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Akdsews, Ann, Otley York. Feb 4. Cranswick, Leeds Akdkews, Thomas, wednesbury, Staffordshire, Builder. Feb 26.
Duignan and Co, Walsall Bakkr. Joseph, Harrow-on. the-Hill, Farmer. Feb 1. Dommett,
G re sham st
Ubxtlbv, James, Cheshunt, Herts, J.P. Feb 15. Gedge, Old Palace yard
Best, Rev Thomas, Redrico, Andover. Jan 31. Dimond and Son, Cavendish sq
Caddbl, RicnAKD Boqhurst, Chatham. Feb 28. Reworth and
AVoodgate, Rochester Coxwrll, Edwabd, Southampton, Gent. March 1. Bassett and Co,
Fusskll, James Flowbb, Bristol, Solicitor. March 1. Fussell and Co, Bristol
Gadd, Hbnry, Chichester, Gent. Feb 6. Raper and Freeland,
Hvrkrll, Mart, Booking, Essex. March 15. Veley and Cunnington. Brrintreo
Gbrrnhalgh, Handel, Heywood, Lancaster, Tailor. Jan29. Todd, Hey wood
Hargrkavks, Joseph, Much Wymontlly, Hertford, Esq. March 25.
Wade and Andrews, Hitehin Mvroitson, John, Ditchingham House, Norfolk, Esq. Jan 30.
Hartcup and Sons, Bungay Mbdwin, Pilford, Horsham, Sussex, Gent. Feb 5. Strangways,
Mbryon, Edward, Clarges st, Middlesex, M.D. Feb 15. Gedgo
and Co, Olc Palace 3Tard Mitcurt-l, Jambs, Hockley, Binningham, Licensed Victualler. Feb
10. Pointon, Birmingham Moses, John, Copley, Durham, Miner. Feb 1. Parker, North
Rawes, Rorbbt, Plumgarths, Kendal, Farmer. Feb 19. Thomson and Wilson, Kendal
Slaughter, Mihill, Binfleld rd, Stockwell, Secretary. Feb 10, Ashurst and Co, Old Jewry
Smith, William Cannon, St Albans, Gent. Janl7. Wells, St Albans
Squance, Charles, East Stonehouse, Devon, Pensioned Porter. Feb 15. Heath, Devonport
Tindal, Acton, Aylesbury, Clerk of the Peace. March 1. Davenport, Oxford
Vickers, Joseph, New Sheldon, Durham, Miller. Fob 1. Parker, North Bondgate, Bishop Auckland
[Gazette, Jan. 4.]
SALISBURY. (Before Mr. Serjeant Tindal Atkinson, Judge.) Dec. 6.—Re Thompson's Bankruptcy. Order and disposition—Goods intrusted to bankrupt as bailee— Consent of bailor.
His Honour, who hud reserved judgment in this case at the la«t coun, said :—This is an application by Henry George Thompson, the son of the bankrupt, asking for an order by the court directing that the trustee, Walter Friero Marreco, should deliier to the applicant the several goods and chattels consisting of articles of household furniture specified in an inventory annexed to an affidavit in supporc of the motion. The facts of the case are few and Bimple. The Bankrupt, George Thompson, carried on, up to the 14th of August last, the business of an innekeper at Salisbury, and on that day was adjudicated a bankrupt. It is alleged, and not denied, inasmuch as the facts stated in the joint affidavit of the father and the son must be taken as admitted, that tho son, who is claiming this furniture, on giving up the business of an innkeeptr at Salisbury, two yesrs since, removed the whole of his furnitnre to his father's house, upon an agreement that, with the exception of a sofa and a bed for which there was not room in the apartments selected, the furniture was to be stored by the bankrupt, on a payment of £5 a year, two years of which have been paid. Any consent to the bankrupt having the use or control of the furniture or knowledge of its being used is denied by tho son, but, as a fact, the whole of the furniture was found by the person put in charge by the trustee of the inn to form part of the ordinary effects of the bankrupt, and had been so nsed by him in the conduct of his business, and no doubt to third persons, customers, and creditors, it would present the appearance ot being his own. So far indeed had the bankrupt dealt with the furniture as his own that be gave a bill of sale to a creditor which covered these as well as other articles. Upon these facts I am called upon to say whether the furniture claimed in this case falls within the provisions of the 5th sub-section of section 15 of the Act of 1869, which mints, "All goods and chattels being at the commencement of the bankruptcy in the possession, order, or disposition of tho bankrupt, being a trader, by the consent and permission of the true ownor of which goods and chattels
