behalf of the plaintiff in securing to him the fruits of his judgment. It had been argued that if the defendant had not advised Harris some other solicitor would have done so and to the same effect. This argument might possibly affect the question of damages, but it did not touch the main question, his answer being that it was not the defendant's business to consider whether or not Harris would consult anybody else. His one and only duty was to protect the interests of his client, the plaintiff. Upon the whole question, therefore, he was clearly of opinion that there had been a palpable breach of faith, and that the judgment of the county court judge was right, not only in respect to his decision on the merits, but also with regard to the damages, which ought not to be disturbed.

Lindlet, J., concurred. The duties of a solicitor to a client were positive and negative, and the latter were as clear and as definite as the former. It was the duty of a solicitor to abstain from doing all acts inconsistent with his positive duty towards his client and from any act which might prejudice or defeat that client's interests. Mr. Cave had relied on varions instances which he had referred to of solicitors aoting for different clients with different interests, such as creditors to a bankrupt's estate, and no doubt these oases occurred every day and properly ; but the answer was that in such cases there was no direct conflict of interests. Here there was, and he had no doubt whatever that the defendant's conduct wag manifestly on the wrong side of the line.

Cave asked for leave to appeal, but

Grove, J., said that, although he agreed tho case was important, yet tbe court were so absolutely without doubt in this decision that they could not encourage such a course.— T,ma.

An American legal journal publishes the following advertisement:—

'BRIEFS skilfully and logically prepared by able and experienced lawyers, members of tho N. Y. Law Instituto Library (students not employed). Satisfaction and absolute secrecy guaranteed. Lawyers practising in N. Y. State or otlier States can thus secure thorough Briefs, for use in the Court of Appeals or elsewhere, and avoid costly counsel who cannot serve you so well as a carefully prepared Brief submitted without argument. Terms low. For particulars, etc., address, NEW YORK BRIEF iHM. PANT, P. O. Box 2,160, N. Y. City."


The following correspondence has been published :— "New-court, Temple, Feb. 17. "My dear Mr. Clabon,—My attention has been oalled by members of the bar to the fifth paragraph in the suggestions made by the Connoil of the Incorporated Law Society, published in the Times of yesterday. It is as follows :—

"' 5- There can be no reasonable donbt that the main canse of the heavy expense of modern litigation is dne to the largely increased fees paid to counsel of late years, and especially to the comparatively reoent practice of giving daily refresher fees, which were all but unknown a quarter of a oentury ago. It is therefore recommended that daily refreshers should be abolished, as being one of the principal causes of the undue lengthening of trialB, and the inoreased expense thereby occasioned.'

"It appears to me and others that most persons would regard the above statement as containing a direct charge against the honour—even the honesty—of every member of the bar; for it apparently means that barristers who are in the habit of receiving refreshers intentionally prolong cases to an nnneoessary length (and, therefore, injurious to their clients), for the sake of pecuniary advantage to themselves.

"I oannot think that the Connoil of the Incorporated Law Sooiety intended to prefer such a charge. But still, the words employed are so likely to be construed in the sense I have indicated, that I venture to address you, as President of the Incorporated Law Sooiety, and to express the hope that the meaning which has been attached to the above suggestion is inoorrect, and that the ooucoil had no intention of making any accusation against an important seotion of the profession to whioh they themselves belong.

"I shall be glad if you will place this letter at your early convenience before the Connoil of the Incorporated Law Sooiety. "I am, dear Mr. Clabon, yours very trnly,

"Henry James.

"J. M. Clabon, Esq., President of the Council of the Icoorporated Law Sooiety."

"Chancery-lane, "W.C., Feb. 18.

"Dear Mr. Attorney-General,—I have laid before the council your letter of the 17th inst., referring to the fifth paragraph of the suggestions made by the Council of the Incorporated Law Society with regard to the expense of and delays in proceedings nnder the Judicatnre Acts, and saying that it appears to yon, and others, that most persons would regard the statements contained in that paragraph as containing a direct charge against the honour—even the honesty —of the bar, as apparently meaning that barristers who are in the habit of receiving refreshers intentionally prolong cases to an unnecessary length (and, therefore, injuriously to their clients), for the sake of pecuniary advantage to themselves.

