agreements with the owners provided that the | put the premises to any use which may suit structures should inclose the lots as a fence. his pleasure, providing that he does not in doMany of them had been in use for several ing so imperil or threaten harm to others. years, and in March, 1890, the street commis- Tiedeman, Pol. Powers, 439. All statutory sioner notified Crawford that they must be restrictions of the use of property are imposed taken down and removed within five days, so upon the theory that they are necessary for the as to conform with a certain ordinance, or the safety, health, or comfort of the public; but a commissioner would remove them. From the limitation without reason or necessity cannot testimony it appears that most of them were be enforced. In what way can the erection substantial and safe structures, and the objec- of a safe structure for advertising purposes tion by the city authorities was, not that they near the front of a lot endanger public safety were insecure, but rather that they did not any more than a like structure for some other comply with the provisions of an ordinance pre- lawful purpose? Why does the posting or viously passed. It provides that "no person painting of an advertisement upon a secure shall erect any billboard or other structure for wall or structure render it insecure? An ownadvertising purposes, unless the same is placed er may desire to use a structure or billboard at such distance from the line of any street or for an inclosure of bis lot, as well as for postsidewalk as shall exceed at least five feet the ing advertisements. In one instance that was height of such billboard or structure; nor shall the desire and purpose of the owner in this any person attach any sign or bulletin to any case. If the wall or inclosure was ten feet lamp-post in this city; and any person found high, then, under the ordinance the owner guilty of violating any provision of this sec- would be required to set it back fifteen feet from tion shall, on conviction, be fined in a sum the front of the lot. What reason is there for not less than three nor more than twenty dol- the surrender or loss of the use of that portion of lars for each offense, and each day's continu- the lot? Or why should the pasting of a piece ance after conviction shall be deemed a sepa- of paper upon a secure inclosure make such a rate and distinct offense." The reasonableness loss necessary? Although the police power is of this regulation and the validity of the ordi- a broad one, it is not without limitations, nance were the principal subjects of contention and a secure structure, which is not an inin the court below and the ones presented for fringement upon the public safety, and is not decision here. At the end of the trial the tem- a nuisance, cannot be made one by legisporary injunction originally granted was dis- tive fiat and then prohibited. Yates v. Milsolved, and the relief asked by the plaintiff waukee, 77 U. S. 10 Wall. 497, 19 L. ed. 984; was denied. 1 Dill. Mun. Corp. 374. It is doubtless within the power of the city to prohibit the erection of insecure billboards or other structures, require the owners to maintain them in a secure condition, and to provide for their removal at the expense of the owners in case they become dangerous. Perhaps regulations may be made with reference to the manner of construction so as to insure safety, but the prohibition of the erection of structures upon the lot line, however safe they might be, would be an unwarranted invasion of private right, and is without legislative authority. In Langan v. Atchison, 35 Kan. 318, 57 Am. Rep. 165, an insecure billboard, which had been fastened to the sidewalk, fell upon one who was passing, and injured him. It appeared to have been in a weak and insecure condition for some time, and the officers of the city knew that it was not erected in a safe and proper manner, and, before its fall, that it was in a condition to endanger persons passing upon the sidewalk. It was held that the city was liable in damages for the injury, upon the theory that it was its duty to keep the streets and walks in a safe condition for persons passing over and along them. It was further held that it was the duty of the corporate authorities to remove or abate any nuisance, and that, under the power given to the city to prevent and remove nuisances and to regulate all structures projecting upon or over the streets or walks, it was bourd to remove or protect the sidewalk from the imperfectly constructed and insecure billboard standing so near the sidewalk as to fall upon it. This authority sanctions the regulation of such structures so far as to make them secure, but nothing is said which would justify the prohibition of structures that are absolutely safe. None of the structures proposed to be