the bankrupt is the reputed owner, or of which he has taken upon himself the sale or disposition as owner, form part of the assets of the bankrupt." In the case of Ex parte Dorman, Re Lake (21 W. R. 94), it was held that, according to the true construction of this sub-section, it is confined to oases where the bankrupt is in the sole possession of goods, as the sole reputed owner. It appears to me, on the facts, difficult to see where such sole possession or sole ownership could arise, unless there is gross fraud in the alleged fact that a separate room was takeo and paid for by the son in order that his goods should be kept distinct from those of his father. No such sole possession or We ownership could, as it appears to me, exist. In order to render goods in the posse-sion, order, or disposition of a bankrupt, two things are required—first, they must be in hi3 possession under such circumstances as to make him the reputed owner of the goods; and, secondly, they must hare been left in his possession through some impropriety or laches of the true owner, under circumstances calculated to enable the bankrupt to obtain a false credit by inducing the world to look at him as the true owner (Hamilton v. Bell, 10 Ex. 545). In the present case, in the absence of fraud, and fraud is not alleged, it must be assumed that the applicant is the true owner, and that the furniture claimed was placed by him in a room specially set apart for his use, and for which he was to pay the sum of £5 a year in the nature of warehouse rent; that being so, it is difficult to say that the furniture in question was placed in the bankrupt's possession under circumstances which, in the eyes of the world, would nuke him the reputed owner, any more than when a man takes an unfurnished apartment at a rent, and places his goods in it, the landlord can be said to be the reputed owner or the sole possessor of his tenant's furniture. In my view of the facts of this case the dealing with the son's property in his absence by the father was a wrongful act which might have rendered him liable to an action for trespass, nor can I see any impropriety or laches on the part of the true owner here which enabled the bankrupt to obtain a false credit by inducing the world to look at him as the true owner. At the time the goods were taken from the room in which they were stored, the true owner was absent in London, and had no knowledge until after the bankruptcy of the fact of the removal, and any consent to such removal is positively denied by him. The c >ses show that if the possession by the bankrupt of the goods of others is due to a fraud upon the true owner, it cannot be said to be with his consent (Ex parte Carlon, Re Birks, 4 D. & C. 120 ; Ex parte Bell, 1 De G. 577). In Collins v. Forbes (3 T. K. 316), it was held that when the bankrupt is in possession of the goods of another, bond fide with the consent of the other at the time of the bankruptcy, for a specific purpose beyond which he has not the right of disposition or alteration, such permission does not entitle the trustee to recover the value of the goods. If subsequent doubt had not been thrown upon this authority, it would be decisive of the present case; but it is still unquestioned law that a carpenter receiving timber to convert into a wagon, or a tailor to whom cloth is delivered to be made into olothes, have neither of them snch a possession of the timber or the cloth as will constitute him repnted owner of it (Rex v. Egginton, 1 T. E. 370; Moore v. Barthopp, 1 B. & C.). Nor can there be any repnted ownership of securities held for a speoifio purpose (Belcher v. Campbell, 8 Q. B. 1). On the same ground, goods sent on approval do not pass under the order and disposition clause nntil, either expressly or by implication, such approval has been given (Smith v. Hudson, 6 B. & S. 431, per Blackbnrn, J.). I have arrived at the conclusion, after carefully reviewing the various authorities, that there never was any consent given by the son that the bankrupt should have the order and disposition of this furniture, and that in fact it never came into his (the bankrupt's) possession otherwise than by a wrongful act on his part, and that with the exception of the sofa and the bed, which it is admitted were placed by the consent of the applicant in the hands of the bankrupt without restriction, the rest of the furniture must be given up by the trustee to the claimant in the case. There being no estate, there will be no order as to costs.
Noddcr, for the bankrupt,
Povming, for the trustee.
