the road; and "excessive weight" means weight beyond the weight usually put on the road by the traffic as a whole. It will be seen that both definitions practically come to the same thing as the terse expression of Lord Justice Bramwell, and that the question really is, Has any extra burden been thrown on the road beyond its ordinary and normal use?

ary use.

In Wallington v. Hookins the question turned on what is the ordinary and normal use of a highway. The justices had found that the traffic was not extraordinary, but that the weight of the traffic was excessive, and that the expense of the repairs was extraordinary. The Queen's Bench Division held that, upon the evidence, the burden thrown on the road was not beyond the ordin"Regard being had," said Lord Coleridge, C.J., "to the character of the district, and of its industry, and to the form of wagon in use, I do not think that the weights are excessive. If the district were au agricultural district they would probably be so; but when once it is allowed that the production of the stones is the recognized industry of the district, and that it is carried on in the usual manner, I think that the weight cannot be called excessive within the meaning of the Act."

The evil which the section was intended to remedy was the great expense caused in repairing roads during the construction of a railway or other public undertaking; and in these cases, even though quarrying of stones is a "recognized industry" of the district, it is clear that the unusual and sudden increase of traffic over the roads will bring the contractors within the section.

THE EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY

ACT.

THIS Act comes into operation to-day. The circumstances under which it was passed, and the doctrine of English law which gave rise to the necessity for it, will be known to our readers. We have on various occasions discussed this topic in relation to then future legislation. The measure that on those occasions was in fieri is now in esse, and the question arises how far the legislation of last session on this subject is satisfactory. We cannot say that the statute is a good piece of workmanship so far as its expression or arrangement are concerned. It bears on the face of it the marks of being a compromise. Its expressions are loose and unscientific. appears to give in one section it takes away in another, and the general impression left on the mind of the reader is one of clumsiness and obscurity.

What it

The provisions of the Act are confined, it should be premised, to railway servants and persons to whom the Employers' and Workmen Act, 1875, applies. This excludes menial servants from the operation of the Act, and probably various other kinds of servants. We do not quite understand why, if the principle of the Act is just, all servants should not have the benefit of it. Menial servants, however, are not a political power as the operatives are.

The 1st sub-section of section 1 provides that when the injury to a workman is caused "by reason of any defect in the condition of the ways, works, machinery, or plant connected with or used in the business of the employer," there shall be the same right of compensation and remedies against the employer "as if the workman had not been a workman of nor in the service of the employer, nor engaged in his work." Sub-section 1 of section 2 entirely alters the effect of the preceding section. It enacts that "under sub-section 1 of section 1, unless the defect therein mentioned arose from, or had not been discovered or remedied owing to, the negligence of the employer, or of some person in the service of the employer, and intrusted by him with the duty of seeing that the ways, works, machinery, or plant were in proper

condition," no right of compensation shall arise. This is obviously a very defective species of legislation. The qualification introduced by the 2nd section is not really in the nature of a proviso or exception, and the limitation therein contained ought to have formed part of the same enactment which creates the liability. The 3rd sub-section of section 2 further limits the operation of the previous section. It enacts that there shall be no compensation "in any case where the workman knew of the defect or negligence which caused the injury, and failed within a reasonable time to give, or cause to be given, information thereof to the employer, or some person superior to himself in the service of the employer, unless he was aware that the employer or such superior already knew of the said defect or negligence.' To some extent it would appear that these provisions only affirm the common law. The employer was always held liable for defective machinery, &c., when there was personal negligence on his part. The law, however, is altered in so far as the employer is made responsible for the neglect in this respect of any person in his service, and intrusted by him with the duty of seeing that the ways, works, machinery, or plant were in proper condition. The liability thus entailed is very sweeping in respect of certain enterprizes, such as collieries. There will be very difficult questions of fact as to what amounts to an intrusting with the duty of seeing that the ways, &c., are in proper condition. The master will not only be made liable for the negligence of persons in the position of superintendents or managers, but for the misconduct of very subordinate and inferior servants. It must frequently be the case that the duty of seeing that some part of the plant is in proper condition is inevitably intrusted, to some extent, to persons of inferior position. The idea involved in some of the arguments heretofore used on the subject is that the negligence of persons who are in the nature of vice-masters should render the master responsible. There is some justice in this idea. There are matters which, it may be said, the master ought to look to himself, or as to which, if he delegates his functions, he ought to be responsible for his delegate. The difficulty is to define what has been called a vicemaster. But the provisions we are discussing go far beyond any such idea. Again, the provision which enables the servant, though he knew of the defect, to throw the liability on the employer, if he gives notice of the defect to any person superior to himself in the service of the employer, is one of a very vague and uncertain nature. One difficult question that will arise will be who is a person "superior to himself." The person may be so slightly superior that very little protection will thereby be afforded to the employer.

