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CASES OF THE WEEK.

BILLS OF EXCHANGE-REMITTANCES TO COVER ACCEPTANCES-SPECIFIC APPROPRIATION.-On the 19th inst., the Court of Appeal (JESSEL, M. R., and BRETT and COTTON, L.JJ.) reversed in part the decision of Malins, V.C., in the case of In re Gothenburg Commercial Company (28 W. R. 456). The question was whether there had been a specific appropriation of bills of exchange which had been remitted to the company in London by a bank in Sweden to put the company in funds to meet other bills which they had accepted for the bank, the company receiving a commission for so doing. It was part of the arrangement that the company should be at liberty to discount the remitted bills, and to deal with the proceeds for their own purposes before their own acceptances matured, paying interest on the proceeds until their acceptances should mature. The company stopped payment on the 20th of January, 1879, and was ordered to be wound up on a petition presented on the 22nd of January. At the time of the stoppage there were outstanding acceptances of the company for the bank to the amount of £2,197, to meet which other bills had been remitted by the bank to the amount of £2,300. Of the remitted bills some had been discounted by the company before the stoppage; the proceeds of the remittances were received after the stoppage from the persons liable upon them, partly by the company between by the liquidator afterwards. The bank afterwards met the the stoppage and the presentation of the petition, and partly bills which the company had accepted. Malins, V.C., held that the bank were entitled to have paid to them the amount of the proceeds of all the remitted bills, both those which had been discounted by the company before their stoppage, and those which were collected afterwards. The Court of Appeal held that a line must be drawn at the date of the stoppage, and that the bank were entitled only to the proceeds of such of the remitted bills as remained in specie at that date. By virtue of the arrangement between the company and the bank the proceeds of the remitted bills had stopped payment, they stopped for all purposes; they renbecome the property of the company. But, when they dition-viz., meeting their acceptances, until the remitted bills dered themselves thereby incapable of performing the conhad been sent to them, and they were then entitled only to retain those of the remitted bills which remained in specie in their hands as an indemnity against liability upon their own acceptances. This liability having been discharged by the bank, the bank were entitled to have the remitted bills which remained in specie restored to them.-SOLICITORS, Plews, Irvine, & Hodges; Ashurst, Morris, & Co.

prietary rights of the greatest importance might fairly come under consideration; for the right of the individual to hold and propagate what religious opinions he pleases is scarcely adequately discussed without a definition of the limits within which he is entitled to devote his property to their support, a definition which may become of great importance in view of the increasing influence of the writers who are opposed to dogmatic religion. Would a bequest to promote the doctrines of the positive philosophy at the present time be upheld? It would seem more likely to be bad, on the prin ciple on which Briggs v. Hartley (14 Jur. 683) was decided, where a bequest for the purpose of promoting a belief in the sufficiency of natural religion was held void. These cases with regard to endowment are really some of the most important factors in determining the legal limits to freedom of opinion. But although the author goes into a variety of questions concerning Church property, which are rather curious than useful, the law relating to endowment, as well as that with regard to the important subject of church buildings, are not treated of at all. Apart from any question as to the general design of the work, such a wealth of learning as the author appears to have at his disposal demands, perhaps, a more finished execution than is here displayed in order to make it as useful as it might become. A lawyer reading such a sentence as this: "As an advowson is in most respects capable of being dealt with as other real estate, it is capable of being exchanged, which, however, is an operation which involves a double resignation and a double induction" (p. 405); or this: "No spiritual person can hold more than two benefices or more than one benefice and one cathedral preferment " (p. 445)would be apt to give the author less credit for precision of statement than he actually deserves. With reference to the general observations or reflections by means of which Mr. Paterson undoubtedly succeeds, to the great benefit of the unlearned reader, in adding the attribute of "readableness" to a mere legal disquisition, they are always interesting, but they are sometimes rather too discursive to be appropriate to a legal handbook, and they are not always suggestive of a sufficiently wide survey of the subject-matter. He says, for instance (p. 379), "Except for the purpose of solving difficulties between the members of the Church, whether clerical or lay, and which the law is bound to solve for the same reason that it solves all other difficulties between man and man, the worth or truth of any religious doctrine is deemed by the law of no intrinsic importance." Surely the smallest consideration of the cases upon those charitable endowments for religious purposes to which we have alluded would show that this proposition is not true. Things may have altered since the time when Lord Hardwicke declared that the Christian religion was part of the law of the land, but they Lave not altered to the extent of making it a matter of indifference to the courts whether a testator gives his property to the support of one religion or another. But in spite of such minor imperfections as those to which we have referred, the book is a useful and valuable summary of many branches of the law which are as interesting to the general public as to the professional reader.

