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of this number 186,806 were discharged on termination of their sentence, others were removed to Government and other prisons, reformatory schools, and lunatic asylums; 2,006 were let out on bail, 6 escaped, 12 committed suicide, 178 died, and 15 were executed. At the end of the year 18,979 remained in prison, of whom 298 are classed as debtors. Those remaining at the end of the year were 189 less than at the end of the previous year. The greatest number of prisoners under confinement at one time was 24,107, and the daily average 19,818. Prisoners committed to hard labour numbered 134,199, showing an increase as compared with 1878 of 7,573. The number of deaths in prison from natural causes was 178, showing an increase of 10. There were 143,764 cases of slight indisposition, 4,407 infirmary cases, and 163 cases of insanity. In the total of these three items there is an increase of about 39,000 over the number of the previous year, and chiefly under the heading of " Slight indisposition."

Punishments for infraction of prison discipline were inflicted in 49,684 cases, classified as follows :— Corporal punishment . . . 121 Punishment cells .... 2,320 Dietary punishment . . . 24,693 Loss of stage or privilege . . . 22,550


This number of punishments exhibits a decrease of 9,628 as compared with the previous year.

Prison Establishments. m OfHcersof local prisonsnumbered 2,202, classified as follows :—Governors and deputy governors, 88; chaplains and assistant chaplains, 97; surgeons and assistant surgeons, 72; clerks, schoolmasters, and schoolmistresses, 205 ; matrons, 56; warders, 1,313; and other sub-officers, 371. The total number gives an average of one officer to 8'9 of the daily average of prisoners, being the same proportion as in the previous year.

Cost or Local Prisons. In the cost of local prison establishments the principal headings are for "Cost of staff," £221,668 16s. 4d.; "Maintenance of prisoners," £164,742 16s. 7d.; and "Other expenses," £36,437 16s. lid. To these sums should be added £2,216 0s. 4d. for rates and contributions in lieu of rates paid by the Treasury, and £5,920, the value of the printing, books, and stationery supplied by the Stationery Office, bringing up the gross total of the cost of local prisons to £430,985 10s. 2d. This sum does not include pensions to prison officers, which are payable partly by the prison authorities and partly by the Treasury. In 1877 the sum paid for pensions was £22,442 6s. 5d. Allowing for this, the cost shows an increase of £2,273 0s. 9d. on the cost of the previous year, and a decrease of £70,363 4s. 4d. from the cost of local prisons in 1876-7. The average charge per prisoner was £21 14s. fid. During the last twelve years the highest average cost per prisoner was £27 8s. -Id., and the lowest £21 12s. 7d.

The value of prisoners' labour in all local prisons was £151,931 ; in the previous year the value was £115,708.

Convict Prisons. The returns relating to convict prisons, which are for the year ending the 31st of March, 1880, show that at the commencement of the year 10,354 persons were undergoing sentence, and that 1,740 were received during the year, making a total of 12,094. During the year 7 were removed to county and borough prisons, 29 to lunatic asylums, 228 were discharged on termination of their sentence, 1,518 on licence, 9 on medical grounds, and 38 on receiving a free pardon; besides these there were 113 who died, and 5 who committed suicide. These make a total of 1,947, and leave 10,378 remaiuing in prison at the end of the year. Among the punishments awarded to convicts for prison offences, it appears that

56 received corporal punishment, 192 were sent to punishment cells, and 11,816 were punished by reduction of diet, and 6,835 by loss of class. The establishments of the convict prisons show a collective total of prison officials of 1,731, consisting of 27 governors, deputy governors, lady superintendents, and deputy superintendents, 25 ministers of religion, 69 schoolmasters and mistresses, 21 medical officers, 11 stewards, 81 clerks, and 1,497 subordinate officers, servants, and guards.

The total cost of convict prisons during the year amounted to £357,126 19s. 6d., being an average ox £33 4s. 3d. per head, and an increase of 14s. 7d. as compared with the amount for the previous year. Convict labour for the year is valued at £214,583 2s. 2d., and the incidental receipts amounted to £1,470 14s. 5d., and deducting these amounts the net cost of convict prisons was £141,073 2s. lid., and the net annual cost per prisoner £13 2s. 5d. In the previous year the net annual cost per prisoner, after deductions, was £12 10s. 8d.

Reformatory Schools.