66

The 2nd sub-section of section 1 makes the employer responsible for injuries caused to workmen by reason of the negligence of any person in his service "who has any superintendence intrusted to him while in the exercise of such superintendence." The definition given, by section 8, of a person I who has any superintendence intrusted to him" is "a person whose sole or principal duty is that of superintendence, and who is not ordinarily engaged in manual labour." This seems to be an attempt at a definition of the "vice-master," to whom we have before alluded. How far such definition will prove successful, time alone can show. It will, however, it is pretty obvious, give rise to troublesome questions of fact. The proviso contained in sub-section 3 of section 2 also applies to this sub-section of section 1, and consequently if the workman knows of, but gives information of, the negligence of the superintendent to the employer, or to any person superior to himself in the service of the employer, the employer is responsible. This seems to involve an absurdity in some cases. The negligence may be that of the manager of the concern, intrusted with plenary power over all the men employed. If the workman injured tells any one, however slightly superior to himself in the service of the employer, though

such person would no more dare to complain to the employer or the manager than the workman himself, the employer is to be liable.

An important question will arise as to all the subsections of section 1. They all refer to an injury caused to a workman "by reason of," &c. How far is the doctrine of contributory negligence left open on this phraseology? An accident may be the result of the negligence of two parties, that of the person for whom the employer is responsible, and that of the workman himself. It would appear that the question of contributory negligence will be open in all the cases to which the Act refers except, perhaps, in some cases under the 3rd sub-section of section 1, to which we shall hereafter refer. The effect of the 3rd sub-section of section 2 would appear to be that if the workman knew of the defect or negligence, and failed to give the information to his employer or superior as required by the section, he will not be entitled to recover, quite apart from the question of contributory negligence. In other words, the question for a jury will be whether he knew of the defect, &c., and failed to give the information; not generally whether he was guilty of contributory negligence.

us is that in many places railway servants constitute a formidable voting power.

The 3rd section limits the amount of compensation recoverable to such sum as may be found equivalent to the estimated earnings, during the three years preceding the injury, of a person in the same grade employed during those years in the like employment and in the district in which the workman was employed at the time of the injury. It was obvious that the man's own earnings could not be taken as the limit, because he might have been out of work a considerable part of the three years. This provision is most anomalous. If the principle of the Act is right, this limitation cannot be founded in justice. It reads like

Sub-section 3 of section 1 makes the employer liable in respect of injuries caused to workmen "by reason of the negligence of any person in the service of the employer to whose orders or directions the workman at the time of the injury was bound to conform, and did conform, where such injury resulted from his having so conformed." Our notion of the meaning of this sub-section is that it is meant to protect the workman in cases where he is ordered to do some dangerous act, or incur some obvious risk, by a superior whose orders he cannot practically resist without the probability of dismissal. We doubt, therefore, whether the doctrine of contributory negligence would here apply, at least so far as the mere incurring of the risk in conformity with the orders goes. Let us take an illustration. A workman is ordered by his superior in the service to work in some place where there is danger from unfenced machinery. Assuming that it is not negligence on the part of the superior to give him the order, by the common law he could not recover, for two reasons: the negligence (if any) would be the negligence of a fellow-servant, and he himself would voluntarily

incur the risk. Our idea is that the Act was meant to meet such a case as this, but the language is somewhat clumsy, and difficult questions may arise upon it.

a

confession that the principle of the Act is very doubtful. Section 4 provides for the period of limitation. The remaining sections relate to matters of procedure with regard to the mode of recovering compensation. There appears to be no provision preventing the workman from contrac ting himself out of the Act. The result has been that, in many cases, the workman has already done so.

THE JUDICIAL STATISTICS.

