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been lost sight of, and although the decision is really a think there can be little doubt that only days on whicb final judgment, and allows the parties twelve months for the House has ordinarily sat sh ould be counted. appeal, the order on a special case has bitherto been drawn up in like manner as orders on special cases under 13 & 14 Vict. c. 35, were drawn up. On

WE LATELY NOTICED that there had been a tendency the face of it the order has, therefore, appeared to

on the part of workmen and employers to con tract thembe an interlocutory order only, allowing the shorter time

selves out of the provisions of the Employers' Liability for appealing. This would appear to have come to the

Act of last year. Two measures have been already in. attention of the Appeal Court in a case of Williams v.

troduced into the House of Commons with a view of Williams, which was not reported on the point referred

preventing any such contracts. The Employers' Liability to. Vice Chancellor HALL has done his best to set

Bill, which has been introduced by Messrs. MACLiver and matters right in Harrison V. The Cornwall Minerals

MORLEY, recites that “attempts have been made to Railway Company (29 W. R. 258), and the Master of

impose on workmen contracts exonerating employers the Rolls in a more recent case, not yet reported, has also

from their liability, ... and it is unjust to workcalled attention to the matter. In future, when a special

men, and inexpedient in the interests of public safety, case involvus the decision of the whole action, it is to be

that the operations of the Employers' Liability Act be set down in the cause books together with a motion for

thus defeated"; and section 1 enacts that “ if and so judgment, and counsel will move for judgment accord

far as any contract purports to derogate from the liability ingly, after the court has given its opinion, and this will

defined or declared by the Employers' Liability Act,

1880, that contract shall be void." The Employers' appear upon the judgment as drawn up.

Liability Act Amendment Bill of Messrs. MACDONALD,
Burt, and BROADHURST is not quite such a sweeping mea-

sure. Section 1 enacts that all the provisions of the Act LORD JUSTICE BRAMWELL's letter on Mr. Justice

of last year “shall have effect and be enforced by every STEPHEN's recent article comes very opportunely, and

court in every case, notwithstanding any contract or might have been still more useful if it had arrived before

agreement excluding all or any of the provisions of the the recent bar meeting. The opinion of the most ex

said Act, or otherwise interfering with the operation perienced judge on the bench in favour of the single.

thereof”; but it is provided “(1) that this Act shall judge system, and his ridicule of Mr. Justice STEPHEN'S

not affect any contract or agreement made before the apprehension of the existence of a class of parliamentary

passing of this Act; and (2) that, in determining in lawyers who won't take what Mr. Justice WATKIN |

| any case the amount of compensation payable under the WILLIAMS would call an “ordinary judgeship," ought to

said Act by an employer, the court shall take into conhave weight with Parliament upon the debate on the Order

sideration the value of any payment or contribution in Council. It is not true, the Lord Justice declares, “that

made by such employer to any insurance fund or com. we should not get such men as Mr. Justice STEPHEN

pensation fund, to the extent to which any person who mentions to be judges. When they found they could

would otherwise be entitled to compensation under the neither be Chancellor nor Chief Justice, and were not

said Act has actually received compensation out of made Lords of Appeal nor Lords Justices, “because the

such payment or contribution at the expense of such public interest did not require men of that class to be

employer." placed there,' they would quietly take their seats as puisne judges after they had saved a good sum of money

THE PROVISIONS of Mr. FORSTER's Bill for the Better by their large practice.” We may add, in confirmation

Protection of Person and Property in Ireland are not of this, that Lord CAMPBELL states that, when Attorney

quite identical with those which were contained in the General, he requested that a puisne judgeship,

Habeas Corpus Suspension (Ireland) Act, 1866. The 1st which was then vacant, might not be filled up until

section authorizes the arrest and legal detention during he had had an opportunity of considering whether he

the continuance of the Act, “without bail or mainwould accept the post or not. He appears, however, to

prize," of any person declared by warrant of the Lordhave withdrawn his application at the urgent request of

Lieutenant to be reasonably suspected of having been Lord MELBOURNE and Lord John RUSSELL.