PUBLIC WORSHIP REGULATION ACT, 1874 (37 & 38 VICT. c. 85), ss. 7, 9, 13-JURISDICTION OF JUDGE-POWER TO ENFORCE OBEDIENCE TO INHIBITION BY IMPRISONMENTVALIDITY OF FORMS FRAMED UNDER ACT-SIGNIFICAVITWRIT DE CONTUMACE CAPIENDO-5 ELIZ. c. 23, s. 2-53 GEO. 3, c. 127, s. 1-12 & 13 Vicr. c. 109, s. 26.-In two cases of In re Dale and In re Enraght, before the Court of Appeal on the 15th inst., some questions were raised upon the construction of the Public Worship Regulation Act, 1874, and the validity of the forms which have been framed under it. The questions were raised upon applications for writs of habeas corpus with the view of obtaining the release of two clergymen who had been imprisoned for disobedience to inhibitions issued by the judge of the Court of Arches, in proceedings instituted under the Act, and for writs of prohibition to the judge, on the ground that he had exceeded his jurisdiction. The first question was whether the judge appointed under the Act has power to enforce obedience to his order (and in particular to an inhibition) made in proceedings SOLICITORS' BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION. under the Act by the process of significavit, or whether he has no power of enforcing his order under the Act but lane, London, on this association was held at the Law Institution, Chancery- tion 7 of the Act empowers the Archbishops of Canterbury he usual monthly meeting of the board of directors of such as is expressly conferred upon him by the Act. SeoWednesday, January 12, the following and York, but subject to the approval of her Majesty, to ap

SOCIETIES.

charman) in the chair, Messrs. Asker (Norwich), Hedger, practice for ten years, or a person who has been a judge directors being present:-Mr. Phillip Rickman (deputy-point from time to time a barrister who has been in actual bert; Mr. Eiffe (secretary). A sum of £145 was distributed vincial Courts of Canterbury and York." And it provides Kays, Pennington, Roscoe, Smith, Styan, Veley, and Wool

in grants of assistance

and other general b

fourteen new members were admitted,
ess transacted.

of one of the superior courts, "to be a judge of the Pro

that whenever a vacancy shall occur in the office of official principal of the Arches Court of Canterbury, the judge

so appointed shall become ex officio such official principal, "and all proceedings thereafter taken before the judge in relation to matters arising within the province of Canterbury shall be deemed to be taken in the Arches Court of Canterbury," and whenever a vacancy shall occur in the office of official principal of the Chancery Court of York, the judge shall become ex officio such official principal, "and all proceedings thereafter taken before the judge in relation to matters arising within the province of York shall be deemed to be taken in the Chancery Court of York." Section 9 provides that the judge shall, after hearing and pronouncing judgment upon the matter of a representation referred to him by the archbishop of the province, "issue such monition (if any)" to the incumbent whose acts have been complained of by the representation, "as the judgment shall require." And section 13 provides that "obedience by an incumbent to a monition or order" of the judge "shall be enforced (if necessary) in the manner prescribed by rules and orders, by an order inhibiting the incumbent from performing any service of the Church, or otherwise exercising the cure of souls within the diocese for a term not exceeding three months; provided that at the expiration of such term the inhibition shall not be relaxed until the incumbent shall, by writing under his hand in the form prescribed by the rules and orders, undertake to pay due obedience to such monition or order "; "provided that if such inhibition shall remain in force for more than three years from the date of the issuing of the monition, or from the final determination of an appeal therefrom, whichever shall last happen, or if a second inhibition in regard to the same monition shall be issued within three years from the relaxation of an inhibition, any benefice or other ecclesiastical preferment held by the incumbent in the parish in which the church or burial ground is situate, or for the use of which the burial ground is legally provided, in relation to which church or burial ground such monition has been issued as aforesaid, shall thereupon become void," unless the bishop shall, for some special reason, postpone the date of avoidance for a period not exceeding three months. The section also enables the bishop, during the inhibition, to make due provision for the service of the church, and the cure of souls, and to raise the sum required for that purpose by sequestration of the profits of the benefice. Both the cases related to matters arising in the province of Canterbury, and before the proceedings were commenced, the judge appointed under the Act had, on a vacancy caused by the resignation of Sir R. Phillimore, become official principal of the Arches Court of Canterbury, or Dean of Arches. In both cases a monition had issued by the judge to an incumbent, warning him to desist from certain ceremonial practices, and in each case the monition had been disobeyed and an inhibition had issued. The inhibition had in each case been disregarded, and to enforce obedience to it the judge had issued a significavit to the Chancery Division, under which a writ de contumace capiendo had been issued out of the Chancery Division, in pursuance of which the incumbent had been arrested and imprisoned. Writs of habeas corpus were then applied for in the Queen's Bench Division, and also four writs of prohibition to the judge of the Arches Court, on the ground that he had exceeded his jurisdiction. It was contended that the judge appointed under the Act, even after he, by reason of a vacancy in the office of official principal of the Arches Court of Canterbury, succeeded to that office, was still, as to proceedings instituted under the Act, exercising a new jurisdiction, and not the ancient jurisdiction of the Court of Arches, and was not an ecclesiastical court within the meaning of the Act 53 Geo. 3, c. 127, which substituted the writ de contumace capiendo, for the former writ de excommunicato capiendo, and that he could not, therefore, enforce obedience to his orders by means of the process of significavit. Reliance was especially placed on the provisions of section 7 of the Act of 1874, that after the judge should have become official principal of the Court of Arches proceedings before him as to matters arising in the province of Canterbury should be deemed to be taken in the Arches Court. This, it was said, implied that the proceedings were not in fact in that court, otherwise it would be unnecessary to say that they should be deemed to be taken there. And it was further contended that, as the Act had provided expressly that if an inhibition remained in force for more than three years, the clerk who had failed to promise obedience to the monition in respect of which it had issued should be at once deprived of his benefice, this

