treaty of 1819 with Spain, which admitted the inhabitants of the Spanish territory of Florida "to the enjoyment of the privileges, rights, and immunities of the citizens of the United States," says: "This treaty is the law of the land, and admits the inhabitants of Florida to the enjoyment of the privileges, rights, and immunities, of the citizens of the United States. It is unnecessary to inquire, whether this is not their condition, independent of stipulation." It is to be observed that the power "to establish an uniform rule of naturalization," vested in Congress by clause 4, section 8, Article I of the Constitution of the United States, is an affirmative grant by virtue of which Congress was authorized to displace conflicting State laws on the subject. This grant can not properly be construed to limit the power of Congress, under the authority" to make rules and regulations respecting the territory belonging to the United States," to provide diversely for individual or collective naturalization in territories acquired, with a view to the special circumstances or needs of each territory. Upon this principle proceeds the express application to organized territories (sec. 2165, Revised Statutes) of the uniform rules respecting individual naturalization through the courts. And on the same principle depend the varying laws respecting both individual and collective naturalization which have been enacted for certain territories and classes of people (post, and sec. 100 of the Hawaiian act cited). In other words, our ordinary naturalization laws are of general but not universal application. It never seems to have been supposed that the power to establish a uniform rule of naturalization meant anything more than that individual applications to become citizens by proceedings in judicial tribunals should rest upon uniform authority and should follow the same forms everywhere in the United States, and in the territories when the rules should be extended and applied to them by Congress. It has never been asserted that the language of this grant of power affected the right of Congress to exclude or to admit certain classes of aliens by special or collective provisions; or the right of the treaty-making power to stipulate for the same results. (See, for a stipulation denying naturalization, Article IV of the Chinese treaty of 1894 ut supra). Accordingly, we find that the power of collective naturalization has been frequently exercised by the President and Senate: In the treaty for the cession of Louisiana, which agreed to admit the inhabitants to the rights of citizens of the United States (Art. III, Treaties and Conventions between the United States and other Powers, p. 331; The Mayor of New Orleans v. Armas, 9 Pet., 223; opinion of Justice Catron in Dred Scott v. Sandford, 19 How., 393, 525); in the treaty with Spain of 1819 referred to in American Insurance Co. v. Canter, supra; in the treaty of 1848 with Mexico (Article VIII, Treaties and Conventions, etc., pp. 681, 685; People v. Naglee, 1 Cal., 232), which gave Mexican citizens in the ceded territory the right of election to become citizens of the United States, and made continuance in the Territory after a year the exercise of that election; and in the Alaska treaty of 1867 (Art. III, Treaties and Conventions, etc., pp. 939, 941), which conferred a similar right upon the inhabitants of Alaska, excepting uncivilized native tribes. Congress, also, has in many instances carried this power into effect. In Boyd v. Thayer, 143 U. S., 135, holding that Congress has the power to effect a collective naturalization on the admission of a State into the Union, by reason of the necessary adoption as citizens of the United States of those whom Congress makes members of the political community, the court says: "Congress, in the exercise of the power to establish an uniform rule of naturalization, has enacted general laws under which individuals may be naturalized; but the instances of collective naturalization by treaty or by statute are numerous." (Id., 162.) And, after reviewing such instances, the court cites the act of February 8, 1887 (24 Stat., 388), making by its terms "every Indian situated as therein referred to a citizen of the United States." "By the annexation of Texas, under a joint resolution of Congress of March 1, 1845, and its admission into the Union on an equal footing with the original States, December 29, 1845, all the citizens of the former republic became, without any express declaration, citizens of the United States [citing 5 Stat., 798; 9 Stat., 108, and other authorities]." (143 U. S., 169.) Compare also the case of Osterman v. Baldwin, 6 Wall., 116, which determined that the act of admission of Texas into the Union was an act of naturalization operating retrospectively. And, finally, the act organizing the Territory of Oklahoma (May 2, 1890; 26 Stat., 81), by its forty-third section, provided, on the one hand, that a member of an Indian tribe in the Indian Territory might apply to the United States court to become a citizen of the United States; and, on the other hand, that a certain Indian confederation, accepting lands in severalty, and selecting their allotments, "shall be deemed to be, and are hereby declared to be, citizens of the United States." With respect to the intention