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HIGHWAYS. Th* Common And Statute Law Relating To Highways In England And North Wales. By R. H. Spearman, Esq., Barrister-at-Law. H. Sweet.

This is a careful and elaborate treatise, covering the •whole ground of highway law. Mr. Spearman groups -his chapters under the general headings of highway areas and authorities; the creation, maintenance, and Alteration of highways; the funds available for the maintenance of highways; offences; and locomotives, ■turnpikes, and miscellaneous provisions. The matter of each chapter is expressed in the form of articles of a code, and to many of these articles there are appended ■notes containing a digest of the decisions or authorities on the subject. Naturally these notes are the most numerous and lengthy in what we may term the nonstatutory part of the book—chiefly in that relating to the creation and maintenance of highways. Here we think that in many places the author expresses very well the result of the authorities. For instance, on the subject of the supposed right to deviate, he says (p. 47) that, " although it has been laid down in most text-books 4 that if a highway became so out of repair and foundrous as to be impassable, or even incommodious, tho public save a right to go on the adjacent ground, whether it be cultivated or uncultivated,' no such rights exist ; in the first place, there is no vestige of authority for assuming the possibility of such a right, save where the road passes over common waste or uninclosed land; but, secondly, even this limitation would bo insufficient—deviation in the sense above used means •deviation from the highway, not from the beaten track; bot the only authority is Duncembe's case, and there the deviation was out of the beaten track on to certain outlets which were part of the highway; the other cases are where the owner wrongfully obstructed the way itself, and in such cases the grantees even of a private right of way have a right to deviate j but such a right, founded on the misfeasance of the owner himself, can be no authority to support a right founded on nonfeasance by a third party over whom ho has no control." It will be seen that the author does not content himself with stringing together head-notes of cases or conclusions of previous writers, but examines the authorities for himself. Generally speaking, the notes we have examined in this part of the book are very satisfactory; ander article 70, however, relating to the ownership of the soil, although the author cites the case of Beckett v. Corporation of Leeds (20 W. R. 454, L. R. 7 Ch. 421), he omits to call attention to the important observations of Lord Justice James, who said that he "should be very slow to come to the conclusion that where thero is a road going through an estate, and a site is granted by the roadside for the erection of a cottage or house, and a cottage or house is built upon that site, the mere conveyance or grant of a piece of laud as the site of a house is, in presumption of law, a grant up to ihe middle of the high road." As regards the statutory part of the work, the notes appear generally to give a reference to the decisions, but Mr. Spearman might with advantage have occasionally attempted to supply rather more in the shape of explanation or comment. Thus wo find the difficult section of the Highway Act, 1878, relating to extraordinary expenses occasioned by excessive weight or extraordinary traffic (section 23), left, on p. 166, without any attempt to elucidate its provisions; nor, do we find any reference here to the case of Lord Aveland v. Lucas (2S W. R. 571, L. R. 5 C. P. D. 351), which, however, is cited on p. 260. On the whole, however, we cau commend the book as a well-arranged and accurate digest of the law -of highways. Book 6 contains a large number of forms, and in the appendix the existing statutes are given in

full, with references in the margin to the articles relating to them in the text.

EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS. A Treatise On The Law or Executors And AdminisTrators, And Of The Administration Op The Estates Op Deceased Persons. By Stuart Cunningham Macaskie, Stevens & Sons. Mr. Macaskie does not give any hint of the class for whose benefit his book is meant. If it is intended for the practitioner, we fear we must say that it can hardly be successful. The subject is not one which, for the purpose of practice, lends itself easily to abridgment. A large part of it consists of judge-made law, to be gathered from numerous cases, and most of the rules whioh have been laid down are honeycombed with exceptions and qualifications. Not only are the cases cited by Mr. Macaskie only a small selection from the mass of decisions on the subject, but there is too much of what we may term gliding over difficulties to suit the reader who wants to find help in the decision of the points which come before him in practice. Thus, in the chapter on tho duties of the legal personal representative, under the head of "Payment of Debts," the author says that " if the deceased should have died insolvent, the administration of the assets will be regulated by section 10 of the Judicature Act, 1875, upon which, however, a somewhat narrow construction has been put." What this construction is he fails to tell us, beyond a reference in the foot-note to lie Suche & Co. (L. R. 1 Ch. D. 48). So again, on p. 130, we are told that the rule that an executor who trades with the assets must account for the wholo of the fund, if it should be lost, and for the whole of the fund and profits, if the venture should be successful, "was perhaps somewhat narrowed by the decision in Vyse v. Foster, but the facts of that case were peculiar, and the ease one of great hardship." And on p. 139 we read that "in one or two cases an inquiry has been ordered what would be a proper remuneration to a solicitor-executor for his trouble, but these cases are altogether exceptional." What the professional reader wants to be told is, how far and in what way a rule has been narrowed by a decision, and under what exceptional circumstances an inquiry as to the remuneration of a solicitor-executor has been ordered. But if Mr. Maeaskie's book is intended for the student, it is likely to be useful, for it presents the leading principles of the law in a terse form; it is apparently accurate as far as it goes, and the style in which it is written is easy and interesting.