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was the only method by which the judge could enforce obedience to the inhibition, though it was suggested that obedience might be enforced by the promoters in other ways, such as by indictment or by proceedings against the clerk in an ecclesiastical court for brawling in his church. court (JAMES, BRETT, and Corron, L.JJ.), however, held (affirming the decision of the Queen's Bench Division, Coleridge, C.J., and Field and Manisty, JJ.) that no new jurisdiction has been created by the Act of 1874, but only a new method of procedure, and that the judge appointed under it was from the first a judge of the two old provincial courts, and is now the official principal of the old Court of Arches, with all the old jurisdiction of the court, and with the same power of enforcing his orders as that court always had.

The second question was whether the forms made use of in the monitions and inhibitions had suffi. ciently shown on the face of them the jurisdiction of the judge. It was urged that, inasmuch as the Arches Court was subject to prohibition, it was an inferior court, and, therefore, bound to show on the face of its orders that the circumstances were such as to give it jurisdiction. Section 19 of the Act of 1874 empowers the Queen, by Order in Council, by and with the advice of the Lord Chancellor, the Lord Chief Justice of England, the judge appointed under the Act, and the archbishops and bishops who are Privy Councillors, or any two of those persons, one being the Lord Chancellor or the Lord Chief Justice, to "cause rules and orders regulating the procedure and settling the fees to be taken in proceedings under this Act, so far as the same may not be expressly regulated by this Act, and from time to time to alter and amend such rules and orders. All rules and orders made in pursuance of this section shall be laid before each House of Parliament within forty days after the same are made, if Parliament is then sitting, or, if not, within forty days after the then next meeting of Parliament, and if an address is presented to her Majesty by either of the said Houses, within the next subsequent forty days on which the House shall have sat, praying that any such rules shall be annulled, her Majesty may thereupon, by Order in Council, annul the same, and the rules and orders so annulled shall thenceforth become void, without prejudice to the validity of any proceedings already taken under the same. Rules and orders were made under this power, and to them was annexed a schedule of forms to be used in proceedings under the Act. In both the cases before the court the forms of monition and inThe hibition given in the schedule had been used. court held that the power to make rules and orders included a power to make forms, and that the forms had a statutory validity. BRETT, L.J., was also of opinion that the Court of Arches was not an inferior court, and it was not bound to show its jurisdiction on the face of its orders.

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The third point was that in each case the writ de contumace capiendo had been irregularly issued. The statute 5 Eliz. c. 23, by section 2, enacted that every writ of de excommunicato capiendo that should be granted out of the Court of Chancery "shall be made in the time of the term, and returnable before the Queen's Highness, her heirs and successors, in the court commonly called the King's Bench, in the term next after the teste of the same writ; and after the same writ shall

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be so made and sealed, that then the said writ shall be forth. with brought into the said Court of King's Bench, and there, in the presence of the justices, shall be opened and delivered of record to the sheriff or other officer to whom the serving and execution thereof shall appertain." The statute 53 Geo. 3, c. 127, by section 1, abolished excommunication (except in certain cases), and substituted for the writ de excommunicato capiendo a writ de contumace capiendo, which was to issue out of the Court of Chancery in the same way, all causes cognizable in the ecclesiastical courts,' the judge whose lawful orders had not been obeyed, pronouncing the person who had disobeyed them contumacious, and in contempt, and signifying the same to the Court of Chancery. And it was expressly provided that the provisions of the Act 5 Eliz. c. 23, should extend to the writ de contumace capiendo, and the proceedings following thereupon, " as if the same were herein particularly repeated and enacted." In both the cases before the court, the writ de contumace capiendo, instead of being brought into the Queen's Bench Division, and "there, in the presence of the justices, opened and delivered of record to the

