Tomlin, Arthur John, Salem rd, Bayswater, Coach Builder. Jan 24 at 2 at offices of Browne, Westbourne grove. Tilsley, Abchurch yard Wallis, James, Kingston-upon-Hull, Timber Merchant. Jan 17 at 12 at Imperial Hotel, Paragon st, Kingston-on-Hull. Spink, Hull Walker and Warwick, Joseph, Gray's inn rd Pianoforte Manufacturer. Jan 13 at 12 at offices of Matthews and Wells, John st, Bedford row Wilkinson, Thomas, Ardleigh, Essex, Grocer. Jan 27 at 12 at the Fleece Inn, Head st, Colchester. Pollard, Ipswich Williams, Edward, Weston-super-Mare, Builder. Jan 27 at 11 at offices of Jones, Magdala buildings, Weston-super-Mare Wilson, John, Felling, Durham, Grocer. Jan 14 at 3 at offices of Newlands, King st, South Shields Wright, John, jun, Metal Bridge, near Ferryhill, Durham, Grocer. Jan 18 at 3 at offices of Wilkes, Northgate, Darlington The Council of the Borough of Salford are prepared to receive Applications for the Office of Town Clerk and Solicitor for the Cor poration. The salary will be £1,000 per annum. The gentleman to be appointed will be required to devote the whole of his time to the service of the Corporation, and must not be less than thirty-five years of age. Applications, with copies of testimonials, address31 to the Mayor of Salford, must be delivered at the Town Hall, Salford, not later than Thursday, the 29th inst. A list of duties, and general terms of conditions, can be obtained from the Town Clerk. (By order) CHRIS. MOORHOUSE, Town Clark. Town Hall, Salford, January 5, 1881. NDIA.-Wanted, Solicitor Act as SCHWEITZER'S COCOATINA, I Clerk to a Wan of Solicitors at Madras. Must be experienced Anti-Dyspeptic Cocoa or Chocolate Powder. Guaranteed Pure Soluble Cocoa of the Finest Quality, with the excess of fat extracted. The Faculty pronounce it "the most nutritious, perfectly digestible beverage for Breakfast, Luncheon, or Supper, and invaluable for Invalids and Children." Highly commended by the entire Medica 1Press. Being without sugar, spice, or other admixture, it suits all palates, keeps better in all climates, and is four times the strength of cocoas THICKENED yet WEAKENED with starch, &c., and IN REALITY CHEAPER than such Mixtures. Made instantaneously with boiling water, a teaspoonful to a Breakfast Cup, costing less than a halfpenny. COCOATINA A LA VANILLE is the most delicate, digestible, cheapest Vanila Chocolate, and may be taken when richer chocolate is prohibited. In tin packets at 1s. 6d., 3s., 5s. 6d, &c., by Chemists and Grocers, Charities on Special Terms by the Sole Proprietors, H. SCHWEITZER & CO., 10, Adam-street, London, W.C. MR. G. H. JONES, SURGEON DENTIST, 57, GREAT RUSSELL STREET, LONDON (Immediately opposite the British Museum), Supplies, by his absolutely Painless System of Dentistry, the Great Exhibition Prize Medal Teeth (London, Paris, New York, Berlin, Vienna, &c.). S. G. Hutchins, Esq., Surgeon-Dentist to the Queen, says: "I am glad you have obtained her Majesty's Royal Letters Patent to protect what I consider the perfection of painless dentistry." Professor Gardner, late of the Royal Polytechnic Institution, says: "I have examined and tested your patented painless system of adjustment; it is quite perfect, and is the most successful application of scientific laws for securing actual wear and comfort yet introduced." Consultation free daily, and terms to suit everyone, Pamphlet, "Painless Dentistry," 116th Edition, gratis and post free. in Conveyancing, and acquainted with Company Law.-Address, with full particulars, to M. B., care of Messrs. Moulton, 37, Chancery-lane, W.C. TO COUNTRY SOLICITORS.-A Solicitor prac. tising in the City, desires an Engagement as Clerk for conducting Town Business. Salary (moderate) fixed, or according to work done.-Letters to W., "Solicitors' Journal," 52, Carey-street, W.C. PRELIMINARY, INTERMEDIATE, FINAL (Pass and Honours), LAW EXAMINATION. MR. R. ALBERT GIBSON'S Classes and Postal Preparation for these Examinations continue throughout the year, except during one month in summer. Two Residential Pupils received. Terms on application to 35, Southampton-buildings, Chancery-lane, or to St. Mary Cray, Chislehurst. [N.B.-At the Michaelmas Examination, 1880, out of 26 pupils sent up for the Final 22 passed, out of 17 sent up for the Intermediate 16 passed, and all 9 pupils sent up for the Preliminary passed. At seven out of the last eight Examinations Mr. Gibson's pupils have taken Honours; the successes including First, Second, Third, Fourth, and Fifth Prizemen, besides many Certificates of Merit, Second and Third Class Honours. In last June FOUR and in last November three pupils secured Honours.] LONDON GAZETTE (published by authority) and LONDON and COUNTRY ADVERTISEMENT OFFICE. No. 117, CHANCERY LANE, FLEET STREET. HENRY GREEN, Advertisement Agent, begs to direct the attention of the Legal Profession to the advantages of his long experience of upwards of thirty years, in the special insertion of all pro forma notices, &c., and hereby solicits their continued support.