In the whole of England and Wales there are 54 reformatory schools to which, during the year 1878-9,. 1,250 offenders were committed, being less by 334 than in the preceding year. At the commencement of thev year the total number in reformatory schools was 4,883, and to this number we add the 1,250 committed during the year, 24 received from other schools, 10 from prison, 16 re-admitted after absconding, and 101 returned from licence or leave of absence; making a total of 6,284 remaining in custody at the end of the year. These were dealt with as follows:—139 were discharged byorder from the Secretary of State, 433 on completion o£ their term, 756 were permitted out on licence or leave of absence, 36 absconded and were not re-taken, 15 were committed to prison for refractory eonduct, 25 were removed to other schools, and 42 died; making a total of 1,446, and leaving 4,838 in detention at the end of the year, or 45 more than at the commencement. Of those committed during the year, 40 6 per cent, had been previously committed, 478 could neither read nor write, 672 could read or read and write imperfectly, 100 could read and write well, and none are classed under the heading " Superior instruction."

The total amount payable by the Treasury on account of reformatory schools for the year was £73,044 16s. 2d., being an increase upon the previous year of £293 0s. 6d. The amount recovered from parents was £6,306 8s. 4d.,. being an increase of £609 3s.

Criminal Lunatics. Criminal lunatics under detention in the several asylums, hospitals, and licensed houses, during the year, numbered 851, of whom 528 were at Broadmoor State Asylum, and 249 at county asylums. Under the Act of. 30 Vict. c. 12, pursuant to which criminal lunatics, whose term of punishment has expired, are not afterwards to be considered as criminals, but are to be treated as pauper lunatics, 99 lunatics ceased during the year to be considered as criminals. Of these 851 criminal lunatics it appears, that 670 were under detention at the commencement of the year, 177 were committed during the year and 4 received from other asylums, 38 were discharged or removed, 4 escaped, 28 became sane, 4 were removed sane for trial or punishment, and 4 were removed to other asylums. Deducting these and the 99 who ceased to be criminals, there were 674 remaining at the end of the year. Ten years ago there were 604. The total cost of criminal lunatics was £29,923, which was contributed as follows:—£2,587 out of county rates, £656 from borough funds, £9,376 from union or parish rates, £16,015 from the public revenues, and £1,289 from private funds. The average cost per head of criminal lunatics at Broadmoor was £47 17s. Cd., as against £53 13s. 7d. iu 1878. For the 47 county asylums the average cost per head for 1879 was £25 16s. lid. as ngaiust £26 5s. 5d. in the preceding year.


CRIMINAL LAW. A Sketch Op The Criminal Law. By W. Sherley

Shirley, Barrister-at-Law. Stevens & Sons.

Notwithstanding the publication of Mr. Justice Stephen's "Digest," there is Btill t'an opening for a .portable, but compendious, Manual of Criminal Law for the use of students. The present work, however, appears from the preface to be designed less for the use of law students than for that of "every intelligent citizen." The author appears to think that criminal law is a subject that should be learned very early in life, for he iopes " that some of those excellent middle-class colleges and grammar-schools which, moving with the Times, have already done so much service by diverting attention from dead languages, decayed philosophies, and other branches of useless learning, may take the matter up, and introduce the criminal law into their curriculum." We fear that the work is too much of a "sketch" to be of great value to those students who have got beyond the stage of the grammar-school, although the definitions of the various crimes appear to be, for the most part, accurately stated, and the work is written in an easy and pleasant style. In some cases, •however, Mr. Shirley's language is not very happily chosen. Thus, at p. 35, he states that "involuntary manslaughter is committed by a person who, while doing -an unlawful act not amounting to a felony, or by his gross and wicked negligence, causes death." The suggestion that negligent acts causing death cannot constitute manslaughter unless they are "gross and wicked" it somewhat startling, but a few lines further on the definition seems to be modified, for we find it stated that, "as to manslaughter by negligence, it has been said that whatever constitutes murder, when done intentionally, constitutes manslaughter when done by culpable negligence." No doubt the limits of the work render it impracticable to introduce all the necessary qualifications to the author's general definitions and propositions. The "fourth and most extensive part of the book, which is headed "Practice," is, perhaps, the most valuable part of the volume, though, unlike the first three parts, it appears to err somewhat on the side of discursiveness, since it ■comprises not only magisterial procedure and the forms of indictment, but also the rules of criminal evidence aDd questions as to the responsibility of children and oarried women. We may observe that, in dealing with the case of a witness upon whose conscience the presiding judge is satisfied that the taking of an oath would have no binding effect, Mr. Shirley states that " such person may give evidence on his promising to tell the truth." This statement of the practice would hardly lead the student to suppose that the 32 & 33 Yict. c. 68, s. 4, provides a special form of "promise and declaration" for such cases, while we cannot find any reference •to the provision in section 20 of the Common Law Procedure Act, 1854, for the making of an affirmation by a person who has a conscientious objection to taking an oath. We are somewhat puzzled with the statement in the preface that the author has referred as frequently as possible to the cases reported "in the two volumes of Crown Cases Reserved, since those cases may well be considered the leading cases in criminal law." If this refers to the volumes that are cited as L. B. 1 C. C. B. -and LR.2C. C. B., it is difficult to understand why the years 1865-75 should be taken to represent a specially-important epoch in the development of English criminal law.

