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Badd T. Davison (Ch.Div. V.C.M.) 102

Chamberlain v. Napier (Ch.Div. V.C.H.) 101

Etuis, Et parte. In re Orbcll (I!key.) 200

-'-1 T. Briggs (Ch.Div. Fry. J.) 107

s Camden v. Murray (Ch.Div. V.C.M.) 100

I v. The Treasurer of the County of Surrey (App.) 170

Post v. Marsh (Ch.Div. Fry, J.) 198

Bepublic of Costa Rica v. Strousberpr (App.) 179

Sear v. House Property Investment Company (Limited)

(Ch.Div. V.C.H.) 192

Stoomraart Mnatschappy Nederland v. The Peninsular and

Oriental Steam Navigation Company (H.L.) 17:1

SalHvan v. Mitcalfe and others (App.) 181

Verminck v. Edwards (Ch.Div. M.R ) ISO

Wuhrrnsea Briok Works (Limited), The, In re (App.) 17H

Wye Valley Railway Company v. liawcs (App.) 177


A Want ranch felt by officials and solicitors who frequent the Royal Courts of Justice was supplied on Monday last by the opening of a refreshment department in the building.

We mrDEKSTANn it is in contemplation to place under the charge of the Chancery Paymaster, in addition to the seventy-seven millions which he now holds for chancery suitors, the whole of the suitors' money paid into court in the common law divisions of the High Court.

As Boon As The cuANOES in the organization of the Iligh Court now in contemplation have been completed, the next step will be to furnish to the profession a consolidation of all the existing rules affecting the practice of that court and the Court of Appeal. It need hardly be said that, even as regards the Judicature Rules, such a consolidation is needed; but when the large body of rules made before the Judicature Act and still in force, and the many sources from which they have to be gathered, are considered, it will be seen that a general consolidation is urgently required. Rut it should be borne in mind that no consolidation which will answer the purpose can be effected except by authority, for in tlie course of it numerous changes must be made in the rules, not only verbal, but substantial.

The Cause Lists of the Chancery Division, which we print in another column, show about the average number

of causes before the five judges of that division. The Master of the Rolls has 62 causes with witnesses, and 82 causes without witnesses. Vice-Chancellor Maltns has a total of 117 causes; Vice-Chancellor Racon has 53; Vice-Chancellor Hall has 62 with witnesses and 40 without, and Mr. Justice Fry has 50 causes; making a total of 472 causes, as against precisely the same number in the books at this time last year. There were 477 causes at the commencement of the last Michaelmas Sittings. The appeal list contains 95 chancery appeals, 69 appeals from the three common law divisions, 11 from the Pro. bate and Admiralty Division, and about 15 from the Court of Bankruptcy. This appeal list Is somewhat smaller than that of the same time last year, when there were 236 appeals in the books.

The Course Taken by the presiding judges at the trial at Dublin of the members of the Land League, in receiving evidence of everything which passed at the various meetings referred to by the prosecution, will indefinitely protract the inquiry, but it is difficult to see how any other conclusion could have been arrived at. The prosecution is not for the delivery of the speeches referred to, but these speeches are adduced as evidence of the existence of an illegal combination. The judgment of the Court of Queen's Bench in Rex v. Hunt (3 B. & Ad. 566) is an authority for the doctrine that in such a case all circumstances which can throw any light upon the general character and intention of the meetings referred to may be given in evidence by the prosecution. It is obvious that the same principle must be equally applicable in favour of the defendants, and that they are entitled to comment upon everything that transpired at a meeting in order to show that the assembly was not an unlawful one, or in furtherance of any illegal conspiracy.

We Suppose the statements in the Times as to tho contents of the new Government Bankruptcy Rill may be taken to be inspired, and it appears from them that in addition to containing (as we were enabled many weeks ago to state that it would contain) most of the recommendations of the Select Committee of last session, the Rill has been altered so as to give a good deal of control to officers of the Roard of Trade. The Bill, it is stated, will propose that all initial proceedings between the adjudication of bankruptcy and the first meeting of creditors should be conducted by officers specially appointed for the purpose by the Roard of Trade. These officers will take interim charge of the estate, will inquire into the conduct of the debtor, will examine him, and will make a preliminary report on bis affairs at tho first meeting of creditors. It will further be proposed that the audit of tho trustee's accounts should be conducted no longer by the committee of inspection, as at present, but by the Roard of Trade, whose staff will be reinforced for the purpose by the creation of a strong audit department, under tho immediate superintendence of the Comptroller in Rankruptcy. If we understand these proposals aright, the occurrence of a commercial catastrophe will be placed on the same footing as the occurrence of a railway catastrophe. There will be a Government inspector sent down, who will institute an inquiry and make a report. This will probably be an improvement on the present system, or want of system; but what about the cost of these numerous and active Government officials? Are creditors to pay a Roard of Trade inspector for telling them that, unfortunately, John Jones, tlie debtor, 1ms no assets, or (as happened in over 1,000 cases in 1879) that he has only assets sufficient to pay a composition of less than one shilling in the pound f The official audit of the trustees' accounts will doubtless be an advantage, but, here again, we shall look with interest to see who is to pay for the "strong audit department."

