of 5 acres, and therefore could not have been ceded under the act of March 2, 1874. Moreover, it was not acquired by the Government for the purpose of erecting thereon a light-house, beacon, or building connected therewith. Its purposes are wholly different and belong to a different department of the Government. Even the light-house reservation, which is within, but not a part of, the military reservation, was not ceded under the act of March 2, 1874, for the reason that it had been ceded under a prior act of December 15, 1791, and the Government at that time acquired its title to an exclusive jurisdiction over the 6 acres in question. Moreover, as the last-mentioned tract is more than 5 acres it can not fall within the act of ⚫ March 2, 1874. It is, however, unnecessary to decide whether the attachment could be served within the 6-acre tract which is used for the light-house, for I understand that the attachment which the sheriff seeks to serve was to be executed by the seizure of certain personal effects of the contractor who was then constructing a gun battery on the military reservation as distinguished from the light-house reservation. There can be no question in my mind that, as to the military reservation, the act of March 2, 1874, has no application. The 210-acre tract, therefore, purchased for permanent seacoast defenses must be regarded as having been ceded under the act of December 22, 1808, already quoted, by which the State of Georgia provides that, "after the passing of this act, the Congress of the United States shall have and maintain jurisdiction in and over all the lands they have purchased or which have been ceded or otherwise acquired by them, or hereafter may be acquired, for the purpose of erecting forts or fortifications in this State," thus conferring exclusive jurisdiction as to the tract in question in the United States Government. There was no reservation of any right to serve either the criminal or civil process of the State. It is clear that without such reservation there can be no right in the State authorities to serve process in the tract in question, for it is an elementary principle of law that a judicial officer can not serve process beyond his jurisdiction. In this connection it is enough to call attention to the case of Fort Leavenworth R. R. Co. v. Lowe (114 U. S., 525 et seq.), where it is said: "When the title is acquired by purchase by consent of the legislatures of the States, the Federal jurisdiction is exclusive of all State authority. This follows from the declaration of the Constitution that Congress shall have 'like authority' over such places as it has over the district which is the seat of government; that is, the power of 'exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever.' Broader or clearer language could not be used to exclude all other authority than that of Congress; and that no other authority can be exercised over them has been the uniform opinion of Federal and State tribunals, and of the AttorneysGeneral. " Of course it is competent for the State in relinquishing its sovereignty and ceding it to the United States to reserve the right to serve civil and criminal process. But in this case no such reservation has been made by the State of Georgia, and the granting of power to the United States is absolute and exclusive of all State authority whatsoever. (U. S. v. Cornell, 2 Mason, 60.) It is needless to suggest that the case is not unimportant, as the work of the Government, especially in the important and often urgent matter of national defense, would be seriously embarrassed if the necessary machinery of the contractors, who are engaged in the construction of such means of national defense, could be seized under the process of the State courts. As was said by Mr. Justice Field in the first case cited, "Their exemption from State control is essential for the independence and sovereign authority of the United States within the sphere of their delegated powers." Very respectfully, The SECRETARY OF WAR. JOHN W. GRIGGS. LOTTERY-ENDLESS-CHAIN SCHEMES. The scheme adopted by the Defender Shoe Store for carrying on business through the mails is as follows: A ticket is sent to A, who returns it with 80 cents, and receives a book containing four similar tickets to sell to four different persons, collecting from each, first, 20 cents, which repays him the 80 cents he first sent; second, he collects also from each 80 cents, making $3.20, which he takes with the four tickets to the company's store and for which he gets a pair of shoes. Another book containing four tickets is sent to each of the four persons to whom A sold his tickets, and each is expected, in turn, to sell these four tickets, upon the same terms, and get a pair of shoes therefor, and so on, indefinitely. The schemes adopted by the Parisian Skirt Company, the Peerless Shoe Company, and by Henry Murray are similar in all essential respects, but they differ from