"The council unanimously direct me to assure you, and through you the whole bar, that they did not intend to prefer such a charge, and that the meaning which has been attached to the snggestion in paragraph 5 is incorrect. The council had no intention of making any accusation against so important a section of the profession to which they themselves belong.

"I have the honour to be, dear Mr. AttorneyGeneral, your faithful servant,

"John M. Clabon, President.

"To her Majesty's Attorney-General, Q.C., M.P., &c., 1, New-oourt, Temple."

"House of Commons, February 18.

"My dear Mr. Clabon,—I have to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of to-day's date.

"The members of the bar will, I am sure, be glad to learn that the meaning which had been attached to the snggestion contained in paragraph 5 of the communication from the Council of the Incorporated Law Society to the Judicature Acts Committee is incorrect. I hope you will forgive me for saying that I think your letter wonld be read with greater pleasure if we could learn from it what meaning the members of the Council of the Incorporated Law Sooiety attach to the words contained in their suggestion.

"Believe me, yours very truly,

"J. M. Clabon, Esq." "Henry James."

"Incorporated Law Societv, Chancery-lane, W.C., Feb. 23, 1881.

"Dear Mr. Attorney-General,—I have laid your letter of the 18th inst. before the Council of the Incorporated Law Society, and with reference to the concluding passage, in which you intimate that my letter wonld hare been read with greater pleasure if the bar could leant from it what meaning the members of the council attach to the words contained in their suggestions (paragraph 5), I have been requested to state that their meaning and intention were to point out the objections to the system, and not to make personal charges agaiust those who use it.

"In making the suggestions the council were guided simply by a desire to reduce, in the interests of the public, the expenses of legal proceedings; and as their own branch of the profession has frequently been charged with unnecessarily lengthening legal documents, because the payment for their preparation is a . cording to length, the fault being in the system (which they have long striven to get altered) and not in themselves, so the suggestion was that the system of 'refreshers' has an inevitable tendency to the result indicated, the system ag iin, and not the individuals, being at fault.

"It muBt be obvious that any change reduoing expenses in the mode under discussion would diminish the fees of solicitors as well as the fees of the bar to the benefit of the snitor.

"I have already assured you that the council in makirg the suggestion had not the least intention to bring any accusation against the bar or any member of it, and I will' only add that it would give the oounoil pleasure if in any way they could aot jointly with the bar in diminishing the oost of legal proceedings tor the publio advantage.

"I am, dear Mr. Attorney-General, yours very faithfully, "john M. Clabon, President.

"To her Majesty's Attorney-General, Q.C., M.P., L, New-court, Temple."



Mr. Gerald Wolfe Lydekker, barrister, died at his residence, The Lodge, Harpenden, on the 12th inst. Mr. Lydekker was the only son of the late Dr. Richard Lydekker, of St. Albans, and was born in 1811. He was educated at Eton and at Trinity College, Cambridge, where he graduated in the first class of the classical tripos in 1833. He was called to the bar at the Inner Temple in Hilary Term, 1841, and he practised for several years on the Home Circuit, and at tbe Essex, Herts, and St. Albans Sessions. He had a fair criminal business at the assizes and sessions, but he retired from practice a few years after his call to the bar, on succeeding (by his father's death) to the estates at Harpenden. Mr. Lydekker was a magistrate for Bedfordshire, Hertfordshire, and the Liberty, of St. Albans, and since 1875 he had been deputy-chairman of quarter sessions for the St. AlbanB Division of Hertfordshire, lie was also a director of th < Clerical, Medical, and General Life Assurance Company. Mr. Lydekker was buried in the family vault at St. Peter's Church, St. Albans, on the 16th inst. He was married in 1848 to the daughter of the late Mr. Serjeant Peake, and heleaves four sons.