either before or after the passing of the Act guilty of high treason, treason felony, or treasonable practices, wherever committed, or of any crime punishable by law

committed in a prescribed district, “ being an act of THE DATE of coming into operation of the Order in violence or intimidation," or the inciting to an act of Council respecting the abolition of the offices of Chief violence or intimidation, and “tending to interfere with Justice of the Common Pleas and Chief Baron of the or disturb the maintenance of law and order.” Such Exchequer, and the consolidation of the common law person is not to be discharged or tried without the Lord. divisions of the High Court, which was laid on the table Lieutenant's warrant, which is to be conclusive evidence of both Houses on the 4th of January last, has been the of all matters contained therein, of the jurisdiction to subject of some controversy. The matter is regulated issue and execute the warrant, and of the legality of the by section 32 of the Judicature Act, 1873, which pro- | arrest and detention. The Act of 1866 authorized the vides that “no such order . . . . shall come into | detention in safe custody without bail till the ensuing operation until the same shall have been laid before 1st of September of all persons in prison at the time of each House of Parliament for thirty days on which that the passing of the Act for high treason, treason felony, House shall have sat, &c.” The question to be solved or treasonable practices under a warrant signed by six is, how are we to count the days of sitting of the members of the Irish Privy Council, or by the Lord. House? Is there a fiction which allows every day suc- Lieutenant, or the Chief Secretary for Ireland, such ceeding the meeting of Parliament, including Sundays, persons not to be bailed or tried till the said 1st of Sep. and those days, such as Saturdays, over which an ad-tember. By the present Bill every person detained is to journment ordinarily takes place, to be counted ; be treated as an accused person, and not as a convicted or are we to count oply the five days a week on prisoner; and a list of persons detained in prison under which there is business transacted ? Unless an address the Act, with a statement of the place of detention, and is presented to her Majesty, the Order in Council | the ground stated for the arrest of each person, is to be would, in the former case, come into operation on Fri- laid before each House of Parliament within the first day, the 4th of February, and in the latter case, not seven days of each month during which Parliament is before the 16th. This, of course, only applies to the sitting. There was no provision corresponding to this House of Commons; when the House of Lords will in the Act of 1866, but a similar enactment was made by have sat thirty days it is not yet possible to anticipate. the Westmeath Act, 1871 (34 & 35 Vict. c. 25), s. 9. The language of the section is not quite clear, but we “ Prescribed district " is to mean any part of Ireland.


specified by an order of the Lord-Lieutenant for the time being in force. Such orders may be made, revoked, or varied by the Lord-Lieutenant by or with the advice of the Privy Council. By section 2 a warrant or order of

The bench lately, by & considerable majority (as the Lord-Lieutenant may be signified either under his will be seen from the minutes of the Council hand or under the hand of the Chief Secretary, and a of Judges, which we print elsewhere), assented to copy of every warrant is within seven days to be trang. the Lord Chancellor's proposal for the abolition mitted (as was also provided under the Act of 1866), to

of the two vacant chiefships ; the bar has now, by the Clerk of the Crown for the city of Dublin, to be by

an inconsiderable majority, expressed in the meeting him filed in his public office. The Lord-Lieutenant is

| lately held in the Middle Temple Hall, dissented from empowered, by and with the advice of the Privy Council, that view. It ought, however, to be remembered, to the to make, reroke, or alter any order prescribing the form honour of the profession, that those members of it who of a warrant, ull such orders to be published in the might reasonably expect to succeed, if anyone succeeded, Dublin Gazette, a printed copy of which is to be con.

to the vacant posts, did not cast their opinion and inclusive evidence of the date and contents of the order,

fluence on the side of their interests-indeed, the expresand that it was duly made. By section 3 the Act is to sion of opinion may be fairly called a disinterested one, remain in force till the 30th of September, 1882, wbile

and seems to find its source wholly in sentiment. This the Act of 1866 was only in force from February till

may account for the fact that the speakers in favour of September of that year.