RAILWAYS. The Law Of Railway Companies, Being A Collection Op The Act8 And Orders Relating To Railway ComTanies, With NoTes Op All The Cases Decided Thereon, &o. By J. H. Balfour Bkowne, Barrister-at-Law, Registrar to the Railway Commissioners, aud H. S. Theobald, Barrister-at-law. Stevens & Sons.

This is a book of which there is little to be said except that it includes all tho Acts directly or indirectly relating to railways, aud that the decisions on the leading Acts have been diligently collected and concisely stated in notes following the sections to which they relate. The Lands Clauses Act is annotated with great elaboration and care, and in many of the notes—e.g., that relating to the cases in which a landowner is entitled to compensation—the decisions are well grouped. Their effect, so far as we have examined them, appears to be correctly stated. The Acts are arranged in chronological order, and the orders made under the Railway Companies Act, 1867, the Regulation of Railways Act, 1873, and the Orders in Council under the Explosives Act, 1875, so far as they affect railway companies, are also priuted. We are surprised to observe that some sections from the Local Government Act, 1858, are printed at p. 413,

although that Act was wholly repealed by 38 & 39 Vict, c. 55, s. 313. The appendix contains the Standing Orders of the House of Commons and the bye-laws relating to the conveyance of railway passengers approved by the Board of Trade.


[To the Editor of the Solicitors' Journal.']

Sir,—I understand that the question of acknowledging in some suitable way the hospitality which the London members of this society have received at the society's various provincial meetings is now under the consideration of a committee of the council, who have some difficulty in determining the most fitting way of entertaining the provincial members.

The chief aim should be to entertain as many as possible in the most agreeable and acceptable manner, and at the same time to utilize the opportunity to advance and promote the interests of the society, and to create and foster a feeling of amity and goodwill between the various members of the society, most of whom are comparative strangers to each other. A public banquet has necessarily been suggested, ao well as a conversazione or a concert. Some, however, of the younger and more active members of the council would, I have some reason to suppose, prefer a ball. I cannot doubt that the council will be most desirous of adopting that method of entertainment which shall be found to be most acceptable to the largest number of members, as well as be most likely to be best appreciated. I do not know in what way the expenses are to be borne, but if the London members are to be asked to contiibute individually, it would seem that care should be taken to ascertain what may be the views of the members of the society generally, unless, of course, the council are tolerably sure that the course they may adopt will be generally acceptable. For my own part, whether there is or is not to be a dinner, I am quite satisfied that a ball will afford attractions and advantages which no other kind of entertainment can possibly afford. The society's hall, library, and adjacent rooms afford most admirable accommodation for receiving a large number of guests at a dancing party, and if the voice of the ladies is to be allowed to exercise even the smallest influence, there cannot be a doubt but that they would largely declare in favour of a ball.

The truth is that the society wants, to some extent, popularizing amongst the younger aud rising members of the profession, who would infinitely prefer the attractions of a dance to the delicacies of a well-appointed banquet, or the most popular or classical music which could be performed, either of which can, of course, be obtained almost as advantageously outside the society as within its ranks. This, however, would not be the case with a ball, which, held in the society's hall, would present an appearance which could hardly be obtained elsewhere in London.