DIVISIONAL COURT OF APPEAL. BEFORE the Divisional Court there were during the year 4 special cases, 2 of which were argued. The special cases filed under 20 & 21 Vict. c. 43, were 71, of which 32 were argued. There were also 30 appeals from county courts, 2 only of which were argued, one decision being affirmed, and one reversed. There were also 4 appeals from the Lord Mayor's Court, 3 from the Court of PasIn 59 other appeals, by way of motion, orders nisi were sage, Liverpool, and 3 from the Salford Hundred Court. granted, 13 of which were made absolute, and 10 discharged.

THE COURT Of Appeal.

The total number of appeals from final judgments awaiting a hearing at the commencement of the year was 183; during the year 286 were set down, making 469 appeals from final orders. During the year 224 were heard, and 46 otherwise disposed of, leaving 199 awaiting a hearing at the end of the year. In the previous year there were 127 of these appeals at its commencement, and 346 set down, making 473; 290 were heard or otherwise disposed of, and 183 were left.

The 4th sub-section of section 1 provides that the employer shall be liable in cases where injury is occasioned "by reason of the act or omission of any person in the service of the employer, done or made in obedience to the rules or bye-laws of the employer, or in obedience to particular instructions given by any person delegated with the authority of the employer in that behalf." Sub-section 2 of section 2 provides that the workman shall not be entitled to compensation unless the injury resulted from some impropriety in the rules, byelaws, or instructions; and that when the rule or bye-law has been approved by any department under any Act of Parliament, it shall not be deemed improper or defective for the purposes of the Act. Nice questions will arise as to whether the particular act or omission complained of was done or made in obedience to the rules or byelaws, or in obedience to the instructions of the employer's delegate; also as to when a person is delegated with the authority of the employers in that behalf. The 5th subsection of section 1 provides that the employer shall be liable in the case of injury caused to any workman "by reason of the negligence of any person in the service of the employers who has the charge or control of any signal, points, locomotive engine, or train upon a railway." Difficult questions will arise as to what is a "train." This last sub-section is a curious instance of legislation. It suddenly throws over all abstractions and makes an anomalous provision with regard to certain concrete cases. The observation that suggests itself to

Appeals from interlocutory orders waiting for hearing at the commencement of the year numbered 39. There were set down during the year 202; 196 were heard or otherwise disposed of, and 45 left at the end of the year. There were 61 original motions, of which 60 were heard or otherwise disposed of, and 1 left.

From the County Palatine of Lancaster there were 10 appeals; 6 being heard, and 4 remaining.

Privy Council in the year 1879 em determined numbered 73, and

From the Stannaries Court there were 7 appeals; 4 were heard or otherwise disposed of, and 3 remained.

prosecution. The number of the 1st of April, 1875, which rethe let of January, 1880, was 94. stared in appeals, in which the are taxed by the registrars, was

The appeals from the London Bankruptcy Court awaiting a hearing at the commencement of the year were 28, and 106 were set down during the year; 107 were heard or otherwise disposed of, leaving 27 awaiting a hearing at the end of the year.

and at Westminster on 127 days. The Court of Appeal sat at Lincoln's-inn on 187 days,

The following summary shows the whole work of the two divisions of the Court of Appeal during the year ending the 31st of October, 1879:

257

665

579

64

Appeals, both interlocutory and final, in
the lists at the beginning of the year
Set down during the year
Heard during the year
Otherwise disposed of
Awaiting a hearing at the end of the year 279

JUDICIAL COMmittee of the PRIVY COUNCIL.

Court of Chancery of England, ind and 40 from the Court of Sesthe same period 11 appeals were sed for want of prosecution. judgments delivered in 1879 was eard in the previous session and

and in 37 of these cases the below was affirmed. In 1878 the dgments, and 36 of these affirmed Only 18 effective causes remained of 1879. The total amount of

259 ccanty court circuits, but
absorbed in those adjoining them, 56

are beid at 499 places. The
erd in county courts in 1879 was
ere were besides 874 cases from
The cases determined numbered
were with a jury and 614,048
smmonses were issued to the
of which 76,856 were heard;
deminent were issued, and 6,246
Erations against goods were
es, and 5,536 sales made. The
paints were eutered was

t of debts recovered was
costs £13,070. The fees amount
pal of the foregoing figures
those of the previous year, with
tian, which in 1878, on the recovery of
in 1579. amounted to £119,620.
Fissed to arrest absconding
orders registered for protection of
their husbands. The average

The number of appeals entered for hearing before the

Under the county courts' admiralty
res 504 suite or proceedings, as
and 432 in 1875; 117 vessels were
vere 63 final decrees. The claims
and the costs allowed to £1,139.
action amounted to £919.
LONDON COURT.