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CASES BEFORE THE BANKRUPTCY
REGISTRARS.

sheriff," had been simply taken to the Crown Office; and it appeared that this was in accordance with the practice which had generally been followed in such cases since the passing of the Petty Bag Act (12 & 13 Vict. c. 109), which by (Before Mr. REGISTRAR BROUGHAM, acting as Chief Judge.) section 26 provided that every writ of any descrip ion thereafter to be issued out of the Petty Bag Office, should or might be issued or tested on any day (not being Sunday, Good Friday, or Christmas Day), whether such day should be in term time or vacation, and that every writ so issued and tested on any day in vacation should be of the like validity as if issued or tested in term time. It was contended that the provisions of the Act of Elizabeth for the opening of the writ in the presence of the justices was merely a description of what would usually take place at the time when the Act was passed, inasmuch as then every proceeding in the courts was taken in open court and not in chambers or offices. The court, however, in accordance with what was said by Lord Holt in one case, that the judges were not issuing the process instruments or conduit pipes, but judicially, as judges," held that the provision was not merely directory or a mere matter of form, but that it was a matter of substance, the object being, as JAMES, L.J., said, that the judges might, if neceseary, apply their minds judicially to the question whethering the writ was such an one as the court would take upon itself plied to the to execute. The writ would not necessarily be read by the judges, or read to them, but it would be the duty of the officer who opened it and read it immediately to take the opinion of the judges if he thought there was anything upon the writ which required to be considered, or which might cause the court not to adopt it, or be instrumental in enforcing it. The Queen's Bench Division held that this provision of the Act of Elizabeth had been by implication repealed by the Petty Bag Act, and it was tended that this view was right, because formerly the courts sat in banco only in term time, and therefore the abolition of the necessity of issuing the writ in term time by implication had repealed the enactment that it should be opened in court. The Court of Appeal, however, held that there was no such necessary implication, and that the provision of the Statute of Elizabeth, as confirmed by that of Geo. 3, remained still in force. The result was that the applications for writs of prohibition failed, but that the appellants were entitled to be released from arrest. BRETT, LJ., said that even if the objection founded on the Statute of Elizabeth had been a mere matter of form, he should have held that the appellants would have been entitled to their release, it being a well-settled principle in the English courts that a man who seeks to procure the imprisonment of another must show that he has followed all the required forms with the utmost strictness.

Jan. 13.-Ex parte Brown, Re Inns.

In the operative part of a bill of sale it was expressed to be made in consideration of £300 by the mortgagee paid to the mortgagor at or before the execution thereof. The deed contained a proviso for redemption on payment of that sum, "together with a bonus of £200 added thereto, making together the sum of £500."

Held, that the consideration for the deed was correctly stated at the sum of £300, and that the provisions of section 8 of the Bills of Sale Act, 1878, had been complied with.

This was an application on behalf of Mr. Joseph Brown, for the payment to him of the amount realized from the sale of certain cabs, horses, and other property formerly belonging to Thomas Henry Inns.

On the 25th of September, 1880, T. H. Inns executed a bill of sale in favour of the applicant of the prop erty in question. The deed contained the follow"Whereas the said mortgagor hath aprecital: said mortgagee to advance to him the sum of £300 which the mortgagee hath agreed to do upon the terms and conditions hereinafter expressed, and upon having the benefit of any security which he now holds, or which may hereafter be given, in respect of the said advance by guarantee or otherwise."

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A fourth point arose in In re Enraght in this way. The appellant had, by the monition, been admonished not to use certain specified vestments, or others of The inhibition recited that he had disobeyed the monition by using one fied vestments, and also by using another vestment of the speciwhich was not specified in the monition; but there was no express finding that the latter vestment was one of a like nature to those which had been specified in the monition. It was urged that the inhibition was bad in toto, because it did not appear how far the sentence was to be attributed to the act which had been specified in the monition, and how far to the act which had not been specified. The court cverruled this objection, on the ground that it might form a good ground of appeal from the inhibition, but that it was not a ground for prohibition.-SOLICITORS, Brooks, Jenkins, 4 Co.; J. Girdlestone; Solicitor to the Treasury.