In this cut, Messrs. Wm. & Samuel Gott, Bradford 'were the plaintiffs in proceedings taken by them under the garnishee clauses of the County Courts Acts, by which they •ought to attach certain assets in the hands of Lister, Sutcliffe, belonging to the estate of William Sutcliffe, deceased, who died in February last. At the date of his death, William Sutcliffe was indebted to Messrs. Gott in the torn of £30 13s. 8d. Letters of administration to his personal estate were granted to his widow, Annie Sutcliffe, in April last. On the 8th of July, Messrs. Gott sued Mrs. Sutcliffe, as administratrix, for the amount of their debt, and they recovered judgment by default, and under that judgment they levied an execution, by which they realized £5. They afterwards found that Lister Sutcliffe had in his hands certain debts due to the deceased's estate, and they thereupon took garnishee proceedings in August last for the purpose of attaching those debts with the view of satisfying the balance of their debt and costs. The case had been before the court on three occasions.
Berry appeared in support of the proceedings taken by Messrs. Gott, and
Greates, for the garnishee debtor, Mr. Lister Sutcliffe.
His Honour, in giving his judgment, said that this was the first case in which he had had to consider the rights of a garnishee creditor to have a garnishee order made which was to attach all the assets of a deceased person. He was aware that it had been the praotice of that court, and of all other courts, to issue default summonses without reference to the question of whether or not the debt was one duo from the defendant himself or from the defendant in a representative character. He was satisfied that the power given by the Act of 1875 to issue default summonses was intended to be limited to cases in which the dobt was due from the defendant in his individual character. One reason for that opinion was that there was a class of debts in respect of which a default summons could not be issued except by leave, and the question whether leave was granted depended upon whether the goods were supplied to the debtor in the course of his trade. Another class of debts required inquiry as to whether a debtor occupied a certain position—whether he was a servant or a minor. None of those could apply, it seemed to him, to a deceased person. Default summonses were issued frequently; and, if the defendants against whom they were issued did not appear to object to the jurisdiction, he was not prepared to say that judgment creditors could be deprived of their judgment. He thought that by receiving the summons, which must be personally served, and by not objecting to the summons on the ground that it was issued against him in a representative character, a defendant might be taken to submit to such judgment as the plaintiff could obtain upon that summons. The rule proTided that where a defendant served with a default summons did not appear at the hearing, the plaintiff was entitled to judgment as a matter of course. But there was a difficulty— and to his mind it justified the view which he took— in reference to judgment recovered upon a default summons, in applying it to a judgment against a defendant in a representative character. The only judgment in a default summons was against an individual. He could conceive many cases in which the judgment creditor would prefer to sue an administratrix—calling her administratrix, and making it appear by her description that he was suing her in her representative character, and Uking the chance of her not appearing, so that he might be able to get judgment against her individually.- There might be cases in which a person should be the representative of an insolvent estate, and yet be perfectly solvent himself, and in which, the judgment being against the individual personally, the creditor of the estate found it to his benefit to know that he was suing a solvent representative, and took the chance of the representative not coming forward to resist the default Simmons, or to set up any special defence he might have —such as his not having received sufficient assets, or his having administered the assets he had received. The creditor of the deceased person adopted that form of procedure for bis own benefit, and he must take the consequences of it. The consequence of taking the summons in that form, and the judgment founded upon that form, was that he established his right to a personal debt against the icdividaal. There were many cases in which it would be greatly
to the advantage of the oreditor to sue in that form, because if he did si, and did not get payment from the person against whom he had recovered judgment, be could issue a garnishee summons against any person who owed a debt to that person in his individual capacity. Suppose that the person against whom the judgment was obtained filed a petition for liquidation. He would then bo entitled under that liquidation to priority, as a secured creditor, over all the other individual creditors in the administration of the assets. But in the case of any su;h liquidation, proceedings, the fund in the hands of the garnishee debtor would not he assets of tbe administrator, and would not have passed to the trustee in the liquidation, because they would have to be used for the benefit of the creditors of the deceased intestate. He was anxious to proceed accurately in this case as far as he could, because he should like practitioners to understand what were the principles upon wh'ch he considered garnishee orders otuht to proceed. He did not think that any such debt shoul i bs nude the subject of a defnult summons, but if it was so made, then the only jivignieut that could issue upon that, however the debtor was described, would be one against the debtor in an individu.il capacity, and it appeared to him that the creditor deprived himself of the right to treat as a fund applicable to the payment of his debt any debt due to the administrator in the due course of the administration of the estate. He was very sorry indeed—sinoerely sorry—that in such a jurisdiction as that, which was novel, and required to be exeroised with great oare and discretion, and which involved great responsibility, there was no appeal from the deoision that a county court judge might oome to. Unfortunately, there was no appeal whatever, and if he had been satisfied that Messrs. Gott were right, he should have had no hesitation in giving them what he considered they were entitled to. Being, however, of a contrary opinion, he felt that if he made the order be would be plaoing the garnishee debtor in a most perilous position. There was no deoision to guide him ou the subject, but, without fearing to make the order, which he would have made if he had felt that Messrs. Gott were entitled to it, he felt that the order ought not to be made. It was some satisfaction to him to feel that, if the contention of Mr. Berry was oorreot—that the plaintifis would be seonred creditors of the estate of the deceased—suoh seourity oould bs made available for their benefit in the admiuistration suit which had been commenced. The summons was then dismissed, with costs.
