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property of the builder should be taken by the landowner in full satisfaction of his claims against the builder. It was analogous to a sale of property with a power to re-purchase. BRETT, L.J., said that it was admitted that a sale of the materials by the builder to a third person would not have affected the rights of the landowner under the agreement, and this was conclusive to show that the title of the trustee in the liquidation was subject to the landowner's rights. COTTON, LJ., said that if by an assignment of the materials for value the right of the landowner could not be defeated, so long as the materials remained on the land, there was no provision in the Bankruptcy Act which placed him in a worse position as against the trustee. The order and disposition clause did not apply, because the landlord was not the true owner of the materials until he had exercised his right to seize them.-SOLICITORS, S. G. Ashwin; H. Montagu.

PRACTICE-BANKRUPTCY APPEAL-TIME FOR APPEALING FROM COUNTY COURT TO CHIEF JUDGE-BANKRUPTCY RULES, 1870, R. 143-BANKRUPTCY RULE OF MAY 26, 1873.-In a case of Ex parte Hall, before the Court of Appeal on the 27th ult., the question arose whether the time for appealing from a bankruptcy order of a county court to the Chief Judge has been varied by the Rules under the Jadicature Act, or whether it is still regulated by the Bankruptcy Rule 143 of 1873, as interpreted by the Bankruptcy Rule of the 26th of May, 1873. Rule 143 provides that "an appeal against a decision or order of the Chief Judge in Bankruptcy, or a judge of a county court, shall be entered with the Registrar of Appeals within, and not later than, twenty-one days from the said decision or order." And rule 150 provided that "the office for entering bankruptcy appeals to be heard by the Court of Appeal in Chancery shall be closed during the ordinary vacations of the Court of Chancery, and the time during which such office shall be closed shall not be reckoned in the number of days ordered for the entering of appeals to be heard by such Court of Appeal in Chancery." This rule was rescinded by the rule of the 26th of May, 1873, which provided that "the office for entering bankruptcy appeals shall be open daily throughout the year, except on Sunday, Christmas Day, Good Friday, the Saturday after Good Friday, Monday and Tuesday in Easter week, and on any day appointed for a public fast or thanksgiving;

and the days on which the office shall be wholly closed shall not be reckoned in the number of days ordered for the entering of appeals." It was decided by the Chief Judge, in Ex parte Hicks (23 W. R. 852, L. R. 20 Eq. 143), that, by virtue of this rule, Sundays are not to be counted in reckoning the twenty-one days under rule 143, so that, in effect, twenty-four days are given for appealing, and this has ever since been accepted as the practice in appeals to the Court of Bankruptcy. But in Ex parte Viney (25 W. R. 354, L. R. 4 Ch. D. 794), the Court of Appeal held that the time for appealing from decisiors of the Chief Judge to the Court of Appeal is now regulated entirely by the rules under the Judicature Act, and the Sundays are not to be excluded from the computation of the twenty-one days fixed by rule 15 of order 58. The court

was not, however, then called upon to decide whether the ald practice remains in regard to appeals from the county courts to the Chief Judge. In Ex parte Hale, this point was raised, and Bacon, C.J., held that, with regard to such appeals, the old practice is still in force, and that, consequently, Sundays are to be excluded from the computation of the twenty-one days under rule 143. The Court of Appeal (JAMES, BRETI, and COTTON, L.JJ.) affirmed this decision.-SOLICITORS, G. Presswell; Clarke, Rawlins, &

Clarke.

COSTS-APPEAL-HABEAS CORPUS-PROHIBITION - APPEARANCE OF JUDGE TO DEFEND JURISDICTION-ORD. 58, R. 5. The case of In re Dale (noted ante, p. 217) came again before the Court of Appeal on the 29th ult. upon the question of the costs of the appeal. The appellant, who had failed altogether in the Queen's Bench Division, succeeded in the Court of Appeal upon his application for a writ of habeas corpus, but failed in his application for a writ of prohibition to Lord Penzance, as the judge of the Provincial Court of Canterbury appointed under the Public Worship Regulation Act, 1874, on the ground that he had exceeded

his jurisdiction. The appellant claimed his costs of the appeal so far as it related to the habeas corpus, and in opposition to his claim it was urged that the proceeding was of a criminal nature, and that the court had no power to give the costs of it. The court (JAMES, BRETT, and COTTON, L.JJ.) held that the appellant was entitled to his costs. JAMES, L.J., said that it was an abuse of terms to call the application for a habeas corpus a criminal proceeding, as the offence for which the appellant was imprisoned was a contempt of court; and BRETT, L.J., said that when a habeas corpus was applied for on behalf of a prisoner, it was applied for on the ground that he was an innocent person, and there was nothing criminal in that. And, as to the costs of Lord Penzance, it was urged that he was not entitled to them, because it was unusual and unnecessary for a judge to appear to support his jurisdiction. The Queen's Bench Division did not give him his costs of his appearance in that court. The Court of Appeal held that there was nothing to exclude the application of the ordinary rule, and that Lord Penzance must be paid his costs of the appeal by the appellant.-SOLICITORS, Brooks, Jenkins, & Co.; J. Girdlestone; Solicitor to the Treasury.