It would not be difficult to point out that the preparations for a ball would be far less onerous than those for any other kind of entertainment, and I cannot help feeling that the elder members of the profession will not allow their natural preference for a dinner to outweigh the attractions, probably to some of themselves, as to the great majority of the younger aud rising members of the profession in London and in the country, which a bull would be certain to afford.

Apologizing for trespassing so much upon your valuable space in respect to a question of comparatively small—though from one point of view of no tliglit—importance, and trusting to hear the sentiments of other members of the society through the medium of your widely-circulated journal, I beg to subscribe myself,

Jan. 21. A Conservative Member Of The Society.

[To the Editor of the Solicitors' Journal.]

Sir,—It may be interesting to some to know that iu the Chancery Registrar's Office where an order directs so much of a sum of consols as will raise £100 to be sold, and " so much of the residue" of the consols as will raise £50 to be also sold, no directions for sale of consols to raise this latter sum will be granted without an affidavit being sworn and filed, and the office copy produced showing the amount of such "residue," although such amount is already shown by the Paymaster General's certificate of the fund in court.

If, however, instead of the words "so much of the residue" the words " so much more of the consols" be used, then the foregoing affidavit is not required. It is to be regretted that the registrar's clerk, when invited to explain the distinction between these two expressions, and the use of the affidavit in the former case, should have hod "no time to discuss abstract questions."

Jan. 24. W. H. G.

[We believe that the Chancery Paymaster invariably requiros an affidavit where the word "residue" is used, in such a case as that referred to by our correspondent. Why it should be necessary for the Paymaster, knowing better than anyone else the amount of the residue, to require this affidavit, seems difficult to explain. If under the Chancery Funds Rules he does not consider himself at liberty to dispense with it, the sooner the rules are altered the better.—Ed. S. J.]


Death Of LunaticEights Of Real And Personal RepresentativesApplication Of Money Arising From Salb Ok Real Estate—Partition Act, 186S (31 & 32 Vict. C. 40), s. 8.—In a case of In re Barker, in Lunacy, before James and Cotton, L.J J., on the 24th inst., a question was raised between the real and personal representatives of a. deceasad lunatic as to the right to a sum of money which had arisen from the sale of real estate of the lunatic, but which was standing in court to the account of the lunatic generally. The lunatic was under the will of his father entitled to anundivided ninth share of real estate. Before he had been found a lunatic an action was commenced for the partition of the estate, and after he had been found a lunatic a decree was made, under section 4 of the Act, at the request of parties iuterested in the property to the extent of a moiety, for a sale of the property. Under this decree a sale took place, and the lunatic's share of the purchase-money was ordered to be carried over to his account gencrully, instead of to the account of his real estate. Alter bis death the money was claimed by his personal representatives as well as by his heir-at-law. Section 8 ot the Partition Act provides that sections 23 to 25 of the Leases and Sales of Settled Estates Act (19 & 20 Vict. c. 120), "shall ext-nd and apply to money to be received on any sale effected under the authority of this Act." Section 23 of the Leases and Sales of Settled Estates Act provides that "all money to be received on any sale effected under the authority of this Act . . . shall be applied as the court fball from time to time direct to some one or more of the following purposes—namely, the purchase or redemption of the land tax, or the discharge or redemption of auy incumbrance affecting the hereditaments in respect of which such money was paid, or affecting any other hereditaments subject to the same uses or trusts; or the purchase of other hereditaments to be settled in the same manner as the hereditaments in respect of which the money was paid; or the payment to any person becoming absolutely entitled." Their Lordships held that the circumstance that the money had been carried to the general account of the lunatic, instead of to the account of his real estate, could not affect the rights of the parties. The lunatic himself was not iu a position to make an election to take the money as personal estate, and the Court of Lunacy had never made any election for him. And their lordships were of opinion that, though section 23 of the Leases and Sales Act, as it stood in the Act, necessarily applied only to settled estates, yet, as it was perfectly general in its words, when it was read into the Partition Act tliere was no such limitation on the generality of its meaning, and consequently it applied, not only to the case of Fettled property sold in a partition action, bnt to any property sold in such an action. The money was, therefore, to be paid to "any person becoming absolutely entitled," and the heir-at-law of the deceased owner was such a person. The money in court, therefore, belonged to t'>e lunatic's heir-at-law,—Solicitors, Hidsdalt, Craddock, <£• Rid,da'e.