We think the ordinance is not reasonable nor valid; hence the ruling of the court cannot be sustained. As has been seen, it proscribes the erection or use of any structure near the lot line for advertising purposes, no matter how substantial and secure it may be. Municipalities may be and are vested with large powers in protecting the health and safety of the people and in promoting the welfare of the public. They have been given authority to prevent and remove nuisances, to protect the walks and ways, and, where they are dangerous, may compel the owners of ad jacent property to erect and maintain railings, safeguards, and barriers along the same. They may enter and inspect all dwelling-houses, yards, inclosures, and buildings, to ascertain whether any of them are in a dangerous state, and may take down and remove such structures as have become insecure or dangerous; and further, may require the owners of insecure and dangerous buildings and other erections to render the same secure and safe at the own er's cost. They may regulate the use of the streets and public grounds, and may regulate or prohibit awnings and awning posts, and all other structures projecting upon or over the street or sidewalk. Fire limits may be estab lished, within which the erection of wooden buildings or structures which would readily communicate fire may be prohibited. Gen. Stat. 1889, par. 555. In none of these provis ions do we find anything which warrants the city to prohibit the erection of safe and substantial structures on any portion of a lot, if, indeed, any such power can be given. In general, it may be said that the owner of real estate has the right to erect such buildings or other structures upon it at he may please, and

changes it from a lawful to an unlawful one. A person may erect a fence around his lot without violating the ordinance, but just as soon as an advertisement is posted or painted thereon it is brought within the condemnation of the ordinance, and the owner is liable to prosecution and punishment.

removed extended beyond the lot, and hence are not to be regarded as if they projected over the street. The regulation as to the erection and maintenance of such structures may be made sufficiently rigid to fully protect the public; but they must be reasonable, and when they pass beyond the bounds of reason and necessity, and impair private property rights they Treating the ordinance as unreasonable and must be pronounced invalid. The unreason-invalid, as we must, the ruling of the court beableness of the ordinance in question is easily low in denying the injunction was erroneous, seen when it is considered that the mere post- and hence there must be a reversal. ing of a harmless paper upon a structure All the Justices concur.

บ.

MINNESOTA SUPREME COURT.

William H. HANSCOM, Respt., MINNEAPOLIS STREET R. CO., Appt. (........Minn.........)

*Evidence that an agent of a street railway company was authorized by it *Headnote by DICKINSON, J.

NOTE.-Authority of agent or representative to employ medical services for employe or other third persons.

Although in the above case the authority of the agent to employ a physician was based on express authority to take injured persons where they could be cared for, it is at least in harmony with the doctrine by which the implied power of agents to employ physicians for third persons is based on the emergency or necessity of prompt action. It will be seen below, however, that the courts are by no means agreed as to the extent to which such extension of an agent's powers can be justified by

the emergency.

In most cases in which the principal was held liable it will be seen that the employment was either made or ratified by superior agents' officers.

Liability of railroad company on contract made by conductor.

generally to see that injured persons were taken where medical aid could be given, construed as justifying the conclusion that the agent was authorized to employ medical aid in such cases.

(April 27, 1893.)

APPEAL by defendant from a dement of the District Court for Hennepin County in

A physician cannot recover from a railroad company for services rendered to an injured passenger or employé, where the conductor notifies the physician that he could not bind the company without instructions, and then the conductor communicates with the general agent and then engaged the physician. Nor is any contract created by reason of employment the next day by the attorney of torney are shown to have been authorized. St. the company, as neither the conductor nor the atLouis, A. & T. R. Co. v. Hoover, 53 Ark. 377.

But an employment of a surgeon by a conductor is valid, where the conductor is the highest representative of the company on the ground, and there

As to ratification of contract made by agents, was an emergency requiring immediate action. see the various subdivisions.

A conductor cannot bind a railroad company to pay for services of a surgeon, in attending to an injured employé of the company, where no authority is shown. St. Louis & K. C. R. Co. v. Olive, 40 Ill. App. 82.

A surgeon cannot recover from a railroad company for services rendered and medicines furnished to an injured employé at the instance and request of a road-master and conductor, there being no evidence of authority to bind, or of ratification. Peninsular R. Co. v. Gary, 22 Fla. 356, 1 Am. St. Rep. 194.