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PRACTICE EVIDENCE OF FOREIGN LAW-DEPOSITION OF "LAW AGENT."-In a case of Saldanha v. Andrews, before the Master of the Rolls on the 14th inst., a question arose whether on a point of foreign law the evidence of a person describing himself as a "law agent' was admissible. JESEL, M.R., after reference had been made to Taylor on Evidence and Roscoe's Nisi Prius Evidence, held that the evidence of a witness who was only described as a "law agent" was inadmissible to prove a question of foreign law, and declined to hear his deposition.-SOLICITORS, Crowdy, Son, & Tarry; Angell, Imbert-Terry, & Page.

Then the deed witnessed that, in consideration of the said sum of £300,"hereinafter called the advance by the mortgagee, paid to the mortgagor at or before the execution hereof, the receipt whereof the mortgagor hereby acknowledges, the mortgagor doth by these presents grant, bargain, sell, and transfer" "all and singular" [then speciadministrators, and assigns absolutely." fying the property] "to the mortgagee, his executors,

Then followed a proviso in this form :-" Provided always (but subject, however, to all the covenants, powers, provisoes, and conditions hereinafter set forth), in case the mortgagor shall pay to the mortgagee the said sum of £300, together with a bonus of £200 added thereto, making together the sum of £500, by twenty-four monthly payments of £20 178. each, the first of such instalments to be paid on the 23rd day of October, and a like instal. ment of £20 17s., on the 23rd of each succeeding month satisfied, or on such other extended days as may from time thereafter until the whole sum of £500 be fully paid and to time be agreed upon and assented to by the mortgagee in writing (and in default of payment of any one instalimmediately due), until by means of such payments the ment the whole amount remaining unpaid shall become said sum or any further sum advanced upon this security shall have been fully satisfied, together with all costs, payments, charges, damages, and expenses hereinafter mentioned, then these presents and every part thereof

shall cease and become void."

T. H. Inns subsequently presented a petition for liquidation under the 125th and 126th sections of the Bankruptcy Act, 1869, and, at the first meeting, the creditors passed a resolution for liquidation by arrangement, and appointed a trustee. Such resolution was duly registered, and the property comprised in the bill of sale was afterwards sold, and the registrar directed the proceeds to be paid into court. T. L. Wilkinson, in support of the application. F. C. Willis, for the trustee.-The bill of sale is void against the trustee, on the ground that the consideration for the deed is not set forth in it in compliance with the provisions of section 8 of the Bills of Sale Act, 1878. The bonus of £200 is part of the consideration, and should have been set forth in the recital.

Mr. REGISTRAR BROUGHAM.-Do you say that the deed ought to have recited £500 as the consideration when the debtor received only £300?

Willis.-It should have said, "In consideration of £300 then advanced, and £200 further covenanted to be paid." The payment of the bonus is an important and substantial part of the deed, and, if the recital omits to state the fact, a creditor may be misled; he cannot tell how much is owing to the mortgagee.

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Mr. REGISTRAR BROUGHAM said he thought the word "consideration meant that which was borrowed, and not what the borrower agreed to repay the lender. The "consideration" in the present case was £300, money advanced

by Brown, for which the debtor agreed to pay £300 and the further sum of £200. The bill of sale was perfectly valid, and the consideration was properly set forth. The creditor was entitled to the benefit of his security, and the application must be granted.

Solicitor for the applicant, W. Maynard.

Solicitor for the trustee, Hope.

SOLICITORS' CASES.

QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION.

(Sittings in Bane before Lord COLERIDGE, C.J., and BOWEN, J.)

Dec. 19.-In the Matter of Francis Murphy, a Solicitor. In this case an application had been made on behalf of the Incorporated Law Society for a rule to strike a solicitor off the roll upon certain charges alleged against him into which it is not necessary to enter, as it was admitted on his part that his conduct had been improper and indefensible. His defence was that he had no personal motive, and had acted only as he believed to protect his client against a fraud. In effect it came to this, that he had concocted a fictitious judgment on which there was an affidavit of debt and a summons served for the attachment of certain moneys in the hands of an auctioneer, and to which his client, he said, was entitled, though in the result it turned out that he was not.

Charles Russell, Q. C., with French, appeared for the solicitor, and was heard at some length on his behalf, admitting the impropriety of his conduct, and that it was very properly brought before the court, but endeavouring to show that he had no motive of personal gain, and was innocent of a corrupt intention.

Murray, for the Incorporated Law Society, urged that it was in fact a conspiracy, and a conspiracy to concoct a pretended judgment with a view to get hold of certain property, the attempt being supported by a false affidavit. It was a conspiracy to deprive a man of his goods by a fictitious judgment and a false affidavit of debt, and this, he submitted, was a serious matter.