Leave To Appeal After Exfiratioh Of TimeSpecial CircumstancesOrd. 58, R. 15.—In a case of In re Tlu liormanton Iron and Steel Company, an application was made to the Court of Appeal, on the 24th inst, for leave to appeal from an order of Jessel, U.K., notwithstanding tha expiration of the twenty-one days limited by rule 15 of order 58. Jessel, M. E., had, following h» own previous decision in In Printing and Numerical Registering Company (26 W. R. 627, L. R. 8 Cb. D. 535), held that, by virtue of seotion 10 of the Judicature Act of 1875, section 87 of the Bankruptcy Act, 1869, is imported into the winding up of a company, and consequently that the proceeds of an execution which had been levied on the company's goods belonged to the liquidator, for the benefit of the company's creditors generally, and not to the execution creditor. The Court of Appeal having since, in In re The Withernsea Brick Works (29 W. E. ITS, ante, p. 135), reversed this view of the construction of section 10 of the Act of 1875, the execution creditor desired to appeal from the decision of Jessel, AI.R. The fand which had under the order been paid over to the liquidator had not been distributed by him, but remained still in his hands. It formed the only assets of the company, and the liquidator had incurred costs in advertising for creditors. Under these circumstances the court (james, Brett, and Cotton, L.JJ.) held that leave to appeal ought to be given, but that the liquidator must be paid out of the fund all costs properly paid or incurred by him on the faith of the validity cf the order. This would include the costs of advertising for creditors. But the liquidator was not entitled, ns had been contended, to charge the fund with remuneration for his services, nor ought the oosts of any creditors incurred by them in consequence of the liquidator's advertisement to be p»id ont of it. James, L.J., said this was not like the case of a man who had got money into his hands under an order of the court, and whose statutory right to keep it after the expiration of the time limited for appealing ought to be maintained. In the present case the money was still in the l ands of the officer of the court to be dealt with. Bhbtt, L.J., said that each case must depend on its own circum»t»nce*. If the money had been distributed among the creditors, lh.4 distribution ought not to have been altered. Bat, as the money was still in the hands of the oourt, there waa no reason why that which by law belonged to one man should be given to another. — Solicitor?, Tahourdins it Rargreaves ; Singleton $ Tattershall.

AppealAbandonmentCosts—In a oase of Charlton r. Charlion, before the Court of Appeal on the 26th inst., a motion was made for the dismissal of an appeal nnder the following circumstances :—An order having been made tbat part of a fond, which had been set apart to meet the costs which sbonld be found due to the former solioitor of the plaintiff?, should be released, the solicitor, on the 20th of December, served a notice of appeal from the order. The appeal was not Bet down, and 011 the 12th of January the appellant wrote to the respondents' solioitor that he withdrew his notice of appeal. Before, however, this letter was received the respondents' solicitor bad delivered briefs to counsel to oppose the appeal, and on the 12th of January he wrote to the appellant, telling him that he bad already delivered briefs to oppose the appeal, and asking him to give an undertaking to pay the respondents' costs of the appeal; otherwise, he said, be should take proceedings to enforce payment. No answer having been ■ent to this letter, the respondents' solioitor, on the 19th of January, served a notioe of motion before the Court of Appeal for the dismissal of the appeal for want of proseoution, and that tbe respondents might be ordered to pay the costs of the appeal, and of the motion. On the bearing of this motion it was urged on behalf of the appellant that

the respondents were entitled only to the costs of an abandoned motion. The oourt (jessel, M.R., and Brett and Cotton, L.JJ.), held that tbe respondents must have the costs of the motion, and that the appeal must be dismissed with oosts. But Jessel, M.R., said tbat this would not preclude the taxing master from considering whether the respondents' briefs had been properly delivered before the appeal had been set down.—Solicitors, W. Kowland Jackson; H. W. Chatterion.