PUBLIC WORSHIP. The Laws Relating To Religious Liberty And Public Worship. By John Jenkins, Esq., Registrar of County Courts. Hodder & Stoughton. This is not, as the title might at the present time lead

one to suppose, a treatise on the Public Worship Act or ecclesiastical law, but an outline of the law of charitable uses, and of the general law relating to the conveyance and enjoyment of public places for religious worship, especially as applicable to Dissenting worship. This is prefaced by an historical sketch of the rise and progress of religious liberty in England, which does not fall within our province. The summary of the Charitable Uses Act and the amending Acts and decisions is concise, but fairly accurate, and the Acts relating to the protection of publio worship and the registration of Dissenting chapels are subsequently noticed. We would suggest that some information as to the decisions on the trust deeds of Dissenting chapels, and some observations as to the form of those deeds, would have been useful. Forms of trusts in Wesleyan, Congregational, Baptist, and Calvinistic Methodist chapel deeds are given. Two of these forms are, we observe, taken from the forms issued by chapel-building societies, and they will be useful for reference. Peto's Act and other Acts are printed in full in the appendix.


To Correspondents.—W. G. W. and R. S. Next week.

[To the Editor of the Solicitors' Journal.']

Sir,—A short time ago you published the last annual report of the Bristol Incorporated Law Society, and in some editorial remarks thereon drew attention to the part of the report setting out certain resolutions of the council, which they had passed and forwarded to the clerk to the sanitary authority, condemning the practice of the authority, on selling their surplus lands or salvages, of stipulating that their title be accepted without question or investigation, and that the purchaser is not to have any covenant for title or production of deeds; and stating the reply of the committee of the authority, " that no alteration be made in the conditions of sale."

Last week there was a sale by public auction here of twenty-eight lots of surplus lauds by the local sanitary authority under conditions of sale two of which are appended at foot, and which conditions are, in the opinion of the Law Council here, and the profession generally, unusual and unfair, and such as to prohibit trustees from investing in either the purchase of property so sold, or the ground-rents created thereon, or to lend trust moneys thereon.

The same sort of question has lately arisen at Sheffield under sales by the corporation there of surplus lands, arising from their street improvements, but there the corporation behaved in a far more liberal manner, for not only did their conditions of sale provide that " the title shall commence with, and consist of, the deed of conveyance thereof to the vendors, and the production of a Queen's Printer's copy of the Provisional Order and Act, together with the said deed of conveyance, shall be accepted as conclusive evidence of the title of the vendors," but the town clerk stated at the sale " that if any purchaser had doubts as to title, the corporation were perfectly willing to give absolute covenants for title against all the world." —[Sheffield Daily Telegraph, Oct. 13, 1880.]

The matter complained of appears to me to be of sufficient public aud professional importance to justify me in addressing you upon it. John- Miller.

Bristol, Dec. 14.

[The following are the conditions referred to :— "5. The vendors are the mayor, aldermen, and burgesses of the city of Bristol, being, by the council of the said city [sic], the urban sanitary authority for the district of the city and county of Bristol, and the property now offered for sale is part of the surplus portion of the property acquired under statutory powers for the purpose of public improvements. The vendors stipulate that no purchaser shall call for any abstract or for the production of their title, or of any deeds or writings, or shall investigate or make any objection or requisition in respect of such title, or the liability or tenancy (if any) subject to which the lot is sold, or, as regards lot 18, the reservation of minerals, but each purchaser Bhall admit, as regards all the lots, that the vendors are seised of the property sold, subject as aforesaid, in fee simple in possession both at law and in equity free from incumbrances, and as regards all the lots, that they have power to sell the same subject to these conditions, and such purchaser shall require no recital in the conveyance thereof, whether on fee-farm rent or absolutely, as to such seisin or otherwise, or as to any other matter, and no purchaser shall make any requisition in respect of any statement contained in this condition, nor require any evidence in support of suoh statement.