-N.B. One copy of advertisement only required, and the strictest care and promptitude assured. Official stamped forms for advertisement and file of "London Gazette" kept. By appointment. SOLICITORS' DIARY, GR ALMANAC, & LEGAL DIRECTORY MORELLA CHERRY Have you ever tasted it? BRANDY. The most delicious liqueur in the world. Nice with hot water, or aërated waters. MORELLA CHERRY BRANDY. Obtained at all Refreshment Bars, All Restaurants, Inns, and Hotels, MORELLA CHERRY BRANDY. The most wholesome of all stimulants. A valuable tonic. See Medical Testimonials. MORELLA CHERRY Is used in place of Wine. BRANDY. BRANDY. The Sportsman's and Traveller's Companion. Esteemed in the Army and Navy. MORELLA CHERRY Supplied to the Queen at all the Palaces. To the Governor-General of Canada. To the Aristocracy, and general public. HOMAS GRANT, The Distillery, Maidstone. HURGOOD & CO., Estate and Land Agents lane, W.C., hold PERIODICAL SALES of Property, at the MART, the Second Tuesday in each month. Railway, School Board, Corporation, Valuati ns for Board of Works, and other Compensations conducted. Probate, Mortgages, &c. Estates managed. A scale of charges upon application. MESSRS. DEBENHAM, TEWSON & FARMER'S LIST of ESTATES and HOUSES to be SOLD or LET, including Landed Estates, Town and Country Residences, Hunting and Shooting Quarters, Farms, Ground Rents, Rent Charges, House Property and Investments generally, is published on the first day of each month, and may be obtained. free of charge, at their offices, 80, Cheapside, E. C, or will be sent by past in return for two stamps.-Particulars for inse tion shoulde be received not later than four days previous to the end of the precding month. Charing Cross Advance and Deposit Bank, Ex parte. In re Parker (App.). 205 201 Great Britain Mutual Assurance Society, In re (App.) ....... 202 Hill's Trusts, In re (Ch. Div. V.C.M.) 211 Kane v. Kane (Ch.Div. V.C.H.) .................................................... 212 Kingsman v. Kingsman (App) ....................................... 207 Mayd, In the Goods of (Prob.Div.) ............................ 214 Millington v. Loring (App.).................................................................................................. 207 Morgan v. Rees (Q.B.Div.) .................................. 213 Stockil v. Purshon (Prob.Div.) ........ 214 Trion Bank of London v. Ingram (Ch.Div. M.R.).. ......... 209 Ward, Ex parte. In re Ward (App.) Warner v. Mosses (App.) CURRENT TOPICS. .......... 206 201 LORD JUSTICE BRAMWELL is expected to return to England in April next. THE MASTER OF THE ROLLS, having regard to the length of his list of non-witness causes, will next week take non-witness causes only. THE COURT OF APPEAL, at the end of the Dale case, will proceed with the hearing of the list of interlocutory appeals from all the divisions of the High Court. THE CAUSE BOOK of the Master of the Rolls is being rapidly added to day by day; and it is anticipated that the next transfer to Mr. Justice FRY will comprise a considerable number of the witness causes set down for the Master of the Rolls. IT IS UNDERSTOOD that the building in Chancery-lane occupied by some of the Chancery Registrars, the Chancery Paymaster, the Record and Writ Clerks, and the Clerk of Enrolments, before their removal to the Royal Courts of Justice, will, towards the latter end of next month, be handed over to the Honourable Society of Lincoln's-inn, in pursuance of the provisions of 28 & 29 Vict. c. 48. THE JUDICIAL COMMITTEE BILL, which has been introduced in the House of Lords by the Lord Chancellor, is not intended to provide for the appointment of a successor to Sir JAMES COLVILE. The 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 41, by which the Judicial Committee was first constituted, provided, by section 1, that such committee should consist of the Lord Chancellor, the Lords Chief Justices of the Courts of Queen's Bench and Common Pleas, the Master of the Rolls, the Lord Chief Baron, the judges of the Admiralty and Prerogative Courts, the Vice-Chancellor of England, the Chief Judge of the Court of Bankruptcy, and all ex-Lord Chancellors, with two additional members of the Committee to be appointed by the Crown. The Court of Chancery and Judicial Committee Act, 1851 (14 & 15 Vict. c. 83), which provided for the appointment of two Lords Justices of Appeal, enacted, by section 15, that every person holding, or who has held, the office of a judge of the Court of Appeal in Chancery shall, if a member of her Majesty's Privy Council, be a member of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council." The Appellate Jurisdiction Act (39 & 40 Vict. c. 59) provides, by section 6, that the two Lords of Appeal in Ordinary appointed under that Act shall, if Privy Councillors, be members of the Judicial Committee, but no corresponding provision