Court there is still an increase
entered were 22,712 in 1879,

2, and 11,739 in 1875. There
superior courts. 9,674 cases
24h came before a jury. In
x the judgment in favour of
there was a non-suit. Judg-
d to the number of 1,587,
beard: 217 warrants of commit-
debtors imprisoned; 4,206 exe-

Ped, and 63 sales

Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in the year 1879 was 64. The cases heard and determined numbered 73, and 16 were dismissed for non-prosecution. The number of appeals lodged since the 1st of April, 1875, which remained for hearing on the let of January, 1880, was 94. The total amount of costs taxed in appeals, in which the costs on one side only were taxed by the registrars, was £18,181.

HOUSE OF LORDS.

The return of the judicial proceedings of the House of Lords during the session of 1879 shows that there were 33 appeals from the Court of Chancery of England, 3 from that of Ireland, and 40 from the Court of Session, Scotland. During the same period 11 appeals were withdrawn, and 13 dismissed for want of prosecution.

The total number of judgments delivered in 1879 was 46, including causes heard in the previous session and standing for judgment, and in 37 of these cases the decision of the court below was affirmed. In 1878 the House delivered 53 judgments, and 36 of these affirmed the previous decisions. Only 18 effective causes remained at the end of the session of 1879. The total amount of fees was £1,884 15s.

COUNTY COURTS.

Formerly there were 59 county court circuits, but three having been absorbed in those adjoining them, 56 now remain, and courts are held at 499 places. The number of plaints entered in county courts in 1879 was 1,044,414, and there were besides 874 cases from superior courts. The cases determined numbered 615,127, of which 1,079 were with a jury and 614,048 without. Judgment summonses were issued to the number of 135,137, of which 76,886 were heard; 31,201 warrants of commitment were issued, and 6,246 debtors imprisoned. Executions against goods were issued in 223,203 cases, and 5,536 sales made. The total amount for which plaints were eutered was £3,380,734. The amount of debts recovered was £1,646,757, and of costs £13,070. The fees amount to £445,068. The principal of the foregoing figures are a slight increase on those of the previous year, with the exception of costs, which in 1878, on the recovery of a smaller amount than in 1879, amounted to £119,620.

There were 22 warrants issued to arrest absconding debtors, and 791 orders registered for protection of wives deserted by their husbands. The average amount of each plaint was £3 4s. 8d., as against £3 4s. 9d. in 1878.

total amount for which plaints were issued was £132,567, and the sums for which judgment was obtained amounted to £45,717, the costs being £4,472. The fees on all proceedings were £13,518, and the court sat on 157 days.

Equity Proceedings.-There were only 15 equity proceedings in the City of London Court during the year, the subject-matter of which amounted to a total of £1,968. Admiralty Proceedings.-Under the admiralty jurisdiction of the City of London Court 168 suits or proceedings were commenced. The aggregate amount of the claims was £19,020, and the costs £1,378.

THE LORD MAYOR'S COURT, LONDON.

The number of actions entered in the Mayor's Court in 1879 was 14,016, showing a gradual increase from the year 1876, when the number was 8,548. The total amount for which actions were entered was £277,052. There were 470 foreign attachments issued for a total of £142,299. On the equity side of the court there were 6 bills of complaint filed in 1879, and 5 in 1878. The fees on all proceedings amounted to £7,041.

ECCLESIASTICAL COURTS.

The number of suits in the ecclesiastical courts in 1879 was 12, as against 13 in 1878. Five of these were in the Arches Court of Canterbury. Of the 12 suits 3 were under the Public Worship Act, 1874; 2 for granting a faculty, 3 for a monition, and 4 for other objects. Further, there were 288 suits for faculties, in 279 of

which faculties were decreed. The court fees in 1879 amounted to £1,289.

REVIEWS.

MORTGAGES.

A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MORtgage. By R. H. COOTE, Esq., Barrister-at-Law. FOURTH EDITION. By W. WYLLYS MACKESON, Esq., Q.C. Stevens & Sons ; H. Sweet; W. Maxwell & Son.