It Seems Probable that in course of time wo shall hear all that took place at the recent Council of Judges. A day or two after that assembly had been held, Mr. Justice Watkin Williams published his " memorandum," and now Mr. Justice Stephen, in the Nineteenth Century tells us what was the advice he gave to the council. He wished them " to abstain from the expression of any opinion at all upon the subject [of the consolidation of the common law divisions and the abolition of the offices of Chief Justice of the Common Pleas and Chief Baron] and to leave to the Executive Government the responsibility ... of making by statute such alterations in the present state of things as they consider necessary." His grounds for this advice were, among others, that the effect of the 32nd section of the Judicature Act, 1873, is to enable the council to make the recommendations they have made, but it does not enable them to make auy report or recommendation on cognate subjects. "The result," he says, " is that they were compelled either to be silent or to recommend two isolated changes, the effect of which can hardly be estimated unless a full statement is given of the scheme of which they are to form a part." Now, although section 32 does not contemplate any report by tho Council of Judges, section 75 apparently makes it obligatory on such council to report annually " what (if any) amendments or alterations it would in their judgment be expedient to mike in the Act, or otherwise relating to the administration of justice, and what other provisions (if any) which cannot be carried into effect without the authority of Parliament, It would be expedient to make for the better administration of justice." Hence, even if the council summoned by tho Lord Chancellor were held to be exclusively devoted to the consideration of the two points referred toby Mr. Justice Stephen, it would seem to have been quite open to him or any other judge to propose cither that the council be adjourned for the consideration of tho matters mentioned in section 75, or at all events to move a resolution in favour of the desirability of complying with the requirement of thatsectionof areportfrom an annual council of the judges. Such a report would have been a more effective, as well as more appropriate, means of considering, and influencing, any scheme which may be on foot for the re-organization of tho High Court, than a magazine article.

We Hope hereafter to deal in detail with the substance of Mr. Justice Stephen's argument, but we may say here that he lays down the propositions that the one-judge system cannot be fully carried out without abolishing trial by jury in civil cases; that auy attempt to carry it out fully, without the abolition of trial by jury in such casep, will greatly lower the efficiency and dignity of the puisne judges of the common law diviBious, and that the attempts hitherto made to introduce the single-judge 6ystem have caused great intricacy, delay, and expense in the administration of justice; and ho suggests a scheme which he thinks will attain the objects iu view without being opcu to these objections, and without involving expense to the public. He would have one court only, the High Court, divided into the Chancery, Queen's Bench, and Piobate Divisions. All the judges should bo called by the eutne title and receive the same pay, and tuke precedence according to seniority. Out of these judges there should be constituted "appellate benches," consisting of three or two judges, according to the nature of the appellate

business; the judges who should sit on the appellate benches being decided by the judges of each division. The bench taking equity appeals should have ono common law member, and each bench taking Queen's Bench appeals-should have an equity member. Wo shall have something to say on this scheme hereafter, but we would ask the learned author how, with the majority of bis chancery appeal bench drawn from the Chancery Division judge.", and the majority of his common law appeal bench drawn from the Queen's Bench Division judges, he proposes to eecure that uniformity of decision which it is one of the main objects of a court of appeal to obtain? Let us suppose that Vice-Chancellor MALissand Vice-Chancellor Bacon sat with a judge of the Queen's Bench Division as the Chancery Appeal Bench, does he think that the decisions of this tribunal would be entirely harmonious with those of the Queen's Bench Appeal Bench P