"9. The vendors will convey each lot with its legal and actual appurtenances only, without any general or other words, and they shall not be required to enter into any covenant for title or production of deeds or writings, except only a limited covenant thut they have not done or knowingly suffered anything to incumber, nor shall they be required to hand over to the purchaser any deeds or writings whatsoever."]


PracticeWrit Issued By Next FriendSolicitor Invalidity Op Proceedings.—In a case of Wood v. Swann, before the Master of the Rolls on the 3rd of December, a motion was made that the writ and all subsequent proceedings in the action might be set aside, with costs against the person who had issued the writ. It appeared that the writ had been issued by a gentleman purporting to be the next friend of a married woman and who was not a solicitor. Jessel, M.R., said that he had consulted with the registrar, who, like himself, had never heard that anyone not a solicitor or a plaintiff in person could issue a writ. He therefore mado the order asked for.—Solicitor, G. Thompson,

Troop In Bankruptcy Accommodation Bill Op. EichakoeDeposit As Security.—In a case of Ex parte Netclon, before the Court of Appeal, on the 9th inst., an important question arose as to the right of proof in bankruptcy in respect of an accommodation bill of exchange— viz., whether, when a bill has been accepted for the accommodation of the drawer, and it has been deposited by the drawer as security for a turn less than the amount of the bill, the holder is entitled to prove in the bankruptcy of the acceptor for tho full amount of the bill, or only for the amount of the debt to secure which it was deposited with him. Strange to say, there seems to have been scarcely any authority upon the point before the present decision. In Cooke's Bankrupt Law (8th ed.), p. 176, it is laid down that in such a case the holder can prove for the full amount of the bill, but that be cannot receive dividends in excess of the debt due to him by the drawer, the authority given for the statement being the case of Ex parte Slozham (6 Yea. 449, 600). It was in the first instance decided by Lord Kosslyn in Ex parte Eloxham (6 Ves. 448), that the proof must be limited to the amount of the debt, but the right of proof was afterwards extended by Lord Eldim in the later case of Ex parte Eloxham (6 Ves. 600). There is, however, a dictum of Hellish, L.J., rather to the contrary effect in In re GomertaU (24 W. B. 257, L. K. 1 Ch. D. 142). In the present case Bacon, C.J., held that the right of proof was limited to the amount of the debt seenred by the deposit. The appeal was argued in June last before Baggallay, Cotton, and Theiiger, L.J J., when the judgment of the court was reserved, and on the 9th inst., Cotton, L.J., delivered tho judgment of himself and Bagoallay, L.J. (which, after the death of Thesiger, L.J., the parties had agreed to accept), stating that he believed Thesiger, L. J., would have concurred in the decision. Their lordshipB were of opinion that the

bolder of the hill was entitled to prove for the full amount of it, but that he could not receive dividends beyond theamount due to him by the drawer. It was conceded, bis lordship said, that, if the bill had been accepted for value, the holder would have been entitled to prove for the larger amount, but it was urged that the fact of the acceptance being for the accommodation of the drawer made a difference. It was eaid, and trnly, that a man who had taken a bill from the drawer as security only wonld hold for the drawer any sum recovered from the acceptor beyond the amount due on his security, and that when the bill had been accepted for the accommodation of the drawer, the drawer would be liable to repay to the acceptor any part of the sum recovered from him which might be handed to the drawer by the holder. But the acceptor bad put it in the power of the drawer to make the hill in the bands of a holder for value available against the acceptor for its full amount, and, although tbs holder might have taken the bill as security for a sum less than its amount, their lordships were of opinion that he was entitled to make the bill available against the acceptor in the way which wonld best produce the sum due to him, and that, in the event of bankruptoy, he was entitled to prove against the acceptor's estate for the full amount of the bill. It had been argued that, if the acceptor bad not become bankrupt,, judgment in an action against him on the bill would have been confined to the amount due on the security thereof from the drawer. But, if the acceptor was solvent, a judgment against him wonld realize the full amount for which it was obtained, and, even if he was not solvent, the amount to be recovered on the judgment would, to au amount not exceeding the sum for which it was recovered, be limited only by the valne of his estate which could be realized under the judgment In case this was insufficient to pay the debt due to the holder of the bill, the amount which he would recover would not be increased by giving him judgment for a larger sum. Ex parte Bloxham, it it was not an authority in favour of the bill-holder (as their lordships thought it was), could not be regarded as au authority against him. —solicitors, Morley # SMrreff; hughes, Booker, <fc Co.; Williamson, Rill, A Co.