MANCHESTER. (Before J. A. Russell, Esq., Q.C., Judge.) Jan. 1.—Lawrence v. Simpson. Mr. Thomas George Lawrence sued Mr. James Simpson, head bailiff of tbe Salford Hundred Court of Record, for recovery of £11 13s. 2d., as damages arising from the negligence of the defendant in exeouling a writ of fi. fa. which the plaintiff had obtained against a debtor named Edward Ashcroft.
Nash appeared on behalf of the plaintiff, and
Tbe writ was issued on Friday, the 13th of August last, but was not executed untilmid-day ou the Tuesday following, when it was found that the debtor had made a deed of assignment of his goods to other creditors, such deed being dated the day previously. The evidence for the defence showed that in consequence of the holidays of the court being close at hand when the writ was issued there was great pressure of business, the assistant bailiffs being unable to execute the writs as soon as they generally did, owing to the large number placed in their hands. If special instructions had been given at the time the writ was sent to the head bailiff, that it was necessary or desirable to execute it at onoe, that would have been done, but no such instructions were given. The writ was, therefore, taken in its ordinary course, and given to an assistant bailiff, named Samuel Murray, for execution on Saturday afternoon. Murray served a number of writs in Rochdale, Heywood, and Bury on the Monday following, but was unable to exeoute the writ in question; he accordingly gave it the following morning to another assistant bailiff, named Burton, who, when he went the same day to serve tbe writ, found some one in possession under the deed of assignment.
His Honour held that the writ had, considering the circumstances of the case, not been delayed for an unusual length of time, and gate judgment for the defendant, with costs.
(Before A. Haktineau, Esq., Judge.)
This was au aetion brought against the lady superintendent of the Brighton Female Convalescent Home, to recover damages, laid at £50. The plaintiff was a London clerk, whose wife was admitted to the Home and was afterwards attaoked by soarlet fever. The notion was basod on the ground of the alleged negligence of defendant in introducing Mrs. Sampson into a room in the Home too soon after another person had been taken ill of soarlet fever, by which, it was contended, Mrs. Sampson became infected by that disease and had sinoe suffered much pain and organio debility. It was explained that persons were admitted to the Home by small payments, and it was nrged that, bowever small and inadequate the payments were, it did not absolve defendant from the necessity of warning Mrs. Sampson of the danger she was running.
His Honour, in giving judgment, held that it was not proved that plaintiff's wile bad oanght the fever at the Home. The institution was of a charitable character, and being so, a oharge against it should be fully proved if made, and he was not satisfied on that point. Precautions had been taken to disinfect the place, and though it was their bounden duty to give a truthful answer if questioned, he did not think it incumbent on lodging-house keepers, and others like defendant, to volunteer information as to there having been fever in their bouse, supposing, of course, that proper preoantions bad been taken. He gave a verdict for defendant, with costs.