of Congress in the present case, I can not conceive that there is any doubt. The language of the Hawaiian act (sec. 4) is that all persons who are citizens of the Republic of Hawaii on August 12, 1898, are hereby declared to be citizens of the United States and citizens of the Territory of Hawaii." This language is positive and unqualified and leaves nothing to construe. Congress knew the situation in the Hawaiian Islands as well as the situation in this country, and understood the laws of the former republic which were continued, repealed, or subjected to amendment, respectively. It is worthy of remark in this connection that section 3 of the bill to provide a government for Porto Rico, as introduced, declared that all the inhabitants of that island, with a certain qualification and exception, "shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the United States." This provision was stricken out (see sec. 7 of the act, 31 Stat., 77, 79) before the bill became law. But in the Hawaiian case Congress, after annexation, admitted the islands as a Territory, established a Territorial government, and did not withhold or limit the privilege of citizenship, which was within its competence to do, but expressly granted that privilege to all persons who were citizens of the Republic of Hawaii on the date fixed. Congress said a very plain thing, and must be understood to have meant what it said. In consideration of the foregoing authorities and reasoning I am unable to agree with the conclusions upon this subject which the Solicitor of the Treasury expresses in his opinions of September 1 and December 4, 1900. The repugnancy which the Solicitor sees between sections 4 and 101 of the Hawaiian act disappears, as he himself suggests, upon the evident construction that section 101 applies and was intended to apply only to those Chinese who were not citizens of the Republic of Hawaii on August 12. 1898. In my opinion, considerations drawn from the general Chineseexclusion policy of the United States, leading to the prepos session that this grant of privilege is difficult to conceive or impossible to suppose, may not justly be invoked to support a persuasion that Congress did not intend to admit to the full rights of citizenship a class of Chinese persons in a distant land who if they had been domiciled in our midst could under no circumstances ever have become citizens of the United States." Nevertheless this is precisely what Congress did. And it must be observed on the suggestion just quoted that while such Chinese persons being born in China. would not have been entitled to naturalization in this country, on the other hand, if born in the United States under a parental status, as defined in the Wong Kim Ark decision, they would have been citizens of the United States by birth through the force of that decision. I do not think that the plain letter and meaning of the statute may be overthrown by the reasoning upon which the Solicitor of the Treasury relies, and I therefore answer both your questions in the affirmative, assuming it to be conceded, however, on the facts stated by you, that the Chinese persons in question, born and naturalized respectively in the Hawaiian Islands, were in fact citizens of the Republic of Hawaii, under the constitution and laws thereof, on August 12, 1898, and have not since that date in any way abandoned or lost their rights as such. I return herewith the inclosures of your letter. Very respectfully, The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. JOHN W. GRIGGS. CITIZENSHIP OF CHINESE-HAWAII-AMERICAN REGISTRY. Any Chinese person who was a citizen of the Republic of Hawaii on DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, SIR: I beg to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of December 21, with its inclosure, informing me that a native of China, naturalized at Honolulu as a citizen of the Hawaiian Kingdom July 5, 1890, has made application for the documenting of a schooner owned by him. The question which you submit for my opinion is whether, in view of sections 98, 100, and 101 of the act of April 30, 1900, relating to the Hawaiian Islands, the applicant is a citizen of the United States, entitled to take the oath that he is such required by sections 4131 and 4142 of the Revised Statutes. and to have his vessel accordingly admitted to registry, it being understood that she carried a Hawaiian register on the 12th day of August, 1898, and at that time was owned bona fide by a citizen of Hawaii and continued to be so owned until purchased by the applicant herein. Section 98 of the act cited provides: ** "That all vessels carrying Hawaiian registers on the 12th day of August, 1898, and which were owned bona fide by citizens of the United States or the citizens of Hawaii * shall be entitled to be registered as American vessels with the benefits and privileges appertaining thereto * * On this situation I have the honor to say that I have this day rendered to you an opinion upon the general question whether or not, in view of the provisions of section 4 of the Hawaiian act of April 30, 1900, and notwithstanding the provisions of sections 100 and 101 thereof, a Chinese citizen of the Republic of Hawaii, as the applicant here is denominated in the inclosure accompanying your letter, is a citizen |