Principles For A Free Society: Reconciling Individual Liberty With The Common GoodAs government budgets come under political fire and free-market ideals spread, the legal and social principles of libertarian thought continue to grow in popularity and relevance. It is particularly timely, then, that Richard Epstein, one of our country's most distinguished legal scholars, here sets out an authoritative set of principles that explains both the uses and the limits of government power. Blending his deep knowledge of classical political theory and legal history with modern economic thought, he considers a wealth of timely topics: the use of norms and customs in setting legal rules; the appropriate spheres for both private and common property for such diverse resources as water and telecommunications; the dark side of altruism in driving collective behavior; and the relative merits of public and private assistance to the poor. Drawing on the work of multiple disciplines, Principles for a Free Society offers a thoroughly realized blueprint to guide us through political conflict in the troubled times ahead. |
Contents
The Utilitarian Connection | 9 |
Social Norms versus Legal Commands | 41 |
Harts Failed Distinction between Legal and Social Norms | 50 |
Copyright | |
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Principles for a Free Society: Reconciling Individual Liberty with the ... Richard A. Epstein No preview available - 2002 |
Common terms and phrases
action allowed altruism antitrust baseline basic behavior Blackstone boundary cave chapter common carriers common law communitarian compensation competitive context contract costs create customers damages decision defendant disputes easement economic eminent domain employer enforcement entitled Epstein exchange external force gain harm principle holdout problem Ibid impose incentives individual injunction institutions interest issue labor laissez-faire land landowner legal rules legal system liability rule limited loss matter modern monopoly natural law navigation servitude neighbors nuisance obligation operation ordinary organization overall owner ownership parties person plaintiff political position possession practice private property property rights protection question railroad reason reduce regime regulation remedy risk Ronald Coase rule of acquisition self-interest self-ownership social norms social sanctions statute strict liability Supreme Court telecommunications theory tion tort transactions utilitarian voluntary welfare workers