leum products hauled through there, but this was a new operator, as I understood it, who wanted to see what could be accomplished. Senator PEPPER. I will say, Senator, that is an evolution of a good many negotiations carried on with these people in an effort to establish these facilities, this experimental operation, which I believe will prove so successful that it will be largely increased. I hope it will. Senator CARAWAY. Senator Andrews, did you want to ask a question? Senator ANDREWS. I am not a member of the committee. I think Mr. Johnson has brought out what I had in mind, the question whether or not the pipe line of 200 miles is going to be supplied by some Texas interest, the question whether you could not get more oil across there by having two 100-mile pipe lines instead of one 200 miles long. For instance, from the mouth of the Withlacoochee to Palatka it is 100 miles, or from Tampa to Sanford, where they have terminals already, that is 100 miles. The question is whether or not you can get more oil across the State by two pipe lines rather than by one pipe line 200 miles long, and put it into the St. Johns River, which is 10 feet deep from there to New Jersey. Mr. JOHNSON. Senator, our position, of course, is that it is up to the Federal Government. They are the body, acting through one of their agencies, that is going to say first if a pipe line is going to be built and, next, where it is going. We want to cooperate, and assure them of cooperation no matter where it is located, or whether they want to build one or build two or build more. They are not asking us in Florida to recommend what we think about the most feasible route for the pipe line. There are interested citizens in these various communities who have been exerting some effort to pointing out the advantages of their particular port or point of discharge. Senator ANDREWS. If they were to build three of them they would not build too many; is that right? Mr. JOHNSON. I think they could use them, Senator. I know they could use them in Florida. Senator ANDREWS. They are the most important thing. Senator ANDREWS. Four would be better, and then you would not supply as much as we ought to have on the east coast. There are a lot of things concerned in this that are as much or more important than supplying ships. There are the school systems that rely on the tax from gasoline to run the school system. There is no way of telling what serious damage is going to be done by using, say, 50 percent of the gasoline that we ordinarily would use. The battleships and the submarines are no good without fuel, neither are the planes that are being supplied with fuel, they are no good without fuel, without gasoline and oil. In other words, it is the lifeblood of the whole war effort, is oil. Mr. JOHNSON. That is right. Senator ANDREWS. Oil and gas. Without it we are nothing, and anything we can do, it seems to me, that would supply that would alleviate everything else, practically. I did not intend making that statement, but I think it follows as a natural consequence. Mr. JOHNSON. Do you want me to cover the Atlantic side, Senator? Senator PEPPER. Yes. Mr. JOHNSON. In Miami proper there is one tanker that arrived there, and two barges. Senator PEPPER. Those two barges went all the way around? Mr. JOHNSON. Yes, sir. Senator VANDENBERG. What do you mean when you say that they went all the way around? Would they go all the way outside of Key West? Senator PEPPER. All the way from Texas through the Gulf of Mexico, up the Straits of Florida, and back to Miami. Mr. JOHNSON. Port Everglades, their movement was entirely by tankers. Two tankers served that port. Jacksonville, six tankers served Jacksonville, with no barges. Miami was the farthest point north that the barges served. Senator PEPPER. What is the total number of tankers that went to the Atlantic seaboard? Did you say two to Miami? Mr. JOHNSON. Just one. Senator PEPPER. One to Miami? Mr. JOHNSON. Yes. Senator PEPPER. How many to Port Everglades? Mr. JOHNSON. Two. I mean two different tankers. They may have made more than one trip. Senator PEPPER. You are talking about the boats? Mr. JOHNSON. Yes. Senator PEPPER. There were two boats? Mr. JOHNSON. Yes. Senator PEPPER. How many to Jacksonville? Mr. JOHNSON. Six. Senator PEPPER. There were nine different tankers that made the journey. How far is it from Port St. Joe around through the Straits of Florida and back to Jacksonville? Mr. JOHNSON. Well, from Port St. Joe to Key West is 576 miles. That is from here down to here [indicating]. From Key West on up to Jacksonville is 523 miles. That is almost 1,100 miles, 1,099 miles, I believe. Senator PEPPER. That is nearly 1,100 miles just in one direction, and then with the turn-around it makes it 2,200 miles that the tanker had to go, when that same tanker could have