3074, Revised Statutes, which provides that in all cases of seizure of property subject to forfeiture for any of the causes named in any provision of law relating to the customs, the value of which does not exceed $500, it shall be appraised by two sworn appraisers at or near the place of seizure, but if there are no such appraisers, then by two competent and disinterested citizens of the United States, to be selected for that purpose by the collector or other principal officer of the revenue residing at or near the place of seizure.

Section 13 of the customs administrative act of 1890 provides that the decision of the appraiser, or, at ports where there is no appraiser, the certificate of the customs officer acting as such, of the dutiable value of merchandise requiring to be appraised shall be deemed and taken to be the appraisement of such merchandise, which, in the absence of an application, either by the collector or the importer, for reappraisement, shall be final and conclusive as to dutiable value against all parties interested. But in case the importer is dissatisfied, or the collector deems the appraisement too low, the question of dutiable value is submitted to a reappraisement by one of the general appraisers, and then may be taken for review, either by the Government or the importer, before a board of three general appraisers, whose decision upon such appeal or review is final and conclusive as to dutiable value.

It is conceded that section 3074 properly applies to cases involving illegal importation (sees. 2865, 3082, R. S.), but it seems that where goods are regularly entered and become liable to forfeiture for undervaluation, the Government's claim for forfeiture rests entirely upon the advance in value by the appraiser or by the Board of General Appraisers. Does section 3074 or section 13 of the customs administrative act provide the rule or method of appraisement in this latter case?

I think there can be no doubt that the laws finally consolidated and embodied in the customs administrative act were intended to supplant the earlier system, and that the method of appraisement provided by section 13 superseded the antecedent statutes and the generally antiquated manner of appraisement by merchant appraisers. The description of

"two competent and disinterested citizens of the United States" contained in section 3074 is evidently an accompaniment and relic of the merchant appraiser system (see secs. 2609, 2930, 2973, R. S.), which is in the main obsolete, although sections 2609 and 2973 are still in the law, and resort is occasionally had at certain ports to section 2609. Section 2930, however, was expressly repealed by section 29 of the customs administrative act.

Now Congress, in exercising its broad right relative to the revenue to devise a general system, with summary features (Cary v. Curtis, 3 How., 236, 245; Cheatham v. United States, 92 U. S., 85, 88; Auffmordt v. Hedden, 137 U. S., 310, 324), "has from time to time passed laws on the subject of the revenue which not only provide for the manner of its collection, but also point out a way in which errors can be corrected. These laws constitute a system * * * "" (Nichols v. United States, 7 Wall., 122, 130) which is universal (State Railroad Tax Cases, 92 U. S., 575, 613) and complete (Auffmordt v. Hedden, ut supra).

The Nichols case, as cited, decided that cases arising under the revenue laws are not within the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims, on the ground suggested by the passage quoted; and it was decided in Arnson v. Murphy, 109 U. S., 238, and Cheatham v. United States, ante, that a certain antecedent right was taken away by acts leading up to the customs administrative act, and that the statutory remedy on that right was exclusive (Schoenfeld v. Hendricks, 152 U. S., 691). In such a system of laws the last expression of the legislative will, embracing the whole field and consolidating and correlating previous statutes, must be regarded as defining an integral scheme. The underlying principle is restated and fortified by authorities in the Paquete Habana, 175 U. S., 677, 685, viz:

"And it is a well-known rule in the construction of statutes, often affirmed and applied by this court, that even where two acts are not in express terms repugnant, yet if the later act covers the whole subject of the first, and embraces new provisions plainly showing that it was intended as a substitute for the first act, it will operate as a repeal of that act."

I also observe that the title of the customs administrative

act is "An act to simplify the laws in relation to the collection of the revenue."

I therefore think it has been established that the customs administration provided by the act of 1890 is a complete, uniform, and universal system, substituting exclusive remedies for those previously in vogue.