In The Case of Elphiclc v. Barnes (29 W. R. 139), a vigorous attempt was unsuccessfully made to upset or refine away the doctrine settled iu Head v. Taltertall (20 W. li. 115, L. B. 7 Ex. 7). In that case as most of our readers who have to do with horse law know, an action was brought to recover back the price of a horse which had been sold at Tatt ersall's, with a warranty and a condition thtt the plaintiff was to be at liberty to return the horse, if it did not answer the description, up to the followiug Wednesday. The hcrse was injured on its way homo, and depreciated in value, but without ony fault of the plaintiff's servant, who was Inking it home. The horse, being found not to correepoud with the warranty, was returned within the time, and it was held that the plaintiff had a right to return the horse and recover back the price, notwithstanding that he was unable to return it in the same condition. Iu Elphick v. Barnes, a horse had been sold by the plaintiff to the defendant upon condition that it should be tried by him for eight days, and returned at the end of that time if the defendant did not think it suitable for his purposes. The horse died in the defendant's stable within the eight days, but without fault of either party. It was contended that Head v. Tattersall did not apply, because in that case the right to return the horse was on a specific ground—viz., that it did not correspond to warranty, whereas here the right to return was general, in case the defendant did not think it would suit his purposes. But if there is any difference between the two cases, it appears to us that the facts in Elphick v. Barnes were stronger against the seller than iu Head v. Tattersall. It the doctrine laid down iu the latter cose is sound, it is clear that where a horse, which is sold subject to a right to return, is injured, the loss falls upon the person in whom the property is vested, and that the property is not vested absolutely in the purchaser until after the expiration of the period within which the right to return may be exercised. How can it make any difference in the application of the doctrine whether the right to return is- limited to certain specified grounds, or it general? The court in Elphick v. Barnes, held that it did not.

At the close of the day's business in the City of London ('• urt on the 4th inst., Mr. Commissioner Kerr, being t»k«d by a suitor if he intended to adjourn any of the casts, as ttis list was a very heavy one, said :—" I am proud to say that up to the end ol last year, during the one-and-twenty ytt't I have presided over this court, not a day has passed that the list has not been finished ; bnt the business has so increased that it ij all hut impossible to do si. In consequence of very absurd engagements at the Central Criminal Caurt, I cannot givo my whole time to tbe business of this court, and should adjournments be necessary, I shall feel exceedingly sorry. I will, however, take steps to get an assistant-judge appointed."


At the end of the year it may be worth while to bring together the recent decisions on the subject of the third party, who is rapidly becoming the subject of a special code of practice. The practice as to the joinder of third parties was upon two occasions during the year the subject of discussion. In Witham v. Vance (28 W. R. 27G) the plaintiffs claimed under a person who had sold property to a former Duke of Cleveland, the latter covenanting to pay to the vendor, his heirs, executors, administrator?, or assigns, the sum of sixpence for every chaldron of coal got out of the land and shipped for sale. The Poke's personal property passed to the defendants, and the land in question was sold, during his lifetime, to the Hutton Heury Coal Company, who had commenced to work the coal therein, but it was alleged that they had been indemnified from the covenant contained in the conveyance to the Duke. The action was brought for an account of the coal gotten and shipped, and (if necessary) for an administration of the real and pereoual estate of the Duke. The defendants obtained leave in chambers to serve a notice in the action under ord. 16, r. 18, as well as a copy of the statement of claim and of the order, upon the Hutton Henry Coal Company, and they now applied that the company might havo liberty to defend, and for directions as to the mode and extent in or to which the company should be bound by the decision of the case. The company sought leave to bring in the vendors (who had covenanted to indemnify them from the covenants contained in the conveyence to the Duko of Cleveland) as additional parties, and Mr. Justice Fry gave them leave to put in a defence to the statement of claim, limited to any new point not raised by the defendants, and also to serve other persons, under ord. 16, r. 18, without prejudice to any question between the defendants and the parties so served. The CarUburn (28 W. R. 378, L. R. 5 P. D. 59) was an action of collision brought by the owners of the ship S. against the owners of the ship C, which was being towed when the injury to the plaintiffs vessel was occasioned. The defendants obtained leave, under ord. 16, r. 18, to bring in the owner of the tug as a third party, and the court afterwards gave the latter liberty to appear and defend, being bound, as between him and the defendants, by any decision of the court as to the cause of the collision. The defendants neither put in a statement of claim, nor appeared at the trial, but the third party did both. Sir R. Phillimore condemned the defendants in damages and costs, holding that their ship was alone to blame for the collision, and that they were not entitled to an indemnity from the owner of the tug, and he afterwards refused an application by the defendants to strike out the latter part of the judgment. The Court of Appeal, however, held that so much of the judgment as decided that the defendants were not entitled to indemnity as against the third party was erroneous, since no such issue had been directed to be joined, and there was no litis conlestatio between the defendants and the third party.