delivered that oil to some west coast point and saved that 2,200 miles. How far is it from Port St. Joe back to Port Arthur? Mr. JOHNSON. I would have to look at my map. Senator PEPPER. Do you reckon it is over 1,100 miles? Mr. JOHNSON. No; I would not think it would be that. Senator PEPPER. I suspect that that tanker could have gone back to Port Arthur and made the return trip as fast as it could go from Port St. Joe to Jacksonville. That same thing is true, to a lesser degree, about those other west coast points. For instance, at Yankeetown, which is the terminus of the 75-mile run, the first one, that is about 179 miles shorter distance than from Port St. Joe to Key West. It would save nearly 1,000 miles of travel around Florida when all you have got to do is go 75 miles and then you enter a waterway that is 10 feet deep. Mr. JOHNSON. Yes. Senator PEPPER. Of course, Tampa is a deep-water port. In the same way you would save mileage by going to Tampa; then going south you have Fort Myers; even if the destination were Miami or Port Everglades. Now, the point that was asked in Mr. Johnson's testimony there, when they say you have got to have an existing inland waterway to get to these points, that is an error, because there are not 15 days out of a year, the engineers have calculated, when those barges cannot go out on the open Gulf of Mexico. It takes them pretty close around the rim, close to shore. Senator VANDENBERG. I do not think there is any doubt in the world about the maximum use of existing waterways. The emphasis is on "existing." Senator MAYBANK. The thought that you brought out about the 2,200-mile round trip is likewise applicable to Brunswick, Savannah, Charleston, and all the way up. The tanker that goes up north of Miami has got to make the same trip. Senator PEPPER. Yes. Mr. JOHNSON. Yes. That, of course, would be very small. Senator MAYBANK. Yes. Senator PEPPER. If you put your oil somewhere down the west coast, then you save those tankers. That completed my questions, Mr. Johnson. Do you have anything else to suggest? Mr. JOHNSON. No, sir. I am through, unless the committee has some further questions. Senator VANDENBERG. I think you have been very helpful, Mr. Johnson. Senator PEPPER. Mr. Johnson, did you say you had some experience in shipping? Senator PEPPER. Yes. Mr. JOHNSON. I was a ship-repair man, constructing and reconstructing vessels over a period of about 16 years. Senator PEPPER. I knew you knew something about boats. Mr. JOHNSON. Yes, sir. Senator PEPPER. Thank you very much. Senator BARBOUR. I think you have been a very helpful witness in every respect. Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you, sir. Senator MAYBANK. Madam Chairman, I have a letter from the Governor of South Carolina which I would ask to have inserted in the record. Senator CARAWAY. Without objection, it may be inserted in the record. (The letter referred to is as follows:) Hon. BURNET R. MAYBANK, United States Senator, Washington, D. C. COLUMBIA, S. C., June 6, 1942. DEAR SENATOR MAYBANK: You have requested me to send to you the statement of my position, as Governor of South Carolina, on the matter of the gasoline rationing in order that my position may be presented to the committee of the United States Senate now studying the matter. It is a real pleasure to me to comply with your request in this letter. First of all, South Carolina will undergo any sacrifice necessary for the winning of the war. This, of course, does not mean that this State is willing to submit to discriminatory treatment without a most vigorous protest. This State believes that every State should share alike in the burdens made necessary by the present national situation. The rationing of any commodity can be justified only on two grounds, to wit: 1. That there is a national shortage of that commodity, or 2. That transportation and distribution equipment makes it impossible to deliver the commodity to all sections of the Nation. It seems to be an admitted fact that there is no shortage of gasoline in the Nation as a whole but that the present situation arises from the failure of transportation equipment to function as in normal times. To ration or not to ration any commodity should not depend upon the fact that some sections of the country may have a sufficient supply for their own use or even a surplus. Rationing of any commodity, to be fair and to accomplish the final goal, must be applied Nationwide. The best illustration of this can be found in the application of the principles of rationing to sugar. There are States in the Union which have a sufficient supply of sugar for their own use but these States were justly required to submit to rationing in order that the problem might be considered from a Nationwide standpoint and in order that the national supply of sugar might