AppealOrder Giving TimeDiscretion Of Judge. —In a case of De Mora v. Concha, before the Court of Appeal on the 26th inst., an appeal was brought from an order made by Bacon, Y.C., in court, giving the respondent six mouths for the completion of evidence in answer to the appellnnt's evidence. The court (jessel, M.R., and Brett and Cotton, L.JJ.) dismissed the appeal, saying that it was an appeal from tbe exercise of a discretion by the judge, and that the Court of Appeal would not interfere unless it was very clearly shown that his discretion had been wrongly exercised. This had not been shown in the present case. Cotton, L.J., said that appeals in cases of applications for time ought to be discouraged. Jessel, M.R., expressed some astonishmeot at finding that the hearing of an application of this kind had been adjourned by the Viae-Chancellor into court. He said th«t the practice in his own chambers was that applications for time thouM be heard by a junior clerk, suhj act, of course, to the right of appeal to the judge in chambers. He should not even allow the costs of employing counsel in chambers in such a case. Brett, and Cotton, L.JJ., declined- to express any opinion as to

which was the better practice Solicitors, Ward, Mills,

& Co.

Cross-notice Of AppealQuestion Not Affecting Original AppellantOrd. 58, u. 6.—In a case of In re Cavander's Trusts, before the Court of Appeal on the 26th inst., a question arose as to the validity of a cross-notice of appeal, given by a respondent under rule 6 of order 58. The appellant having served his notice of appeal, one of the respondents gave notice to all the parties (including the appellant), that on the hearing of tbe appeal he should contend that the order appealed from ought to be varied in a manner which he specified. The variation thus suggested would not have affected the interest of the appellant. The Court (jessel, M.R., and Brett and Cotton, L.JJ.) held that, under such circumstances, rule 6 did not apply, and that the respondent ought to have given an independent notice of appeal. Jessel, M.R., said that, though the last words of rule 6, "be shall give notice of such intention to any parties who may be affected by such contention" are very genera], yet, looking at the introductory words, "It shall not, under any circumstances, be necessary for a respondent to give notice of motion by way of cross-appeal," it was obvious that the notice of tbe respondent's intention was only intended to be a snbstitute for a cross-appeal. A crossappeal must necessarily aSecl the original appellant, but it might affect other parties, and, if it did, notice must be given to them. It was not intended that a respondent should he able, by a notice under the rule, to raise some new question between himself and other respondents wbioh did not affect tbe appellant. If a respondent wished to bring forward a new question of that kind, he must give a fresh notice of appeal. It was not a cross-appeal. That this must be so appeared also from the consideration that the notice must be given to the appellant, and why should notice be given to him when ex iujpothen he had no interest in the matter? His lordship added that he was reported to hare said in one case, and he probably did say, that, after such a notioe had been given, the appellant conld not withdraw his appeal, but that only meant that the appeal could not be withdrawn so is to prevent the respondent who had given the notice from

I raising the question mentioned in it. Under the circumstances leave was given to the respondent to s^rve a notice of appeal. It should be observed that this decision appears to conflict with that of the Court of Appeil (James, Brett, and Cotton, L.JJ.) in Ralph v. Carrick (28 W. R. 67, L. R. U Ch. D. 873), which case, however was not referred to.—

i Solicitors, T. W, Buckler; W. H. Orchard; Fmnis $■ Wglie.

WillSpecial Power Of ApfointmbntResiduary DeviskWills Act, S. 27— Property Ineffectually Appointed Comprised In Residuary Devisk. — In a case of Freme v. Clement, before the Master of the Rolls Od the 25th in»t., a question arose, where in a will, dated after the Wills Act, a special power of appointment, given to him l>y a settlement before the Wills Act, was exercised by the testator, hut so that the appointment was void for remoteness, and where the will contained a residuary devise in favour of pome of the objects of the power, whether the property comprised within the power passed to the residuary devisee or passed as in default of appointment. The question turned to a great extent upon the meaning of the word "devise" in the various sections of the Wills Act, and whether it included a special power of appointment. Jessel, M.R., was of opinion that, although the instrument giving the power was executed before the Wills Act, still that the appointment was to be construed as to its execution and construction according to the law then in force, and, therefore, that the rules under the Wills Act would apply to the construction of the appointment. After an elaborate examination of the various sections of the Wills Act, he came to the conclusion that the words device and bequeBt in the 27th and other sections included property over which the testator had a special p'>wer of appointment, and, therefore, thBt the property comprised within the appointment passed under the residuary devise in the will.—Solicitors, Field, Roseoe, <t Co. ; Brownloio $ Howe; Dean $• Taylor; li. M. $ F. Lowe.