STAY OF PROCEEDINGS PENDING APPEAL-APPLICATION TO COURT OF APPEAL-DEATH OF JUDGE OF FIRST INSTANCE -ORD. 58, RR. 16, 17.—In a case of Bostock v. Pearson an application was made ex parte to the Court of Appeal, on the 31st ult., with reference to a stay of proceedings pending an appeal from a decision of the Vice-Chancellor of the Lancaster Court. By virtue of rule 17 of order 58 such an application ought to be made in the first instance to the court whose decision is appealed from, but in the present case, owing to the death of Vice-Chancellor Little, it was impossible to make the application to that court. Under these circumstances the court (JAMES, BRETT, and COTTON, L.JJ.) thought that the application might be properly made at once to the Court of Appeal, and they gave leave to serve a notice of motion for the purpose.-SOLICITORS, Cross, Sons, & Riley.

RESTRICTIVE COVENANT AS TO USE OF LAND-"Beershop." -In a case of The London and Suburban Land and Building Company v. Field, before the Court of Appeal on the 31st alt., a question arose upon the construction of a cove. nant in restriction of the use of land. The defendant was subject to a covenant not to erect on a piece of land, forming part of an estate laid out for building, "any public-house, tavern, or beershop," nor to use any house erected on the piece of land as such. A shop had been built on the piece of land, and the defendant who was the occupier of the shop, had obtained a licence authorizing him to sell beer there not to be drunk on the premises, and he was selling beer there accordingly. The action was brought to restrain him from breaking the covenant. Jessel, M.R., overruled a demurrer to the statement of claim. It was contended on behalf of the appellant that the word "beershop" had a technical meaning, equivalent to that of "beer-house," i.e., a place where beer was gold to be drunk on the premises, and that, consequently, there had been no breach of the covenant. The court (JAMES, BRETT, and COTTON, L.JJ.), however, following the decision of the Queen's Bench Division in The Bishop of St. Albans v. Battersby (26 W. R. 979, L. R. 3 Q. B. D. 359), held that the word "beershop" had no technical meaning distinct from its ordinary meaning, and that it must be taken to mean a shop where beer was sold, even if it was consumed off the premises.-SOLICITORS, Shum, Crossman, & Co.; T. W. Rogers.

CLUB-EXPULSION OF MEMBER-JURISDICTION OF COURT TO INTERFERE.-In a case of Dawkins v. Antrotus, before the Court of Appeal on the 1st inst., the question arose whether the court had jurisdiction to review the decision of a general meeting of the members of a club, expelling the plaintiff from membership. The original rules of the club contained no provisions for the expulsion of members, but there was a power to alter the rules by a majority at a general meeting, at which at least forty members were present. After the plaintiff became a member a new rule was passed under this power, which provided that in case the conduct of any member, either in or out of the club-house, should, in the opinion of the committee, be injurious to the character and