Terre Haute & I. R. Co. v. McMurray, 98 Ind. 358. And a railroad company is liable for services furnished to a party injured in operating the road, where the surgeon was employed by the conductor in charge of the train, and the injury required immediate attention, and the company knew of such services being rendered, and of such employment, and failed to disaffirm it. Terre Haute & I. R. Co. v. Stockwell, 118 Ind. 98.

A contract made by a conductor of a railroad train with a boarding-house keeper to care for a wounded brakeman, whose skull is crushed, where the conductor is the chief officer at that point, is

necessity, dictates of humanity and self interest of the employer justify such a contract for which the employer is liable. Toledo, St. L. & K. C. R. Co. v. Mylott (Ind. App.) Jan. 19, 1893.

A physician cannot recover from a railroad com-binding as there is an emergency and an immediate pany for services rendered to a party injured in the operation of the road, where such physician is employed by the station agent and the conductor, the cars having run over and fractured a person's leg which requires amputation. Tucker v. St. Louis, K. C. & N. R. Co. 54 Mo. 177.

A railroad company is under no legal obligation to furnish surgical attendance to its wounded employés, and a surgeon, called by a conductor to attend an injured brakeman, hurt while in discharge of his duties, who attended on the brakeman until he died, cannot recover for such services from the railroad company, the conductor not having any 20 L. R. A.

In case of pressing necessity and emergency, a conductor of a train, who is the highest officer at the place, may employ a surgeon although the company may have a local physician at that place also, if the demands are so great that one surgeon cannot attend to the wounded employés. Evansville & R. R. Co. v. Freeland (Ind. App.) March 17, 1892.

A railroad company is liable for the care ren

favor of plaintiff in an action brought to recover the value of medical services, rendered at the request of one of defendant's employés to

dered to a brakeman injured in the employ of the company, where he was sent by the conductor to plaintiff's house, and the conductor telegraphed the facts to one of the officers of the company, who made no reply and when the plaintiff asked to whom he should look for his pay was told that when the brakeman died or got well to bring his bill to the office and it would be sent in. Indianapolis & St. L. R. Co. v. Morris, 67 Ill. 295.

A conductor having employed a competent surgeon in an emergency for an injured brakeman, has no authority to employ additional surgeons for the same party. Louisville, N. A. & C. R. Co. v. Smith, 121 Ind. 353.

Contracts made by superintendents, or president.
There is some conflict of authorities on the ques-

tion as to the superintendent of a company being
presumed to have the power to employ a physician,
some courts holding that such authority must be
proved to create a liability.

A physician employed on a telegram from the general superintendent of a railroad to care for an injured employé may recover from the company for such services. Atchison & N. R. Co. v. Reecher, 24 Kan. 228, 1 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 343.

A recovery by a physician was sustained, for services rendered to a person injured on the railroad, which services were furnished at the instance and request of the superintendent, who had authority to employ a physician other than the regular company physician in case of an emergency. and where the jury were properly instructed. McCarthy v. Missouri R. Co. 15 Mo. App. 385.

A physician may recover of a railroad company for services in attending a man injured by the train, where such physician was employed by the general superintendent, although the company offered to prove that it was the duty of the chief surgeon of the company to attend to all persons injured, but this was excluded. Cincinnati, I. St. L. & C. R. Co. v. Davis, 9 L. R. A. 503, 126 Ind. 99. But on the contrary it is held that a superintendent of a railroad company, having general supervisory control over the whole of the road, directing advertisements, supervising the line of road, paying money to employés, but not having any direction over the treasury, is not presumed to be authorized to employ a physician to take charge of a child injured by the trains. Stephenson v. New York & H. R. Co. 2 Duer, 341.

A corporation is not liable to a physician for services rendered to an injured employé by a physician employed by the superintendent of the corporation, where it is not shown that such superintendent was authorized to employ a physician, in case of an emergency. Meisenbach v. Southern Cooperage Co. 45 Mo. App. 232.

one injured while a passenger on defendant's road. Affirmed.

