without return certificates, and then to have certificates forwarded to them, but that the established rule which is consistent with the treaty requires personal delivery of the return certificate by the collector to the Chinaman. It seems that this decision applied to a case which presented at least as strong an equity as the present case, whether the express requirement of the act of 1888 and the regulations that an application shall be made by the laborer in person a month prior to departure, or the general language of the treaty that the Chinese laborer shall, before leaving, deposit, etc., without any definite limit of time before departure, be taken as the true guide. Here there was no application whatever to the collector, but the Chinaman's petition, duly sworn to and dated on one day, was apparently handed the next day at the gang plank of the steamer to the Chinese inspector, who stamped it with his visé, seemingly without examination. It may be that the Chinese inspector was careless in the performance of his duty, and that he should not have permitted the applicant to go on board without a proper return certificate. It may be that the Chinaman did not understand the law, and relied, to his harm, on statements made to him by interested parties that he had done all that was incumbent on him; that he thought he was entitled to return upon the incomplete paper which he possessed, and thus was innocently misled. by the action of the Government officer in affixing his certification of departure. But even if it is assumed that the inspector knew of the defect in the Chinaman's paper (which is not a necessary assumption), and, notwithstanding the performance of a routine duty in the hurry and confusion of a steamer's sailing, should have observed the obvious omissions and defects in the Chinaman's paper and should have turned him back, I can not grant that this constitutes an estoppel against the Government which should prevent the enforcement of the usual rules. It is by no means clear that the Chinaman can complain of the Government inspector with any force or reason; but if he could, such complaint can not be heard to avoid the requirements of the law. The result may be in part the inspector's fault, and may be altogether the misfortune of the Chinaman without any intentional fault on his part; but that situation can not be taken as equivalent to a title and right to reenter the country, notwithstanding the failure to comply with the law. It is the essence of the right that application should be made sufficiently long in advance of departure to enable the Government to make investigation before a return certificate is signed and issued. Therefore it appears to me to be a case where the principle of nunc pro tune is particularly inapplicable and improper. For that principle, if applied to this case, would result in passing an application now which should not only have been made a month before the Chinaman's departure, and was not, but was never made at all; and in issuing a return certificate to a person who should have taken it with him when he left this country, and who, by the express mandate of a law which is presumably in force, is not permitted to return to this country without it. Nevertheless there seem to be peculiar elements of equity and hardship in this case, although the only fact which clearly appears is the fact that the Chinaman is a registered laborer, and the claim that he has a wife and child in this country is asserted rather than established. Assuming that his home and family and business are in the United States, where he appears to have lived without offense for many years, it is fair to say that the man was simply ignorant and was innocent of fraud, for with these compelling reasons moving him to return, and with the evidence that he desired to do so and had taken the preliminary steps to obtain the right, it is not likely that he willfully and intentionally avoided the completion of these steps and took the manifest risk of refusal of entry on his return. I must find, however, that under the peculiar nature and language of these laws it is not possible to recognize the appeal to considerations of elementary justice and humanity (even if well-founded), or to bring the case within the scope of an act of executive clemency. The Chinese-exclusion laws are necessarily rigorous and of the highest degree of technicality, and do not permit the imposition of maxims of equity which commend or command judicial authorities to search with scrupulous care for a way to do justice when the technicalities of the law present obstructions. I venture the suggestion, however, that in your power and discretion as administering these laws, and especially in your comprehensive authority over such "landing" cases as these, you may fairly soften the seeming harshness of the case by continuing the custody of the man and delaying his return to China long enough to enable his business interests here to be settled and his wife and child to accompany him on his return voyage; provided you find upon investigation that the allegations as showing an equity are true, and provided, further, the responsibility of the steamship company for safe custody covers the additional period of detention. I return the papers herewith. Very respectfully, The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. P. C. KNOX. AUTOMOBILE-DRAWBACK. An importer is not entitled to a refund of duties paid upon an automobile imported for use in the construction of an express wagon upon the reexportation of the completed wagon, such wagon not being a manufacture within the meaning of section 3019, Revised Statutes, and of section 30 of the act of July 24, 1897 (30 Stat., 211). To entitle an importer to a refund of duties under those statutes, it is necessary that the ultimate completed article shall be wholly manufactured in this country, and the mere combination of a completed motor with, or its construction into, a vehicle, does not constitute a new and distinct manufacture within the meaning of the drawback laws. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, SIR: I beg to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of January 30, in which you state that the Adams Express Company has applied for the allowance of drawback on an automobile used in the construction of an express wagon; that the motor when imported was complete as such, but there was no provision for a framework or other portions of the superstructure which were built in this country; that subsequently the company, in order to make a better machine, which would work satisfactorily in the conduct of their business, overhauled the apparatus and added a number of new 19395-VOL 23-02- -40 parts. It then appeared that the machine so constructed and reconstructed would not perform the work for which it was imported, and the company now desires to export the same in its present condition with the benefit of a drawback. You ask my opinion on the question, whether a machine so produced constitutes a manufacture within the meaning of the drawback laws, calling my attention to the case of the Tide Water Oil Company v. United States (171 U. S., 210). I have the honor to say that the case mentioned construes section 3019, Revised Statutes, providing for a drawback equal to the duties paid on all articles wholly manufactured in this country of imported materials. The articles in that case were packing boxes made out of imported shooks manufactured in Canada, which required slight trimming and mere nailing together in this country to constitute the finished boxes. The court held that boxes so constructed were not wholly manufactured in the United States, and that drawback was not allowable. In the course of the opinion they say: The object of the section was evidently not only to build up an export trade, but to encourage manufactures in this country, where such manufactures are intended for exportation, by granting a rebate of duties upon the raw or prepared materials imported, and thus enabling the manufacturer to compete in foreign markets with the same articles manufactured in other countries." And again: * *The object of the drawback was partly, at least, to encourage domestic manufactures." It is evident, then, that under this law and under later analogous drawback laws, the joint purpose or object is to build up an export trade and to encourage domestic manufactures, and one or the other of these objects may be said, in general, to be the basis of all drawback laws. The following is an outline of the statutes upon the subject: Duty-paid merchandise may remain in warehouse in Government custody, and if exported directly from that custody within three years shall be entitled to return duties (sec. 2977, Rev. Stat.). But no return of duties shall be allowed on exportation of merchandise after it has been removed from the custody and control of the Government (secs. 2978 and 3025), except as provided in section 3019, supra, and except in the case of certain specified articles also involving the principle of the use of material produced or labor applied in the United States (secs. 3020, 3022, 3026). These other specific exceptions do not affect the instance before us. In the evolution of the subject, beginning with section 3019, other laws have been passed, the most recent of which is section 30 of the tariff act of July 24, 1897, which provides in part "That where imported materials on which duties have been paid are used in the manufacture of articles manufactured or produced in the United States, there shall be allowed on the exportation of such articles a drawback equal in amount to the duties paid on the materials used, less one per centum of such duties"-with provisos requiring that both the domestic and imported materials used shall be so identified and so appear in the completed article that the quantity or measure thereof may be ascertained. In the view I take of this question, however, it will not be necessary to consider these provisos; and, indeed, if the case were clearly favorable to the importer on the fundamental propositions, it is likely that the provisos would present no difficulty. I see no reason to doubt that under the intent of the later law, as well as under the express language of section 3019, Revised Statutes, it is necessary that the ultimate completed article shall be wholly manufactured in this country, whatever the stage of advancement of the preceding "materials" may be. It is clearly decided that the idea of "materials" does not demand products in the cruder stages; that the finished product of one manufacture may become the material of the next in rank, i. e., the material may be raw material or material which was the result of the last complete manufacture. (Tide Water Oil Co. v. United States, ut supra.) But the import of that decision is that the boxes were partially or even substantially manufactured abroad before the separate parts were assembled in this country. It is true, on the one hand, that if, for instance, all the separate parts of a watch are imported from abroad and merely put together in this country, the watch is not manufactured in the United States |