On Wednesday last, says the Times reporter, Lord Coleridge, on taking his seat, was asked to put off one or two cases in which Mr. Murphy, Q.C., who is on circuit as a commissioner of assize, is engaged as couLsel, and he at once acceded to the application, and said that any case under similar circumstances would be put off, and might be deemed to be so put off, on notice to the associate. It may be mentioned that there was 1 great improvement noticed in the cause list, from which all the cases postponed were left out, so that the list only contained the causes ready for trial, and, therefore, it now represents what is the real work to be done. Even as thus reduced, however, the cause list contained the names of 734 causes. Many of these have already been appointed for particular days up to the 21st of February. It is clear, therefore, that sittings at A'isi iVnw will be held continuously during the assizes, except on the two days a week when the Divisional Court sits i/i Banc.
HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE.
York, Jackson v Lovell
Bo won, J
Warwick, Ford v Osborne A anr
Middlesex, Lords Commrs of the
Williams, J London, Foreign A Col Government Trust t.'o, limd, v Peirson The late L C Justice Middlesex, Finder v Patrick
Williams, J Middlesex, Hayes v Cordiugley
Williams, J Middlesex, Percival v Hughes
Manisty, Js. London, Craven v Norman
Williams, J London, Brown v Rolt A Co
London, Harris v Truman, Hanbury, A Co Field, J London, Bunnett A Co v Potter A Sons Field, J London, Whiting v Martin
Bowen, J London, Dickenson v Norris
Field, J Surrey, Shilton v White A anr
The late L C Justice Liverpool, Wappers v Imperial Marine Insurance Co
Baggallay, L J Leeds, Wheater & anr v Gray
Dorset, The Queen v Inhabitants of Dorset Ld Coleridge
York, Feldman v Margeson
Bowen, J Lincoln, Bunting, jun, v Morlcy Field, J
Shearburn v Salter
Offl Ref, G M Dowdeswell. Esq York, Jackson A anr v Lovell
Gt Western Ry Co v Sirhowy Ry Co special case
Morris A ors v Budden A anr
The Rhodes Bank Coffee Palace Permanent Benefit Building Society v The .Union Bank of Manchester dem Vickers v Allen dem Harford v Choney dem Stallard v Toms A Co spec case Jones v Worlford dem Linten v Green spec case
Hurst v Johnson spec case
Shankland A Co A anr v Bain
In re Ingram v Mayor, Ac, of Leeds spec case
Goffin v Donnelly dem Cooling v .Smart dem Young A Co v Mayor, Ac, of" Royal Leamington Spa
Wing v Indormaur dem.
Lissnor v Sarner A ors dem
Mayor, Ac, of Rochdale v Justccs of the Peace for the County of Lancaster spec case
Calf Hey Mill Co, limd, v Anderson Bros spec case
Paghouse Mill Co, limd, v Same spec case
Marsden A anr v Meadows, Salmon claimant spec case Truefltt v Allen dem
Dyson v London A N W Ry Co
Gt Western Ry v Churchwardens„.
In re the Companies Act, ISG2, 79. & 1877, and of the Building Societies Acts, and In re Swansea, Cambrian Benefit Building Society
Milsom v Challis
Torquay Market Co v Small
Bentley v Beckwith
the Parish of Birmingham
Guardians of Islo of Thanet
COMMON PLEAS DIVISION.
REMANET PAPER. NEW TRIALS. Michaelmas Sittings, 1S79. Middlesex, Nowell v Williams Lord Coleridge pt hdt'
Easter Sittings, 18S0.
Manchester, Chapleo A Wife v and Smith A ors
To stand over until Appeal disposed of.
NEW TRIALS AND MOTIONS FOR JUDGMENT Michaelmas Sittings, 1880. Exeter, Bulteel A anr v Curteis Winchester, Cooper v Ihlwraon
Lord Coleridge Cooper v Wurritnn Bodmin, Rowe v Reynolds A anr Lord Coleridge
PEREMPTORY PAPER, in the Matter of an Arbitration between Wythes & anr & Bolinzaglu ft ors
Enlarged to first day of Hilary Sittings, 1881.1 Marshall v Bnlckow, Vaughan ft Co
Enlarged to first day of Hilary Sittings, 1881.
Enlarged to first day of Hilary Sittings, 1881.
Enlarged to first day of Hilary Sittings, 1881.
Enlarged genorally and Master to report.
Enlarged generally and Master to report .