Practice Solicitor Delivery Of Bill WithDrawal—order To TaxSpecial Circumstances.—In a case of Re Holroyde ii Smith, before the Master of the Rolls on the 21st inst., a motion was made to discharge a common order to tax a solicitor's bill. On the 8tb of November Messrs. Holroyde & Smith sent their client, a Mr. Mitchell, a bill of their solicitor and client costs of an action conducted by them, but the bill was not signed. The bill had oharged {inter alia) £5 6s. a day for certain journeys to London, instead of the u-mal charge of £3 3s. Mitchell's new solicitors wrote to Holroyde & Smith on the 17th of November, stating they had instructions to hate the bill taxed, and had they any suggestions to make to avoid a taxation. An interview took place between the solicitors, but they did not come to any agreement, and on the 19th of November Holroyde & Smith wrote to Mitobell enolosing a fresh bill, and stating that, "inasmuch as you have sustained a loss in this matter by ex'ra costs, it is our desire to relieve yon as much as possible, and we should be sorry to have any nopleasantness, and therefore, upon consideration, we have made out a fresh bill of costs, which we desire you to accept in lieu of the former one, and, in fact, we beg to give you notioe we only consider yon liable npon the bill sent with this letter." Mitchell subsequently obtained the common order for taxation, and Holroyde & Smith now moved to discharge it, on the ground that there were special circumstances justifying them in withdrawing the bill, and that the case fell within the authority of /,'. Chambers (34 Beav. 177). Jessel, M.R., was of opinion that there were n j special circumstances in the case to bring it within the prinoiple of the decision in He Chambers; and he therefore refused the motion, with costs.—SoliciTors, Layton <fc Jaqites; Bower <£• Cotton.

PracticeAbsconding DefendantSubstituted SerViceEquitable Mortgage—Rules Of Court, 1875, Ord. 9 E. 2.—In a case of Wolverhampton and Staffordshire Banking Company v. Bond, also before the Master of the Rolls on the 21st inst., a motion was made lor substituted service of the writ, or directions for notice in lieu of service. The plaintiff were equitable mortgagees, Bond being the mortgagor, who bad absconded in May last. None of his relations knew where he was, though it was believed he bad gone to Australia. Jessel, M.R., gave leave for substituted service on the defendant's relations, and directed advertisements to be inserted in the Timet and in a local paper; he also required the production of an affidavit showing that the value of the property was not substantially more than the amount of the incumbrances on the property, and required the plaintiffs to undertake to apply for a sale at the trial.—Solicitors, Ullithorne, Currey, $ Villiers, for Neve $ Ruttcr, Wolverhampton.

CompanyAgreement F >r User Of Patents In ConSideration Of Payment Out Of Dividends Implied ConTract To Continue BusinessWinding Up.—In aca«e of Re Edison Telephone Company of London, before the Master of the Rolls on the 22nd inst., an application for a winding-up order of the company was made by a shareholder, on the ground that tie company had ceased to carry on business by reason of its having sold its property to another company, in consideration of s lares in the la'ter, in pursuance of a power to that effect in its memorandum. A patented by certain agreements had sold certain patent rights to the company in consideration of their paying him half their surplus divideuds after £5 per cent, had been paid to their shareholders. By the articles, dividends were only payable out of net profits, and by another article the patentee was entitled in respect of one share allotted to him to exercise half the voting power of the shareholders. The patentee now objected to any winding-up order being made, on the ground that the company bad impliedly contracted with him to continue their business so as to enable them to carry out their agreement with him. The liabilities of the company, except under the agreement with the patentee, bail all been provided for. Jessel, M.R., was of opioion that it was a case for a winding-up order notwithstanding the dissent ol the patentee. According to his agreement with the company he was only to be paid by means of dividends, and these were only payable out of net profits. His contention that the company were impliedly bound to continue their business had really no bearing on the present case, because, according to their memorandum, of which the patentee had notice, the company had an absolute power to sell tbeir business as they thought tit, and to prevent any injustice to the patentee the power bad evidently been inserted giving him the preponderance of voting power. The company had sold their business out and out, and had taken as the consideration certain shares in the buying company, which shares were doubtless part of their assets and saleable as such. The company could not earn any lurther dividends, and there was nothing left to be done but to divide the proceeds of the sale among the shareholders. The patentee might have a claim on the asse's, but, in his opinion, he had no right to stop the making of a winding-up order, which his lordship accordingly made. He also refused to stay the proceedings in the winding up pending an appeal.—SoliciTors, Freshfields <fc Williams; Itenshaw tfc Renslutw; Waterhouse <£• Winterbotham.

