of ownership obtained by the owner before leaving this country, and nothing in the regulations is to affect the right of a customs officer to inspect and seize any fur-seal skin or garment imported which he may find to have been imported in violation of the act.

The first step in the inquiry on any such case is the consideration of the evil to be remedied, and the evil which this act seeks to prevent is the killing of fur seals in certain waters of the North Pacific Ocean. It is to be noticed that section 9 applies to "any person whatsoever" and to all fur-seal skins "imported after this act shall take effect."

Now, in view of the attitude and claims of the United States regarding fur seals taken in the waters in question, it might be contended that the clearly mandatory provisions of the act and of the regulations thereunder apply to any person who enters the territory of the United States with such articles in his possession, although he may be innocent of the intent to violate the law and may be ignorant of its provisions, and may allege with truth that such innocence and ignorance should protect him, because he has not in fact imported the article into the United States, but is merely in transit to his home in a foreign country, and is therefore entitled to export it in bond. In other words, the inquiry is, whether the general purpose of the act of 1897 for the protection of fur seals gives it such effect as to embrace within its provisions fur-seal skins casually brought into the United States by citizens or subjects of other powers who do not intend to dispose of the skins or the garments into which they are manufactured in this country, but are merely in transit with the same to or from their homes in foreign territory.

The statement itself of this question perhaps suggests that an affirmative answer would give too broad a scope to the act of 1897, but I merely formulate the entire inquiry and do not undertake herein to answer for the reason, as suggested, that an answer may not now be necessary. I observe, however, that the solution of the matter turns on the meaning to be given to the word "importation" in section 9 of the act-whether it shall be held to mean on the one hand a bare arrival of goods within the limits of a port

of entry (United States v. Vowell, 5 Cr., 368; Arnold v. United States, 9 Cr., 104) with the intention to unlade (United States v. Ten Thousand Cigars, 2 Curt., 436; Harrison v. Vose, 9 How., 372, 381; United States v. Lyman, 1 Mason, 499; McLean v. Hager, 31 Fed. Rep., 602, 606; The Schooner Mary, 1 Gall., 206) or, on the other hand, shall be held to mean such an arrival of goods with the further intention of disposing of them by sale or otherwise within the country.

The decisions just cited refer to merchandise shipped in the ordinary course of trade for sale and consumption or use within the territory, rather than to effects accompanying a traveler; although, of course, it is obvious that any general relaxation of definitions in favor of travelers, even if not forbidden by existing law, only increases the opportunities for evasion of law which naturally exist respecting travelers' effects. As to the administrative practice, it appears from your letter of March 14 and its inclosure that the Treasury Department, while applying, without express limitation to residents, the rule that women's wearing apparel brought by a man is not free of duty as personal effects (S. 18448), and applying, also without such limitation, to "passengers departing from and arriving within the United States," Regulations I-V of Treasury Circular No. 55, dated April 10, 1899, nevertheless inclines to the recognition of such a case as the present one as matter of transit rather than of importation by permitting Canadians owning seal-skin garments and going abroad through the United States to forward such garments for transit in sealed crates from points in Canada just across the line; and, further, if residents of Canada or other foreign countries returning en route to their homes have not obtained a certificate of ownership under the regulations before departure abroad (as many such travelers do), and do not produce the required invoice certified by a United States consul, they are required to give other satisfactory evidence of ownership and origin of the seal skins of like character with that demanded from returning residents of the United States who are without a certificate or certified invoice.

That is, the garment is inspected with reference to its

apparent age, etc., in order to determine to the satisfaction of the officer whether under the law it should be detained for further proof or ultimate destruction, or may be released. But it seems that while a passenger en route to Canada, in the absence of satisfactory evidence of origin of the skins, would not be permitted to retain the garment in his possession while within this country, yet if it is found within his baggage the package may be forwarded to the port of exit under bonded carriage.

I infer from these facts and rules that you possess practically a certain administrative discretion on the subject, and may not only receive from any owner who is a returning traveler other evidence of origin of the skins of which a garment accompanying him or her is manufactured than a certificate of ownership or a certified consular invoice, but, if you are satisfied that there was no intention to violate the customs-revenue laws or the act of 1897, may allow the foreigner passing through this country to transport and export in bond a fur-seal garment, although the skins of which it is manufactured, while not intended to remain in this country, may not be proved to have been taken in other waters than those specified in the act of 1897 or before the act took effect.