Three cases during the year dealt with the question of the costs of third parties. In Witham v. Vane (2) (28 VP. R. 812), Mr. Justice Fry ordered the payment by the plaintiffs of the costs, not only of the third party, but also of fourth parties. In Yorkshire Wagon Company v. Newport and Abercarne Coal Company (28 W. R. 505, L. R. 5 Q. B. D. 268), the master had, on the defendants' application, given third parties liberty to defend, all costs to be left in the discretion of the judge at the trial. On the application of the third parties, a similar order was made ns to fourth parties, upon whose application another similar order Whs made as to fifth parties. At the trial, the fourth and fifth parties appeared, but the third paities did not, and a verdict was found for the defendants. Mr. Justico Lush, before whom the case was tried, ordered the third parties to pay the costs of the fourth and fifth parties, and

! he subsequently ordered the defendants to pay the costs of (he third parties, including the costs which he had previously ordered the latter to pay. These orders were set aside by the Queen's Bench Division on the ground that the master's original order was ultra vires. Another question was raised in the case, but was not determined by the court, namely, whether order 16 gives any power to bring in fourth and fifth parties. In Dawson v. Shepherd (28 W. R. 805), a third party had been served by the defendant with a notice under ord. 16, r. 18, and had obtained leave to attend the trial, and it was ordered that ho should be bound by the result of the trial, "costs reserved." The plaintiff and defendant settled the action without giving notice to the third party, who afterwards applied for an order directing tho payment of his costs by the defendant. This order was refused by the Exchequer Division (affirming the decision of Manisty, J., at chambers) on the authority of Yorkshire Wagon Company v. Newport and Abercarne Coal Company, but the Court of Appeal held that there was power to order poyment of the third party's costs, and Bramwell and Brett, L.JJ., both held that, even if the master had no power to make an anticipatory order as to costs, the discretion given by order 55 empowered tho court to order the defendant to pay costs to the third party. It appeared that when tho summons was heard in chambers, Manisty, J., who had been a party to the decision in Yorkshire Wagon Company v. Newport and Abercarne Coal Company, had observed that the decision of the Queens Bench Division in that case had proceeded upon the particular facts which were then before the court.


In Horsley v. Cox (17 W. R. 596, L. R. 4 Ch. 97), Lord Hatherley pointed out that while the Common Law Procedure Act of 1852 contained a clause referring to proceedings in equity, the whole of the Act of 1854, "which gave to a judgment creditor a right of attachment in respect of money due from any person whatsoever to his debtor," applied to common law procedure alone. The consequence was that while, before the Judicature Act, tho common law reports abounded in decisions on attachment of debts, there were hardly any reported cases upon the subject in the chancery reports. In Horsley v. Cox the present Master of the Rolls, when at the bar, contended that a bill would lie to enable a judgment creditor to obtain a charge analogous to a garnishee order upon an equitable debt, but his argument failed to convince either the late Master of the Rolls or Lord Hatherley. Now that the powers in respect of attachment of debts, which were formerly practically confined to the common law courts, are also exercised by the Chancery Division, numerous cases have occurred, and ic may be desirable to glance at some of the points which have been recently settled relating to this subject.