the former in that it is not the originator of the series, but the persons to whom he sells the coupons who are to send in the money, and also in containing a provision that in case two coupons are sold, and the cash therefor turned in, the seller is entitled to some other article of less value, or the company will redeem the unsold coupons at a certain value. Held: That such schemes do not come within the prohibition of section 3894, Revised Statutes, as amended by the act of September 19, 1890 (26 Stat., 465), which forbids the transmission through the mails of matter "concerning any lottery, so-called gift concert, or other similar enterprise offering prizes dependent upon lot or chance." The only element of uncertainty as to getting the article offered in each particular case is whether the person will succeed in selling the four tickets, and this depends upon his own ability and exertion as much as ordinarily does the question whether one can sell that which he has for sale. If the condition upon which a prize may be received depends solely upon the ability of the beneficiary to perform that condition, then it does not depend upon "lot or chance," in any legal sense. To constitute "lot or chance," in a legal sense, the condition upon which the prize is to be received must depend for its performance entirely upon others over whom and whose action the beneficiary has no control. Opinion of August 31, 1900 [ante, p. 200], commented on and distinguished. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, SIR: In response to your letter of September 22, 1900, in which you request my official opinion whether certain schemes there set out for disposing of their wares by the persons named come within the prohibition of section 3894, Revised Statutes, as amended in 1 Supplement, Revised Statutes, page 803, which prohibits transmission through the mails of matter "concerning any lottery, so-called gift concert, or other similar enterprise offering prizes dependent upon lot or chance," I have the honor to reply as follows: You submit for opinion four different cases, each differing from the others in some details, but all very similar in general plans, and I shall consider them in the order in which you present them. THE DEFENDER SHOE STORE. The plan of the Defender Shoe Store, of Cleveland, Ohio, is this, taking a single instance a ticket is sent to, we will say, A, which reads as follows: "20 cents. TICKET A. "THE DEFENDER $3 SHOE." "How to obtain a pair of fine shoes for 20 cents. "Book No.-. "Return this ticket to the Defender Shoe Store, Cleveland, Ohio, with eighty (80) cents, for which we will issue to you a book containing four tickets. Sell these four tickets. for 20 cents each, thereby getting your 80 cents back. Collect 80 cents from each person to whom you sell a ticket. Send or bring this ticket to us with the 80 cents, for which we in turn will issue a book of four tickets for the purchaser. When you have sent each of the four tickets to us in this way you can readily see that we will have received $3.20, and you are then entitled to a pair of Defender men's shoes or a pair of Defender women's shoes, in patent or enamel leather, black or tan vici kid, tan calf, box calf, or calf-skin, equal to many $5 shoes in the market, and they cost you but 20 cents. "(Write name and address of owner of this book here and not the party you sell it to:) "Name: "Address: "DEFENDER SHOE STORE, "247 Superior Street, Cleveland, Ohio. "[Please write plain and fill out each ticket. See other side.]" On the reverse side of the ticket is the following: "[When sending for coupon book use this blank.] "DEFENDER SHOE STORE, 247 Superior Street, Cleveland, Ohio. "DEAR SIR: Please find enclosed 80 cents, for which send coupon book of four tickets. "Name: "Address: NOTICE. "If a ticket has been lost we will send duplicate free of charge, upon condition that you give number of same. "If you have sold two tickets and sent them, with the money, to us, and you can not sell the balance, return same to us and we will redeem them at 20 cents each, so you will not be out anything. "Send all money by post-office money order, express money order, or registered letter. Do not send stamps." Upon the inside of the cover is printed this: "When writing for or giving information always give the number of this book, as all coupon-books are kept by number. "Fill in these lines with the names of the parties to whom you sell your tickets. Collect 80 cents from each person to whom you sell a ticket, and send or bring the ticket to us with the 80 cents. "A B "C D "When all your tickets are sold, send in this entire cover with your name and address, where shoes are to be sent, which will be sent you as soon as the four tickets you have sold are received by us from you, according to terms of tickets. SPECIAL NOTICE. "Do not confound our method with the many so-called endless chain schemes, for it is not. Our new idea is a |