interest of the club, the committee should be empowered, if they deemed it expedient, to recommend such member to resign, and, if he should not comply within a month, the committee should then call a general meeting, and if a majority of two-thirds of that meeting should agree by ballot to the expulsion of the member, his name should be erased from the list, and he should forfeit all right and claim upon the property of the club. The plaintiff was an officer in the army, and he alleged that a general officer, who was also a member of the club, had, while acting as a member of a military court of inquiry, held for the purpose of investigating certain allegations made by the plaintiff, acted improperly and unfairly towards him. The plaintiff published a pamphlet, which contained allegations of gross misconduct against the Duke of Cambridge, the Secretary of State for War, and various officers in the army, including the general officer in questior, and sent a copy of the pamphlet by post, addressed to the general officer at the Horse Guards, in an envelope having printed on the outside of it words imputing dishonourable conduct to him. The committee of the club called upon the plaintiff for an explanation. The plaintiff failed to give any explanation, and the committee then called upon him to resign his membership. This he declined to do, and a general meeting was then called to expel him, notice being given to him. The meeting was held, and a resolution for the expulsion of the plaintiff was passed by a majority of 108 to 36. The plaintiff, by his action, claimed a declaration that the resolution of the meeting was null and void, and it was contended on his behalf that the resolution had been come to in a capricious, unfair, and arbitrary manner, and not bonâ fide, and that the committee had been unduly biassed against the plaintiff, several of them being officers in the army and in the same regiment as the officer to whom the pamphlet had been sent. Jessel, M.R., though he said (vide 23 SOLICITORS' JOURNAL, 681) that he shouid himself have felt very great difficulty in holding that the mere sending a copy of the pamphlet to a member of the club, not at the club, in an envelope with the objectionable words printed on it, was "injurious to the character and interests of the club," he could not take upon himself to say that the committee had acted so unreasonably as to enable him to impute legal malice to them. He could not say that they, or the general meeting, had acted without reasonable or probable cause, or that the allegation of malice was sufficiently made out. He therefore dismissed the action. This decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeal (JAMES, BRETT, and COTTON, L.JJ.) on substantially the same grounds. JAMES, L.J., said that he entirely agreed with what was said by the Lords Commissioners in Inderwick v. Snell (2 M. & G. 216), in relation to the removal of directors of a company by a meeting of the shareholders, which was directly applicable to the case of a club. If the meeting of the members had been duly convened and had power to decide the particular question, the court had no jurisdiction to interfere unless it could be shown that the decision was so grossly unfair and unreasonable that it could not have been arrived at except from some malicious motive. If the committee and the general meeting were not acting fraudulently, and there was no ground for assuming that they were so acting, they were the sole judges whether the rule as to expulsion ought to be applied, and the court could not interfere. His lordship, however, was of opinion, with deference to the Master of the Rolls, that nothing could be more injurious to the character and interests of a c'ub than the conduct of the plaintiff in sending the pamphlet in question. BRETT, L.J., said that, unless there was clear proof of mala fides, which there was not in this case, the court had no authority to consider whether what was done by the meeting was reasonable or not, or to interfere with their decision, even if of opinion that it was wholly beyond reason and withSOLICITORS, Guscotte, Wadham, & Daw;

out reason.

Nicholl, Manisty, & Co.

PRACTICE-MOTION ON ADMISSIONS IN THE PLEADINGSRULES OF COURT, 1875, ORd. 40, r 11-RIGHT OF DEFENDANT TO MOVE WHO HAS NOT COUNTER-CLAIMED-RIGHT TO "RELIEF."--In a case of Pascoe v. Richards, before the Master of the Rolls on the 28th ult., the defendant had put in a defence to the statement of claim, but had not counterclaimed for any relief. The plaintiff then replied specially, and the defendant rejoined by joining issue on the reply. The defendant now moved under ord. 40, r. 11, that the action might be dismissed, on the ground that, on the admitted facts

in the pleadings, the plaintiff had not disclosed any case for relief against the defendant. The material words of the rule are as follows:-" Any party to an action may, at any stage thereof, apply to the court or a judge for such order as he may, upon any admissions of fact in the pleadings, be entitled to, without waiting for the determination of any other question between the parties. Any such application may be made by motion so soon as the right of the party applying to the relief claimed has appeared from the pleadings." The arguments turned mainly on the question whether the defendant could be said to be entitled to any "relief," as he had not counter-claimed, and a decision of Hall, V.C., of Litton v. Litton (L. R. 3 Ch. D. 793), was relied on in support of the view that a defendant, under the above circumstances, was not within the rule. JESSEL, M.R., was of opinion that the motion was well founded. If Hall, V.C., had decided the point, he should have followed bis decision; but, in his opinion, he had not decided the point that arose in the present case. In Litton v. Litton, default had been made in replying, and the Vice-Chancellor held that the proper mode in such a case was for the defendant to give notice of trial or to move to dismiss. Moreover, if the books of practice had been uniform as to the construction of the rule, he should probably have followed the general rule adopted by them, but they were not uniform as to the construction to be adopted, and he must, therefore, construe the rule himself. Now, on the rule, it was clear that "any party" could move, and those words must include a defendant. The later words were more ambiguous, and the difficulty was as to the meaning of the word relief." In other places in the rules where the word "relief" occurred, it was not confined to its old narrow meaning of the "relief' claimed by bill in chancery, but was to be used in its ordinary and wider sense. He did not see that a defendant could ask for greater relief than to have the action dismissed, and he thought the word was used in that sense. He was, moreover, of opinion that the first and enacting part of the rule was not to be cut down by the later portion, which only showed the way in which the enacting part was to be carried out, unless by clear and unequivocal words. On the construction of the rule, and on the reason of the thing, he thought the defendant, in such a case as the above, came within the rule; and he should, therefore, not allow the objection to the motion on that ground. On the merits, however, his lordship dismissed the motion.-SOLICITORS, Dollman & · Pritchard; Henry Aird.