A garnishee order nisi to attach debts does not operate so as to create any charge until it is served on the garnishee. This point was decided in Re The Stanhope Silkstone Collieries Company (27 W. R. 561, L. R. 11 Ch. D. 160). In that case a petition had been presented for winding up the company on a certain day, and the garnishee order nisi, which had been obtained two days before, was not served until the day after. The court decided (reversing the decision of Fry, J.) that a judgment creditor was not 0 secured creditor at the time of the commencement of the winding up. The Master of the Rolls snid that an uttachment or garnishee order was a mode of enforcing by execution the payment of the debt in tho original action, and that it did not operate to give the plaintiff in the original action auy security until it was served. The garnishee might, before servloe, pay his own creditor—that if, tho original debtor—and the judgment creditor would be remediless so far as the order was concerned, and would have to issue execution upon the original unsatisfied judgment. The order nisi was, in fact, "an imperfect execution." James, L.J., said it was impossible to distinguish the present case of an execution against debts from an execution against chattels. There was no distinction in principle between the two, bat in the case of a garnishee the creditor is made his own sheriff, and allowed to make his own execution. The ground on which Bramwell, L.J., based his judgment was, that the order absolute did not purport to attach the debts, but orders " that they be attached," and this implied that something further should be done, and it was like the case of an order for attachment of a person for contempt. He was not attached upon tho writ issuing, but was attached under it. This case was followed by Hamer v. Giles (27 W. R. 834, L. R. 11 Ch. D. 942), where a question arose between a solicitor who had obtained a charging order under the Act of 1860, and a judgment creditor who had obtained a garnishee order, but had not served it until the day after the solicitor's order had been obtained. It had been previously decided in Ex parte Joselyne, Re Watt (26 "W. R. 845, L. R. 8 Ch. D. 327), that the effect of the service of the garnishee order nisi is to transfer the property in the debt to the judgment creditor, and that he is to be treated as a secured creditor within the Bankruptcy Act.

In a case of Richler v. Laxton (27 W. R. 214), it was decided that the fact of the existence of a foreign attachment in the Lord Mayor's Court does not prevent the operation of a garnishee order. This case illustrates very clearly the distinction between the two processes. Attachment in the Mayor's Court, as Lush, J., said, is simply 8 process to compel appearance, and when once the defendant has appeared the attachment is gone. A garnishee order, on the other hand, is a process of execution, and its effect is to transfer all the rights of the judgment debtor against the person who owes him money to the judgment creditor, with the additional remedy of summary execution. This case was approved in Levy v. Lovell (28 W. R. 602, L. R. 14 Ch. D. 234), where the Court of Appeal decided (overruling the decision of Vice-Chancellor Bacon, and disapproving of that of Vice-Chancellor Hall in In re London Cotton Mills Company, 25 W. R. 109), that service of a foreign attachment in an action in the Mayor's Court has not the effect, which we have just seen is produced by a garnishee order, of making the judgment creditor a secured creditor within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Act.

The question as to the circumstances under which money can be attached by judgment creditors has been considered in a large number of cases since the Judicature Aot. In Richardson v. Blmit (L. R. 2 C. P. D. 9) it was decided that a mere notice to treat for compensation in respect of premises, served by the Metropolitan Board of Works, did not constitute a debt owing or accruing. Grove, J., said that in this case there was nothing more than a mere surmise that, in an event which might or might not happen, a debt might become due to the judgment debtor. In Hall v. Pritchelt, Corporation of Huddersfield, Garnishees (26 \V. R. 95, L. R. 3 Q. B. D. 215), it was decided (following Jones v. Thompson, E. B. & E. 63) that accruing salary of a medical officer could not be attached. A sum of money which was payable for interest on stock by one railway company to another, under a working agreement, was held to be attachable in Bouch v. The Stvenoaks Railway Company (27 W. R. 507, L. R. 4 Ex. D. 133). Tho court considered that the money was not impressed with a trust, and that a duty which was imposed upon the respondent company to apply the money in question to a particular purpose could not prevail over the creditor's rights. In Dolphin v. Layton (27 W. R. 7S6, L. R. 4 C. P. D. 130) the county court judge had decided that money which had been paid into court, and was in the

hands of the registrar, could bo attached, but this decision was reversed by the Common Pleas Division, Danmau, J., saying that the registrar of a county court in exactly the same position as a master of one of tlie superior courts. In one of the last cases upon tho subject (Re Cowan's Estate, Rapier v, Wright, 23 W. R. 827, L. R. 14 Ch. D. 638), a receiver had been appointed, and ordered to pay an annuitant quarterly, and it was held by Vice-Chancellor Hall that the money could be made available for payment of the judgment creditor of tho annuitant.


In view of the introduction of a Bankruptcy Bill which seems likely to become law, the portion of the judicial statistics relating to bankruptcy have a peculiar interest.

During the ten years in which the Bankruptcy Act, 1869, has been in operation, the number of cases of bankruptcy has enormously increased, as is shown in the following table :—

By By
Bankruptcies, arrangement, composition. Total.