the extinction of these ancient offices seem not, as a rule, to have been those who are most concerned with current business ; and that the eminent gentleman who led

the opposition to the proposed change is one who has The CONCURRENCE, in the same number of the London

for many years sought fame rather as a scholar Gazette, of the pames of an English and a Scotch peer

and an author than in the courts of justice. will draw attention to the Bankru ptcy Disqualification

It is, indeed, hardly credible that those who are Act, 1871 (34 & 35 Vict. c. 50), which enacts that every

sufferers by the disorder and confusion that now reign peer who becomes a bankrupt shall be disqualified from

among the relics of a system which is in the course of sitting or voting in the House of Lords, or in any com

vital change, should wish to perpetuate those varieties in mittee thereof, and if a peer of Scotland or Ireland,

the administration of justice which are the cause of their shall be disqualified from being elected to sit and vote in

miseries. Yet we seem almost driven to the belief that men the House of Lords; but a bankrupt peer recovers his

who are acquainted wito the legislation of the last thirty rights of sitting and voting upon the determination

years fancy it yet possible to restore the past as it once of his bankruptcy. It will be remembered that by the

existed, and to start the legal coach along the old road, Bankruptcy Act, 1869, any member of Parliament adju.

just as if nothing bad happened. It is true that the bar, dicated a bankrupt is suspended for a year from the right as a body, have not taken much part in bringing about of sitting or voting in the House of Commons, unless

these changes. Bodies of men, however trained and within that time the ordor is annulled or the creditors

educated, rarely do so. But then it is surely rather proving debts are fully paid or satisfied, and by section

late to begin to interfere; and it is unfortunate to 122, in default of such annulment, payment, or satisfac

take an opportunity of doing so which seems to afford tion, the member's seat is to be vacant at the end of the

no other motive for speech than the fact that they have year.

been silent so long, and that as there is nothing else

just now to say, they must say just that or nothing. MR. Astox, Q.C., writing to a daily contemporary,

There is indeed something strange, and almost weird, suggests that the Temple Bar Memorial, when removed

in the interest which thus gathers the bar to their from its present position, should be replaced by a sub.

ancient hall to defend these superannuated offices. It way for the purpose of enabling foot-passengers to cross

recalls the silent mariners in the eachanted ship, with safety from the Royal Courts of Justice to the other

| which has been moving on, rather from some unside of the Strand ; and another correspondent states

known impulse than under any guiding hand :that the subway was part of the original plan which the

The loud wind never reached the ship, architects of the building were instructed to provide for.

Yet now the ship moved on! There can be no doubt that the subway or bridge was

Beneath the lightning and the moon

The dead men gave a groan. part of Mr. STREET's original plan, made in pursuance of

They groaned, they stirred, they all uprossthe printed instructions to competing architects to which we referred some months since. The want of the subway

but only the first half of the next line is trueis due, not to Mr. STREET, but to the modifications in

Nor spoke, nor moved their eyes. troduced by Mr. Ayrton, when, as Chief Commissioner | Yet let us hope that they will after a time “move of Works, he applied bis ingenuity to reducing the cost their eyes " enough to see how much it will conduce of the New Law Courts.

to the real dignity and power of the administration of justice to dispense with these useless and now mean

ingless titles rather than offices; and will throw their THE ANNUAL EXPENDITURE for wages of serrante and energios into the attempt to assist in forcing the guardians of the Royal Courts of Justice after that

chariot of law out of the ruts where it now drags its building becomes fully occupied has been officially esti

wheels. If they will do this, we do not despair of seeing mated at £10,000.

once again an united bench and bar under the control of a powerful chief, and some of that true dignity restored which idle attempts to withstand “manifest destiny," and to cling to the old remnants and patches of

the past, can only diminish and impair. Lord Sband, says the Scotsman, having been named a member of the Committee of Judges and others appointed to advise the Lord Chancellor in reference to proposed improvements in the practice and