17

WILL-GIFT OF RESIDUE TO WIDOW FOR LIFE WITH REMAINDER TO CHILDREN ADVANCES TO CHILDREN HOTCHPOT CLAUSE-INTEREST.-In a case of Re Rees, Rees ▼. George, before the Master of the Rolls on the 29th ult., the testator, by his will, gave the income of his residuary estate to his widow for life, and after her death, after legacies to his sons, directed his residuary estate to be divided amongst all his children at twenty-one, or marriage. The will contained a declaration that every sum of money advanced to his children during his life, or any money paid by the testator towards their maintenance or education, should be brought into hotchpot and accounted for as part of the respective share of such child in his residuary estate. The testator died in 1860, and the chief clerk certified that he left nine children, all of whom attained their majority, and that he had made advances to four of them. The widow died in 1880, whereupon the residuary estate became divisible, and on a petition for payment out of court of the nine shares, the question arose from what date the advanced children, in bringing their advances into hotchpot, were to be charged with interest on their shares. JESSEL, M.R., was of opinion that the interest was to be charged on the advances from the date of the death of the widow, and not from the date of the testator's death. -SOLICITORS, Warriner; Clarke, Woodcock, & Ryland.

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HUSBAND AND WIFE-PROTECTION ORDER-DISCHARGEDEATH OF WIFE WILL SEPARATE ESTATE PROBATE ACTION-COUNTER-CLAIM-DIVORCE ACT, 1857 (20 & 21 VICT. c. 85), ss. 21, 23-JUDICATURE ACT, 1873, s. 2 4, SUB-SECTION 3. In the Probate, Divorce, and Admiralty Division, on the 1st inst., the case of Mudge V. Adams was argued upon a demurrer to portions of the statement of defence and counter-claim. The plaintiff propounded the will of the wife of the defendant, and the statement of claim alleged that the deceased had

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appointed the plaintiff as her executor by a will duly executed by her when living apart from her husband, after baving obtained a protection order, and being possessed of separate estate. The defendant alleged in his statement of defence and counter-claim that the protection order had been obtained by his wife without his knowledge, and by means of fraud and false representations, and that he had not been guilty of desertion. By his counter-claim he asked that the court should pronounce against the will and grant letters of administration to him as the lawful husband of the deceased, and also for a declaration that the protection order was fraudulent and void, and should be set aside and discharged. The plaintiff replied that the defendant for a long time during the lifetime of the deceased knew of and acquiesced in the existence of the protection order, and allowed the deceased to act thereunder, and was thereby estopped from now questioning its validity. The plaintiff also demurred to so much of the statement of defence and counter-claim as alleged that the protection order was obtained without his knowledge and by means of fraud and false representations, and ought to be set aside, and that the defendant had not been guilty of desertion. It was argued by the plaintiff's counsel that the protection order precluded the defendant from disputing the will of the deceased, and that be could not, after his wife's death, take any step to have the order discharged. HANNEN, P., stopped the argument of the counsel for the defendant, and overruled the demurrer, upon the general principle that an order obtained by fraud may be set aside at the instance of the party complaining of the fraud, naless the rights of innocent parties would be prejudiced by so doing. The interests of the executor or of the legatees under a will made by a married woman who has obtained a protection order were not such rights as would be prejudiced by the discharge of the order, and the making of a will was not among the "acts "done by the wife between the making and the discharge of the protection order, which are specially protected by the 21 & 22 Vict. c. 108, s. 8, in the event of the order being discharged. The 20 & 21 Vict. c. 85, . 21, p'aced a wife who had obtained a protection order in the same position, with regard to property and contracts, as if she had obtained a decree of judicial separation, while section 23 enabled a husband or wife against whom a decree of judicial separation has been pronounced, "at any time thereafter," to present a petition to reverse the decree, on the ground that it was obtained in his or her absence, or that there was reasonable ground for the desertion. The words at any time thereafter" showed that the death of the busband or wife was not a bar to the application for the reversal of a decree of judicial separation, and for the same reason the death of the wife did not preclude an application to discharge the protection order, al hough, no doubt, it cast a heavy onus upon the husband. Secondly, the defendant was entitled to raise the question of the discharge of the protection order in the probate action, since he had properly claimed by his pleadings, in respect of a legal right, such relief as the court could have granted "in any suit instituted for that purpose, against the same plaintiff," within section 24, sub section 3, of the Judicature Act, 1873. In the present case the procedure was simplified, because both the probate and the discharge of the protection order were matters within the jurisdiction of the same division. He therefore held the counter-claim to be gcod, but reserved all questions as to costs until he had heard all the facts of the case.-SOLICITORS, Poole, Hughes, & Poole; Wedlake & Letts.