Mosse v Killick Widdecomb v Westwood
i v Crawley
APPEALS FROM INFERIOR COURTS.
Barber v Stone & anr
Rowe v Harvey Dredge (clmt)
Goldsmith ft anr v Gt Eastern
Stevens & Sons v Woodward ft anr
Mason v Goodacre i V
Hicks ft Sons v Army and Navy
Provision Market Co. limd
To bo heard before three judges. London, Bouffler v Levy ft anr Pollock, B
11th June, 18b0, ordered to stand over till rule in Court of Appeal argued.
Middlesex, Green v Stewart and London, Akerblom v Price and , anr Huddleston, B Co Pollock, B
To be heard before three judges.
Mirtrilfflcx, Cnmmings v tit N R;
Co Huddleston, B
Middlesex, Jaques v London TramCo L C Baron
London, PiggoU v Turner
Stephen, J Middlesex, Hicks v Faulkner
Stephen, J Middlesex, Digby v Whelply
London. Caslake v Bywatere and ors Stephen, J
London, Grant v Holland
Stephen, J , Griffin v Keates
L C Baron Cambridge, Dobedo v Fisher
L C Baron
Norwich, Lombe v Cooper and ors L C Baron
Middlesex, Hyman and anr v Nye and Bona Sir H Hawkins
Gloucester, Clarke, trustee, Ac v Walker Fry, J
Maidstone, Button v Vale
L C Baron
Warwick, Coleman v L and N W Ry Co Huddleston, B
London, Bowen v Lloyd
Shrewsbury, Hammond v L and NWRyCo J Brown, Esq, QC Leeds, Haigh v Jennings and anr Stephen, J
Chester, Edwards and Wife v The Pembroke and Tenby Ry Co
Baggallay, L J Gloucester, Butler v Storer
Warwick, Vickers v Chatwood's Patent Safe and Lock Co, limd Huddleston B Stafford, Sheldon v The Imperial Union Accidental Assurance Co, limd Fry, J
Lewes, Ball v Beardsley
L C Baron Leeds, Smith v Woodhead
Stephen, J Liverpool, Cooke v Sheard
London, Daleand anrv Wakefield Sir H Hawkins
SPECIAL CASES. H.M.'s Principal Secretary of Kino v Pilbrow
State for War v Horsman James Watt and Co v Mersey
Lander v Railway Passengers' Steel and Iron Co
CASES STANDING FOR JUDGMENT. Barton v Ommaney m New Trial Paper
Baron Pollock and Sir H. Hawkins, 12th June, 1880. James v Horron Inferior court appl
Baron Pollock and Justice Stephen, 7th Dec, 1880.
APPEALS FROM INFERIOR COURTS.
Kent, Rochester, Pepper v Blaig
berg (pt hd) Middlesex, Bow, Nicholson and
ors v Nicholson
Reinstated, Met Pol Dis, Murray v Davies
To be argued before three Judges Surrey, South Eastern Ry Co v London, Same v Ter Horst and
limd, v Leech, surveyor, ftc The Gt Western Ry Co v Mus
grave, surveyor, ftc Rolfe, surveyor, fto, v Hyde and
Tho Aberdare Rhondda Coal Co, -
ftc, limd, v Newman, surveyor, Jowett, surveyor, ftc ,v Moss (for
ftc Justices of Lancashire
Chapman, surveyor, ftc, v Royal Midland Ry Co v Blake, sur
Bank of Scotland veyor, fto
Mersey Docks and Harbour Bd v Last, surveyor, ftc, v London
Lucas, surveyor, fto Assurance Corporation
Martin, surveyor, ftc, v Trustees Bowers, surveyor, ftc, v Justices
of Congl Memorial Hall of Peace for Co of Cumberland
Dodson, Burveyor, ftc, v London Pacey, surveyor, ftc, v Horsley
and N W Ry Co London and N W Hy Co v Mus
Iniproved Industrial Dwellings grave, surveyor, ftc
Co v Last, surveyor, ftc Cottell, Inspector of Taxes, v
COURT OF APPEAL.
In re Garrud Ex parte Newitt and anr
In re Alven Ex parte Hall and anr
In re Leyinan Ex parte The Trustee
In re Packman Ex parte London and County
Banking Company In re Ward Ex parte Bennett