The Chicago Bar Association have bad a dinner, says the procedure of law courts in England, attended a meeting

| Albany Law Journal, and a question arose as to the meaning of the committee in London on Tuesday. We learn, on of a verse in the programme said to be in Latin, and after excellent authority, that the information which Lord an animated discussion no two could agree as to its mean. Shand communicated to the judges as to Scotch pro ing, and no one could be found who could give & correct cedure was greatly appreciated.

translation of it.

of a third person. “In this case," said Lord Justice THE ATTORNMENT CLAUSE. Thesiger, " the rent is not a real rent but a mere sham;

the tenancy is not a real tenancy but a mere sham; and We suppose we must consider the judgment of the

the attornment clause is a mere device to give the mortCourt of Appeal in the recent case of Ex parte Jackson,

gagee a hold, in the event of bankruptcy, over the In re Bowes (29 W. R. 253), as a final explanation of one

goods and chattels of the mortgagor which would othermain test to be applied to ascertain the validity of an

wise have been distributed amongst the general credi. attornment clause in a mortgage. As our readers will

tors, and the attornment clause is invalid and inoperaremember, we have often drawn attention to the vacilla

tive because it is a fraud upon the bankruptcy law." tions of judicial opinion on this subject. In In re

In another recent cuse of Ex parte Punnett, In Williams (26 W. R. 274) Lord Justice James rested his

re Kitchen (29 W. R. 129), a curious question decision that the attornment clause was invalid on the

was raised as to the attornment clause. The first ground that looking at the whole scope of the deed, and mortgagee of a leasehold public-house took an at. the intention of the parties, it was a mere contrivance to

tornment as tenant from the mortgagor to secure give the mortgagee an additional benefit in case of the

the interest on his mortgage; the second mortgagee mortgagor's bankruptcy. But Lord Justice Thesiger laid

did the same, and it appeared on the face of the it down that section 34 of the Bankruptcy Act, 1869, is

secord mortgage that the first wortgage was still outintended only to protect a bona fide rent, and not a rent standing and undischarged. The question was whether, which does not in any way represent the real letting value

under these circumstances, the second mortgagee had a of the premises. In In re Stockton Iron Furnace

right to distrain after the liquidation of the mortgagor Company (27 W. R. 433), Lord Justice Bramwell said

for rent accrued under his attornment before the liquithat the intention and object of the arrangement in In

dation. The court held that he had. “If," said the re Williams was to commit a fraud on the bankruptcy

Mas ter of the Rolls, “by a condition, notwithstanding law, since practically the effect of the provisions of the

the facts are known that the legal estate ie outmortgage in that case was that the attornment clause

standing in a mortgagee, and that the mortshould come into operation only in the event of bank

gagor is not really the owner of the reversion, ruptcy. That is to say, he adopted the view of Lord

you can create a teyancy by what may be called es. Justice James in the earlier case. But the latter Lord

toppel, or quasi-estoppel (it does not matter what Justice propounded the view (in which he was sup

term we use), it appears to me there is nothing, either in ported by the Master of the Rolls) that the reservation in

law or in good sense, to prevent the same arrangement the attornment clause of a rent very much above the

being made with more than one mortgagee." value of the property might show that the attornment clause was a device to enable the mortgagee to obtain, in the event of the mortgagor's baukruptcy, something which he would not otherwise obtain. In Ex parte The Bank of Whitehaven, In re Bowes (28

REGISTRATION OF TRADEW. R. 523), Bacon, C.J., refused to admit the excessive

MARKS IN COLOUR. amount of rent reserved as a test of whether an attornment clause was a fraud on the bankruptcy law. He thought that no such proposition could be drawn from On more than one occasion we have briefly called the earlier decisions. When the case came before the attention to the subject of colour in connection with the Court of Appeal, however (sub. nom. Ex parte Jackson), registration of trade-marks, but the recent case of In the court (Baggallay, Cotton, and Thesiger, L.JJ.) held, re Robinson (29 W. R. 31) throws so much additional unequivocally, that the validity of an attornment clause light upon the matter that we take this opportunity of in a mortgage depends on whether the tenancy created, recurring to it and dealing with it in greater detail. and the rent reserved, are a real tenancy and a real rent; It is well known that the Trade-Marks Registration and that the proportion the rent reserved bears to the Act of 1875, by which the registration of trade-marks true lettable value of the property is the chief test of the in the United Kingdom is regulated, contains no allusion reality of the rent.