be conserved. The same principle applies to the rationing of any commodity when the need for it depends upon the failure of normal transportation facilities to function in a proper manner. Under such a situation, justice, fairness, and the principle of square-dealing require that all transportation facilities shall be operated cooperatively in order that every section of the Nation may have the benefit of the total transportation equipment of the Nation. If every community should be required to share its sufficiency or surplus of transportation equipment with the communities which have a deficiency of such equipment, then the pooling or cooperative use of all equipment would cause a minimum interference with the citizens in securing the commodity, which minimum interference would apply to every citizen alike. Why those in charge of administering the gasoline rationing program could' not have conceived the above elementary facts from the beginning is beyond the conception of intelligent people. If they did recognize the elementary correctness of those principles then their failure to apply them to this situation justly brings upon them the condemnation of a large portion of the American people who wish to win the war but who also expect efficiency and squaredealing upon the part of the officials in charge of such matters. It seems to me that any student of public events will have to recognize that the gasoline situation has been badly fumbled by those in charge. It would have been easy to have started gasoline rationing on a Nation-wide basis. Thereby, probably the reduction in amount to the individual citizen would not have been more than 10 to 20 percent, whereas some sections are now required to stand as high as a 50 to 60 percent reduction, with other communities allowed to secure all that they want. The miserably poor manner in which the gasoline rationing situation has been handled by the officials in charge has produced three very bad situations, as follows: 1. The method of handling gasoline rationing has caused greater injury in the rationed States to the morale of the people than any other act of the officials in Washington. The people in the rationed area know that they have beer discriminated against and are positive in their belief that the officials in charge of this work are either grossly ignorant and inefficient or that they are wildly following the path of least resistance. In spite of the great stupidity demon strated in this situation, up to the present time no one could impunge the motives of these misguided officials but the good of the Nation depends on the finding of a remedy. 2. Wide unemployment and the destruction of business in the rationed areas have resulted from the present policy. This can be demonstrated by traveling any of the highways in the rationed areas and by observing the condition of businesses which depend upon the use of the highways. This situation will finally reflect itself in a reduction of revenues to the Federal Government because these people will be unable to pay the taxes that they have been paying in the past. If the present inequality must continue then the Government should provide for the relief of the hundreds of thousands of people who, in some manner, depend upon gasoline for the earning of their livelihood. 3. In the rationed areas, the present policy threatens to materially cripple the revenues of the States, counties, and municipalities. In South Carolina we have large bond issues depending upon the gasoline tax for payment. To the counties go the proceeds of 1-cent-per-gallon tax on all gasoline sold in the State. The municipalities are relieved of expensive street work so long as the highway department has revenue from the gasoline tax with which to do this work. There is no justification for more than half of the States to be prosperous from gasoline taxation while the States in the rationed areas must sustain such heavy losses. If the Congress is willing for the present rationing of gasoline to continue in such an unfair and discriminatory manner, then the Congress should have the courage to appropriate to the rationed States sufficient funds to make up for the loss in revenues. The people of South Carolina are depending upon the Congress to see that this situation is corrected. The great majority of the people have absolutely no confidence in the bureaucrats who have so badly "fumbled" this matter, but the people are looking to the Congress to bring about a proper solution. Sincerely yours, (Special delivery.) R. M. JEFFRIES, Governor. Senator CARAWAY. The meeting is adjourned to Wednesday at 10:30. (Whereupon, at the hour of 11:40 a. m., the subcommittee adjourned to Wednesday, June 10, 1942, at 10:30 a. m.) (At 5:05 p. m. an adjournment was taken until Thursday, July 2, 1942, at 10:30 a. m.) |