CompositionCreditor Omitted Prom Debtof.'s StateMent Op AffairsApplication After Beqisteation To Admit ProofBankruptcy Act, 1869, s. 126.—In a case of Ex parte Lacey, before the Court of Appeal on the 9th inst., thequestion arose whether after the registration of composition resolutions a creditor who was not named in the debtor's statement of affairs, and who was, therefore, as is expressly provided by section 126, not bonnd by the composition, and who had not taken any part in the meetings of the creditor.", could obtain from the court an order to admit a proof of his debt, and that the debtor shonld pay him the amount of the composition in respect of it. No trustee had been appointed for the receipt and distribution of the composition, and no eeourity had been given for its payment. Baoon, C.J., had made snch an order on the application of an omitted oreditor. And in support of the order it was urged that, as was decided by the Lords Justices in Ex parte Canw (23 W. B. 459, L. B. 10 Ch. 308), the provision of section 126, that creditors who are omitted from the debtor's statement are not bound by the composition, was inserted for the benefit of Buoh creditors, and can be waived by them if they elect to take the benefit of the composition, whioh may in some cases be more advantageous to them than their original right to sue the debtor; and it was suggested that a debtor might omit from his statement the names of creditors whom he did not wish to pay, and hand over all his assets to a trustee for the payment of those creditors who were mentioned in his statement, and so, when the omitted oreditors exeroised their right of sning him,, there might be nothing left to pay them. The court (james, Cotton, and Lush, L.JJ.), however, held that, on the registration of the resolutions, the composition proceedings came to an end, and that after that the court had no power to interfere, except in the mode pointed out by section 126—that is, by enforcing the provisions of the composition upon the motion of any person interested. The section provided for the correction of any mistake made inadvertently by a debtor in the statement of his debts, with., tho consent of a general meeting of his creditors, and, if there was a fraudulent omission, a sufficient remedy was given to • the omitted creditor by the power given to the oourt by the kit clause of section 126 to adjudge the debtor a bankrupt, if it should appear that the composition could not proceed without iojuetice or undue delay to the creditors. The court had no jurisdiction after the registration of the resolutions to enforce a merely personal demand of a creditor against the debtor, there being no assets to administer. The observations of Melliah, L.J., in Ex parte Oarew must be read with reference to the facts of the particular case, which were very different from those of the present case. There the debtor had mentioned in his statement of affairs a disputed claim against him for an alleged breach of trust, which was the subject of a pending chancery suit, and a fund had been placed in the hands of a trustee sufficient to pay the composition to all the creditors, including the estimated amount of the claim in the chaneery suit. And all that the court did wae to refuse an application by the debtor, made after the composition had been paid, to all the creditors but the claimant in the chancery suit (which suit was still pending), that the trustee should hand over to the debtor the balance remaining in his bands. And the observations of Lord Hatherley and Lord Blackburn in Breslauer v. Brown (2fi W. R 536, L. K. 3 App. Cas. 672) were to be explained in the same way, that is, as recognizing the right of an omitted creditor to apply to the Oourt of Bankruptcy for payment of the composition only during the pendency of the composition proceedings, which, in an ordinary case, meant before the registration of the resolutions. Leave to appeal to the House of Lords was refused.—Solicitors, John Evans S; Peacock; G. Sou Innes, cf Sen.