1870 1,351 2,035 1,616 5,002

1871 1,238 2,872 2,170 6,280

1872 933 3,694 2,208 6,835

1873 915 4,152 2,422 7,489

1874 930 4,440 2,549 7,919

1875 965 4,233 2,691 7,889

1876 970 4,986 3,287 9,249

1877 967 5,239 3,327 9,533

1878 1,084 6,356 4,010 11,450

1879 1,156 7,167 4,809 13,132

Total 10,515 45,174 29,089 84,778

The debtor's summonses issued iu London and in the several county courts in 1879 were 3,069 ; there were 241 "declarations of inability" filed, and 1,752 petitions for adjudication. Among the 1,156 debtors adjudicated bankrupt, 373 were on debtor's summons, 187 on declaration of inability, 373 on failure of liquidation proceedings, and 223 on other acta of bankruptcy. Of the total number, 853 were traders and 303 non-traders. In 809 cases trustees were appointed with a committee of inspection, and in 267 without a committee. There were 136 applications for the discharge of bankrupts during the year 1879, and 12 were discharged where ten shillings iu the pound had been or might have been paid, and 124 on resolution of creditors after payment of a dividend of less than ten shillings. During the year 1879, 4,913 bankruptcies were dealt with; of this number, 149 were annulled, 79 of them on acceptance of a composition or scheme of settlement, 26 by reason of no trustee having been appointed, 10 on appeal, and 34 for other reasons. Besides the 149 bankruptcies annulled, 303 were closed on payment of dividend, and 349 without a dividend, and 4,112 were pending at the end of the year. In 1879, the total stated or estimated amount of bankrupts' liabilities was £4,298,721, and the estimated assets £570,713. In 1878, the liabilities were estimated at £9,287,156, and the assets at £1,930,731. The summary of receipts and payments by trustees shows a balance of £434,326 at the commencement of the year, and that the receipts and advances by trustees amounted to £6C3,36S, making together £1,097,693 ; the repayments, including dividends, were £536,547, and tho balance at the end of the year was £561,145.

The number of bankrupts' estates closed in 1879 was 652. In 303 of these tho liabilities amounted to £1,258,311, and the gross receipts to £296,215, and dividends wero paid. In 239 cases the liabilities amounted to £644,748, and the gross receipts to .£33,031, which last amount was wholly absorbed in costs. In 103 cases, with liabilities amounting to £232,415, no. thing was received and no dividends were paid.

On the 303 bankrupt's estates which paid a dividend, and were closed in 1879, only 7 paid twenty shillings in the pound, and 2 paid between fifteen and twenty (hillings, and besides these there were only 12 which paid more than ten shillings in the pound.

Liquidation by Arrangement.—There were during the year 1879 14,574 petitions for liquidation filed, 7,167 resolutions were registered, and there were 2,788 resolutions for discharge; the gross amount of debts was £17,989,482, and the gross value of the estates was £7,307,999; the stamp duty amounted to £40,694. In the year 1878 there were 12,723 petitions filed, 6,356 resolutions were registered, and 2,282 resolutions for discharge; the gross amount of the debts was £14,774,342, and the gross value of the estates £5,443,372; the stamp duty amounted to £34,325.

Composition witfi Creditors.—During the year 1879 there were 4,809 resolutions for composition registered, and these related to debts amounting to £7,389,990; and the gross value of the estates was £2,314,905 ; the stamp doty amounting to £17,073. In 1878 the resolutions numbered 4,010, the debt* amounted to £5,912,243, the assets to £1,638,971, and the stamp duty to £14,662. Of the 4,809 compositions 51 were twenty shillings in the pound, and 140 others above ten shillings. In the previous year there were 4,010 compositions, in 41 of which twenty shillings in the pound was offered, and 124 others were above ten shillings.

Summary of Bankruptcies, Liquidations, and Compositions. — The total liabilities under bankruptcies, liquidations by arrangement, and compositions, amounted in 1879 to £29,678,193, and the assets to £10,193,617. In 1878 the total liabilities were £29,973,740, and the assets £9,023,074.

Bankruptcy Appeals.—There wero 133 appeals from decisions in bankruptcy to the Court of Appeal in 1879. Of this number 67 decisions were affirmed and 38 reversed or varied, 13 were withdrawn or arranged, and 15 were pending at the end of the year.

The appeals presented to the Chief Judge in Bankruptcy during the same period numbered 171; of these 48 were affirmed, and 56 reversed or varied, 3 were referred back, 24 were arranged or withdrawn, and 40 were left pending.

