igation or commerce, where it is usually applied to vessels, or persons or property on shipboard. Such cases are expressly provided for by the expression, in the same sentence, or upon any American vessel." The distinction there made of "perils of the sea within the United States or upon any American vessel" clearly show that the perils of the sea, contemplated by the act, are not restricted to those which menace life on shipboard or in shipwreck. It is impossible to give a definition of the term "perils of the sea" which will fit and cover every case. But, generally, it may be said that whenever, wherever, and in whatever way human life is directly imperiled by the sea, this, within these statutes, framed to protect and rescue life from such peril, is a peril of the sea, the rescue from which in the manner prescribed may entitle the rescuer to the honorable national distinction provided by these acts. The perils of the sea, to one on shipboard, are provided for by the words “or upon any American vessel." The other provisions, while they may in terms embrace also one on shipboard, yet obviously have a broader scope and apply also elsewhere; and the only limitation fixed is that they shall apply in waters over which the United States has jurisdiction. So that I am of opinion that a bather, a person capsized from a small boat, one falling into the water from a wharf, a child in shallow water near the shore-that in each of these and similar cases, if the person is thereby in imminent danger of his life, he is so, within the liberal spirit and intention of these acts, from a peril of the sea. And I am unable to perceive why all of the classes of cases to which I have reference are not as much perils of the sea as in the case of a disabled vessel on a rocky lee shore; nor why the saving of life and reward of the rescuer is not just as much within the reason, spirit, and intent of these statutes in one case as in the other. And had section 7 of the act of June 20, 1874, stood alone, I should be of opinion that it applied to all cases like those to which I have referred. All of these acts are in pari materia and have the same object. Neither repeals another, and they may all be read as one act. While section 7 of the act of 1874 authorizes the Secretary to bestow these medals "upon any persons who shall hereafter endanger their own lives in saving or endeavoring to save lives from perils of the sea," and authorizes medals of the first class in "cases of extreme and heroic daring," and those of the second class in "cases not sufficiently distinguished to deserve the medal of the first class,” section 12 of the act of 1878 authorizes the Secretary to bestow medals of the second class "upon persons making such signal exertions in rescuing and succoring the shipwrecked and saving persons from drowning as, in his opinion, shall merit such recognition." It would seem that it was the intention of this section to give to the Secretary, in the two cases mentioned, a broader discretion than was conferred by section 7 of the act of 1874, and not to except or exclude from what, in the previous act had been called "perils of the sea," two such obvious of those perils as shipwreck and drowning. And I am of opinion that these may be still classed as perils of the sea, under section 7 of the act of 1874, and that section 12 of the act of 1878 merely gives to the Secretary a broader discretion in case of shipwrecked and drowning persons than was conferred by section 7 of the previous act; and that medals of the first or second class may be bestowed in case of shipwrecked or drowning persons, in case the rescuers come within the terms of that section; or medals of the second class, under section 12 of the act of 1878, where the rescuers do not endanger their own lives, but make such signal exertions in rescuing or succoring the shipwrecked, or saving persons from drowning as, in the opinion of the Secretary, merit such recognition. In other words, both being perils of the sea, they are provided for in section 7 of the act of 1874: Provided, The exertions of the rescuers are of the character there described. But if such exertions do not come up to that standard, the persons may still receive a medal of the second class, under section 12 of the act of 1878, if in the opinion of the Secretary they merit such distinction. The term "the shipwrecked" requires further consideration. Persons shipwrecked may be, and generally are, for a time at least, in peril of the sea, and in that case are provided for in section 7 of the act of 1874; and those who save them from that peril may be entitled to a medal of the first or second class if their exertions are of the character described. On the other hand, persons shipwrecked may be no longer in danger from the sea, that peril having passed, and yet be in imminent danger and in great need of succor and rescue. They may be adrift in an open boat, without food or water, or stranded on some barren coast, or in other situation where, without rescue or succor, they would die of starvation, thirst, or exposure. In these, and many other situations readily imagined, the danger which menaces is not strictly a peril of the sea, and, therefore, provision is easily made for them in section 12 of the act of 1878, and those who make such signal exertions in