Lord COLERIDGE said the facts were not in dispute, and the undisputed facts were that a solicitor had lent himself to a proceeding which could only be described as the concoction of a debt to deprive a man of that which turned out afterwards to be his right, and in order to carry out this scheme he had used his professional skill and given his professional advice. It was true that it was not a raud in the sense of a scheme to acquire personal profit. It certainly was a serious case however. He confessed that he was disposed to take rather a stern view of such cases of misconduct, but he did not think this was a case which called for the severe measure of striking the solicitor off the roll. Still it called for some punishment, as it was prostitution of the legal knowledge of one of the officers of the court. The solicitor said it was only an error of judg ment." It was more than a mere error of judgment, it was an attempt to carry out an object he thought right by means he knew to be wrong. Under these circumstances he thought justice would be satisfied by sentencing him to pay all the costs and to be suspended from practice for a

year.

Mr. JUSTICE BOWEN concurred.

EXCHEQUER DIVISION.

(Sittings in Banc before LUSH, L.J.)

Jan. 16.-In the Matter of G. Tedder, a Solicitor. In this case Murray, on behalf of the Incorporated Law Society, moved to make a rule absolute to strike Mr. Tedder off the roll.

The rule was granted on a certificate of conviction, and notice had been served on the defendant, who is now undergoing a sentence of imprisonment in Coldbath-fields Prison for a criminal offence. No cause being shown,

His LORDSHIP ordered the rule to be made absolute.Times.

MANSION HOUSE POLICE COURT.
Jan. 5, 10.-Ball v. Priest.

This was a summons under the " Lodgers' Goods Protection Act, 1871 (34 & 35 Vict. c. 79)," to show cause wh

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certain furniture, goods, and chattels alleged to have been illegally distrained on should not be ordered to be restored.

Rolland, for the complainant.

Boxall, to oppose the order being made.

Mrs. Priest is the owner of a house and premises in Tudor-street, Blackfriars, London. She demised these premises to A. Thompson for a term of three years from March last, at a yearly rent of £75, payable quarterly, the tenant to pay all rates and taxes. Thompson sub-let a part of the premises -viz., the shop, basement, and parlour-to the complainant, Ball, at a yearly rent of £70, exclusive of rates and taxes. Thompson retained the occupation of the upper part of the house and lived there; Ball did not sleep on the premises, and only used them for business purposes. The quarter's rent to Christmas, 1880, being in arrear, Mrs. Priest put in a distress for rent, and Ball's goods were seized. He claimed the benefit of the Lodgers' Goods Protection Act, tendered to the broker the balance of rent which he alleged was due from him to Thompson on the current quarter, and served on the bailiff employed to levy the distraint a declaration under that Act. The goods seized were sold, and Ball then issued the above summons.

For the complainant it was argued that this case came within the decision of Phillips v. Henson (26 W. R. 214, L. R. 3 C. P. D. 26), and that, though Mr. Ball was an under-tenant, still, under the authority of the above case, he was a "lodger" within the meaning of the Act.

On behalf of Mrs. Priest it was urged that, as Ball did not sleep or live on the premises, this case was distinguishable from Phillips v. Henson, and that the exclusive occupation of a part only of a house as business premises could not con. vert an under-tenant into a lodger; and a definition of the word "lodger" given by Bovill, C.J., in the case of Thompson v. Ward (L. R. 6 C. P. 327, 360) was quoted.

THE MAGISTRATE decided that Ball was not a lodger within the meaning of the Act, as the premises were demised to him, and as he did not inhabit the premises but only used them for business purposes.

Summons dismissed.

Solicitor for complainant, A. Harrison. Solicitor for defendant, Eustace W. Owles.

LEGAL APPOINTMENTS.

Mr. JOHN BATTEN, solicitor, F.S.A., has been appointed a Deputy-Lieutenant for Dorsetshire. Mr. Batten is the eldest son of Mr. John Batten, solicitor, of Yeovil, and was born in 1815. He was admitted a solicitor in 1838, and formerly practised at Yeovil. He was for several years town clerk of that borough, and, after his retirement from practice, he was appointed a magistrate for Somersetshire and Dorsetshire. He is also a deputy-lieutenant for the former county.

Mr. EVELYN HAY MURRAY has been appointed Secretary of Presentations to the Lord Chancellor, in succession to Mr. Carrington Francis, resigned.

