national neutrality, and were properly subjected to the penalty of prize law.

In the case of the Benito Estenger the claimant's petition submits as ground for Executive clemency the contention that the claimant is and was a Cuban sympathizer as distinguished from other Spanish subjects who were loyal to Spain during the war, and the fact that the district court and the Supreme Court, in condemning the vessel, stated that in such case, if the distinction suggested exists in fact and is based on services to the Cubans, or if for any reason the circumstances justify liberal treatment, relief rests in the Executive and doe: not belong to the courts. In this application also it is alleged that the purpose of the voyage, ending in seizure and condemnation, was not to trade with the enemy, but to serve the cause of humanity-in this case by the shipment of food stuffs to Manzanillo to supply the needy and starving families of the insurgents. The claim indicates the view that the vessel owner, though a Spanish subject and technically an enemy, being a Cuban sympathizer and engaged in this asserted mission, was an ally of the United States, and that it is inconsistent, harsh, and unjust to condemn his property. And with the suggestion that he properly relied upon a certain arrangement, which he is of opinion was consummated by him in his capacity of ally with the United States consul at Kingston, Jamaica, and through the latter with Admiral Sampson, which entitled him to protection, are submitted, as establishing his status, certificates of municipal officers at Santiago de Cuba showing that the claimant is a citizen of standing who has been active in the civic affairs of that municipality since the reorganization of its government under American control, and certain other certificates of various other Cuban gentlemen of consequence expressing the conviction that the claimant's standing as a Cuban patriot, who rendered the services stated to the insurgents, is undoubted.

But in this case, as in that of the Adula, I must note the fact that the claims as now advanced were in substance passed upon by the Supreme Court and determined adversely to the claimant, and if it shall be considered that additional evidence vindicating, or tending to vindicate, the claimant's

status as a well-known and consistent Cuban patriot, is presented, I have to observe that evidence which was before. the court in the shape of the original documents in the case, but which was not touched upon in the opinion, made it clear beyond any real question that the contentions of the claimant were not so well founded in fact as to raise a substantial equity and justify relief from the legal penalty imposed. By reason of this I am bound to think that the Cuban gentlemen who support the claimant's petition have been unwittingly, or in a measure, misled in reference to the specific facts involved in the case. I do not intend to suggest that such support is due to any contrivance of the claimant, because, in the doubtful aspect and issue of events at that time in Cuba, as affecting individual subjects of Spain resident there and their property rights, a man might honestly entertain sentiments of sympathy with the Cuban cause, and be willing to carry those sentiments into action, and yet, through inability to do so, or through failure of the facts presented to measure up to the requirements of action requisite to show service to our own Government or to the insurgents, a case for Executive interposition would not be established. At least, in this case, apart from the claims advanced, or in contrast with them, if the matter should be so regarded, the evidence contained in the original documents and exhibits referred to, in addition to the evidence of the printed record, shows such a state of facts and relations regarding the claimant as to leave the petition without substantial foundation. It follows, therefore, in

the case of the Benito Estenger, as in that of the Adula, that circumstances which may justify liberal treatment by the Executive, referred to in the opinion of the Supreme Court in the Benito Estenger case as quoted supra, do not exist, and the condemnation being proper in law and without valid objection founded in equity, the extension of Executive clemency, if guided by no other considerations than those now before you, would not appear to be justified. As I have already remarked, these applications are necessarily addressed to the pardoning power and presuppose offenses against the United States. And yet, the ground brought forward is in effect, in both cases, the entire inno19395-VOL 23-02-24

cence of the claimants of offense, or even of an intention to commit an offense. The district court and the Supreme Court of the United States have both found the acts of the claimants inconsistent with innocence. If they were guilty, as it is solemnly adjudged they were, there is no ground upon which they are entitled to any clemency. They are to be considered as having intentionally violated their rights and privileges as trading vessels. Another point, therefore, to be borne in mind is that the grant of clemency by act of Executive grace purely, if determined upon by you, ought not to appear as amounting to a finding of innocence. The contrary finding of an offense committed (if not of guilt) is as fully established by the judgment of the Supreme Court as if the court had affirmed a jury's verdict of guilty in a criminal prosecution.

I remain, sir, very respectfully,

The PRESIDENT.

JOHN W. GRIGGS.