A Queen's Counsel writes to the Times:-"As one of those who signed the requisition for the meeting of the bar, which I have just left, I beg to say that, whatever its verdict, it seems to me to be valueless. It was im prssible to hear, hardly more possible to see, and very many of the working members of the bar, more especially of those in the fullest practice, are conspicuous by their absence. If it is a mere counting of noses, well; if anything more, it is simply valueless as any sort of aid in deciding a very grave question once and for all. I may add that three other working members of the bar-one a Queen's Counsel of long standing, whose experience and opinion are worth consideration-left at the same time as myself and for the same reason."

CASES BEFORE THE BANKRUPTCY
REGISTRARS.

(Before Mr. REGISTRAR PEPYS, acting as Chief Judge.) Jan. 25.-Ex parte Foreman and another, Re Roberts. A bill of sale was expressed to be made in consideration of £1,250, being a debt owing to the grantee by the grantor, £24 for interest due, and £100 then paid by the grantee to the grantor. In fact the grantor received £94 only by cheque, £6 being deducted for one year's interest, in anticipation, on the £100.

Held, that the deed was, by section 8 of the Bills of Sale Act, 1878, void against the trustees in the liquidation of the grantor. This was an application on behalf of the trustees of the property of Edwin Roberts for an order declaring that a bill of sale, dated 9th of June, 1879, and made between the debtor of the one part, and James Miles of the other part, was null and void against the said trustees, and that the property comprised therein, and the proceeds thereof, belonged to them.

By the bill of sale, which was registered pursuant to the Bills of Sale Act, 1878, the debtor, carrying on business as a pawnbroker, assigned to James Miles, who now claimed to be entitled to the benefit of the security, all his furniture, goods, fixtures, chattels, and other effects upon the premises occupied by him at No. 138, St. James's-road, Holloway, the pledges and stock-in-trade therein, and also all other goods, chattels, and effects which might thereafter come into or upon the said premises or any other premises of the debtor during the time any money might be due under and by virtue of the said bill of sale, by way of security for the sum of £1,250, in the said indenture expressed to be a debt owing to J. Miles by the debtor for money lent, and the sum of £24 for interest due thereon, and a further sum of £100, in the said indenture expressed to be then paid by Miles to the debtor, making thereby the sum of £1,374, with interest thereon at the rate of £6 per cent. per annum.

The sum of £100 was not, in fact, paid by Miles to the debtor at the time. The debtor received £94 only, by a cheque for that amount, dated 6th of June, 1879, the sum of £6 having been deducted and retained by Miles for one year's interest on the £100. There was a question upon the evidence whether a sum of £13 was not also paid by Miles, being the premium upon a policy of insurance effected on the debtor's life and deposited with Miles by way of security.

On the 9th of April, 1880, the debtor filed a petition for liquidation of his affairs, and at the first meeting trustees were appointed, with a committee of inspection.

Robson, in support for the application :-Apart from any other question the bill of sale is void against the trustees by reason of the consideration for which it was given not having been truly set forth in accordance with section 8 of the Bills of Sale Act, 1878. If anything be deducted for interest or discount the fact should be stated: Ex parte National Mercantile Bank, Re Haynes (28 W. R. 848, L. R. 15 Ch. D. 42, 23 SOLICITORS' JOURNAL, 504). In the present case interest in anticipation was deducted, and Ex parte Charing Cross Advance and Deposit Bank v. Parker (L. R. 16 Ch. D. 35) applies. He also cited Ex parte Challinor (28 W. R. 205).

E. C. Willis, for the respondent :-It is not clear from the evidence that the £94 was the only sum paid. But assuming that it was, the practice of deducting expenses is well known. Ex parte Challinor shows that the expenses attendant upon the mortgage may properly be deducted from

the amount advanced.

Mr. REGISTRAR PEPYS said he could not distinguish the present case from Ex parte Charing Cross Advance and Deposit Bank, In re Parker. The amount deducted was not so large as the agreed sum in that case (£30), but still it was in the nature of a deduction for interest; and the Court of Appeal had laid it down that, when interest was dededucted from the consideration, the deed was, by section 8 of the Bills of Sale Act, void as against the trustee in the liquidation of the grantor. He must hold, therefore, that the bill of sale in this case was invalid, but the order would be made without costs.

Solicitors for the trustees, Wright & Law.
Solicitor for the respondent, Nevett.

OBITUARY.

VICE-CHANCELLOR LITTLE.