He

Mr FRANCIS SHARP POWELL, barrister, who has been elected M.P. for the Borough of Wigan in the Conservative interest, is the son of the Rev. Benjamin Powell, and was born in 1827. He was formerly fellow of St. John's College, Cambridge, where he graduated as a senior optime, and also in the second class of the classical tripos, in 1850. was called to the bar at the Inner Temple in Easter Term, 1853, and he formerly practised on the Northern Circuit. Mr. Powell is a magistrate and deputy-lieutenant for the West Riding of Yorkshire. He was M.P. for Wigan from 1857 till 1859, for Cambridge from 1863 till 1868, and for the Northern Division of the West Riding from 1872 till 1874.

Mr. ROBERT LEYCESTER UPTON, solicitor and notary, of Calcutta, has been appointed Solicitor to the Government of India, in succession to Mr. Charles Sanderson, resigned.

Mr. HENRY WHITFORD, solicitor (of the firm of Whitford & Sons), of St. Colomb, has been appointed a Perpetual Commissioner for taking the Acknowledgments of Deeds by Married Women for the County of Cornwall.

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HALIFAX BUILDING AND QUARRYING COMPANY, LIMITED.-The M.R. has fixed Jan 21 at 12 at his chambers for the appointment of an official liquidator

MCLEAN AND COMPANY, LIMITED.-Petition for continuing the voluntary winding up presented Jan 14, directed to be heard before Bacon, V.C., on Jan 22. Baker and Nairne, Crosby sq, solicitors for the petitioners

WASTE METALS PRODUCTS COMPANY, LIMITED.-Petition for winding up presented Jan 5, directed to be heard before the M.R. on Jan 22. Lewis, Old Broad st, solicitor for the petitioner WIVELISCOMBE SLATE COMPANY, LIMITED.-Hall, V.C., has by an order dated Dec 10, appointed Petheram, Lombard ct, to be official liquidator

[Gazette, Jan. 14.]

INGLO-FRENCH BREWERY COMPANY, LIMITED. -The M.R. has fixed Jan 27 at 11 at his chambers for the appointment of an official liquidator

FRITISH EMPIRE NEWSPAPER COMPANY, LIMITED.-Malins, V.C., has by an order dated Dec 23 appointed Greening, King st, to be official liquidator. Creditors are required, on or before Feb 28, to send their names and addresses and the particulars of their debts or claims to the above. March 8 at 12 is appointed for hearing and adjudicating upon the debts and claims COTTAGES AND VILLAS BUILDING AND INVESTMENT COMPANY, LIMITED.-Petition for winding up presented Jan 11, directed to be heard before M.R. on Jan 29. Bryden, Benet's hill, Doctor's Commons, solicitor for the petitioner

GOLD COMPANY OF SOUTHERN INDIA, LIMITED.-By an order made by Hall, V.C., dated Jan 11, it was ordered that the voluntary winding up of the company be continued. Greenhill, solicitor for the petitioner

GROCER'S SOCIETY, LIMITED.-Petition for winding presented Jan 13 directed to be heard before the M. R. on Jan 29. Hudson and Co, Bucklersbury, solicitors for the petitioners MARINE AQUARIUM COMPANY, SCARBOROUGH, LIMITED.-Petition for winding up presented Jan 15, directed to be heard before the M.R. on Jan 29. Taylor and Co, Great James st, Bedford row, solicitors for the petitioner

TRAMWAYS SHARE INVESTMENT COMPANY, LIMITED.-Petition for winding up presented Jan 13 directed to be heard before Bacon, V.C., on Jan 29. Bellamy and Co, Bishopgate st Within, solicitors for the petitioner [Gazette, Jan. 18.]

FRIENDLY SOCIETIES DISSOLVED. SOUTHAMPTON DISTRICT BRANCH OF THE GRAND UNITED ORDER OF ODDFELLOws, George Inn, Above Bar, Southampton. Jan 10 [Gazette, Jan. 14.] Borough Stores, [Gazette, Jan. 18.J

SUNDERLAND TAILORS' FRIENDLY SOCIETY,
Dunning st, Sunderland, Durham. Jan 14

In the House of Commons, on the 17th inst., Mr. Norwood asked the Attorney-General if it were the intention of the Government, as stated in some public prints, to appoint a commission of judges, barristers, and solicitors to inquire into the working of the Judicature Acts; and, if so, whether the Government would consider the desirability of adding to the commission two or more laymen to represent the interests of the suitors. The Attorney-General said that it was not the intention of the Government to appoint such a commission as was referred to. But it appeared that the time had come when some effort for diminishing the costs of litigation should be made. For that purpose alterations in the rules and orders would be necessary, the responsibility of which would rest with the Lord Chancellor and the committee of judges. But to make the inquiry as complete as possible the committee was to be assisted by two counsel of the inner bar, two of the outer bar, and two solicitors. The work would be of a technical character.

LAW STUDENTS' JOURNAL.

