In response to my request for a more full and complete statement of the facts and circumstances upon which my opinion is desired, you did, by letter of March 22, 1900, advise me as follows:

"The removal of Mrs. Tompkins occurred on September 30, 1894, leaving a vacancy at $1,200 per annum, which was filled as follows:

"R. A. Charles, of the office of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, was reduced October 1, 1894, from class 2 to class 1, vice Tompkins, removed.

"S. A. Lewis was reduced October 1, 1894, from class 3 to class 2, vice Charles, reduced.

"H. L. Piper was reduced October 1, 1894, from Assistant Superintendent Life-Saving Service, and transferred to class 3, office of Internal Revenue, vice Lewis reduced.

"It is a fact that the contemplated changes under the Dockery Act were considered previously to the passage of the act; changes were made, and vacancies occurring were continued and used to lessen the number of removals which would be made necessary on the 1st day of October, 1894, when the Dockery Act went into effect.

"It is a fact that at that date, October 1, 1894, all changes in the service were influenced, more or less, by the necessary reduction of force under the act; every opportunity was taken advantage of to lessen the number of compelled removals from the service, by the use of vacancies in other bureaus or offices available, and by making removals of least competent clerks in order that clerks of greater ability might be retained in the service by transfer from offices abolished or reduced in force under the Dockery Act.

"To follow down the line of changes and reach an appointee in a specific office directly affected by the Dockery Act is difficult. It can only be said that the Tompkins vacancy made one less removal necessary from the service under the Dockery Act.

"The Commissioner of Internal Revenue, in a communication dated January 22, 1900, says:

"I have the honor to state that while the Dockery Act did not specifically reduce the force of the Internal Revenue Bureau, it made a large specific reduction in the force of the

Treasury Department, which reduction the then Secretary, Mr. Carlisle, distributed through the Department instead of confining it to the bureaus or offices reduced or abolished by said Dockery Act.

"In carrying out this plan of reduction a large number of dismissals were made by the Secretary in offices not specifically affected by the Dockery Act, and the vacancies thus created were filled by reductions, promotions, or transfers made for the purpose of securing places for persons who had previously been paid on the rolls of offices reduced or abolished by said act, or whose positions were desired for such persons.

Thus, by reference to the memorandum attached to the letter of Mr. Proctor, it will be seen that in the dismissal of Mrs. Tomkins the objective point was to secure, by the reduction of Mr. Charles and Mr. Lewis, a third-class clerkship for Mr. Piper, whose transfer thereto from his former position in the Life-Saving Service was necessary to carry out the Secretary's plan of distributing the reduction through the Department generally, and that her dismissal was therefore due to the operations of the Dockery Act as administered by the responsible head of the Department, the only officer of the Government clothed with authority to accomplish such reduction, and from whose decision as to the manner in which the reduction should be made there was no appeal.

"In connection with this matter I will also state that Mr. Carlisle declared over and over again, verbally and in writing, that dismissals made by him in offices not specifically affected by the Dockery Act, were made necessary by the reduction of force made by Congress in the Dockery Act.'

"It is evident that Mrs. Tompkins's case comes clearly within the clause of amended civil service Rule IX, which provides for the reinstatement under said rule of persons separated from the service by reason of a reduction of force required by law.'

"The statement of the Commissioner, in whose office Mrs. Tompkins was employed when separated from the service, enforced the conclusion that she was removed as the result of a necessary reduction of force specifically required by

law, and this contenticn being disputed, your opinion in the premises was requested."