CASES BEFORE THE BANKRUPTCY REGISTRARS. (Before Mr. Registrar Pepys, acting as Chief Judge) Jan. 25.— Re Challis. New first meeting under liquidation petition ordered, by consent of creditors who have voted against resolutions for liquidation by arrangement, notwithstanding that a petition for adjudication has been presented again it the debtor.

This was an application for leave to convene a new first meeting of creditors under a petition for liquidation presented by A. J. Challis.

It appeared that at the original meeting, held on the 19th of January, resolutions were proposed for liquidation by arrangement of the affairs of the debtor, and five creditors whose debts amounted to £2,200 voted in favour thereof, and five other creditors whose debts amounted to about £200 voted against them. The resolutions were therefore lost, a majority in number of the creditors not being obtained, and since the meeting Messrs. Taylor & Sons, who were large creditors, had presented a petition for adjudication against the debtor. Rather than the uiatter should go into bankruptcy the dissenting creditors now expressed their willingness to assent to resolutions for liquidation by arrangement, and they consented to the present application being made.

H. Reed, in support of the application.

Mr. Registrar Pepys: Do I distinctly understand that all the creditors who dissented from the resolutions are now willing that a new meeting be appointed:

Reed said that was so.

Mr. Registrar Pepys said, that under tho circumstances, leave would be given to convene a new meeting. Solicitors, Laytoii, Son, <fc Co.



Mr. George Monnsey Gray, solicitor, late of Staple-inn, died at his residence, 7, Upper Bedford-place, on the 19th itisi., at the age of eighty-live. The deceased, who Whs one of the oldest solicitors in London, was the son of the late Mr. John Gray, bis mother having been a daughter of Mr. George Monnsey, of Carlisle, and he was born in 1795. He was admitted a solicitor in 1818, and practised at 9, Stapleinn for about fifty years. He was formerly in partnership with Mr. Henry Monnsey, next with Mr. Richard Baynes Armstrong, and finally with Mr. Ewart Simon Mounsey. Aboot twelve years ago be retired from practice on Hccount of failing strength. Mr. Gray bad for many years u large private practice, and was the head of a firm having an extensive ageixy connection with the North of England.

MR FRANCIS HUNT. Mr. Francis Hunt, solicitor, formerly of Witney, died at Oxford, from bronchitis, on the 17th inst. The deceased was born in 1S09, and was admitted a solicitor about the year 1837. He formerly practised at Witney, but he retired from business several years aero. Mr. Hant had for many years an extensive practice at AVitney, where he held several public appointments. He was clerk to the Witney Board of Guardians, and superintendent registrar, and also cleric to tbo county magistrates and to the Commissioners of Land, Assessed, and Income Taxes for the hundred of Bampton.


Married Womens' Property.

A paper on tbe Bill to amend the Aote relating to the property of married women which has been introduced this session, was read by Mr. C. B. B. M'Laren, M.P., on Saturday. The chair was taken by Mr. J. Hinde Palmer, Q.C., M.P. Mr. M'Laren maintained that the law with respect to tbe property of married women ought to be fundamentally changed in accordance with the relations of modern society, and that all amendments ought to proceed npon the principle that tho labour of eaoh of the partners in matrimony shonld be lor the use of both, and that neither partner should be responsible for the acts of the other. Tbe Bill of 1881 proceeded upon this principle, and at tbe outset it enaoted that the act of marriage should leave the property both of husband and wife unaffected. It secured in the case of a happy marriage the enjoyment of this property to both, while in the case of domestic differences it gave to each the complete dominion over his or ber separate estate. The Bill really secured to all women the advantages now possessed only by the rioh, who could afford the luxury of a settlement; and it thus revealed what really amounted to an oppressive and prohibitive tax npon justice to the poor. Oat of every thirteen wives not more than two could pay for or really understand tbe need of a marriage settlement; but this Bill would afford protection to all. The Bill might be made a complete code of tbe law of conjugal property; but this would be too bold an effort. Some of its details, however, were valuable instalments of reform.