COUNCIL OF LEGAL EDUCATION.

The Council of Legal Education have awarded toTheodore Hall Hall, Lincoln's-inn, and Richard Robert Cherry, Middle Temple, studentships in jurisprudence and Roman law of 100 guineas, to continue for a period of two years.

William Philip Schreiner, Inner Temple, and Walter John Napier, Lincoln's-inn, studentships in jurisprudence and Roman law, of 100 guineas, for one year; and to

William Herbert Upjohn, Grays-inn, a certificate of honour of the second class.

The council have awarded the following prizes to the following students :

Roman law, constitutional law, and international law. -Stevenson Stewart Moore, Middle Temple, a prize of £50; George Manchester Cohen, Middle Temple, a prize of £25; Richard Walter Kittle, Lincoln's-inn, a prize of £15; George White, Middle Temple, a prize of £10.

Common law. Henry Terrell, Middle Temple, a prize of £50; Mancherji Dadabhai Dadysett, Middle Temple, a prize of £25; John Carey Hall, Middle Temple, and Robert Colin Ringrose, Middle Temple (aq.), a prize of £12 10s. each.

Real and personal property law.-C. H. Grafton, Inner Temple, a prize of £25; John Lenton Pulling, Gray's-ion, a prize of £10.

Equity.-James Kelleher, Inner Temple, a prize of £50; Charles Halman Beard, Middle Temple, a prize of £10.

The council have also awarded to the students who obtained the greatest aggregate number of marks in the subjects of the lectures given by two of the professors-viz., in:

Equity, and real and personal property law.-Richard William Giles, Middle Temple, a prize of £70; and Charles Valentine Hickie, Middle Temple, a prize of £30.

The Council of Legal Education have awarded to the following students certificates that they have satisfactorily passed a public examination :

:

Reginald Brodie Dyke Acland, Inner Temple; Ahsanuddin Ahmad, Inner Temple; Henry Frederick Amedroz, Inner Temple; Arthur Jacob Ashton, Inner Temple; Philip Arthur Ashworth, Inner Temple; John Armytage Batley, Lincoln's.inn; Arthur Anthony Baumann, Inner Temple; Claude Villiers Emilius Bayley, Inner Temple ; Robert Augustus Bennett, Inner Temple; Nasarvanji Framji Bhandara, Middle Temple; Arthur Hatfield Summer Bird, Inner Temple; Edward Oliver Pleydell Bouverie, Inner Temple; Cecil Erskine Bovill, Middle Temple; Henry James Broun, Inner Temple; Albert William Chaster, Middle Temple; Herbert Henry Child, Lincoln's-inn; William Francis Clerke, Inner Temple; Walter Baker Clode, Inner Temple; Charles Augustus Vansittart Cony bare, Gray's-inn; Charles Lewis Coote, Lincoln's-inn; Benjamin Francis Conn Costelloe, Lincoln'sinn; Milverton Godfrey Dauglish, Lincoln's-inn; Thomas Hugh Anderson Denman, Lincoln's-inn; Cecil Fane De Salis, Inner Temple; Alfred Doran, Inner Temple; William ElliottLewis, Gray's-inn; William Ellis Chute Ellis, Inner Temple; Richard Farrell, Lincoln's-inn; Henry Stackhouse Luther Fry, Lincoln's-inn; James Gibson Gartside, Middle Temple; James Greenwood, Inner Temple; Henry Percy Harris, Lincoln's-inn; George Frederic Hart, Lincoln'sinn; Henry Charlton Hawkins, Lincoln's-inn; Allan George Ferrers Howell, Inner Temple; William Ellis HumeWilliams, Middle Temple; Charles Stephen Hunter, Inner Temple; Clarendon George Hyde, Middle Temple; William Jeans, Middle Temple; Henry Campbell Jenkins, Middle Temple; James Clarence Kirkpatrick, Lincoln's-inn; Alexander Boyle M'Connell, Gray's-inn; Malcolm Reginald M'Millan, Middle Temple; George Thomas John Millar, Lincoln's-inn; John Baron Moyle, Lincoln's inn; William Anthony Byam Musgrave, Inner Temple; William Henry Myers, Inner Temple; Kumar Gojendra Narayan, Middle Temple; Montagu Lewis Parkin, Lincoln's-inn; Charles Parsons, Lincoln's- inn; Harry Arthur Pearson, Inner Temple; Lorenzo Frederick Pearson, Gray's-inn; Thomas William Phillips, Middle Temple; Alexander Pulling, Inner Temple; William T. Raymond, Middle Temple; Stanislas Matthew Rhodes, Inner Temple; Rees Jenkins Rhys, Inner Temple;

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