was made in the case either of the ordinary judge of appeal appointed under the Judicature Act, 1875, or of the three additional judges of appeal transferred from the Common Law Divisions under the Appellate Jurisdiction Act, 1876. The present Act, however, qualifies all the present Lords Justices of Appeal for taking part in the proceedings of the Judicial Committee, by enacting (by section 1) that "every person holding, or who has held in England, the office of a Lord Justice of Appeal shall, if a member of her Majesty's Privy Council in England, be a member of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council." THE PROTEST 66 against the State's encroachments upon rights assured to the Church of England by solemn Acts of Parliament," which has found utterance in the memorial by Dean CHURCH and others to the Archbishop of Canterbury, is not inaptly followed by a deprecation of the attempt to "enter into details upon a subject confessedly surrounded with great difficulties." An Act of Parliament, however, either exists or it does not, and we have endeavoured to discover what are the rights assured by the solemn Acts of Parliament referred to. First, we have the pre-Reformation period, during which by Magna Charta, and afterwards by 25 Ed. 1 (Confirmatio Chartarum), and 14 Ed. 3, c. 1, it was declared that "the Church of England shall be free, and shall have her whole rights and liberties inviolable," and that "Holy Church have her liberties in quietness, without interruption or disturbance." This is full, affirmative, sweeping, and solemn, though a little vague. Then we have the Reformation Acts of Henry the Eighth, the most important of which is the "Act of Submission of the Clergie to the Kynge's Majestie" (25 Hen. 8, c. 19). By this Act no canons may be made without the Royal assent, or made contrary to the Royal prerogative, or the customs, laws, or statutes of this realm. Then we have the Acts Second (14 Car. 2, c. 4). The first of these Acts revives of Uniformity of Elizabeth (1 Eliz. c. 1), and Charles the a number of prior statutes, of which the Act of Submission is one, and unites all ecclesiastical jurisdiction to the Imperial Crown of this realm." The second, in providing for the uniformity of worship, recites indeed the assent of Convocation to its provisions, but contains no gaving clause for consulting Convocation in future, the only saving clause being one, section 20, of confirmation of all former laws and statutes for uniformity of worship. Since the Reformation, all Acts upon the subject have been restrictive of the independence of the clergy, (although many acts, of which the Clerical Subscription Act 1865 is the most important, have enlarged their liberty), and it seems to follow that there has been an implied repeal of the "solemn Acts of Parliament which were passed in the pre-Reformation period. How far the Crown might make ecclesiastical law without the consent of the other branches of the Legislature, or how far the Act of Submission falls to the ground by the substitution of the High Court of Delegates, by 2 & 3 Will. 4. c. 22, for the Ecclesiastical Commissioners mentioned in that Act, may be questions "surrounded with great difficulties"; but having looked with some care into the statutory charter put forward in the memorial, we have no hesitation in saying that (even making full allowance for the fact that the Act of Submission registered a submission to the Crown, and not, eo nomine, to Parliament) "there is nothing in it." And in the second edition of Blunt's Church Law, revised by Mr. WALTER PHILLIMORE, page 6, we find it said, "It is now a nearly recognized principle of the English Constitution that Parliament is supreme." In fact, it seems pretty clear that if the "solemn Acts of Parliament are to be revived, the pre-Reformation constitution of the Church of England must be revived with them-but perhaps this may be what the memorialists desire. MESSRS. LOFTS & WARNER, in replying in the Times to an unwise letter by the promoter of the Temple Bar Memorial, relating to the leases on the Conduit Mead Estate, mention a course that has been adopted in some cases which seems to afford a hint of some value. It appears that the Conduit Mead Estate was originally leased at ground-rents for building for terms of about sixty years, but renewable in perpetuity upon payment of a fixed fine and fees every fourteen years; and it is stated that the City corporation exercise their power in a very arbitrary manner, and that if a lessee fails to pay the fine before the expiration of the fourteen years, his right to the renewal is absolutely confiscated. "So much importance," continue the writers, "is attached to this, that in some cases our clients have had painted up in the halls of their houses the date of the year upon which the fine becomes pay. able." It would seem that this painting up is the voluntary act of the occupier; but it may