I am, however, clearly of opinion that if the act of 1897 is applicable to Pearson's case, and is invoked by you, the burden of proof thereunder rests and remains upon the claimant. Neither the acquittal on the charge of smuggling nor any other proceeding under the customs-revenue laws has the effect of shifting the burden of proof in the entirely distinct and different proceedings, summary and executive rather than judicial, provided by section 9 of the act of 1897.

Very respectfully,

JOHN W. GRIGGS.

The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.

DISPOSITION OF WRECKED SPANISH WAR VESSELS.

The Spanish vessels wrecked in battle by the naval vessels of the United States during the war with Spain, and now lying along the coast of Cuba, are the property of the United States.

That island being now temporarily within the jurisdiction of the United States, the Secretary of the Treasury, under section 3755, Revised Statutes, has power to make such provision for the sale or other disposition of such wrecked vessels as he may deem necessary.

Section 3755 applies as well to wrecks which are the property of the United States as to the vessels of private owners which have been wrecked, abandoned, or become derelict.

The acts of June 14, 1880 (21 Stat., 197), and August 2, 1882 (22 Stat., 208), which authorize the Secretary of War to remove sunken vessels or craft which obstruct the navigation of a "navigable" water of the United States, do not apply to the coastal waters of Cuba, as such waters do not become waters of the United States by reason of the temporary jurisdiction of the United States over that island.

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

March 29, 1900.

SIR: Referring to your communication of the 17th instant, relative to the Spanish vessels lying aground along the shores of Cuba, you inform me that after making costly efforts to raise such of said vessels as were thought to be worth repairing and to recover from them articles of value left on board, with scant success, however, and having no further appropriation available for such uses, the Navy Department has abandoned the undertaking, being uncertain as to the extent of its jurisdiction in the premises, the situation being novel and the existing status peculiar.

In this connection you call my attention to section 3755 of the Revised Statutes and section 4 of the act of June 14, 1880 (21 Stat., 197), and the act of August 2, 1882 (22 Stat., 208).

It seems, further, that the various wrecks are of no use for the naval service and are not desired for other purposes, and that a certain application has been received from persons who wish to raise the wreck of the Alphonso XII, destroyed by the Terror and other vessels, and now lying off the north shore of Cuba. The Navy Department, therefore, being uncertain as to its authority and rights in relation

to the matter, wishes an expression of my views before taking any action with regard to the disposition of the property in question.

I have the honor to state in response that the question. respecting the Alphonso XII appears to be the only one actually arising and pending in the Navy Department, and my observations, therefore, as to the status of the wrecked vessels generally are to be taken as suggestions rather than as a formal opinion by which your action is to be guided.

It would seem that if the Navy Department has neither general nor special authority in law to recover and preserve these wrecks and their appurtenances, and if the only appropriation available has now been exhausted, the conclusion to abandon the undertaking was necessary. Section 3755, Revised Statutes, authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury

"To make such contracts and provisions as he may deem for the interest of the Government for the preservation, sale, or collection of any property or the proceeds thereof which may have been wrecked, abandoned, or become derelict, being within the jurisdiction of the United States, and which ought to come to the United States."

These wrecks all appear to be lying on the shores and in the coast waters of Cuba, and as that island is now within the jurisdiction of the United States under the treaty with Spain and in international law, although temporarily so, and by means of a military government, it is my opinion that section 3755 gives to the Secretary of the Treasury complete authority in the premises.

The portions of the acts of June 14, 1880, and August 2, 1882, which you cite, make it the duty of the Secretary of War to remove sunken vessels or craft which obstruct the navigation of a "navigable water" of the United States, and give him a certain discretion respecting the sale and disposition of any such sunken craft. As these acts are restricted to navigable waters of the United States, I am of opinion that they do not apply to the coast waters of the island of Cuba, which do not become waters of the United States by reason of our temporary jurisdiction over that island. The plain meaning and intent of the language of the acts of 1880 and 1882 in my opinion forbid that view.