Mr. Joseph Augustus Yorke, barrister, died on the 14th inst. Mr. Yorke was the only son of the late Hon. and Very Rev. Grantham Munton Yorke, Dean of Worcester, and was grandson of the third Earl of Hardwicke. His mother was the daughter of Sir Henry Conyingham Montgomery, Bart. He was born in 1831, and was called to the bar at the Inner Temple in Easter Term, 1854. He formerly practised on the Home Circuit, and for several years he held a commission in the Iuns of Court Rifle Volunteers. He was secretary of presentations to Lord Chelmsford when Lord Chancellor, and in 1867 he was appointed one of the registrars of the Leeds Bankruptcy Court, but the office was abolished by the Bankruptcy Act, 1869, and he retired upon a pension. In 1876 he was appointed by Sir Richard Cross to be police magistrate for the borough of South Shields, bathe did not hold the office very long, since about a year ayo he was compelled by ill-heslth to retire upon a pensions Mr. Yorke was married to the daughter of Mr. Thoma Cliambre.


The Hon. George Charles Brodrick, barrister, has been elected Warden of Merton College, Oxford, in succes■ion to the late Dr. Robert Bullock Marsbam. Mr. Brodrick is the second son of the seventh Viscount Midleton, and was born in 1831. He was educated at Harrow and at Balliol College, where he graduated as a double first (classics and law and modern history) in 1854. In the following year he obtained the Arnold Prize and the Chancellor's Prize for an English essiy, and he was afterwards elected a fellow of Merton College. He graduated LL.B. of the University of London in 1858, and he was called to the bar at Lincoln's inn in Trinity Term, 1859. Mr. Brodrick formerly practised on the Western Circuit, and he was for a short time a member of the School Board for London for the Westminster Division.

Mr. Francis Richard Turxbr Bloxam (of the firm of Paterson, Snow, & Bloxam), of 25, Linooln's-inn-fields, has been appointed a Commissioner to administer Oaths in the Supreme Conrt of Judicature.

Mr. Pope Alexander Cooper, barrister, who has been appointed Attorney-General of the Colony of Queensland, in succession to Mr. Henry Rogers Beor, deceased, was called to the bar at the Middle Temple in Trinity Term, 1872. He was called to the bar at Brisbane in 1874, and is member for the Cook District in the Queensland Legislative Assembly.

Mr. William Henry Cutler, solicitor, of 10, King-street, St. James'e-tquare, has been appointed a Commissioner to administer Oaths in the Supreme Conrt of Judicature.

Mr. Henry Cecil Geare, solicitor, of 57, Lincoln's-innfields, has been appointed a Commissioner to administer Oaths in the Supreme Conrt of Judicature.

Mr. George Domett Gocld, solicitor, of Leeds, has been appointed a Commissioner to administer Oaths in the Supreme Court of Judicature.

Mr. George Hadfield, solicitor, of Manchester, who has been elected President of the Manchester Incorporated Law Society for the ensuing year, is the son of Mr. George Hadfield, solicitor, of Manchester, many years M.P. for Sheffield. He was admitted a solicitor in 1850.

Mr. Joseph Hands, of Loughborough, has been appointed a Commissioner to administer Oaths in the Supreme Court of Judicature.

Mr. Willan Jackson, solicitor, of Wellingborough, has been appointed Clerk to the Irthineborougn and Earls Barton School Boards, on the resignation of his partner, Mr. Matthew Reid Sharman. Mr. Jackson was admitted a solicitor in 1876.

Mr. Charles Russell Jambs (of the firm of James & Co., solicitors, of Mertbyr Tydfil and Aberdare), has been appointed a Commissioner to administer Oaths in the Supreme Court of Judicature.

Mr. Alexander Smith Kinnear, advocate, LL.D., has been elected Dean of the Faculty of Advocates in Scotland, in "ncoession to Lord Fraser. Mr. Kinnear is an LL.D. of the CnWersity of Edinburgh. Bo was called to the bar in Scotland in 1806, and he holds the offioe of Solicitor of

The Hon. Henry James Moncrieff, advocate, has been appointed Sheriff of Renfrewshire and Buteshire, in succes* "•n to Lord Fraser. Mr. Moncrieff is the eldest son of the Right Hon. Lord Moncrieff, Lord Justice Clerk of Scotland, and was horn in 1840. He was educated at Harrow and at Trhuty College, Cambridge, where he was placed in tbe first class ia the LL.B. examination in 1861. He was called to the bar in Scotland in 1861, and he was appointed an advocate-depute in April, 1880.

Mr. Samuel, Prior, solicitor, of 38, Walbrook, has been appointed a Commissioner to administer Oaths in the Supreme Court of Judicature.