rescuing or succoring persons in such situation, as in the opinion of the Secretary merit such recognition, may be entitled to the medal of the second class. It is believed that the foregoing answers, in a general way, all of your questions, but you desire specific answers to certain questions: First. Does the act of 1897 "give the Department authority to bestow medals upon persons who endanger their lives in saving or attempting to save persons who were suffering the perils of the sea in any case except by actual shipwreck or from being upon or connected with any vessel in distress? Second. Do the words 'perils of the sea,' as used in section 7 of the act approved June 20, 1874, apply to any perils other than such as may arise in connection with actual shipwreck or a vessel in distress, or upon an American vessel?" To each of these questions I answer, Yes. Third. "Do any of the statutes relating to life-saving medals apply to the rescue or saving from drowning of persons who accidentally fall from docks, wharves, or other places into any waters of the United States?" To this question I answer, Yes, if the other facts mentioned. in the statute concur. Fourth. You especially request a definition of the term "perils of the sea," as used in section 7, act of 1874. No definition of this term, as used in that section, in a statute like that, can be given which will be likely to cover all the various cases arising; but, generally, I refer you to the one already given herein, viz, perils caused by the sea, or which are such by reason of the sea, in connection with the foregoing observations upon that subject. You also ask whether the construction given to these acts by the Department, as shown in Nos. 1 and 2 of second page of circular transmitted, is correct. I think not, inasmuch as No. 1 limits the perils of the sea to actual shipwreck, or to persons upon or connected with any vessel in distress, or upon any American vessel, and No. 2 awards medals only for "signal exertions in rescuing or suecoring the shipwrecked and saving persons from drowning, either by actual shipwreck or from being upon or connected with any vessel in distress." I return the inclosures transmitted with your note. Respectfully, JOHN W. GRIGGS. The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. ATTORNEY-GENERAL--OPINION. The claim of Dudley & Michener for the payment of a sum of money as compensation for the cancellation by the War Department of a contract entered into between that Department and the claimants for furnishing the Government with Mauser rifles is one which, under the act of July 31, 1894 (28 Stat., 208), and the decisions of this Department, should be referred to the Comptroller of the Treasury for his opinion. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, SIR: On November 17, 1898, your predecessor transmitted to me a communication addressed to him by Messrs. Dudley & Michener, of this city, making claim upon the War Department for the payment of a certain sum as compensation for the cancellation by the War Department of a contract entered into between the War Department and Dudley & Michener on the 9th of July. 1898, for furnishing the Government with 20,000 Mauser rifles, etc. Secretary Alger requested the opinion of the Attorney-General as to whether or not he had authority to pay Messrs. Dudley & Michener their claim. The question submitted for my opinion is one which, under the act of July 31, 1894 (28 Stat., 208, chap. 174, sec. 8), may be, and under the decisions of this Department ought to be, submitted to the Comptroller of the Treasury. (See 21 Opin., 178, 181, 188, 530, and opinion of December 20, 1899.) I accordingly return the claim of Dudley & Michener, in order that it may be referred to the Comptroller for his opinion, if desired. In explanation of the delay in acting upon this matter, I would say that I was under the impression that the claim of Messrs. Dudley & Michener had been in some way adjusted so as not to require any opinion thereon, and therefore filed the papers under that misapprehension. Very respectfully, The SECRETARY OF WAR. JOHN W. GRIGGS. CIVIL-SERVICE-REINSTATEMENT. The words "specifically required by law," found in section 2, Rule IX, of the Civil-Service Rules, which provides that "Any person who has been separated from the service by reason of a reduction of force specifically required by law may be reinstated, etc.," mean that the reduction of force must have been specifically required, not that the removal of the particular individual must have been specifically required by law. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, April 20, 1900. SIR: By letter of March 5, 1900, you transmitted to me copies of correspondence between the Treasury Department and the Civil Service Commission relative to the proposed reinstatement of Mrs. Louise Tompkins as a clerk in the office of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, who had previously, as claimed by your Department, been separated from the service by reason of a reduction of force specifically required by law. Referring to the facts and contentions of the parties, as set forth in the correspondence referred to, you request my opinion as to whether Mrs. Tompkins is eligible for reinstatement under the second proviso of Rule IX of the Civil-Service Rules. |