This is, as the editor observes, not so much a new edition as a new book. Coote has disappeared from reference in the dusty corner where Burton's Compendium the lawyer's shelves, or is only kept for occasional and Fearne on Contingent Remainders repose. Within the thirty years which have elapsed since the last edition was published, many branches of the law of mortgage have undergone complete change, and others, one may almost say, have been newly developed. Nor are these text-books has been radically altered. The modern the only causes for the disuse of Coote. The style of practitioner has become impatient of long-drawn state

ments of the facts of cases. He wants to have his text

CITY OF LONDON COURT.

In the City of London Court there is still an increase of business. The plaints entered were 22,712 in 1879, as against 21,163 in 1878, and 11,739 in 1875. There were also 9 cases from the superior courts. 9,674 cases were determined, 59 of which came before a jury. In 212 only of these cases was the judgment in favour of the defendant, and in 237 there was a non-suit. Judgment summonses were issued to the number of 1,587, and 691 of these were heard; 217 warrants of commitment were issued, and 15 debtors imprisoned; 4,206 executions of goods were issued, and 63 sales made. The

as comprehensive as possible, and as terse as possible. He looks for the effect of a decision, not for a report of a decision; for in these days of cheap law reports and numerous public law libraries, he has little difficulty in finding a report of any case he may wish to

examine in detail.

Mr. Mackeson has adapted his book with considerable skill to these modern notions. He has spread his net erty, including, besides mortgages of all kinds, properly over every branch of the subject of securities upon propso called, judgments, liens, and pledges. While retaining Mr. Coote's general arrangement of the subject, he has cut out the long statements of cases, and his additions are always tersely expressed. As far as conciseness of statement goes, the book could hardly be surpassed. Here and there, indeed, it is carried to the extent of disregarding the proprieties of style; see, for instance, the statement of Ex parte Parke (L. R. 18 Eq. 381), on p. 689, and the curious sentence on p. 451, with reference to order and disposition, "Similarly a custom of leaving goods sold in vendor's possession for convenience of vendee, as in case of pigs; whisky in bonded warehouse (and it is immaterial whether a

delivery order is given); tea warrants; hay; and pianos on hire and sale, takes case out of statute."

|

practice enables us to speak with some confidence of the excellence of its design, and of the execution as being, on the whole, careful and satisfactory. The present edition appears in a considerably enlarged form, and includes a large number of new forms. The precedents of agreements-one of the most useful sections of the book-do not, however, appear to have been increased in number, but we observe several substitutions. We do not understand why the precedent of an agreement to grant a lease of brickworks to a company should have been omitted. Some precedent of an agreement to grant a lease to a company ought to be inserted to make this part of the work complete. The common forms in memoranda of association and the forms of objects claus es have been considerably increased. The latter now embrace a very wide range, and are a curious index to the whims of the day. Thus we have now for the first time an object clause for coffee-taverns; and in his note Mr. Palmer says that during the last eighteen months scarcely a week has passed without the formation of more than one coffee-tavern company. The temperance music-hall object clause is another novelty. The oyster and mussel company has disappeared from the list, but we observe with surprise that the skating-rink still remains, notwithstanding that these institutions have ceased to enjoy popular favour. Both as regards memoranda and articles, we are glad to observe increased attention paid to the "private company, which now occupies so much of the attention of the company draftsman. Forms 82 and 83, though they do not cover nearly all the variations which have been adopted as regards the transfer of shares in such companies, will furnish a good basis for working upon.

With regard to the author's mode of treatment of the subject, the chapter relating to the consolidation of securities affords a fair illustration. This is contained in about twelve pages. After defining the difference between consolidation and tacking, the author deals with the case of one mortgagor and one mortgagee, and then proceeds to the case of a transferee of the two mort. gages, and subsequently to the case where the equities of redemption are in different persons. He then discusses the question of the union of the mortgages; and here, we think, with all our liking for Mr. Mackeson's brevity of statement, a little more space might well have been devoted to Lord Justice Cotton's admirable judgment in the recent case of Mills v. Jennings (28 W. R. 549, L. R. 13 Ch. D. 639); or, if this could not be spared, the result of that case might have been better stated, in the words of the Lord Justice, as being that the purchaser of an equity of redemption "is not subject to any equity arising from acts done by his vendor subsequently to the sale, and, therefore, as against a purchaser of an equity of redemption of an estate, there can be no consolidation of a mortgage subsequently created on another estate." On the other hand, the effect of Cummins v. Fletcher (28 W. R. 272, L. R. 14 Ch. D. 699) could hardly be better stated than it is by Mr. Mackeson in his next sentence-" The right to consolidate does not apply where there has been no default in respect of one of the securities." Throughout this chapter we find all the decisions cited and stated with clearness; and at the end (as in many other places in the volume) the author gives a summary of the law on the subject in a series of propositions. In some respects the chapter might, perhaps, have been better arranged, but it constitutes an excellent practical digest of the law on the consolidation of mortgages. A similar remark applies to the other parts of the book which we have examined. The chapter on the Bills of Sale Acts is a good specimen of clear and careful statement, the simple device of indicating the alterations made by the Act of 1878 in italics saving a great deal of explanation.