Mr. Thomas Adam Watson, solicitor, of Bradford, has been appointed a Magistrate for that borough. M

was admitted a solioitor in 1857, and is in partnership with Mr. James Norton Dickons.

Mr. John Henry Wade, solicitor and notary (of thefirm of Rawson, George, 4 Wade), of Bradford, has been appointed a Magistrate for that borough. Mr. Wade was admitted a solicitor in 1852, and is solicitor to the Bradford School Board, also a director of the Bradford District Bank.


WINDING-UP NOTICES. Joint Stock Companies. Limited In Chanceby. Babbado9 Gas Company, Limitbd.—Petition for winding up, presented Feb 17, directed to bo heard before the M.R. on Feb 26. Smith and Wood, Great James st, Bedford row, agents for Southall and Co, Birmingham, solicitors for the petitioners


Limited.—The M.R. has fixed Feb 28 at 11 at his chambers for the appointmen t of ah official liquidator

Clbsdad Valley Slate Quabbies Company, Limited.—Petition for winding up, presented Feb 11, directed to be heard before the M.E. on Feb 26. Andrew and Co, Groat James st, Bedford row, solicitors for the petitioners

Hampton-on.sea Estate Association, Limitbd.—Creditors are required, on before March 18, to send their names and addresses and tho particulars of their debts or claims to John Jorvis Garrard, Leadenhall st. March 25 at 12 is appointed for hearing and adjudicating upon tho debts and claims

Tbamways Cobpoeation Limited.—By an order made by theV.C.H. dated July 9, it was ordered that tho corporation be wound up. Miller and Miller, Sherborne, solicitors for the petitioner

[tfjzettc, Feb 18.]

Bagwobth Collieey Company, Limited.—By an order mado by the M.R. dated Feb 12, it was ordered that tho company be wound up. Field and Co, Lincoln's inn fields, solicitors for tho petitioner

H. A. Bbown And Company, Limited.—By an order mado by tho V.C.H. datod Feb 11, it was ordered that the company bo wound up. Burn, Clement's lane, solicitor

Union Land And Building Company, Limited.—By an order made by the V.C.M. dated Jan 11, it was ordered that the voluntary winding up of the company be continued. Dixon, South sq. Gray's inn, agent for Ncodham and Co, Manchester, solicitors for the petitioner

{Gazette, Feb. 22.]

Unlimited In Chancery. Madbas Ibbigation And Canal Company.—Petition for winding up, presented Feb 12, directed to bo heard before the M.R. on Feb 29. Ashurst and Co, Old Jowry, solicitors for tho petitioners

[Gazette, Feb. 18.]

County Palatine Of Lancasteb. Mbbsey Steel And Ikon Company, Limited.—By an ordor mado by Bristowe, V.C.,".dated Feb IS, it was ordered that the company bo wound up. Simpson and North, Liverpool, solicitors for the petitioner ■

[Gazette, Feb. 18.]

Friendly Societies Dissolved. Sheffield District Clerks' Fbibndly Society, Aldinc climbers. Feb 12

Bud Of Hope Tent 68 Independent Ordee Of Rechabites, 40, Radnor terrace, South Lambeth. Feb 15

[Gazette, Feb. 18.]

Sick And Benefit Fund Of The Roreberry Lodge Of The Royal Antediluvian Order Of Buffaloes Fbibndly Society, Tower, Artillery st, Bishopgatc. Feb 18

[Gazette, Feb. 23.]



At the sixth annual mooting of tbe society, held at the Town Hall, Nottingham, on the 29th of January, 1881, the president (C. Butlin, Esq.) in the chair,

It was resolved:—

That the annual report of the council be taken as read, and that the same be received and adopted.

That the thanks of the society be given to Mr. Charles Butlin for his services as president during tbe past year.

That the thanks of the society be given to Mr. Arthur Browne for his services as secretary of tho Law Library Committee during the past year.

That the thanks of the society be given to Mr. Arthur Williams for his services as secretary during tbe past year.

That the thanks of the society be given to T. T. Weightman, Esq., and H. Y. Stanger, Esq., barristers-at-law, for

« PreviousContinue »