be suggested as worthy of consideration, in cases where the head lease of a leasehold house contains any unusual or stringent covenants which may be broken by the occupier, whether it would not be advisable for the lessee, in granting underleases of the house, to stipulate that a concise statement of these provisions shall be constantly kept painted up on the wall of some frequented part of the premises. For instance, suppose the head lease, containing a proviso for re-entry on breach of covenants, also contains a covenant (such as is to be found on some estates where the ground landlord provides the drainage system for rain water from the roofs, &c., only) that the lessee, his executors, administrators, or assigns, will not permit any sewage or polluted water to flow into the water drains, it is very advisable to keep this prohibition constantly before the attention of occupiers, otherwise the probabilities are that some waste-pipe from a new lavatory will be connected with the drain which carries off the water from the roof; and a cause of forfeiture may arise. So, also, in leases of shops held under head-leases containing restrictions as to the trades which may be carried on, it would be desirable, in the interest of the original lessee or his assignees, that these restrictions should be painted up in some frequented part of the premises. If any covenant compelling this painting up is already in use in underleases, we shall be glad to be favoured with a copy of it. If treated " THE JUDGMENT of the Common Pleas Division, delivered on Tuesday, in the case of Tanner v. The Swindon and Marlborough Railway Company, in which an inquisition for damages in a compensation case was set aside on the ground that a champagne lunch had been given to the jury by the claimant, has introduced some novel distinctions into that branch of law (more developed in the United States than in this country) which relates to "treating" jurors. Thus Mr. Justice GROVE distinguished between an unpremeditated luncheon and a luncheon prepared beforehand, and between a champagne luncheon and a luncheon of every-day occurrence. the only reason for upsetting the verdict of a jury is that stated by the court-viz., the fear that a tendency to favour the person providing the luncheon will result then the distinctions, suggested are reasonable. A premeditated luncheon will usually be a better luncheon than an unpremeditated one, and a champagne luncheon will generally be more popular than a non-champagne luncheon. But is it clear that this is the only ground for setting aside the verdict? Would it not be reasonable to hold that, whether the luncheon did or did not influence the minds of the jury in favour of the provider, it had a tendency to render their minds unfit for the proper performance of their duties? This is the doctrine of the United States courts, or some of them; but, on the ground that it would. be difficult and dangerous to lay down any rule by which it should be determined whether a juror bad drunk too much or not, they seem to have pushed the doctrine to an absurd length, and to hold that even the slightest indulgence in drink will incapacitate a juror. Thus, in State v. Baldy (17 Iowa, 39), the verdict of a jury was set aside because one of the jurors, who had been permitted to retire for a few moments, drank a glass of aleat a grocery store. And in Brant v. Fowler (7 Cow. 562) the court upset a verdict because one of the jurors had taken one-third of a gill of brandy "to check diarrhoea." Subsequent cases have modified the stringency of this rule, and it appears that now a sick American juryman may safely resort to a glass of spirits. THE COMPLAINTS which have been made by the Surrey magistrates against one of the coroners for that county, and which were partly gone into before the Lord Chancellor on Thursday last, will have drawn attention. to the question of the liability of a coroner to be removed from his office. The old writ de coronatore exonerando still lies, and has been, on several occasions, put in force. The 25 Geo. 2, c. 29, s. 6, also provided that if a coroner not appointed by annual election or nomination, or whose office is not annexed to any other office, "shall be lawfully convicted of extortion or wilful neglect of his duty, or misdemeanor in his office, it shall be lawful for the court before whom he shall be so convicted to adjudge that he shall be amoved from hisoffice." In Ex parte Parnell (1 J. & W. 451), Lord ELDON held that this statute has not interfered with the jurisdiction of the Lord Chancellor to remove a coroner from his office for neglect of duty.. More recently the Coroners Act, 1860 (23 & 24 Vict. c. 116), s. 6, has put elected and nominated coroners upon the same footing, and has expressly provided that "it shall be lawful for the Lord Chancellor, if he shall think fit, to remove for inability or misbehaviour in his office any such coroner elected or