In my opinion, the contention of the Treasury Department is correct. The language of the proviso to Rule IX referred to is, "Any person who has been separated from the service by reason of a reduction of force specifically required by law may be reinstated without regard to the length of time he or she has been so separated from the service." It not only appears from your statement of facts, but it seems also to be conceded by the Civil Service Commission, that the law known as the "Dockery Act" did specifically provide for a reduction of force in the Treasury Department, but in bureaus separate and distinct from the Bureau of Internal Revenue; that the act referred to did require that a certain number of persons employed in each of certain bureaus of the Department, the Internal Revenue Bureau not being one, should be separated from the service in their respective bureaus. It is also conceded in the communication of the Civil Service Commission of February 12, 1900, that Mrs. Tompkins's separation can be said to be by reason of a reduction of force which was required by law, but it is contended that it was remotely and indirectly so, and not directly and specifically so. The Commission contends that the word "specifically " used in the rule must relate directly and unmistakably to the particular place or person affected, and that unless it does so, the rule does not apply.

Conceding, therefore, that the moving cause of the discharge of Mrs. Tompkins was the reduction of force required by the Dockery Act, although that act did not require any specific reduction in the office of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, the question is, Does the proviso of Rule IX cover her case? It is obvious that her removal was not due to any other cause than the necessity imposed upon the head of the Treasury Department, by reason of the passage of the Dockery Act, to reduce the force in his Department. As is stated in your communication of March 22. changes in the service at the date that act went into effect were influenced more or less by the necessary reduc

tion of force under the act; every opportunity was taken advantage of to lessen the number of compelled removals from the service by the use of vacancies in other bureaus or offices available, and by making removals of less competent. clerks, in order that clerks of greater ability might be retained in the service by transfer from offices abolished or reduced in force under the Dockery Act. That which the rule requires as a condition for reinstatement is that the separation from the service shall have been by reason of a reduction of force specifically required by law. The reduction of force to be affected must be specifically required. The rule does not say that the removal of the particular individual must be specifically required by law, but only that the separation of such individual from the service shall be by reason of such reduction. The phrase "by reason of" in this connection has the force and meaning of the phrase "because of." See the word "reason" in Webster's Dictionary. Can it be denied, under the statement of facts you present to me, that the separation of Mrs. Tompkins from the service was by reason of a reduction of force? It is true it was not a reduction of force in the bureau in which she was employed, but the proviso to Rule IX does not declare that the reduction must be in the particular bureau from which the clerk is separated. Can it be denied that the cause for which she was separated from the service was a reduction of force specifically required by law? The Dockery Act specifically required a reduction of force, and that reduction was made. The removal of Mrs. Tompkins was effected in carrying out that scheme of reduction, and for no other reason. It was made because of that specifically required reduction in the force.

The statement from my opinion of December 9, 1899, construing this clause, which is quoted in the letter of the Civil Service Commission of January 31, 1900, is not applicable to this case. The language quoted by the Commission

is as follows:

"There may be doubt as to what is meant by the phrase, specifically required by law,' the doubt arising from the indefinite nature of the word specifically, but there can be

no doubt that the reduction of force referred to must be one required by law and not one which is caused by the exercise of the discretionary power vested in an executive officer. It must be a reduction which, under the law, is compulsory, and not one which is optional.”

That opinion referred to a state of facts where the reduction of the force was optional with the executive officer. In this case the reduction of the force was specifically required, the only matter remaining optional with the Secretary being the method by which he would execute the specific reduction. The fact that he had the option to discharge one clerk to make room for another, in carrying out this scheme of reduction, does not render his duty to reduce the force discretionary. That was absolute and mandatory. The result, therefore, is that Mrs. Tompkins is eligible, under the facts stated, for reinstatement.

Very respectfully,

JOHN W. GRIGGS.

The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL-OPINION.

When an opinion is desired from the Attorney-General, the question to which an answer is desired, as well as a statement of the facts upon which the question is based, should be clearly set forth in the request.

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

April 20, 1900.

SIR: I am in receipt of your communication of March 24, 1900, by which certain papers, referring to a contract between the United States and James B. Eads, are referred to me, with the request for an opinion as to whether, under the contract between the United States and Eads, any liability existed at the date of the approval of the act of February 26, 1897, entitled, etc., on the part of said Eads or his representative for a failure to close the Pass a Loutre. I beg to call your attention to the well-settled rule of