CIVIL SERVICE-PORTO RICO-PHILIPPINES.

The attitude of the executive and legislative departments of the Government has been, and is, that the native inhabitants of Porto Rico and the Philippine Islands did not become citizens of the United States by virtue of the cession of the islands by Spain by means of the treaty of Paris.

The act for the temporary government of Porto Rico did not confer Federal citizenship upon the inhabitants of that island.

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

January 23, 1901.

SIR: I have the honor to return herewith the various papers relating to the proposed amendment to the civilservice rules which is intended to govern applicants for examination for appointment to the civil service of the United States in Porto Rico and the Philippine Islands.

I have read and considered the views of the different members of the Civil Service Commission, as contained in these papers, and submit herewith a draft of a rule which, in my judgment, ought to be adopted to cover the case.

The undisputed attitude of the executive and legislative departments of the Government has been and is that the

native inhabitants of Porto Rico and the Philippine Islands did not become citizens of the United States by virtue of the cession of the islands by Spain by means of the treaty of Paris. It was not the intention of the commissioners who negotiated the treaty to give those inhabitants the status of citizens of the United States. The act for the temporary government of Porto Rico did not confer upon the native inhabitants of that island Federal citizenship, but denominated them citizens of Porto Rico.

In my judgment, the position thus deliberately assumed by the executive and legislative branches of the Government violates no constitutional provision, as I have contended in my arguments before the Supreme Court in the cases recently discussed before that tribunal.

The language of the amendment I have recommended is so constructed as to permit the native inhabitants of the Philippine Islands and the citizens of Porto Rico to be admitted to examination and appointment in the civil service in those islands, respectively, thus preserving a consistency of construction by the executive department, but withholding no actual right to which the inhabitants in question may be said to be justly entitled with respect to the civil service.

I am, sir, very respectfully,

The PRESIDENT.

JOHN W. GRIGGS.

IMPORTATION OF COPYRIGHTED BOOKS PRINTED ABROAD.

The importation of books copyrighted in the United States prior to 1891, and subsequently printed abroad, is not prohibited by section 3 of the act of March 3, 1891. (26 Stat., 1106, 1107.)

The requirements and prohibitions of section 4956, as amended by said act, took effect in general prospectively, and do not embrace in their burdens (without regard to their benefits) a copyright obtained before March 3, 1891.

The new parts or the changed portions of an amended law, unless expressly applied, should not be held to diminish or injure vested rights under the earlier law.

A law speaks from the date of its approval or from the future date fixed to take effect, except so far as it is in terms retrospective.

Section 4959, as amended by the act of March 3, 1891, permits rather than requires a revised edition of a book by foreign authors theretofore published to be copyrighted.

Opinion of April 19, 1895 (21 Opin., 159), distinguished and criticised.

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

January 24, 1901.

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of December 15, 1900, which states that the American Book Company, of New York, has applied to you for relief in the matter of an importation of Liddell & Scott's GreekEnglish Lexicon, under detention at the port of New York for supposed violation of section 3 of the copyright act of March 3, 1891; that the copyright in the United States of the seventh edition of the work issued in 1882 was owned by Harper & Brothers, of New York; that the copyright of the present or eighth edition is owned by the applicant under assignment from Harper & Brothers; and calling my attention to an opinion of Solicitor-General Conrad (21 Opin., 159), you request my opinion on the question whether the book, having been copyrighted in this country prior to the act of 1891, is subject to the prohibitive provision of section 3 of said act. You indicate that the importation consists of the folded and unstitched sheets constituting the parts of the copyrighted book, designed to be stitched and bound in volumes in this country as the eighth edition, but not made from type set within the limits of the United States.

Responding to your request, I have to say that this work, a standard authority of English scholarship, in passing through its several editions, has been revised, corrected, augmented, and improved with the cooperation especially of American Greek scholars, and in the eighth English edi tion a short note to the preface, signed with the initials of Professor Liddell, and dated "Ascot, June, 1897," states that certain slight corrections and additions have been inserted in the text, the rest appearing in the addenda.

The copyright law, previous to the "international copy right act" of 1891 (26 Stat., 1106), gave the benefit of copyright only to citizens of the United States or residents therein (Rev. Stat., sec. 4952). The law of 1891 extended the benefit reciprocally to foreign authors and artists, and