Accordingly, it seems to me that whenever dutiable value of merchandise subject to appraisement is invoived, and no question of criminality or fraudulent illegality arises prior to appraisement, the appraisement is to be conducted according to section 13 of the customs administrative act, and not according to section 3074, Revised Statutes. This is the case under section 7 of the customs administrative act as amended by the act of July 24, 1897, which chiefly contemplates appraisement for dutiable value, although forfeiture as a penalty for undervaluation may be a result. On the other hand, where the claim of forfeiture is based upon a forged invoice or smuggling (sec. 2865), or on fraudulent importation contrary to law, or concealment or sale after such importation (sec. 3082), it is evident that appraisement for dutiable value is not an element of the transaction. The phrase "dutiable value" applies properly to importations regular on their face and legal in all respects unless undervaluation should appear; and undervaluation, while subject to additional duties or penalized, is hardly criminal and is often consistent with innocence and unintentional mistake. In short, the method of appraisement of said section 13 is the exclusive method to be employed on the civil side of customs-revenue administration; and the appraisement procedure in undervaluation cases which aims at the levy of additional duties is none the less civil because forfeiture may accrue or be incurred as a possible ultimate result.

It is true that section 3074 speaks of property subject to forfeiture for any of the causes named in any provision of lar relating to customs; but that may properly be held to refer to such provisions of law existing when the Revised Statutes took effect. One of the later acts from which section 3074 is drawn limits the included laws "relating to the customs" by the words "now in force" (sec. 11, act July 18, 1866, 14 Stat., 178, 180). It is also true that section 3074 is not

enumerated among the sections of the Revised Statutes expressly repealed by section 29 of the customs administrative act. But it was necessary to save section 3074 as applicable to customs causes of forfeiture other than those developed by the appraisement of dutiable value; that is, to such causes as were criminal in their nature ut supra; and the general repeal of inconsistent provisions by section 29 is sufficient for the repeal pro tanto of section 3074. There is clearly an unavoidable repugnancy, so far, between the earlier and later law.

I may also suggest that a dissatisfied importer has a complete remedy under section 13 aforesaid, which will ultimately bring his case before a board of three general appraisers. The reason for the provision of appraisement by two competent and disinterested citizens, founded on motives of protection to an importer, thus ceasing in a case like the present, the law itself falls to the same extent, in accordance with a well-known maxim. Nor may the official character of the Government appraisers, in contrast with the disinterested character of unofficial citizens, be alleged as a reason for applying section 3074, because that section itself obviously contemplates no such objection, and, indeed, prefers two sworn appraisers under the revenue laws" when there are such at hand.

I have the honor, therefore, to respond to your request for an opinion upon the question submitted, by holding that it is not necessary to have merchandise seized for violation of section 32 of the act of July 24, 1897, appraised by two competent and disinterested citizens of the United States," to be selected by an officer of the customs for that purpose, because section 13 of the customs administrative act provides the proper method of appraisement.

Very respectfully,

JOHN W. GRIGGS.

The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.

ALIEN LABOR-LACEMAKERS.

The immigration clearly forbidden by section 1 of the act of February 26, 1885 (23 Stat., 332), is that brought under contract to perform

manual labor or service; and manual labor includes both skilled and unskilled labor.

The case of the Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U. S., 457, considered. The proper distinction, founded on this case (id., 463), is that between manual labor, including the mechanical trades, on the one side, and the professions on the other.

Alien lacemakers, if not entitled to admission into this country under some provision contained in the above-named act, or acts supplemental thereto, should be excluded as manual laborers, skilled or unskilled, who have come to this country in order to perform labor or service. A "draftsman," who is described as a “lacemaker," seems to be one who is so closely connected with the particular trade as to be a member of it, just as a molder or designer of molds appears to belong to the metal-casting trade.

"Design" refers to manufactures as well as to the fine arts, and the test of the individual's industrial character may depend upon the nature of his designs or the conditions and methods of its application to manufacture.

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
January 28, 1901.

SIR: Your letters of January 10 and 11 present for my opinion the question whether certain alien lace makers who have lately arrived at the port of Philadelphia should be refused a landing by the immigration authorities on the ground that they have come to this country in violation of the alien contract labor laws. You state that the question has arisen in view of language of the Supreme Court in the case of the Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States (143 U. S., 457), it being contended on one hand that this opinion narrows the application of said laws to aliens coming to the United States to perform manual labor, and on the other that the opinion simply decided that an alien clergyman engaged abroad to perform duties of his calling in this country is not within the statute, and that the more enlarged declarations of the opinion are mere dicta.

I am thus apprised that I am not to consider other grounds which are submitted on behalf of these aliens and on which they may or may not be entitled to admission, whatever the character of their labor or service, and whatever the real or supposed scope of the decision in the Trinity Church case. These grounds would depend largely, if not altogether, on the facts before you or within your reach, and present for careful consideration the claims that there was no contract