Sir Arthur Hobhouse, Mr. G. Palmer, M.P., Mr. Horace Dsvey, M.P., Sir D. Wedderbntn, M.P., and some others baring spoken in favour of the principle of the Bill, the chairman, in summing up the discussion, said that considering the character of the present Bill, he was not sorry that it would have to undergo the ordeal of examination by a select committee of the House of Commons. Referring to a passage in the speech in which Lord Cairns introduced Mr. Russell Gurnty's Bill of 1870 in the House of Lords, ho said Lord Cairns had there laid down what the promoters of this Bill wished to see carried into effect. The Lord Chancellor had, in a private interview, had the provisions of the Bill explained to bim, and Mr. Palmer said he thought he was justified in saying that his lordship took a favourable view of the general pi inciples upon which they proceeded.


The general annual meeting was held in the library on January 24, 1881, at which the following members were present:—Mr. T. G. Hyde, president, in the obair, and Messrs. W. P. Hughes, vice-president, R. F. Hill, Cutler, Beale, Parker, Jeffery, Davis, Allen, boD. secretary.

The treasurer's accounts showing a balance of £75 2s. 7d were audited and passed ; tbe report of the committee last year was read and adopted.

The following election of officers for the present year took place:—

Mr. T. G. Hyde, president; Mr. W. P. Hughes, vioepresident; Mr. W. Allan, treasurer and also hon. seoretary. All the above-named gentlemen were re-eleoted. Messrs. Beale, Barker, H. Corbett, Jeffery, and Davis were eleoted on the committee for the present year.

It was resolved that a sum of £5 be given out of the funds of the sooiety for providing prizes for tbe Worcester and Worcestershire Law Students' Sooiety under regulations to be made by the committee. A vote of thanks was passed to the president for his servioes during the past year.


COUNCIL OF LEGAL EDUCATION. Easter Examination, 1SS1. Examination of Candidates for Fast Certificates. The attention of students is requested to the following rules :—

No student admitted after the 31st of December, 1872, shall receive from the council the certificate of fitness for call to the bar required by the four Inns of Court unless he shall have passed a satisfactory examination in the following subjects—viz., (1) Roman law; (2) The law of real and personal property; (3) Common law; and (4) Equity.

No student admitted after the 31st of December, 1872, shall be examined for call to the bar until he shall have kept nine terms j except that students admitted after that day shall have the option of passing the examination in Roman law at any time after having kept four terms.

An examination will be held in April next, to which a student of any of the Inns of Court, who is desirous of becoming a candidate for a certificate of fitness for being called to the bar, will be admissible.

Each student proposing to submit himself for examination will be required to enter his name, personally or by letter, at the treasurer's or steward's office of the Inn of Court to which he belongs, on or before Thursday, the 24th day of March next; and he will further be required to state in writing whether his object in offering himself for examination is to obtain a certificate preliminary to a call to the bar; or whether he is merely desirous of passing the examination in Roman law under the above-stated rule.

The examination will commence on Tuesday, the 6th day of April next, and will be continued on the Wednesday, Thursday, and Friday following.

It will take place in the hall of Lincoln's-inn ; and the doors will be closed ten minutes after the time appointed for the commencement of the examination.

The examination by printed questions will be conducted in the following order:—Tuesday morning, Aprils, at ten until one, on the law of renl and personal property; Wednesday morning, April 6, at ten until one, on common law; Thursday morning, April 7, at ten until one, on equity; Friday morning, April 8, at ten until oue, on Roman law.

The oral examination will bo conducted in the same order, and on the same subjects, as above appointed for the examination by printed questions.

The examiner in the law of real and personal property will examine in the following subjects :—The e'ementary principles of the law of real and personal property, with reference chiefly to the treatises of Mr. Joshua Williams on those subjects.

The examiner in common law will examine in the following subjects :—(1) The law of contracts; (2) The law of torts; (3) Criminal law; (4) The procedure in the common

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