to the question of colour, but that question was tacitly The process by which this conclusion is reached is reserved for the consideration of the Lord Chancellor and something like this :—there is clearly a right, as between his advisers when the rules under the Act should have mortgagor and mortgagee, where the former is in posses to be framed. In those rules, when they were prepared sion of the mortgaged property, to insert in the mort and made public, no express mention of colour was gage deed an attornment by the mortgagor to the made, but the silence of the rules was easily interpreted mortgagee. The object of this clause is to give the to mean that colour was to be eliminated. Among other mortgagee an equivalent for the benefit which he would provisions contained in the rules, the 8th rule rehave derived from the rent if a third person had been quires an applicant for registration to suppiy the regisin possession of the mortgaged property. In the trar with a description of his trade-mark in writing, latter case the mortgagee could at any time have accompanied, when practicable, by a representation of demanded payment of the rent in arrear. He the trade mark in duplicate. By the 13th rule the could have applied the rent which might be paid registrar is to require the epplicant to insert an adverto him under such demand in discharge, or part tisement of the application in the official paper (now discharge, of the interest in arrear on his mortgage, and published under the title of the Trade-Marks Journal), if it was more than sufficient for the discharge of the and by the 15th rule the applicant may, for the purposes interest due, it could be applied in discharge or satisfac of such advertisement, be required to furnish the printer tion, pro tanto, of the principal debt itself. The equiva of the journal with a wood-block or electrotype of the lent for this is an attornment at what the court call “a trade-mark, or with such other information or means of real rent”-i.e., a rent corresponding to the true lettable advertising the trade-mark as the registrar may valve of the property. If the property is in possession allow. It is also material to notice that by another of the mortgagor, the mortgagee may turn him out and part of the 8th rule the registrar may, in exceptional let it to a stranger, and, therefore, there is nothing cases, deposit in the Patent Museum a specimen or unreasonable, nothing that can be called a fraud on copy of a trade-mark which cannot conveniently be the law of bankruptcy, in allowing the parties to make a placed on his register, and may refer thereto in his contract in the mortgage deed which they might after- register in such manner as he thinks advisable. With wards validly and effectually make. An attornment at | respect to deposited marks, it is apparent that they a sum called rent, but which is infinitely in excess of any will be seen by those who inspect them in the same rent which any tenant would give for the premises, is | colours and arrangement as they present in actual use. far more than an equivalent for the benefit of the tenancy | With respect to cotton goods, a special set of rules, zumbered from 57 to 63, was made, which appeared in alone, therefore, was registration in colour permitted. The the new edition of the rules issued in 1876, having been selvage mark on cotton goods, consisting of threads vari. drawn up subsequently to the original framing of the ously coloured and arranged, running through the selvage rules in 1875. By the 57th rule, an office is to be estab- of the goods, afford a good example of such mark; or lished at Manchester for the exhibition of all trade-marks reference might be made, by way of illustration, to such used in the cotton trade. By the 58th rule, as amended marks as those appropriated by the Public Stores Act, by the rule of December 1, 1876, every proprietor of an 1875, to the public stores, such as white, black, or coloured old cotton mark is required to send to the Manchester worsted threads laid up with the yarns and the wire, office three representations of such cotton mark, in such respectively, for hempen cordage and wire rope; or blue form and with such a description as may be from time to or red cotton threads in each wick, or wicks of red cotton time required by the Commissioners of Patents. By for candles. With respect to such marks, it is easy to the 60th rule, the Committee of Experts at Manchester, see that registration in any other mode than by deposit appointed under rule 59, are to form a list of the cotton would be futile, as the whole essence of the trade-mark marks sent to the Manchester office in two classes (the consists in colour; but then we have the authority of the first class consisting of such cotton marks as they con Master of the Rolls for saying, and, indeed, his whole sider to be trade-marks within the Act, and the second decision in In re Robinson turned on the fact, that all class consisting of such cotton marks as they consider marks for cotton goods are registered by deposit, so that not to be trade-marks within the meaning of the Act), very ordinary marks, if applicable to goods of that deand to transmit such list to the Commissioners of Pa- scription, are registered in their usual colours, and aro to tents, accompanied by two representations of each of be inspected at the places of deposit-i.e., according to the marks specified in the second class in such list. The the usual practice at present, at the Patent Museum, third representation of each of the marks in the second South Kensington, at the Trade-Marks Registry, Southclass is to be retained for reference in the Manchester ampton-buildings, and at the Royal Exchange, Manoffice. By rule 62, proprietors of marks not placed in chester. It certainly appears to be rather invidious that the second class may apply for registration in the or- manufacturers of cotton goods should be placed on so dinary way. By the additional rules of February 26, different a footing from manufacturers of goods in other 1877, rules 13, 15, and 17 are not to apply to trade- classes, and that marks which in any other class would marks in respect of cotton goods in classes 23, 24, and be advertized and registered as devoid of colour, should 25, and the registrar is to advertise applications under be admitted to registration in a coloured form; but the the rules, for the registration of trade-marks in the case becomes still more anomalous when it is considered cotton classes, showing, among other particulars, the that in other classes manufacturers who adopt one form places in London and Manchester where specimens of of trade-mark will obtain registration by deposit, while the marks are deposited for exhibition, and provision is those who adopt another description of mark will have made for consequent registration. By the further rule to put up with black and whito. No doubt there is a of December 28, 1878, it is provided that proprietors of certain advantage in having an abstract device protected, old " combination stamps" for cotton piece goods, are in whatever colour it may naturally be used in practice; to send to the Manchester office four representations of but, after all, it is not so very great an advantage to such combination starps in such form and with such a have protection awarded for that which it is not desired description as may be from time to time required by the to use. Commissioners of Patents. The additional rule of October 21, 1879, clears up a doubt which had been generally entertained, and declares that rules 57 to 63