appointed, or hereafter to be elected or appointed." The latest recorded case upon this subject appears to be In re Ward (9 W. R. 843), where Lord CAMPBELL issued a writ de coronatore exonerando, after finding, on an investigation of the evidence before him, that a coroner had attended an inquest in a state of intoxication, and dismissed the jury without He held adequate reason and without swearing them. that the Act of 1860 gave him no discretion, but obliged him to hear the evidence on both sides. In that case the coroner had been fined for drunkenness, and the peti tion for his removal had been presented to the Lord Chancellor by the clerk of the peace for the county, by order of the Court of Quarter Sessions. COVENANT NOT TO ASSIGN WITHOUT CONSENT. SINCE Treloar v. Bigge (24 W. R. 843, L. R. 9 Ex. 151) lessees' solicitors have very generally inserted in the covenant not to assign without licence the words "such licence not being arbitrarily withheld"; whereupon lessors' solicitors, not to be outdone, often add, "in case a respectable and responsible person is tendered," or words to the like effect. The efforts of these zealous and jealous amenders often end in leaving the covenant to assign in a condition which would have caused great grief to the late Mr. Lindley Murray. In Treloar v. Bigge some provisions of this kind caused some embarrassment to the Court of Exchequer. The plaintiff covenanted not to assign without the defendant's consent in writing, "such consent not being arbitrarily withheld"; and in the proviso for re-entry, in which power was given to the lessor to re-enter on the lessee's assigning without the lessor's consent, the words had been inserted "but such consent is not to be arbitrarily withheld." The question was raised whether these expressions amounted to a covenant by the lessor, so as to give the lessee a right of action against him for arbitrarily withholding his consent. The court held that they did not. consent not to be unreasonably withheld." That is to say, himself that it 66 means unreasonable-without reasonable cause," and that the refusal (unless the context shows the contrary) need not be a refusal having reference to the character or solvency of the person to whom the assignment is proposed to be made. But it should be borne in mind that Amphlett, B., expressed considerable doubt as to the meaning of the word "arbitrarily," and lessees' solicitors will do well to express directly the meaning ascribed to that word by Kelly, C.B. As regards the words inserted in the covenant not to assign, we have always thought that there could be little question that they did not amount to such a covenant. The reasonable interpretation of the covenant in Treloar v. Bigge seems to be that the lessee agrees not to assign without the lessor's consent, provided the lessor does not arbitrarily withhold such consent. If the lessor does arbitrarily withhold such consent, then the covenant does not apply, and the CONTRACT TO LEAVE BY WILL. lessee is free to assign. That construction is more consistent with the words of the covenant and the intention of the parties than is the construction contended for by the lessee in Treloar v. Bigge. And it is, as Amphlett, B., pointed out, more convenient that the lessee should, in case the consent of the lessor is arbitrarily withheld, be at once restored to his common law right of assigning, and be entitled to deal with the property as he pleases, than that he should be remitted to a remedy against the lessor for withholding his consent. These appear to us to be the grounds on which the decision of the court in Treloar v. Bigge should be rested; we do not attach much importance to the notion stated by Amphlett, B., in his judgment, that the words "such consent not being arbitrarily withheld," could not answer two purposesthat they could not both qualify the lessee's covenant and constitute a covenant by the lessor. Why not? does not seem difficult to imagine cases in which words of this kind might be reasonably interpreted as fulfilling such a double function. It The question of the construction of the clause in the proviso for re-entry in Treloar v. Bigge-"but such consent is not to be arbitrarily withheld"-was a good deal more difficult. It was probably correct to hold that, considering their position and context, they were not sufficiently clear and explicit to constitute a covenant by the lessor not to arbitrarily withhold his consent. But it is to be observed that Kelly, C.B., said in his judgment that, "had these words been used elsewhere in the instrument, although, perhaps, part of the same sentence in which they now stand, it is possible there might be a covenant in them." In the recent case of Sear v. House Property Investment Company (Limited) (29 W. R. 192), a lessee covenanted with a lessor not to assign the demised property without the consent in writing of the lessor, "but such THE circumstances