Debtor's SummonsJurisdiction Op CourtResidIng*Carrting On Business Bankruptct Roles, 1870, E. 17.—In a case of Ex parte Brettll, before the Court of Appeal on the 9th inst., a question arose with regard to the jurisdiction of the Court of Bankruptcy to issue a debtor's summons. Rule 17 of the Bankruptcy Rules of 1870 provides that "a debtor's summons may be granted by the London Bankruptcy Court, if the debtor Tttidm or carries on business within the district of that court." A debtor's summons was issued out of the London court against a person who was a clerk in a bank in the city of London, but who lived in one of the suburbs outside the district of the London court. The debt claimed had been contracted in the city. The debtor was described in the summons only by the address of the office ot the bank, and the summons was served upon him there. Mr. Registrar Hurray dismissed the summons as irregular, on the ground that the debtor did not reside within the district of the London court. The Court of Appeal (james, Cotton, and Lush, L.JJ.) held that tbe summons had been properly issued, on the ground that the debtor carried on business in the city of London. The object and intent of the rule, they said, was that the proceedings on the summons should take place in what might be called the debtor's natural forum, and a man might properly be said to carry on business at the place where he was occupied in an employment which was the business of his life. It was not necessary that he should be carrying on basiness as a principal. James, L.J., was also of opinion that the London court had jurisdiction, on the gronnd that the debtor might be fairly said to reside where he was to be found daily.—Solicitors, W. W. Wynne «fc Son; P. CHft.

Company"winding UpSecured CreditorExecuTion LEVIED AFTER PRESENTATION OF "WlNDING-UP PETITION—Judicature Act, 1875, s. 10—Bankruptcy Act, 1669, s. 87.—The important question of the construction of section 10 of the Judicature Act, 1875, upon which we commented last week (ante, p. Ill), came at length to be decided by the Court of Appeal, on the 13th inst., in a case of In re The Withernsea Brick Works, the result being tho affirmance of tbe view which we ventured to suggest of the proper construction of the section, and the overruling of the decision of Jessel, M.R., in In re Printing and Nunurical Roistering Company (26 W. R. 627, L. R. 8 Ch. D. 535). The facts were shortly these :—A judgment creditor for a sum exceeding £50 issued execution against the company, and the sheriff seized their goods. Before a sale had been effected, tbe company presented a winding-up petition. An order was then made in the action, restraining the creditor until further order from proceeding to enforce his

judgment, and the sheriff thereupon withdrew from possession. A winding-up order was made, and tbe judgment creditor applied in the winding up for leave to proceed with his execution. Malins, V.C., was of opinion that section 10 of the Judicature Act, 1875, did not operate to render section 87 of the Bankruptcy Act, 1869, applioable to the winding up of a company, and he ordered the liquidator to pay the amount due in respect of tho j udgment out of the first assets which should come to hist hands. This decision was affirmed by tbe Court of Appeal (james, Cotton, and Lush, L.JJ.). Jambs, L.J., was of opinion that the only object of section 10 was to introduce into the administration of the assets of a deceased person and the liquidation of a company the same rule, as between secured and unsecured creditors, as that which had prevailed in the administration in bankruptcy, and the fallacy of the view of the Master of the Rolls was in supposing that, because in bankruptcy a security was avoided under certain circumstances, the same result was intended to follow in the administration of assets and in a winding up. Section 10*1 contained no words avoiding any security. Section 87 dealt with the question what constituted the fund to be administered, not with the administration of the fund, and its provisions could no more be imported by means of section 10 into a winding up than could the bankruptcy law as to fraudulent preference, or order and disposition. When the) Act was passed there were different rules of administration in chancery and bankruptcy with regard to secured creditors, and the object of section 10 was to alter that, and make the rule the same in both jurisdictions. Cotton, L.J., said that the liquidator was seeking by his appeal, not to administer the assets of the company, but to bring into the assets that which, independently of section 87 of the Bankruptcy Act, or some other statutory enactment, would not be assets of the company at all. If the Master of the Rolls' view of section 10 was right, it would follow that the discretion given to the court by section 87 of the Companies Act, 1862, to allow a judgment creditor of a company to proceed to en. force 11 is judgment, after the making of a winding-up order, had been taken away altogether. And section 87 of the Bankruptcy Act did not purport to interfere with the rights of secured and unsecured creditors inter se, except in so far as its effect was to bring into the assets of the company something which would not otherwise belong to them. In his lordship's opinion, on the fair construction of section 10, its effect was to alter the rule of administration, not to alter the property which was to be administered. Lush, L.J., said that section 87 of the Bankruptcy Act was part of the Bankruptcy Code, and applied to a bankrupt trader; it had nothing to do with a company in liquidation. A winding-up order of itself put a stop to all proceedings against the company, though the Companies Act gave the court a discretionary power to allow the proceedings to go on. And the object of section 10 of the Judicature Act was to govern the administration of assets. Its whole object was that, when a secured creditor made a claim against the assets of a company in liquidation, he should be in the same position as a secured creditor who was making a claim against the assets of a bankrupt. In the present case, the creditor was making no claim to share in the assets of the oompany; he was only claiming the benefit of his security, and the court could give him leave to realize it.—Solicitors, Weed <fc White; Collyer-Bristow $ Co.