REVIEWS. do not apply to new cotton marks, and that applications for the registration of trade-marks for cotton goods, not being old marks, are to be made in the ordinary manner,

COLLISIONS AT SEA. subject to the proviso that marks which have been placed | A TREATISE ON THE LAW or COLLISIONS AT Sea, By Regiin the second class shall not be registered except by | NALD G. MARSDEN, Esq., Barrister-at-Law. Stevens & order of the court.

Sons. Thus the matter stands upon the rules, and it is in- This is a useful and well-written summary of the teresting to consider the historical explanation given of law relating to a subject the importance of which is these regulations by the Master of the Rolls. This is shown by a statement in the preface, that in the year what he says in In re Robinson :-"The rules do not 1878 there were in collision 1,790 sailing ships, and 836 allow the registration of colour except in special cases as steamships, in other words that about fifteen per cent. of provided by rule 8, and the rules and additional rules the steam vessels and 3-6 per cent. of the sailing vessels applicable to cotton goods. There is nothing in of the world suffered loss from this cause along. Mr. the Act of Parliament about it at all. The Trade Marks Marsden sets forth in small compass, and in a very Act allowed the Lord Chancellor to make certain readable shape, the general rules of law applicable to the rules. He made rules after consultation with subject of maritime collision, as laid down by statutes, a great many people, and they became part or determined and defined in decided cases. The rule of the Act. The difficulty of advertising was so of the road at sea as it existed in its customary and ungreat, and the difficulty of getting the shade of colour written form before it had become embodied and modified with chromo-lithography was so great, that colour was by Act of Parliament is also briefly stated, and the various abandoned simply for practical purposes. But it was changes which that rule has from time to time underfound necessary to treat all cotton marks as exceptional gone are fully set out in their chronological order. The under rule 8, and to exhibit them at the Patent Museum, reported cases upon each division of the subject are inSouth Kensington, and also at certain places in London telligently collated ; but with regard to one important and Manchester, which are mentioned in the advertise- ì matter of practice we wish to say a word. The question ment in the official paper under the Additional Rules, r. of costs in the Admiralty Division and on appeal is some1.” So that it was only on account of certain practical what complicated. It seems, however, from the judge difficulties in the way of advertising ordinary trade-ment of the Court of Appeal in The Swansea and The marks in colour that the rule was established and en- | Condor (L. R. 4 P. D., at p. 120), that the Court of forced by the Commissioners of Patents or the Registrar Appeal will now apply the ordinary rules of costs followof Trade Marks, that such ordinary mark should being the event; and the judgment of the same court in registered without colour. But with regard to certain The City of Manchester (L. R. 5 P. D. 221) applies the descriptions of marks, the whole distinctiveness of which general rule as to the discretion of the court. These consisted in the colour in which they were represented, cases throw doubt upon the decision of Sir Robert registration in colour was essential, and for such marks | Phillimore in The Matthew Cay (49 L. J. Prob. 47)! We think that Mr. Marsden might with safety have been trustee in the liquidation of the builder. The agreement: more distinct upon this point than he has ventured to be ; provided for the erection by the builder of a number of but, to do him justice, he refers to all the decisions down houses upon a corresponding number of plots of land be. to the date of his publication, noting that the case of longing to tho landowner. The houses were to be como: The Daisy was not followed in The Swansea and The