One of the least satisfactory parts of the previous edition was that relating to debentures. We are glad to observe that many of the precedents have been greatly improved, possibly (though we cannot bo certain on this point) by access to precedents which owe their origin to the ingenuity of two draftsmen who devoted much care to this subject, one of whom is now on the bench and the other has become an eminent Queen's Counsel.

The omissions we have come across are few and slight. In the sections relating to the attornment clause and power of distress, some reference should have been made to the provisions of section 6 of the Bills of Sale Act, 1878; and to the statement on p. 245, that under the Bankruptcy Rule 28 of 1871, the leave of the court must be obtained for a disclaimer, there should have been added a reference to the recent case of Reed v. Harvey (28 W. R. 423), in which it was held that a disclaimer of a leasehold interest by a trustee is operative, though no application for leave has been made to the court. The book is dated November, 1880, so that no reference could be given to the recent case of Barrow v. Manning (ante, p. 95), in which the Court of Appeal exploded many of the notions as to oppressive and irregular sales by a mortgagee under a power of sale, which were set on foot by Robertson v. Norris (1 Giff. 421, 443) and other cases; but we observe that Mr. Mackeson has stated the doctrine laid down by these cases with due caution on p. 231.

LE OFFENDERS.

de report of the Manchester Juvenile
Committee.

that they are of opinion-

to imprison in common gaola
ps under fourteen years of age
pt in very grave cases.
provide for the proper treatment
arrest or when under remand, or
she should be established in populous
of detention, with separate wards
and with proper arrangements for
and instruction of the inmates.
special places of detention' are not
befal (with the sanction or under
Setary of State for the Home Depart-

trial schools, certified reforma.
<rater quitable institutions as such places
the proper regulations for the purpose.

ambie to make the minimum age for ase of certified industrial schools eight aried reformatory schools twelve years. mer to enable magistrates to deal satisamcons classes of juvenile offenders who it is desirable, where the offender the power to inflict a fine of not exceed male to order not more than six strokes and and, where the offender is a young the power to inflict a fine of not exceeding order not more than twelve strokes dwerend the punishment of birching to by mier kxteen years of age for non-indictable Catish imprisonment in a common gaol as committal of a juvenile offender

A siruatury school.

< niet birch should only be given by stendiary magistrate, and that, in or guardian of the offender the order, and should have the right y juvenile sentenced to be birched

by a medical officer, who shall certify punishment

4 dien be of great assistance to magis or guardan of a juvenile offender in the charge, and that it is, therefore, summon the parent or guardian 4me to give to magistrates power to or guardian, or other friend of a ju y his future good conduct, or to ment when called upon, and that it is, Petat power be given to take such rea pride the processes for effectually es4 ses parental neglect or misconduct das, the court should have power to person who causes the offence as well

Nearly half the book now consists of forms of orders relating to companies. The orders and precedents in winding up have been enormously increased in number, and are now a most complete collection, covering the proceedings at every stage. Forms of orders in actions and proceedings by and against companies (as, for instance, in actions for rescission of contracts obtained by misrepresentation, and against promoters and directors in respect of secret profits) are a new feature in this edition, as also are the forms of orders and precedents in proceedings for arrangements under the Act of 1870. Mr. Palmer has also added nine precedents of private Acts. It will be seen that the scope of the work has been largely increased. The notes, as in the former edition, are practical, and, so far as we have tested the additions, we have found them, generally speaking, reliable. Some few of the notes in the former edition were a little incautious, but this carnot be said of the observations we have examined in the present edition. Thus, under the new form, under Memoranda of Association, relating to the purchase by a company of its own shares, Mr. Palmer says that the better opinion is that, as a purchase involves a reduction of capital, it can only be effected with the sanction of the court given pursuant to the Acts of 1867 and 1877. We have always, notwithstanding Hope v. International Society (25 W. R. 203, L. R. 4 Ch. D. 327), considered this very doubtful, and should have thought that Mr. Palmer would have treated it, as Mr. Buckley dɔes, as a quære. The judgment of the Court of Appeal a few days ago, in In re The Dronfield Silkstone Company (ante, p. 155), appears to have disposed of this "better opinion."