Costs Taxation Production er Documents ReFreshers To CounselDiscretion Op Taxing Master.— In a cose of Brown v. Sewell, before the Court of Appeal on the 15th inst., some important questions arose as to the taxation of costs. The first question was whether when a judge's ordeT is made in an action in tbe Chancery Division for the production of documents at the office of the producing party's solicitor, that party, if ultimately successful in the action, is entitled, as between party and party, to his solicitor's costs of the production, and whether under the same circumstances the successful party is entitled to his own costs of inspecting the documents of his adversary. In the present case the taxing master had given the defendant (tbe successful party) costs of production under both the above heads, and Bacon, V.C., had declined to interfere with his decision. The Court of Appeal (jessel, M.R., and Cotton and Lush, L.JJ.) held that the taxing master was wrong on both points. Jessel, M.R., said that under the old practice in the Court of Chancery the strict rule was that the inspecting party was entitled to have the documents of which production was ordered deposited at the Record and Writ Clerks' Office, and it was a matter of indulgence and convenience to the producing party to allow the documents to be produced at the office of his own solicitor. There would have been no costs of production at the Record and Writ Clerks' Office, and it was well settled in the Conrt of Chancery that the producing party could not make his opponent pay more costs for his own convenience. There was no reason for altering this rule now. But in consequence of the transfer of the Record and Writ Clerks' Office to the Central Office of the Royal Courts, some new rule might be required in order to make the practice uniform in all the divisions. Before that transfer there was no office of the common law masters at which documents could be deposited for production. After the power to order prodnotion was given to the common law courts, it oould only be exeroised by ordering production at the office of the produoing party's solioitor. It might well be said then that, the prodnotion ac the solicitor's office being a matter of right, not of favour, the oosts of production ought to be allowed. And it appeared by a note from Master Dodgson that Buch had been the practioe in the common law divisions. Under the Judicature Aot there was power to order production in the oountry, and it was deserving of consideration whether for the future production sbonld not be at the district registry or at the Central Offioe. His lordship did not, however, decide this point now. As to the inspecting party's oosts of inspection, the practioe in chancery was quite settled that he oould not get them from his adversary. Cotton, L.J., said there was nothing in the Judicature Aot or Rules to alter this, and there was no reason for altering it. Lush, L.J., said it was most desirable that there should be uniformity of practice in all the divisions.

Another point was aa to the allowance of refreshers to counsel. The trial of the action commenced about twelve o'clock on one day, and it was conoluded abont eleven o'clock on the following day. The taxing master allowed refreshers, and Bacon, V.C., declined to alter his decision. The Court of Appeal held that refreshers ought not to be allowed. Jessel, M.R., said that he understood tbe practice of common law with regard to refreshers, as he had stated in Barruon v. Wearing (27 W. R. 526, L. R. 11 Ch. D. 206), to have been settled many years ago by the Court of Queen's Bench, and the Court of Common Pleas adhered to it in the year 1874—viz., that, when a case occupied more than one day— which meant more than the time of one day, for it might occupy parts of two days making less than a whole day—then the taxing master had a discretion to allow refreshers. But, when the case occupied less than the time of one day, the taxing master could not allow refreshers—he had no discretion. In the present case, the taxing master had acted under a mistake of fact in allowing the refreshers. Cotton, L.J., said that the practice of allowing refreshers had been adopted from the common law divisions into the Chancery Division, and the rule of the common law divisions ought to be followed.