pleted at specified dates, and time was to be of the essence Condor; and when he wrote, the decisions of Sir Robert

of the contract. Leases of the plots were to be from time Phillimore in The City of Manchester had not come

to tima granted by the landowner to the builder, as the before the Court of Appeal. In an appendix Mr.

houses were covered in to the satisfaction of the land Marsden places in parallel columns the regulations for

owner. There was also a proviso that nothing in the preventing collisions issued in 1863 and 1880; and also

agreement should operate as an actual or present demiso

of the premises or any part thereof, it being the trneincludes the local regulations of the principal ports of

intent of the agreement that the builder should havo the the United Kingdom. The whole book is marked by

right only to enter upon the land for the purpose of the a thorough practical acquaintance with the subject, and

due performance of the agreement, and not otherwise, and ought, in our opinion, to be of great value to persons that, io default of such dae performance, the right and intoconcerned in navigation as well as to lawyers.

rest of the builder under the agreement should absolately

cease. Some of the houses were not completed at the speci. STATUTE LAW.

fied dates, and, moreover, those houses bad not been for the

space of twenty-eigbt days regularly proceeded with a coord: STATUTE LAW: THE PRINCIPLES WHICH GOVERN THE ing to the agreement, and the landowner ro-entered on the

CONSTRUCTION AND OPERATION OF STATUTES. By E. | plots on wbioh those houses were being erected, and took WILBERFORCE, Barrister-at-Law. Stevens & Sons.

possession of the buildings and materials thereon, but he This is the third treatise upon the subject of the con

had pot taken more than a merely formal possession before

the builder filed a liquidation petition. The agreement had struction of statutes which has appeared in the last few

not been registered as a bill of sale, and the trustee in years. We have frequently regretted the ignorance of the liquidation claimed the materials which had been seized statute law, as compared with case law, which tends to by the landowner. Bacon, C.J., held that this claim spoil many who pass for good lawyers, and we are glad to | was well founded, on the ground that the stipulation believe that the literary liveliness of the subject may | for forfeitore of the materials to the landowner was a be some evidence of increased professional interest in “bill of sale" within the definition contained in section 7 of it. Mr. Wilberforce's book bears throughout conspicu. the Bills of Sale Act, 1854, as being “a licence to take posses. ous marks of research and care in treatment, but is sion of personal cbattels as security for any debt." This wanting in originality and in criticism of the deci. | decision was reversed by the Court of Appeal (JAMES, BRETT, sions which he has so well strung together. The

and Cotton, L.JJ.), who were of opinion that, though the little controversy about marginal notes, for instance,

stipulation in question was a licence to take possession of where we have Willes, J., in Claydon v. Green (L. R. 3

personal chattels, there was no debt for which the possession C. P. 522), and the Court of Appeal in Attorney-Generul