In the three years which immediately preceded the passing of the Bankruptcy Act, 1869, there were 248 appeals, giving an average of 82 for each year. The Court affirmed 69 of the decisions, being an average of 33 a year, and reversed or varied 110, an average of 36 in each year.

Bills Taxed.—The number of bills taxed by the taxingmasters and registrars was 23,677, the gross amount of which was £600,173, of which £104,963 was struck off on taxation, being rather more than one-sixth of the whole.

The secretary to the Inland Revenue Commissioners writes to the Times to Bay, with reference to a letter complaining that np to the { resent time the Surveyors of Taxes have received no instructions with regard to an allowance for income-tax on rent remitted, that general instructions were issued to those officer* on the 24th ult., authorizing them to pursue the same course for the current financial year as was lanctiooed by the Treasury for the year 1879-80.

The applications for letters patent for inventions reoorded in the Patecit Office during 1880 were more numerous than in any previous year, having readied 6,517. In 1879 the number was 5,338, while in 1878 tbey amounted to 5,343. With a few slight fluctuations, there has been a steady increase of business since the passing of the Patent Law Amendment Aot in 1852, when a very sudden and extensive upward tendency manifested itself. In 1850 the number of patents granted reached 523 only, in 1860 the applications were 3,196, and in 1870 they had increased to


MERCHANT SHIPPING. A Treatise Of The Law Relative To Merchant Shits Akd Seamen. By Loud Tenterden. Twelfth Edition. By Samuel Prentice, Esq., Q.C. Shaw & Sons.

The legislation of last session relating to merchant shipping has apparently stimulated the activity of authors and editors of works on this subject. This is the third large book on merchant shipping which we have reviewed within the last few weeks. Our task is here, however, comparatively light, for we have only to see how faf Lord Tenterden's work, within the limits which he prescribed for himself, has been brought up to the present state of the law. As regards the legislation which has taken place since the publication of the last edition, we find all the Acts printed in full in the appendix, and indexed; but (probably owing to the exigencies of printing so large a book) we do not find them always noticed in the text. We have, at any rate, failed to find any reference to the Merchant Shipping Act, 1854, Amendment Act, 1880, at p. 43, or to the Merchant Seamen (Payment of "Wages and Rating) Act, 1880, in the part of the book relating to advance and allotment notes, at p. 474. With regard to the recent cases, Mr. Prentice seems to have mostly aimed rather at inserting a reference to them, than at discussion of them. Thus Lockhart v. Falk (23 W. R. 753, L. R. 10 Ex. 132) and Francesco v. Massey (21 W. R. 440, L. R. 8 Ex. 101) are simply mentioned in a foot-note to the paragraph of the text relating to the cesser clause, in which, by the way, no reference is made to the important case of Bannister v. Breslauer (15 W. R. 840, L. R. 2 0. P. 497), which, having been threatened with overthrow, has now become an established precedent. Similarly, we find Ogg v. Shuter (24 W. R. 100, L. R. 1 C. P. Lt. 47) dismissed in a foot-note on p. 276 with the remark: "But see as to the vendor's bold on the goods if vendee refuses to perform conditions of sale: Ogg v. Shuter." It is again mentioned in a foot-note on p. 405 in the words, "See Ogg v. Shuter." And Attwood v. Sellar (27 W. R. 726, L. R. 4 Q. B. D. 342)appears to be only referred to in footnotes on pp. 501 and 509. These important cases seem to deserve more extended notice at the hands of the editor. The book, however, contains references to most of the recent cases on the matters discussed by Lord Tenterden, and the portions of the text we have examined have been carefully revised so as to be consistent with the present law. Mr. Prentice has introduced a useful change by distinguishing ttie parts of the book which are the same as in the fifth es^ion (the last which was published in the lifetime of the author) by placing them between brackets; and in his preface he has given an interesting notice of the maritime Codes and Laws.

THE LAW SOCIETY'S CALENDAR. The Incorforated Law Societi Calendar For 1881. Published by authority of the Council of the Incorporated Law Society.

We have here the long looked for calendar, and most of those who examine It will be disposed both to wonder why the idea was never taken up before, and to congratulate themselves on the measure of success with which it has now at last been carried out. The calendar opens oppropriately with a sketch of the history of the society and of its work in the matters of legal education, legistion specially affecting solicitors, professional discipline, the consolidation of the courts, and law reform iu general; and this sketch concludes with a passage so well representing the ideas and wishes which the Solicitors' Journal has, for many years, attempted to present, that we venture to quote it in full:—

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