of the recent case of Alderson v. Maddison (29 W. R. 105, L. R. 5 Ex. D. 293) are, we should imagine, of a character not unfrequently occurring. They were as follows:-The plaintiff, as heir-at-law of an intestate, claimed the title-deeds of the intestate's farm, of which the defendant had taken possession on his death. The defendant counter-claimed a declaration that she was entitled to a life estate in the farm, and to retain the title-deeds for her life. The jury found that the defendant was induced to serve the intestate as his housekeeper without wages for many years, and to give up other prospects of establishment in life, by his promise to make a will leaving her a life estate in his farm if and when it became his property. Mr. Justice Stephen held, first, that the finding, taken with the facts, amounted to a finding that there was a contract to the above effect between the intestate and the defendant, and that such contract, being based on a good consideration, was binding on the intestate and his estate; and, secondly, that since the contract had been completely performed on the defendant's part, section 4 of the Statute of Frauds did not apply, and that the defendant was entitled to the declaration asked in the counterclaim. The learned judge laid it down that a representation which influences the conduct of a person to whom it is made, can only be legally efficacious either by way of contract or estoppel. The representation may be a term in a contract-in other words, it may be a promise, or it may give rise to an equity, for estoppels of the sort referred to in Pickard v. Sears (6 A. & E. 469) are really in the nature of equities, entitling the party to whom the representation is made to have the rights of the parties determined on the basis of the existence of the facts which have been represented to exist. In the case we are discussing the learned judge held that there was a contract, and it certainly seems to us that the case is one of contract or nothing. The word "representation," which has been much employed in support of the plaintiff's contention in cases of the class of Alderson v. Maddison, has much to answer for in the history of the law. It is a word that, to our mind, bears a very bad character, and whenever it is used we begin to look with suspicion, lest some fallacy should be endeavouring to obtain admission. It is highly desirable that ambiguous expressions such as "representation," wandering about for no good purpose, should be "comprehended," to use the language of ancient Dogberry, and made to deliver themselves of their meaning, if any. A woman acts as a rich old man's housekeeper for years, or a man marries a rich old man's daughter, in hopes, to use plain English words corresponding to the substance of the transaction, that thereafter advantage may accrue to her or him, such hopes being, perhaps, fanned by expressions of future intention on the part of the said rich old man. The rich old man dies and disappoints the hopes so entertained, and, thereupon, with what glib promptitude do your "representations" come on the scene! Seriously, we vehemently object to vague equities founded on loose expressions like "representations." Either there is a contract or there is not, and in the latter case there is nothing. And that is what Mr. Justice Stephen has said. But we wish the line could be drawn tighter than he has thought himself justified upon the decisions in drawing it. The notion of a contract to make a will is full of objections. There is a most dangerous contradiction involved in the idea. It may, no doubt, be that if the law did not admit of such an idea, in some cases wicked testators would avail themselves of their power of exciting false hopes to do injustice and wrong; but it appears to us that the evils on the other side more than counterbalance this evil. We would have the law say, with no uncertain voice, that any person seeking to bind a person's estate after his death must procure the desired result to be effected by instrument inter vivos. Then there would be no room for ambiguities, for difference of intention on the one side and the other, and, for what is worse, for perjury on the side of one party, when the other is unable to give his version of the transaction. The truth is that in this class of case the testator seldom or never really supposes that he is contracting himself out of his freedom of testamentary disposition on the one side, and it is more than doubtful whether the other party on the other side really supposes him to be doing so. The other party really gives the services, or whatever the supposed consideration may be, in hope, and would give them none the less though there were no shadow of a promise. Neither party has any idea of a contract. The notion of a contract to make a will in a particular way seems to us to run counter to the essential idea of a will, and to its legal characteristics. The curious