Mr. George Little, Q.C., Vice-Chancellor of the Chancery Court of the Duchy of Lancaster, died on the 27th ult. Vice-Chancellor Little was called to the bar at the Middle Temple in Easter Term, 1840, and practised for many years in the Court of Chancery, and in the Lancaster Palatine Court. He became a Queen's Counsel in 1866, when he selected the court of Vice-Chancellor Maline, but his practice was chiefly in bankruptcy appeals. In 1871 he succeeded the late Sir John Wickens as Vice-Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, and he held that office till his death. About four years ago he retired from practice, and he had since devoted the whole of his attention to his judicial duties. Mr. Little fully justified the expectations that were entertained at the time of his appointment, and be obtained the esteem and respect of the bar, and the confidence of the suitors in his court. It may be remembered that about two months ago his judgment in Duncan v. North and South Wales Bank, which had been reversed by the Court of Appeal, was unanimously restored in the House of Lords.

SOCIETIES.

LAW ASSOCIATION.

At the usual monthly meeting of the directors, held at the hall of the Incorporated Law Society, Chancery-lane, on Thursday, 3rd of February, the following being present, viz., Mr. Desborough (chairman), and Messrs. Boodle Desborough, jun., Hedger, Sydney Smith, Styan, and A. B. Carpenter (secretary), a grant of £5 was made to a non-member, and the ordinary general business was transacted.

BIRMINGHAM LAW SOCIETY.

The annual meeting of the Birmingham Law Society was held on the 28th utt., at the Library Room, Wellingtonpassage, Bennett's-hill. Mr. J. Marigold, president of the society, occupied the chair, and among those present were Messrs. W. S. Allen, C. F. Arnold, T. Assinder, S. Balden, jun., J. W. Browett, A. G. Buller, J. F. Butlin, A. Canning, J. B. Carslake, J. Chirm, E. M. Coleman, H. D. Crompton, J. E. Deakin, E. Docker, T. S. Eddowes (Sutton Coldfield), M. A. Fitter, T. A. Garland, A. Godlee, H. M. Goodman, E. J. Hayes (town clerk), T. Horton (hon. secretary), W. Horton, J. Jelf, G. J. Johnson, W. Johnson, E. H. Lee, T. G. Lee, L. W. Lewis (Walsall), W. Lowe, J. Marigold, T. Marlow (Walsall), T. Martineau, C. E. Mathews, W. Morgan, H. New, C. E. Newey, H. Parish, R. J. Parr, R. A. Pinsent, G. T. S. Plant, W. H. Powell, E. B. Rawlings, J. Rider, Joseph Rowlands, Jacob Rowlands, T. H: Russell, C. T. Saunders, S. R. Shore, T. S. Smith, G. T. Smith, S. N. Solomon, and J. T. Springthorpe.

The report was taken as read.

The PRESIDENT, in moving its adoption, drew attention to its principal features. He remarked that the number of members showed satisfactory increase, and that it was also gratifying to see the exercise of the privilege of using the library by the articled clerks. The financial report was also satisfactory. Referring to the library, the president said too much praise could not be awarded to their hon, secretary for the immense labour he had brought to bear upon, and the extraordinary time he had given to, the compilation of the catalogue. The library was founded in 1832, when it consisted of 647 volumes; in 1840, the number had increased to 900, in 1857 to 1,450, in 1865 to 1,903, in 1873 to 3,599, and at the present time contained 8,500. Parliament had not, during the past year, been able to effect any changes in the law, and from the Irish stew at present before the House of Commons it did not appear likely that there would be very much improvement or many new aws during the present session. There was, however, promised a Bankruptcy Bill, to which the President of the Board of Trade had promised to give his very great at

tention; and he believed it was the intention of that gentleman to take great credit for making the Bill one of the best measures that could be framed. He (the president) also believed there was almost an avowed intention of getting the measure through without the intervention of the solici tors. He could only say, if the solicitors had no haud in framing the measure, that the new Bankruptcy Bill would be very unlikely to carry out that which it was desired to do. If, however, they were taken into consultation by the persons dealing with the subject, the joint action would result in the passing of a proper measure.

Mr. CARSLAKE seconded the motion.

Mr. T. MARTINEAU spoke with reference to the evils in connection with the present administration of justice in the provinces, and drew attention to the remedies proposed by the conference at Liverpool. He asked them, if Liverpool, with its three civil assizes each year, felt the evil consequences of the present system, how much worse off was a town of the magnitude and commercial importance of Birmingham, which had either to send cases for trial at Warwick or London, or perhaps had to send for settlement or arbitration? A great many people had felt that Birmingham should be not only an assize town, but the centre of an assize district. He was glad to point out that the scheme agreed upon at Liverpool would, if carried out, give Birmingham more than had been anticipated in their most sanguine moments. It not only proposed that Birmingham should be the centre for civil and criminal purposes, but that Birming ham should practically have a resident judge and continuous sittings. He had always taken the greatest interest in the question of assizes for Birmingham, but he had known no scheme so comprehensive, complete, and effective, as this brought forward by the Liverpool Society, and it should receive no heartier support than from the town of Birming

ham.