| was to be a security. BRETT, L.J., said that, even if there

was a debt, the possession was taken, not as a security for it, V. Great Eastern Railway Company (28 W. R. 759, L. R. 11 Ch. D. 460) on the one side, and Jessel,

but ia discharge of it. It was argued on behalf of the trustee

that, as the materials were to be forfeited to the landowner as M.R., in Re Venour's Settled Estates (L. R. 2 Ch. D. liquidated damages, and damages are, by section 31 of the 525) on the other, might well have been treated more Bankruptcy Act, 1869, made provable in bankruptcy as & critically, and so might the question of “headings," ) debt, it might be properly said that the possession was and the question whether utterances in Parliament | taken as security for a debt. But COTTON, L.J., said that may or may not be referred to in construing a statute,

the mere fact that the Bankruptcy Act made damages. and the question whether a statute is directory or im.

provable as a debt did not make damages & debt for perative. We miss also any allusion to the Statute Law

the purposes of another statute. Another point raised was Revision Acts. There is a complete table of cases

that the landowner had waived the forfeiture which had which are numerous and sufficient, the only one which

arisen from the non-completion of the houses at the specified we have missed being Reg. 1. Haslingfield Overseers

dates, by making advances of money to the builder for

the purposes of the agreement after that forfeiture (L. R. 9 Q. B. 209), in which the court referred to the

had taken place. It was not necessary to decide Parliament Roll-but there is no table of statutes, and, the point, because the court was satisfied on the evidence though there is a good table of contents, the index is that there was another continuing forfeiture by reason rather meagre. In spite of these faults the book is a of the houses not having been regularly proceeded with for good one, and we welcome its publication.

twenty-eight days. But their lordships intimated an opinion that the making of advances to the builder for the purposes of the agreement, after the expiration of the time appointed

for the completion of the houses, would be strong evidence CASES OF THE WEEK. of waiver of the forfeiture by the landowner. And JAMES,

L.J., said that it would require a good deal of consideration BUILDING AGREEMENT-LICENCE TO SEIZE MATERIALS--|

before he could assent to the decision of the Court of FORFEITURE-WAIVER-ACT OF BANKRUPTCY-BILLS OF

Common Pleas in Doe v. Brindley (12 Moore, 37), that

allowing a builder to proceed with the work after the ex. SALE ACT, 1854 (17 & 18 Vict. c. 36), ss. 1, 7.-In a casel piration of tbe time limited for the completion of bouses of Ex parte Newitt, before the Court of Appeal on the 27th | under a similar agreement, was not a waiver of the forlele ult., the question arose wbetber a stipulation in a building l ture. A third point raised was tbis : it was alleged that agreement tba', if the builder should not in all things no possession of the materials was taken by the landowner observe and perform all things contained in the agreement, until after the filing of the liquidation petition, and it was or if the intended buildings, or any of them, should not be said that the Jandowner had no property in the materials commenced, or should at any time be left in an unfinished until he had seized them, and that the licence only author-state, and for the space of twenty-eight days not regu. ized him to seize that which was the property of the builder larly proceeded with, as therein provided, tben, notwith at the time of the seizure, and before the seizure the standing that no lease should have been granted in pursu. materials had become the pruperty of the trastee, inasmuch ance of the agreement, it should be lawful for the land. as his title related back to the filing of the petition. The owner to re-enter on the land and the houses then built or court, however, held that this objection was unfounded. begun to be built thereon, and to expel therefrom the builder, JAMES, L.J., said that the trustee took all the property of the and that on such re-entry all svob buildings, materiale, debtor, but he took it with all the liabilities which affected and things then in and about the premises should be it in the debtor's hands, unless the property which he took forfeited to and become the property of the landowner As the legal representative of the debtor was enlarged by "as and for liqaidated and settled damages"-whether | some express provision of the bankrupt law. There was this stipulation required registration under the Bills of | Do such provision applicable to the present case. , Sale Act in order to render it effectual ag against the | stipula'ion in the agreement was that in a certain event to

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