We think that the book will be found a very valuable addition to the practitioner's library. Considering the wide range, and the difficulty, of the subject, Mr. Mackeson may be congratulated on the success with which he has converted an old and rather long-winded text-book into a complete, terse, and practical treatise for the modern lawyer.

COMPANY PRECEDENTS.

COMPANY PRECEDENTS FOR USE IN RELATION TO COMPANIES
SUBJECT TO THE COMPANIES ACTS, 1862 To 1880. With
Copious Notes. By FRANCIS BEAUFORT PALMER, Bar-
rister-at-Law. SECOND EDITION. Stevens & Sons.
Use of the first edition of Mr. Palmer's book in

le fender, and, further, that, as many
by jareniles through want, arising
e court should have power to pro-
W parents for gross neglect of family,
dependents may have become chargeable

We to give to courts of assize and
ad quarter sessions power, in cases
them, to commit juvenile offenders
ty and certified industrial schoole,
- power to deal with juvenile
be dealt with summarily.
charged with larceny ought to be con-
every such offender should be
Sistemeanor only, and that the
Cenas larceny by a court of sum
Marge quarters of industry, the
remove one source of juvenile delin-
ass of the Elementary Education
e made applicable to England and
ended that any officer of a school

ace committee shall have power
tres any juveniles under the specified

JUVENILE OFFENDERS.

THE following is the report of the Manchester Juvenile Offenders' Executive Committee.

The committee report that they are of opinion-"1. That the power to imprison in common gaols children and young persons under fourteen years of age should be abolished, except in very grave cases.

"2. That, in order to provide for the proper treatment of juvenile offenders on arrest or when under remand, or after committal, there should be established in populous places special places of detention,' with separate wards for males and females, and with proper arrangements for the regular occupation and instruction of the inmates.

3. That, where special places of detention' are not provided, it should be lawful (with the sanction or under the orders of the Secretary of State for the Home Department) to use certified industrial schools, certified reformatory schools, or other suitable institutions as such places of detention under proper regulations for the purpose.

4. That it is desirable to make the minimum age for committal in the case of certified industrial schools eight years, and of certified reformatory schools twelve years. 5. That, in order to enable magistrates to deal satisfactorily with the various classes of juvenile offenders who are brought before them, it is desirable, where the offender is a child, to retain the power to inflict a fine of not exceeding 40., or (if a male) to order not more than six strokes with the birch rod, and, where the offender is a young person, to retain the power to inflict a fine of not exceeding £10, or (if a male) to order not more than twelve strokes with the birch rod; to extend the punishment of birching to male offenders under sixteen years of age for non-indictable offences, and to abolish imprisonment in a common gaol as a prior condition of the committal of a juvenile offender to a certified reformatory school.

"6. That an order to birch should only be given by two justices or by a stipendiary magistrate, and that, in every case, the parent or guardian of the offender should be informed of the order, and should have the right to be present. That every juvenile sentenced to be birched should first be examined by a medical officer, who shall certify that be is fit for such punishment.

7. That it would often be of great assistance to magis trates to have the parent or guardian of a juvenile offender in court on the bearing of the charge, and that it is, therefore, desirable to enact power to summon the parent or guardian in all such cases.

8. That it is desirable to give to magistrates power to accept from the parent or guardian, or other friend of a juvenile offender, a surety for his future good conduct, or to bring him up for judgment when called upon, and that it is, therefore, recommended that power be given to take such recognizances, and to provide the processes for effectually estreating them when necessary.

"9. That, as in many cases parental neglect or misconduct conduces to the offence, the court should have power to proceed against the person who causes the offence as well as against the juvenile offender, and, further, that, as many offences are committed by juveniles through want, arising from parental neglect, the court should have power to pro ceed against either or both parents for gross neglect of family, whether or not the dependents may have become chargeable to the parish.