feature of it is that, according to the doctrine, it is immaterial whether the party makes the will agreed upon or not, because the law will treat his property exactly as if it were made. Consequently there is, in substance, a will without any of the formalities required by the law. We anticipate what will be said in answer to this. It will be urged that in substance the effect of a contract to make a will in a particular way is that of an instrument inter vivos. For instance, a contract to leave a life estate, as in the case which formed our text, is in substance a disposition inter vivos, by which the right to a life estate on the death of the owner arises. But we answer that the mischief involved in a form not corresponding to the reality of the transaction is, in law, very great. It is of great importance that the associations of ideas which constitute distinct legal entities, should not become confused together, because such confusion leads to confusion, not only of nomenclature, but of mental intention. The difficulty of discriminating is obvious, especially when the discrimination has to take place after the death of one party, between the holding out of mere hopes and the making of legal promises. Assume that some person, by false representations of his testamentary intentions, gets some poor woman to serve him for years gratis, what is the proper attitude of the law on the subject? Ought the law to say, "The woman shall not be deceived: the estate of the testator, who sailed so near the wind, and used such expressions as to create in the woman's mind a notion that he was bound to leave her such and such property, shall be bound as if the will had been executed?" In our view, most distinctly and decidedly, that is not the proper attitude of the law. The best protection, in our opinion, for persons in consimili casu with the woman of our hypothesis, and also for the heirs and other relations of testators, is the distinct understanding that testamentary disposition is free, and that contractual obligations must be effectuated otherwise than by testament. We do not say that it is possible to hold this in the face of the decisions to which Stephen, J., refers, and there may undoubtedly be a difficulty with regard to the past, but we cannot help wishing that, with regard to the future, it was possible to re-establish the law on this footing. CONTINUING SURFACE DAMAGE, WHERE, as in the usual case, mines of coal or iron-ore have been worked under leases, with liberty to deposit spoil and refuse upon, and to otherwise appropriate and injuriously affect, the surface, subject to paying compensation therefor, and where such working has been of long duration and the lease has been successively assigned or successive lessees have worked the mines, and in so doing have used the liberty in question, a very considerable difficulty not uncommonly arises, and is likely to arise still more often in the immediate future, regarding the liability for the damage continuing to arise from the continuance of the refuse heaps and other prejudicially affected surface. Does the liability exist, and, if so, against whom? Is it against the working lessee or assignee for the time being, or is it a liability that is to be distributed (subject or not to the Statute of Limitations) among the successive workers pro ratâ, necessitating an inquiry into the proportions in which each has in his own time contributed to the cause of damage? And when the land is sold, may the purchaser (buying, of course, with notice of the condition of the land) become entitled, as to a right running with his purchase or otherwise, to any and what remedy in respect of the continuing damage? And when (as must eventually happen) the working is discontinued, but the refuse-heaps, &c., remain, has the landowner any right (and how is such right enforceable) to have the surface restored, or to have damages or compensation for the abiding injury, and upon what principle are such damages or compensation assessable? These questions are becoming yearly more urgent, and the solution of them is not greatly aided by the existing law as that is to be gathered from the authorities. In the Wigan district, we have been credibly informed, these questions, or most of them, are now the subject of considerable controversy, and litigation is imminent, if it has not been actually commenced, for their settlement or attempted settlement. We believe that the like questions concern very many other mining centres. The most recent case (and it is not a very recent one) bearing proximately on the subject is that of Mordue v. Dean, &c., of Durham (L. R. 8 C. P. 336), and that case may be regarded as the leading authority where the question depends (as it usually does) upon title-that is to say, upon the construction of the deed or deeds whereby the mines are severed from the surface lands. And where the question does not depend upon title in the |