Mr. SAUNDERS also expressed his approval of the scheme, and added that the resolutions passed at Liverpool had been adopted at the conference of Associated Provincial Societies in London, and would be submitted forthwith to the Government, in the hope that they would be taken into immediate consideration. Of course, the important question would arise, that in Birmingham there were no courts in which the assizes could be held. In this respect, they were in the hands of the town council, but no doubt with such influential members as Messrs. Johnson and Martineau this difficulty would receive consideration. Referring to the present imperfect means of educating law students in Birmingham, Mr. Saunders announced the proposed appointment of a reader for the elementary classes, and a lecturer for those more advanced, in conjunction with the Council of the Incorporated Law Society, the examination committee of which had decided to report to the council in favour of a grant in aid of the payment of the fees.

The report and statement of accounts were then adopted. The CHAIRMAN next proposed, "That this meeting tenders its hearty thanks and congratulations co Mr. Thomas Horton, the honarary secretary, on the occasion of the publication of the new catalogue of the library, and hereby instructs the committee to take into their consideration in what manner, agreeable to Mr. Horton himself, the society can record their grateful sense of the benefits conferred on the society, the profession, and the town, by his long-continued and successful labours in the increase, arrangements, and cataloguing the library."

Mr. G. J. JOHNSON seconded the resolution, speaking in the highest terms of the services of Mr. Horton, who, he said, had made their library the finest out of London. The motion was cordially agreed to, and

Mr. HORTON, in expressing his acknowledgments, referred to the assistance he had received in the compilation of the subject-index from his partner, Mr. E. H. Lee.

Mr. J. E. DEAKIN moved as a recommendation to the committee to consider whether some action should not be taken to enable solicitors to enforce the return of fees paid to counsel in respect of the work undertaken, but not performed by

them.

Mr. T. G. LEE seconded the motion, but

Mr. G. J. JOHNSON advised them not to take up the matter unless they were prepared to go to the root of the evil and urge the total revision of the existing understanding, making arrangements between barristers and those by whom they were instructed of the nature of an ordinary contract, with the usual responsibilities for non-fulfilment.

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Upon the suggestion of the CHAIRMAN and other gentlemen, who promised that the committee would take the question into consideration, the motion was withdrawn.

The election of members upon the committee concluded the proceedings.

After the conclusion of the meeting a telegram was received from the Incorporated Law Society stating that the gold medal prize had been awarded to Mr. George Francis Huggins and Mr. Arthur Leslie Crockford, bracketted equal.

The following are extracts from the report of the committee:

Members.-Your committee report a satisfactory progress in the prosperity of the society, the number of members now being 217 as against 206 for the year 1880.

Parliamentary.-The Bills introduced by the late Government before the dissolution-viz., the Settled Land Bill, the Conveyancing and Law of Property Bill, and the Solicitors' Remuneration Bill-were considered by your committee, but before any action was determined upon Parlia ment was dissolved. The measures were reintroduced into the House of Lords on the assembly of the new Parliament, but it soon became evident that there would be no legislation with reference thereto in the then session.

Professional Remuneration.—This question has received considerable attention from your committee, who are prepared to co-operate in any movement to give effect to the principle of remuneration by conmission, believing that any injustice to the profession in the scale adopted would soon be Telieved.

Bankruptcy. The attention of your committee was directed to the Bill introduced by the late Government, but the measure was not taken up by the present Government in the late session. The legislation promised for the present session will at once be considered by your committee.

Administration of Justice.-On the request of the Liverpool Law Society your vice-president, Mr. Saunders, with Mr. Martineau, attended, as a deputation from your committee, at a conference at Liverpool upon this important subject, the law societies of Manchester and Newcastle-onTyne being also represented. The following resolutions were adopted at this meeting, and the same are to be taken into consideration at a further conferet ce of representatives to a meeting of the Associated Provincial Law Societies, convered for the 22nd of January instant :

1. The inadequacy of the present arrangements for the trial of causes in the large centres of population has long been admitted. The causes of this state of things have been fully stated on previous occasions, and it is unnecessary now to do more than shortly to recapitulate them.

2. The opportunities for the trial of causes are not sufficiently numerous, and this leads to accumulation of business at the assizes now held. The time allowed at the assizes for disposing of the civil business is insufficient, and this causes arrangements of the most inconvenient kind to be made for the dispatch of business. The trial of causes is unduly hurried, and questions of law arising on trials, instead of being decided, as they ought to be, after argument, by the judge during the sitting, are postponed for argument and decision in London at some subsequent period, thus greatly increasing the expenses.