A third point arose thus :—The Queen's Counsel who appeared for the defendant on the trial died before the case was heard on appeal, and on the appeal another Queen's Counsel was retained. Under these circumstances a larger fee was paid to the Queen's Counsel on the appeal than had been paid to his predecessor on the trial, and the fee paid to tbe junior was proportionately increased. The taxing master allowed these increased fees. Bacon, V.C., affirmed his decision, and the Court of Appeal refused to disturb it. Jessel, M.R., said that no donbt in the Chancery Division the fees of counsel on an appeal were generally the same as on the original hearing. But the rule was a most valuable one that the court would not interfere with the decision of tbe taxing master in a question of amount, unless there had been a gross miscarriage. If this was not so, a large part of the time of the judges of the High Court and of the Court of Appeal would be occupied with questions of taxation. And, moreover, the taxing masters in the Chancery Division were, as a rule, solicitors of experience, and better qualified to decide on tbe amount of fees than the judges themselves. It might be said that the circumstances afforded no reason for increasing the fee of the junior on the appeal. But, by a long-settled practice, there was a well-known relation

between tbe fees of the leader and the j nnior, and there was no ground for interfering with the taxing master's decision. —Solicitors, Bolton $ Co.; Lear oyd % Co.

CompanyNotice To Liquidators Not To Pat DiviDends To DirectorsSet-offRight Of ActionJurisDiction Of Court To Advise LiquidatorsService Of Notice Of Motion—Companies Act, 1862, s. 138—CostsRules Of Court, 1875—Ord. 55, R. 1.—In a case of Re Standard Discount Corporation [Limited), before the Master of the Rolls on the 10th inst., a motion was made that it might be determined by the court whether the liquidators of the company were justified, notwithstanding the threats and opposition of one Argles, a member of the company, in paying the late directors of the company their proportion of the surplus assets now in course of distribution, or whether such surplus assets should be held over, pending proceedings by the said Argles. The motion was made under section 138 of the Companies Act, in consequence of certain letters of Mr. Argles, requiring the liquidators not to pay the late directors of the company any portion of the assets until he had had an opportunity of bringing certain claims against them in the winding up, which would, as be alleged, result in large sums being found due from them. The liquidators had declined to take any proceedings. Mr. Argles required to inspect the books by an accountant, whijh had been refused. Objections on his part were now taken to tbe motion on the grounds that the court had no jurisdiction to interfere, and that the motion should have been made ex parte, Bo as not to came Mr. Argles to pay the costs, and also on the merits. Jessel, M. R, said that the question raised by the motion was as to the payment of a dividend ont of the assets, and he was clearly of opinion that it was properly within the 138th section, and that he bad jurisdiotion to determine the question. As to whether the motion ought -to have been served on anyone, he was of opinion that in all cases the court must decide the question of parties, and, indeed, the liquidators might have first come to the court and asked who ought to be served on the motion. In his opinion it Whs proper in the present case to have served Mr. Argles, as he would not be bound by the decision iu his absence. Tbe liquidators would most naturally wish to bind him, as he said that if they paid this dividend he should hold tbem personally responsible. The case was within the principle of those cases where persons made a claim to trust funds iu the hands of trustees, and the trustees brought an action to determine the rights, making the different claimants parties. He could see no difference between the case of liquidators and any other trustees, except that this question was raised by motion instead of by action. In the present case one of the shareholders said the liquidators had no right to pay certain dividends, and the liquidators were entitled to come to the court and ask if they were justified in paying them. On the question of jurisdiction as to giving the liquidators the costs, he was clearly of opinion be had a discretionary power of dealing with tbem under rule 1 of order 55 of the Rules of 1875. On the merits, what Mr. Argles alleged was that the directors had speculated with the funds of the company, and were liable to pay large sums to tbe company. Mr..Argles thought be could prove this if allowed inspection of the books. On the other hand, the liquidators said the only transaction of the sort could not be impeached, and that they did not intend to take any proceedings. Then Mr. Argles wanted to have the books seen by an accountant, which had been declined. All that was beside tbe present qnestion, which was as to the payment of a dividend, and if any discovery was refused there was another way in which, if necessary, it could be obtained. In his opinion, however, the fact of the claim was no reason for stopping the payment of the dividend, as even if there was a claim against the directors, there would be no right of set-off, and therefore ha saw no reason for staying the payment of these sums to tbem. He thought on the facts that Mr. Argles had acted most unreasonably, and therefore he should order him to pay the costs of the motion, and should declare tbe liquidators entitled to pay the dividends.—Solicitors, L. S. J). Rawlins; Arglet, Sand-Bailey, is Art/les.

CompantWinding UpHolder Of Fire PolicyFirr After Winding UpPkoopCompanies Act 1862, s. 158 — Rule 25, Orders, November, 1862—Judicature Act, 1875, s. 10—Bankruptcy Act, 1869, s. 31—Rule 67, Bankruptcy Rules, 1870—Form 32 Of Bankruptcy Forms, 1870.—In.

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