10. That it is desirable to give to courts of assize and to courts of general and quarter sessions power, in cases which are brought before them, to commit juvenile offenders to certified reformatory and certified industrial schools, and generally all and every power to deal with juvenile offenders as they might be dealt with summarily.

11. That no child charged with larceny ought to be convicted of felony, but that every such offender should be deemed to be guilty of a misdemeanor only, and that the offence should be punishable as larceny by a court of summary jurisdiction.

12. That in order to remove one source of juvenile delinquency, more especially in large quarters of industry, the casual employment clauses of the Elementary Education (Scotland) Act, 1878, be made applicable to England and Wales. It is also recommended that any officer of a school oard or of a school attendance committee shall have power to remove from the streets any juveniles under the specified

age who are found engaged in casual employment during illegal hours, and to convey them to a suitable place of detention, not being a prison or a police cell, for the night, unless they be claimed in the meantime by their parents or guardians.

"13. That, in order to recognize more fully the legal duty of parental responsibility, the maximum contribution from parents towards the maintenance of their children in certified industrial and certified reformatory schools should be raised from five shillings to seven shillings per week, the actual average cost of such detention, and that the amount to be levied in each case should be determined by the court at the time of the committal of the offender.

"14. That a certain number of justices should be annually selected at quarter sessions to serve as ex-officio members on the committee of each certified reformatory and certified industrial school situated in their division.

15. That, where special places of detention are not provided, it would often be useful to commit to reformatory and industrial schools for short terms, and that it is desir able that power be given to commit, in such cases, for any short term, at the discretion of the magistrates.

made for the reception, in some public institution, of juve"16. That it is further desirable that provision should be nile offenders who, by reason of disease, of physical or of mental weakness, or of a confirmed criminal disposition, are not now received into certified reformatory or certified industrial schools."

The committee generally advise that the utmost possible freedom of action and of choice of punishment should be and that it is important that the statute law with respect to accorded to magistrates in dealing with juvenile offenders, be revised and amended so as to bring it into agreement certified reformatory and certified industrial schools should with such of the above recommendations as may be adopted by Parliament.

LEGAL APPOINTMENTS.

Lord Justice BAGGALLAY has been elected an Honorary Fellow of Caius College, Cambridge.

Mr. ISAAC NEWTON EDWARDS, solicitor, of St. Albans, has been appointed a Perpetual Commissioner for Hertfordshire, for taking the Acknowledgments of Deeds by Married Women.

Mr. WILLIAM THOMAS HAMLIN, solicitor (of the firm of Hamlin & Grammer), of 7 and 3, Staple-inn, and also of minister Oaths in the Supreme Court of Judicature. Gunnersbury, has been appointed a Commissioner to ad

Mr. ARTHUR HUGHES, solicitor, of Aberystwith, has been elected Town Clerk of that borough. Mr. Hughes was admitted a solicitor in 1870.

Mr. JOHN PATRICK MURPHY, Q.C., who has been appointed a Commissioner of Assize for the Midland Circuit, was called to the bar at the Middle Temple in Michaelmas Term, 1856. He became a Queen's Counsel in 1874, and practises on the South-Eastern Circuit. He is a bencher of the Middle Temple.

Mr. ALFRED WILLS, Q.C., who has been appointed a Commissioner of Assize for the Oxford Circuit, is the son of the late Mr. William Wills, solicitor, of Birmingham. He was educated at University College, London, and graduated B.A. at the University of London in 1849. He was called to the bar at the Middle Tempie in Michaelmas Term, 1851. Mr. Wills became a Queen's Counsel in 1872, and is now a member of the North-Eastern Circuit. He was appointed recorder of Sheffield a few months ago, and he is a bencher of the Middle Temple, a member of the Incorporated Council of Law Reporting, and examiner in common law and the law of evidence at the University of London.

Mr. WILLIAM WEBB, solicitor, of Morpeth, has been elected Clerk to the Chevington Local Board.

Mr. HERCULES CAMPBELL YATES, solicitor, of Macclesfield, has been elected (after a poll) to be Coroner for the Eastern Division of Cheshire, in succession to the late Mr. Jolin Edward Garside, of Congleton.