3. The consequences to the public interested are that the decisions of questions of great importance are ofter unduly

delayed; that causes, if tried at all, are frequently disposed of under conditions of baste and pressure which are very unsatisfactory; that causes which both parties desire to bave tried, and in the preparation of which for trial great trouble and expense have been incurred, are, against their wish, and under the alternative of being made remanets to a subsequent assize, either referred to arbitration, which simply means the waste of the money spent in preparing for trial, and the adoption of a method of decision almost invariably tedions, costly, and distasteful to the parties concerned, or compromise, equally distasteful to them, on terms which might as well have been arranged before the expense and trouble of getting up the case for trial had 'been incurred.

4. For these grievances the most effectual remedy would seem to be the adoption of the system advocated by the present Attorney-General in the House of Commons, on the 21st of March, 1879-7iz., the establishment of local

centres of the High Court of Justice, with continuous sittings at such centres, for the trial of all causes arising within the districts attached to them.

5. It is suggested that Liverpool, Manchester, Leeds, and Birmingham should be constituted local centres, with proper districts allotted to them, and that at each local centre, subject to arrangements for reasonable vacations, and perhaps for occasional sittings for criminal business, a judge of the High Court should be continuously engaged in disposing of all civil actions arising within the district.

6. It is not contemplated or desired that judges should reside permanently at local centres. The rotation in which they would attend, and the period during which the rotation judge would remain at the local centre, are matters which could best be arranged by the judges themselves with reference to their other engagements.

7. All questions of law arising on the trial of any action should be decided without delay at the local centre by the judge before whom the action is tried.

LAW STUDENTS' JOURNAL.

INCORPORATED LAW SOCIETY.
FINAL EXAMINATIONS, 1880.
Special Prizes.

Reardon Prize.-To Charles Thwaites, who, from among the candidates during the year 1880, has shown himself best law, and attained honorary distinction, the council have acquainted with the theory, principles, and practice of the awarded to him the prize founded by Miss Ellen Reardon, in memory of the connection of her father, Mr. Daniel Reardon. of London, with the legal profession. Mr. Thwaites served his clerkship with Mr. Frederick Wm. Fisher, of Doncaster ; and Messrs. Van Sandau & Cumming, of London, and obtained a prize in June, 1880.

Timpron Martin Prize for candidates from Liveroool.To Walter Herbert Cowl, who, from among the candidates from Liverpool in the year 1880 passed the best examination, and who attained honorary distinction, the council have awarded the prize, consisting of a gold medal. founded by Mr. Timpron Martin, of Liverpool. Mr. Cowl served his clerkship with Mr. Arthur Edwin Cowl, of Liverpool and Great Yarmouth, and obtained a prize in June, 1880.

Atkinson Prize for candidates from Liverpool or Preston.To Walter Herbert Cowl, who, from among the candidates from Liverpool or Preston in the year 1880 has shown himself best acquainted with the law of real property and the practice of conveyancing, has otherwise passed a satisfactory examination, and has attained honorary distinctior, the council have awarded the prize, consisting of a gold medal, founded by Mr. John Atkinson, of Liverpool. Mr. Cowl served his clerkship with Mr. Arthur Edwin Cowl, of Liverpool and Great Yarmouth, and obtained a prize in June, 1880.

Broderip Prize for real property and conveyancing (open to all candidates).-Charles Thwaites, having, among the candidates in the year 1880 shown himself best ac quainted with the law of real property and the practice of

conveyancing, having passed a satisfactory examination, and having attained honorary distinction, the council have awarded to him the prize, consisting of a go'd medal, founded by Mr. Francis Broderip, of Lincoln's-inn. Mr. Thwaites served his clerkship with Mr. Frederick Wm. Fisher, of Doncaster; and Messrs. Van Sandau & Cumming, of London, and obtained a prize in June, 1880.

Scott Scholarship (open to all candidates).-Charles Thwaites being, in the opinion of the council, the candidate best acquainted with the theory, principles, and prec. tice of law, they have awarded to him the scholarship founded by Mr. John Scott, of Lincoln's-inn-fields, London. Mr. Thwaites served his clerkship with Mr. Frederick Wm. Fisher, of Doncaster; and Messrs. Van Sandan & Cumming, of London, and obtained a prize in June, 1880.

Birmingham Law Society's Prize for candidates from Birmingham.-The examiners also reported that among the candidates from Birmingham in the year 1880 Mr. Arthur Leslie Crockford and Mr. George Francis Huggins passed the best examination, and were of equal merit. Mr. Crock

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