The facts are stated in the opinion.

| nothing to show that they corruptly withheld such approval, he must obtain such approval before he can recover. Union Pac. R. Co. v. Anderson, 11 Colo. 293.

A railway company is not liable to a physician who attended persons injured by a railroad accident where the president of the railroad company told the wounded persons to employ whatever physician they chose. and the company would pay the bills. The physician knew of such statement but it was not made to him by the president nor made in his presence. Canney v. South Pacific Coast R. Co. 63 Cal. 501, 12 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 310.

But a division superintendent is not presumed to be authorized to contract for surgeon's attendance on passengers injured while traveling on the road, where such injury is not caused by the negligence of the railroad company. The court makes a distinction between power to contract for services for employés and for passengers. Union Pac. R. Co. v. Beatty, 35 Kan. 265, 57 Am. Rep. 160, 26 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 84.

And the railroad company is not liable for a small bill of drugs furnished to a woman who had been hurt by the locomotive of defendant, and which was furnished on an order given by the division superintendent of that part of the road, in the absence of proof as to the duties of such superintendent. Brown v. Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. 67

Mo. 122.

Contracts made with general agents or managers.

A general agent of a railroad company will be presumed to have power to procure board and attendance for an employé injured in the service of the company. Atlantic & P. R. Co. v. Reisner, 18 Kan. 458.

A general manager of a railroad company bas authority to bind the company for medical services rendered to an employé injured by an accident R. 2 Exch. 228, 15 Week. Rep. 769, 36 L. J. Exch. 123.

on the road. Walker v. Great Western R. Co. L

A contract for medical services furnished to an

injured employé of a manufacturing hardware company, made by the general business manager of the corporation, is not binding on the corporation in the absence of evidence showing authority on the part of such general business manager. Swazey v. Union Mfg. Co. 42 Conn. 556.

Contracts made by agents generally.

family for support, and this applies where the physician is called by the wife to treat a hired hand. Baker v. Witten (Okla.) July 1, 1892.

A judgment against an electric company for an undertaker's bill rendered for services in bury- A husband is not liable for medical attendance ing a person at the instance of the general super-upon one not a member of or dependent upon the intendent of the company was reversed for it was not shown in the record that the party was an employé of the company at the time of his death, or that he was on the premises of the company at the time of his death, or that the superintendent bad power or authority to make such a contract. If the party was on the premises of the company at the time of his death it was the duty of the company to give him proper burial. Kipp v. East River Electric Light Co. 46 N. Y. S. R. 397.

Where a company physician agrees to submit to the superintendent of the road and the division surgeon, his bills for services rendered to persons injured on the road, for approval, and there is

A physician may recover compensation, where the defendant sent his brother for another phy. sician, but he being out, the brother called the plaintiff, who was informed after traveling some fourteen miles in the country that the trouble was over and his services would not be needed. Bartlett v. Sparkman, 95 Mo. 136.

A contract made by a managing agent of a plantation, for a physician's services for one year will not bind the owner of the plantation although he saw the physician on the plantation, and did not

Messrs. Koon, Whelan & Bennett for Dickinson, J., delivered the opinion of appellant.

object, and sometimes he furnished medical attend- A physician cannot recover, without proof of auance but was under no obligation to furnish the thority on the part of the contracting agent where same. Malone v. Robinson (Miss.) March 13, 1893. after the rendition of services by a physician to an An employment of a physician by a station agent | injured employé at the request of the supervisor of a railroad company, to attend an injured em- of the road, the physician was told by the superinployé, is binding on the company where such sta- tendent of the railroad company that it had been tion agent informs the general superintendent of customary to pay debts of that kind, but as the the facts and no objection is made. Toledo, W. & physician had sued that the company would not W. R. Co. v. Prince, 50 Ill. 26; Toledo, W. & W. R. pay. The physician then told the superintendent Co. v. Rodrigues, 47 Ill. 188, 95 Am. Dec. 484. that he was employed by the supervisor, and thereupon the superintendent replied that he would see the supervisor and that if he had obligated the company the bill would be paid. Mobile & M. R. Co. v. Jay, 61 Ala. 247.